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Preface
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed on December 8, 1987 
in Washington by U. S. President Ronald Reagan and CPSU General Secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev, was a milestone in nuclear disarmament and a decisive 
step towards ending the Cold War. To mark the thirtieth anniversary of this 
monumental event, the Berlin Center of Cold War Studies, the Leibniz Institute 
for Contemporary History, and the Department of History of the University of 
Mannheim got together to hold a conference at the European Academy in Berlin. 
This took place between November 30 and December 2, 2017, under the title, 
“The INF Treaty of 1987: A Reappraisal.” The present volume contains the revised 
proceedings.
It was a memorable conference. The organizers were the three editors of this 
book along with Bernd Greiner. Many others contributed to the conference’s 
success. First, we would like to thank the German Foundation for Peace Research, 
the Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation, and the Humboldt University Berlin for 
the generous financial support that made the conference possible. Secondly, we 
would like to thank those who chaired the various panels: Dr. Bernd Rother, Dr. 
Arvid Schors, Prof. Dr. Hélène Miard-Delacroix, and Dr. Agnes Bresselau von 
Bressensdorf. We are also very much indebted to Dr. Bettina Greiner and Sophie 
Lange for the excellent organization of the conference, which included a public 
panel discussion, chaired by Bernd Greiner, in the Humboldt University Berlin. 
On the panel were: Susanne Baumann, Dr. Oliver Meier, Otfried Nassauer, and 
Prof. Dr. Andreas Wirsching. 
Prof. Dr. Leopoldo Nuti and William Alberque, who gave papers at the confer-
ence, had to drop out of the published proceedings, but we thank them for the 
helpful contributions they made to our discussions in Berlin. Two essays in this 
book are by authors only approached later. We are very grateful to Wolfgang 
Richter for agreeing to take on the complicated task of summarizing the intrusive 
INF verification system, and our special thanks go too to Prof. Dr. Ulrich Kühn, 
who discusses the present problems and prospects of the INF Treaty. Finally, we 
would like to thank Cedric Bierganns, Richard Rohrmoser, and Philipp Scherzer 
for issuing two conference reports. 
Our last words of thanks go to those who helped us prepare the text of this 
volume, especially our English copy-editor, Jon Ashby, who turned the submitted 
papers into highly readable English essays, and our student assistants, Leila Esh 
and Philipp Scherzer.

Philipp Gassert / Tim Geiger / Hermann Wentker
“The Reward of a Thing Well Done  
Is to Have Done It”: The Rise and Fall  
of the INF Treaty, 1987–2019
An Introduction
On December 8, 1987 U. S. President Ronald Reagan welcomed his Soviet coun-
terpart General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to the East Room of the White 
House for the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).1 As 
they were preparing to sit down at the massive oak table, once used by Abraham 
Lincoln’s cabinet at the time of the American Civil War, Reagan joked that the idea 
behind the INF Treaty had been “disarmingly simple.” Unlike previous treaties, 
“it didn’t simply codify the status quo.” As the President made clear: “For the first 
time in history, the language of ‘arms control’ was replaced by ‘arms reduction’—in 
this case, the complete elimination of an entire class of U. S. and Soviet nuclear 
missiles.” Quoting Russian proverbs, Reagan took credit for having invented the 
“zero option” six years earlier. He also expressed his hope that the INF Treaty would 
not remain “an end in itself,” but be “the beginning of a working relationship that 
will enable us to tackle the other urgent issues before us.”2
Gorbachev joined Reagan in stressing the historic significance of the moment, 
claiming that their mutual venture had “a universal significance for mankind, 
both from the standpoint of world politics and from the standpoint of human-
ism.” He exhorted his American partners, to “take full advantage of that chance 
and move together toward a nuclear-free world, which holds out for our children 
and grandchildren and for their children and grandchildren the promise of a 
fulfilling and happy life without fear and without a senseless waste of resources 
on weapons of destruction.” Yet, he seemed a bit less triumphant, a bit more 
somber, a bit more skeptical than Reagan when it came “to bestow laurels upon 
each other.” For Gorbachev that was still “too early.” Smiling at Reagan, he quoted 
the famous nineteenth-century American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson: 
“The reward of a thing well done is to have done it.” It would be up to future 
1 “Reagan and Gorbachev Sign Missile Treaty and Vow to Work for Greater Reductions,” in: 
The New York Times, December 9, 1987, p. A1.
2 Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, “Remarks on Signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty,” December 8, 1987, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/120887c 
(last accessed January 30, 2020).
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generations to “hand down their verdict on the importance of the event which 
we are about to witness.”3
Now, thirty years later, a generation has passed. With the benefit of hindsight 
and access to new primary sources, we can take up Gorbachev’s challenge. 
What historical “verdict” do we pass on the 1987 Reagan–Gorbachev agreement 
today? On the surface, things look far from good: the world is in a dismal state 
with regard to nuclear disarmament. The INF Treaty, Gorbachev’s and Reagan’s 
crowning achievement—for which the two could jointly have been awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize—is now obsolete.4 As early as 2014, the Obama Administration 
started publicly to complain that Russia was in violation of the Treaty: Moscow 
was developing a new class of medium-range missiles.5 Then, on October 20, 
2018, two years into his Presidency, President Donald J. Trump announced that 
the U. S. would withdraw from the INF Treaty “in response to Russia’s longstand-
ing violation of its obligations.”6 On February 1, 2019, U. S. Secretary of State, 
Mike Pompeo, gave a formal six-month notice of America’s intention to withdraw 
if Russia would not return “to full and verifiable compliance.” Otherwise, he said, 
“the Treaty will end.”7 Accordingly, on August 2, 2019, Pompeo declared that the 
INF Treaty had ceased to exist. Shortly thereafter the Russian Foreign Ministry 
confirmed that it was “formally dead.”8 
Thus, after 32 years, the INF Treaty has been relegated to Leon Trotsky’s 
famous “dustbin of history.” Reagan, Gorbachev, and their advisors, along with 
the representatives of their respective allies, may have done their “thing well” 
during the second half of the 1980s, as many of the contributions in this volume 
demonstrate, yet, their more hyperbolic expectations and historic predictions 
have not come true. Reagan’s and Gorbachev’s children and grandchildren 
are not living in a nuclear-free world. To the contrary. While few contem-
poraries of 1987 expected that all nuclear weapons could be abolished, they 
certainly thought that a “new thinking” had taken hold in international rela-
3 Ibid. 
4 In 1990, Gorbachev alone was granted the Nobel Prize for his policy of Perestroika and 
Glasnost and “for his leading role in the peace process which today characterizes important 
parts of the international community.” See https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1990/
gorbachev/facts/ (last accessed March 10, 2020).
5 Amy F. Wolf (Congressional Research Service), “Russian Compliance with the Intermediate 
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress,” updated August 2, 
2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43832 (last accessed January 30, 2020).
6 “Remarks by President Trump Before Air Force One Departure,” October 20, 2018, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-air-force-one-departure- 4/ 
(last accessed January 30, 2020).
7 “U. S. Intent to Withdraw from the INF Treaty,” Press Statement by Secretary of State, Michael 
R.  Pompeo, February 2, 2019, https://www.state.gov/u-s-intent-to-withdraw-from-the-inf-
treaty-february-2-2019/ (last accessed January 30, 2020).
8 “INF Nuclear Treaty: U. S. Pulls Out of Cold-War Era Pact With Russia”, BBC News, August 2, 
2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49198565 (last accessed January 30, 2020). 
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tions.9 Yet, the opposite seems to be happening in recent years. Both, Russia 
and the United States are developing new and more sophisticated weapons, 
partly in response to a rising People’s Republic of China.10 In this perspective, 
future historians may see the ending of the INF Treaty as collateral damage 
arising from the failure of Russian and American containment efforts vis-à-vis 
Beijing. Whatever the reasons, the revocation of the INF Treaty taken together 
with an increasingly hostile U. S.–Russian relationship further undermines an 
already fragile post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. At the same time, 
Europeans, Americans, and Russians are at loggerheads over the best strategy for 
preventing Iran from becoming the tenth nuclear power.11 
To the public eye, this all seems to be quite a turnaround from the situation 
even a decade ago when, in 2009, U. S. President Barack Obama delivered a famous 
speech in Prague to the thundering applause of his Czech audience, in which he 
envisioned “clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace 
and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”12 A few days later, Obama and 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the “New START Treaty,” which 
further limited the strategic arsenals of the U. S. and Russia. Moreover, Obama 
promised new domestic political efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty of September 10, 1996 and to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty of July 1, 1968, pointing to North Korea and Iran as imminent threats, 
but also to the need to keep terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet, in 
this same speech, Obama thanked both the Czech and the Polish governments 
for their courage in hosting a new American missile defense system. While 
ostensibly this was meant to protect Europe from an Iranian attack, it gave Russia 
an excuse to allege that the U. S. was not keeping to its side of the grand bargain 
struck in the late 1980s and early 1990s.13 Therefore, despite all the extraordinary 
9 To invoke Gorbachev’s iconic phrase, see Marie-Pierre Rey, Gorbachev’s New Thinking 
and Europe, 1985–1989, in: Fédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and  Leopoldo 
Nuti (eds.), Europe and the End of the Cold War. A Reappraisal, London / New York 2008, 
pp. 23–25; Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev and the “New Political Thinking”, in: Wolfgang 
Mueller, Michael Gehler, and Arnold Suppan (eds.), The Revolutions of 1989. A Handbook, 
Vienna 2015, pp. 33–46. 
10 Both Russia and the U. S. saw themselves hemmed in by the INF Treaty with regard to the 
options available to them to respond to the development of intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons by China and by North Korea; see the contribution by Oliver Bange in this volume. 
11 See the speech by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy, 
May 21, 2018, https://www.state.gov/after-the-deal-a-new-iran-strategy/; Joint statement by 
the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom on the Joint Compre-
hensive Plan of Action, January 14, 2020, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/
news/-/2292574 (last accessed March 22, 2020). 
12 Remarks by Barack Obama in Prague, April 5, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered (last accessed January 
30, 2020), emphasis ours. 
13 See the contributions by Ulrich Kühn and Oliver Bange in this volume as well as David 
Parker, U. S. Foreign Policy Towards Russia in the Post-Cold War Era. Ideational Legacies 
and Institutionalized Conflict and Co-Operation, London / New York 2019, pp. 198–204. 
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attention that the Trump Administration’s recent actions are receiving, we should 
not forget that Russian–American relations were turning sour even during the 
Obama years. This became most clearly visible with the Russian occupation of 
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014. But nuclear disarmament had already 
become a contentious issue in 2010. Future historians may find more continuity 
than change when it comes to the foreign policies of the Obama and Trump 
Administrations.14
Though the American withdrawal from the INF Treaty produced a short-lived 
outcry, surprisingly few people seem to be losing their sleep over a new “nuclear 
threat” in Europe today. Almost all the public attention of Europeans goes to 
global warming, the wars in the Near and Middle East, the questions brought 
up by refugees and illegal migration, and now by new pandemic diseases. When 
it comes to nuclear weapons, those who comment are mostly talking about Iran 
and North Korea, all but ignoring the new nuclear buildup in their immediate 
neighborhood. Although European NATO members formally backed the Ameri-
can allegations, they did not do so wholeheartedly. NATO General Secretary 
Jens Stoltenberg cautiously stated that the “allies agree that the most plausible 
assessment would be that Russia is in violation of the Treaty.”15 In October 
2018, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said he regretted the American 
decision. He criticized Russia for failing to clarify the “serious allegations that it 
has violated the INF Treaty.”16 Moreover, Maas lamented the end of the Treaty 
because “a piece of Europe’s security has been lost.”17 Yet, the German Federal 
Government, while it officially continues to pursue the increasingly elusive goal 
of a Reaganesque INF “global zero,” does not seem to give a possible new arms 
race in Europe much urgent consideration because of other, more pressing issues. 
France, after Brexit the last nuclear power within the European Union, seems to 
be slightly more concerned. French President Emmanuel Macron has criticized 
the apparent lack of awareness of most Europeans with regard to a new Russian 
nuclear missile threat, now that the INF Treaty has become obsolete.18
14 On continuity vs. change in U. S. Foreign Relations see Timothy J. Lynch, In the Shadow of 
the Cold War. American Foreign Policy from George Bush Sr. to Donald Trump, Cambridge 
2020. 
15 Amy F. Wolf (CRS), “U. S. Withdrawal from INF Treaty: What is Next?”, Updated January 2, 
2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IF11051.pdf (last accessed January 30, 2020), emphasis 
ours. 
16 “Foreign Minister Maas on the U. S. announcement that it is withdrawing from the INF 
Treaty”, October 21, 2018, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-inf-
treaty/2151874 (last accessed January 30, 2020).
17 “Foreign Minister Maas on the end of the INF Treaty”, August 2, 2019, https://new-york-un.
diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/maas-inf-treaty-end/2237298 (last accessed January 30, 2020). 
18 Speech of French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on the Defense and Deterrence Strat-
egy delivered on February 7, 2020, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/07/
speech-of-the-president-of-the-republic-on-the-defense-and-deterrence-strategy.
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1. What Was the INF Treaty? And What Can We Learn from It? 
German Foreign Minister Maas’s August 2, 2019 statement correctly points to 
an apparently forgotten fact: that the 1987 INF Treaty was about a new security 
architecture for Europe. Its structure was put in place in the years between 1987 
and 1994—during the last years of the Cold War and the first decade after its end. 
The INF Treaty became the first milestone of this new architecture of “relaxing 
tensions”, which was clearly characterized by a massive reduction of weapons of 
mass destruction. Whereas the INF Treaty had only reduced a very small number 
of the overall nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, the START I Treaty of July 31, 
1991 (expired in 2009) led to deep cuts in the strategic arsenals of the two super-
powers. Moreover, the so-called “Presidential Nuclear Initiatives” of 1991/92 
melted away the bulk of U. S. and Soviet short-range tactical or “battlefield” 
nuclear weapons.19 With the peaceful revolutions and the end of Communism in 
Central and Eastern Europe, a new era of democracy, international cooperation, 
harmony and trust seemed to emerge. The “Charter of Paris for a new Europe,” 
signed by 34 heads of states and governments on November 21, 1990, is the 
best known manifesto of this burgeoning optimistic belief in a “New World 
Order.” Moreover, the so-called “Helsinki process” was made permanent by the 
transformation of the noncommittal “Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe” (CSCE) into a more ambitious “Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe” (OSCE) in 1994.20 
The INF Treaty of 1987 was the landmark starting point of this epochal devel-
opment. Most importantly, it abolished a whole class of nuclear weapons that 
would have carried their “payloads” (nuclear warheads) to a European theater of 
war and to the two Germanies in particular. 
At the end of the day, the INF Treaty may have helped to increase Europe’s 
security, but we should keep in mind that, of course, neither of the superpowers 
acted for primarily altruistic reasons or just to please their European allies. Quite 
the opposite. For the Soviet Union, the deployment of the fast-flying American 
Euromissiles was a devastating move against its security. The ballistic Pershing 
II missiles could reach their Soviet destinations within less than 15 minutes, 
reducing the time to reflect and react nearly to nil.21 Worse, the USSR had 
19 See the contribution by Oliver Bange in this volume.
20 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Our History”, https://www.osce.org/
whatistheosce (last accessed February 6, 2020); on the Helsinki process see Nicolas Badalassi 
and Sarah Snyder (eds.), The CSCE and the End of the Cold War. Diplomacy, Societies, and 
Human Rights, 1972–1990, New York / Oxford 2019. 
21 The Soviet Union, as well as Western peace movements, postulated that the flight-time of a 
Pershing II from launch to impact would add up to 5 to 8 minutes whereas NATO’s military 
experts calculated about 15 to 20 minutes. This difference was due to the fact that the Warsaw 
Pact’s flight reconnaissance had a lower performance than NATO’s. It thus could verify 
Pershing II launches only after about 10 minutes as West German diplomats realized quite 
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no antidotes whatsoever against this lethal threat. In his memoirs, Gorbachev 
leaves no doubt that the INF Treaty massively improved the security of the Soviet 
Union: “By signing the INF Treaty we had literally removed a pistol held to our 
head.”22 The United States mainland, of course, was never directly threatened by 
Soviet intermediate-range missiles (except for Alaska and the Aleutian Islands). 
Nevertheless, Washington felt relieved by the “decoupling” effect of the Treaty. 
Henceforward, the U. S. regained its free hand in choosing how to react to a case 
of Soviet aggression in Europe, without automatically being drawn into a nuclear 
exchange with its Cold War adversary right from the very beginning of any 
ensuing military conflict. 
In his manifesto Perestroika, published in late 1987, Gorbachev proclaimed: 
“The INF Treaty represented the first well-prepared step on our way out of the 
Cold War, the first harbinger of the new times.”23 Some contemporaries went 
even further, claiming that this ground-breaking agreement had ended the Cold 
War altogether. Political Scientist Francis Fukuyama famously talked about the 
end of the Cold War epoch in a piece published during the summer of 1989, 
months before the final crisis of Communism; and historian John Lewis Gaddis, 
then the doyen of American Cold War Studies, wrote in his 1987 study The Long 
Peace as if he were looking back to a bygone period.24 With superpower conflict 
gone, and the nuclear arms race over, the Cold War had seemingly ceased to 
exist. Again, with the benefit of hindsight, we know that this assumption was 
rather premature. Regional “East–West” conflicts like those in Afghanistan and 
Angola were far from being over in 1987. Moreover, the collapse of the Socialist 
states in Eastern Europe and of the USSR itself was still two or three years away. 
Nevertheless, while historians have engaged in a long-standing argument over 
the extent to which ideological or geopolitical conflicts drove the Cold War, the 
“nuclear arms race” was certainly one of its defining features. Today, the “new 
late in spring 1983. See Memorandum of Political Director in the FRG’s Foreign Office, Pfef-
fer, January 28, 1983, in: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik (henceforward: 
AAPD) 1983, ed. by Tim Geiger, Matthias Peter, and Mechthild Lindemann, Doc. 20, p. 103, 
Footnote 8.
22 Mikhail Gorbatschow, Memoirs, New York 1996, p. 444. Gorbachev had already used the 
metaphor of the Pershing II as “a gun pressed to our temple” in a preparatory meeting for the 
Reykjavik summit on October 4, 1986; see Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (eds.), 
The Last Superpower Summits, Budapest / New York 2016, p. 163.
23 Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the World, New 
York / London 1988, p. 443.
24 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, in: The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), 
pp. 3–18; John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, 
Oxford 1987; see also Nicholas Guyatt, The End of the Cold War, in: Richard H. Immer-
man and Petra Goedde (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, Oxford 2013, 
pp. 605–622; Jonathan Hunt and David Reynolds, Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and 
Moscow, 1985–1988, in: Kristina Spohr and David Reynolds (eds.), Transcending the Cold 
War. Summits, Statecraft, and the Dissolution of Bipolarity in Europe, 1970–1990, Oxford 
2016, pp. 153–174.
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missile crisis,” which in 2019 led to the end of the INF Treaty, may bring us “back 
to the future” of the 1980s.25 
So, what was the now defunct INF Treaty? 
First, the INF Treaty abolished all American and Soviet land-based nuclear 
missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500  kilometers, their launchers and 
associated support structures. These were to be scrapped within three years 
from when the Treaty entered into force.26 This so-called “double zero option” 
referred to the removal of both long-range INF (LRINF 1,000–5,000 km) as well 
as shorter-range INF (SRINF 500–1,000 km) missiles from Europe. 
This means, second, that air- or sea-launched missiles were not covered, 
nor were the atomic warheads necessarily destroyed.27 The INF Treaty talks 
addressed only a certain type of missiles and their support structures—a point 
which is often overlooked. This does not diminish the overall diplomatic impor-
tance of the Treaty, but it does put the achievement of Reagan and Gorbachev 
into perspective. 
Third, the INF Treaty eradicated a whole category of nuclear weapons. By 
May 31, 1991, at the end of the three-year destruction period that had started 
with the exchange of the instruments of ratification by President Reagan and 
General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow on June 1, 1988, exactly 1,846 Soviet 
and 846 American INF missiles were to be eliminated.28 These 2,692 missiles 
amounted to just 3 to 4 per cent of the existing nuclear arsenals.29 This fact—that 
25 Which is one of the scenarios that Ulrich Kühn lays out in his contribution. 
26 Which meant after ratification. In the American case, this gained Senate approval on May 27, 
1988. Ratification happened on June 1, 1988; on ratification see Robert Service, The End of 
the Cold War, 1985–1991, London 2015, p. 296; Maynard W. Glitman, The Last Battle of the 
Cold War. An Inside Account of Negotiating the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 
New York / Basingstoke 2006, pp. 223–233. 
27 In one of the annexes to the INF Treaty, in the “Protocol on Procedures governing the 
Elimination of the Missile Systems”, Article II, No. 3 it was laid down: “Prior to a missile’s 
arrival at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be 
removed.” See https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/inf4.htm. As the “Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists” reported in autumn 1990, the nuclear warhead of the dismantled Pershing II 
(W85) was on the verge of returning to Europe as a recycled and converted new nuclear 
bomb, also based on the original warhead ground-model B61 Mod. See Robert S. Norris and 
William M. Arkin, Beating Swords into Swords, in: The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 46/9 
(1990), pp. 14–17. See also “Aus alt mach neu”, in: Stern No. 45, October 31, 1990.
28 Up to May 1991, the United States eliminated 234 Pershing II and 443 BGM-109 Cruise Mis-
siles, as well as 169 Pershing IA SRINF missiles, while the Soviet Union eliminated 654 SS-20, 
149 SS-4, 6 SS-5, and 80 SSC-X-4 INF missiles, as well as 239 SS-23 and 718 SS-12 SRINF 
missiles. See Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
[INF] Chronology, https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/inf-chron.htm (last accessed March 11, 
2020). On treaty implementation see the essay by Wolfgang Richter in this volume.
29 See Telegram No. 2448 of German Ambassador Hellbeck, Bejing, on conversation between 
Bavarian Premier Minister Franz Josef Strauß and Chinese Premier minister Zhao Ziyang, 
October 15, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 288, p. 1469. On the Soviet side, the percentage of 
eliminated nuclear weapons from the global stockpile was estimated at 4 per cent, Eduard 
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the INF Treaty left about 97 per cent of the then nuclear stockpiles completely 
untouched—was vociferously pointed out by critics of the agreement at the time, 
but it seems to be forgotten by most historians or political observers nowadays. 
Fourth, the British and French had “independent deterrents”, and these were 
not included in the nuclear disarmament talks of the two superpowers. This 
was the result of long and protracted diplomatic wrestling which had gone on 
ever since the superpowers started the Geneva INF negotiations after NATO’s 
Dual-Track Decision in 1979. Although initially, during his visit to Moscow on 
July 1, 1980, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) had been told by 
the Soviet leadership that the French and British “third countries systems” were 
not supposed to be part of future INF Talks between the superpowers,30 the USSR 
soon pressed for their inclusion in the Geneva talks. Though sections of Western 
Europe’s political elites and societies were inclined to accept this Soviet demand, 
it did not become NATO policy. Keeping the British and French nuclear weapons 
out of an INF deal remained a precondition for the Alliance. It was Gorbachev 
who, in 1986, finally accepted that an INF Treaty would solely deal with American 
and Soviet systems. In this way he helped to overcome one major obstacle that had 
hitherto caused stalemate in the negotiations.31 
Fifth, the INF Treaty bound only the U. S. and the Soviet Union (and accord-
ingly its successor state Russia). As a bilateral agreement it could not take care 
of any future INF proliferation. That China might at some stage become a 
potential threat was not yet regarded as a matter of great urgency back in 1987. 
However, already at the time of the negotiations, members of the Soviet military 
had misgivings about leaving East Asia out. Western experts were aware of this, 
too, but given the situation in the 1980s, East–West issues took priority over 
anything else.32 
Sixth, one can therefore argue that the INF Treaty was a product of the Cold 
War world order, in which the superpower (or East–West) conflict was dominant. 
While the INF Treaty helped the powers overcome this conflict and contributed 
to the fall of Communism in Europe, its value was much diminished in a post-
Cold War world marked by the rise of new nuclear powers such as China, India, 
Pakistan, and North Korea. Why should Russia or the United States, so the 
reasoning goes, have continued to bind themselves by a pact that was tying their 
hands in their strategic rivalry with China?33 
Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, London 1991, p. 92; Aleksandr G. Savel’ev 
and Nikolaj N. Detinov, The Big Five. Arms Control and Decision Making in the Soviet 
Union, Westport, Conn. 1995, p. 137.
30 Memorandum of Conversation, in: AAPD 1980, Munich 2011, Doc. 193, p. 1038.
31 See the contributions by Oliver Barton and Christian Wenkel to this volume. 
32 For the Asian aspects of the INF Talks see Glitman, Last Battle of the Cold War, pp. 145–156.
33 See the chapter by Ulrich Kühn in this volume; also see Christian Leuprecht, Joel J. Sokolsky, 
and Thomas Hughes (eds.), North American Strategic Defense in the 21st Century. Security 
and Sovereignty in an Uncertain World, Cham 2018. 
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Even though the INF Treaty is dead, what lessons does it hold for us today? 
First of all, many historians, along with international relations and security 
experts, agree that, despite being a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union 
and the United States only, the INF Treaty was a core piece, central to the forma-
tion of a new and multilateral post-Cold War security architecture for Europe.
Second, it helped to end the Cold War and to create an international environ-
ment conducive to the post-Communist transformation of Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
Third, given that the post-Cold War order was already coming to an end 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century, as the “war on terror” helped to 
push America in new directions, it is actually surprising that the INF Treaty 
managed to survive for more than 30 years, making it one of the longest-lasting 
international disarmament treaties ever. 
Fourth, while its demise was perhaps overdue, its emergence was a bit of a 
surprise. It took only four years, after a new heightening of tensions during the 
early 1980s and the deployment of new nuclear weapons in Western Europe 
as part of NATO’s Dual-Track Decision in late 1983, before the INF Treaty was 
signed.34 It was a policy reversal that made contemporaries gasp. 
Fifth, a key element was “trust”. The 1983–87 reversal would not have been 
possible, if Reagan and Gorbachev had not learned to trust each other and if their 
advisors as well as their societies had not gone along.35 
Thus, the history of the INF Treaty may hold a tentatively optimistic message 
for the future, despite its recent demise. If the conditions are right, trust can 
be built step by step and lead to astounding results. It is often said, that trust is 
something that needs work,36 and in general terms this is certainly true. But it 
34 The Dual-Track (or sometimes Double-Track) Decision has been treated extensively in the 
literature, see the previous volume by the editors, Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann 
Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in 
deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive, Munich 2011, as well as Leopoldo Nuti, 
Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), The Euromissile Crisis and the 
End of the Cold War, Washington, D. C. / Stanford, Cal. 2015; Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre 
Rey, N.  Piers Ludlow, and Bernd Rother (eds.), Visions of the End of the Cold War in 
Europe, 1945–1990, New York / Oxford 2012; Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, 
Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), The Nuclear Crisis. The 
Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s, New York / 
Oxford 2016.
35 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Joshua Baker, and Laura Considine, Trust or Verfication? Accepting Vul-
nerability in the Making of the INF Treaty, in: Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian 
F. Ostermann (eds.), Trust, But Verify. The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation 
of the Cold War Order, 1969–1991, Washington, D. C. 2016, pp. 121–139.
36 George H. W. Bush wrote in hindsight: “You can’t develop or earn this mutual trust and respect 
unless you deliberately work at it.” Quoted in J. Simon Rofe, Trust between  Adversaries and 
Allies. President George H. W. Bush, Trust, and the End of the Cold War, in: Klimke, Kreis, 
Ostermann (eds.), Trust, pp. 63–81, here p. 63; on trust see the contribution by Bernd Greiner 
to this volume. 
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seems that the work of building personal trust between political leaders does 
not need years and years of previous cooperation—as Reagan and Gorbachev 
realized quite rapidly in 1986–87.37 Nevertheless, since it was definitely in the 
interest of both sides to trust each other, one can say that without this interest a 
trust-based relationship would not have emerged.38 Though the INF Treaty may 
now be history, its genesis as well as its legacies may offer us valuable insights and 
lessons. It is these that this volume will address. The five thematic sections of our 
book will look at the superpower negotiations (I), then move on to the reactions of 
Western (II) and Eastern Allies (III), before surveying the socio-political contexts 
in selected countries (IV). The final chapters will examine the legacy of the INF 
Treaty and attempt a look into the future (V). 
2. It Takes Two to Tango: Reagan, Gorbachev,  
and the Superpowers
A history of the INF Treaty needs to start with Ronald Reagan—as the contribu-
tions in the first section of this volume demonstrate. But then we need to move 
swiftly on to Gorbachev, though he did not enter the scene until 1985. So, Reagan 
happens to be first, since he was the first to come up publicly with what would 
later be called the “zero option,” which became the core principle of the INF 
Treaty. In a speech at the National Press Club in Washington on November 18, 
1981, he proposed the cancellation of American “deployment of Pershing II and 
ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, 
and SS-5 missiles. This would be a historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could 
together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over 
37 Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (eds.), The Last Superpower Summits. Gor-
bachev, Reagan, and Bush. Conversations that Ended the Cold War, New York 2016; Robert 
Service, The End of the Cold War, 1985–1991, London 2015.
38 That old habits die hard is shown by the fact that the visit of Secretary Shultz to the USSR 
in April 1987, which brought Gorbachev’s offer of the double zero solution was in instant 
danger of cancellation because of allegations that the KGB had bugged the construction area 
of the new American Embassy in Moscow; see George Pratt Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph. 
My Years as Secretary of State, New York 1993, pp. 889–891; for the Soviet side Pavel Palaz-
chenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter, 
University Park 1997, pp. 65 f. Another telling episode was witnessed by Colin Powell, in 
winter 1987, as Reagan’s National Security Advisor. He remembers that the National Security 
Agency, the CIA and other intelligence agencies heavily tapped the White House before the 
signing ceremony of the INF Treaty in order to get information about the Soviet “nuclear 
football” that of course permanently accompanied the General Secretary just as did the 
nuclear emergency satchel of the President on the American side: “Anybody walking across 
the White House lawn wearing a pacemaker during the summit would be lucky not to be 
microwaved.” See Colin Powell, My American Journey, New York 1995, p. 358.
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the people of Europe. This, like the first footstep on the moon, would be a giant 
step for mankind.”39
Reagan’s speech caused consternation among some of his advisors as well as 
among his adversaries. It also left some of the NATO Allies puzzled.40 But it fits 
well with his overall, relatively consistent approach to nuclear weapons as both 
Beth Fischer and Ronald Granieri argue in their contributions to this volume. 
Not hesitating to compare the “zero option” to the “race to the moon,” which 
epitomized the high point of superpower Cold War rivalry, Reagan also linked his 
proposal to earlier efforts of détente. It is worthwhile re-reading Reagan’s speech, 
because Reagan places himself in the context of the Nixon–Kissinger approach 
to the Soviet Union, which has often been contrasted with an allegedly more 
“hawkish” Reaganesque or “neo-conservative” approach.41 Quoting from a letter 
he had written to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev earlier that year, Reagan 
reminded the General Secretary that he had been first introduced to Brezhnev 
by Nixon, when in June 1973 the two leaders had met at Nixon’s western home 
in San Clemente.42 At that time Reagan was serving as Governor of California: 
Mr. President: When we met, I asked if you were aware that the hopes and aspirations of 
millions of people throughout the world were dependent on the decisions that would be 
reached in those meetings. You took my hand in both of yours and assured me that you 
were aware of that and that you were dedicated with all your heart and soul and mind to 
fulfilling those hopes and dreams.43 
Few took Reagan’s reference to détente at face value. The way he reminded his 
audience of a tradition of mutual interaction and negotiation was probably seen 
as a clever PR trick disguising a more sinister agenda. After all, Reagan had been 
elected as a staunch anti-Communist and a “crusader for freedom,” who believed 
in “peace through strength.”44 And, though historians continue to argue about 
Reagan’s intentions and debate the extent to which the labels of “hawk” or “dove” 
can be applied to him with much explanatory value, the emerging historiographic 
39 Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and 
Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/ 
111881a (last accessed February 3, 2020). 
40 The British side knew in advance, see the contribution by Oliver Barton in this volume; West 
Germany all along had pushed for the “zero option”, see Tim Geiger’s contribution in this 
volume. 
41 See Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism. The Biography of a Movement, Cambridge 2010.
42 Tiffany Thompson, Summitry and President Nixon’s Legacy, in: Richard Nixon Foundation 
Website (January 12, 2017) https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2017/01/summitry-president-
nixons-legacy/ (last accessed February 7, 2020). 
43 Reagan, Remarks, November 18, 1981, ibid. 
44 James Graham Wilson, Ronald Reagan’s Engagement and the Cold War, in: Bradley Linn 
Coleman and Kyle Longley (eds.), Reagan and the World. Leadership and National Security, 
1981–1989, Lexington, KY 2017, pp. 11–29, here pp. 14 f. 
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picture is that of a man who stuck to his guns and consistently followed a nuclear 
abolitionist agenda.45 
Beth Fischer, in her chapter on “Nuclear Abolitionism, the Strategic Defense 
Initiative, and the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty,” lends support to 
the idea of Reagan, “the consistent,” qualifying her own earlier argument of a 
“Reagan Reversal” in 1983/84.46 As Fischer argues, Reagan’s announcement of a 
massive military buildup, after entering office in January 1981, his “zero propo-
sal” of November of that same year, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 
which he made public in a seminal speech on March, 23 1983, should not be seen 
as being in conflict with each other.47 Reagan had unconventional views about 
security, but basically, as Fischer affirms, he “abhorred nuclear weapons and 
sought to eliminate them.” The President did not believe in the doctrine of Mutu-
ally Assured Destruction (MAD) nor did he buy into flexible response.48 He thus 
undercut the core principle that NATO had upheld in its strategy since 1968.49 By 
building up the American military arsenal, he wanted to force the Soviets to the 
negotiating table so as to make massive cuts in the nuclear deterrents possible 
and to end the Cold War. SDI, too, served the goal of making nuclear weapons 
“impotent and obsolete,” as the President famously framed it.50 
Part of the trouble Reagan faced was that neither the governments of the 
Western Allies nor many of his own advisors bought into his enthusiasm for 
abolishing nuclear weapons. As Ronald Granieri shows in his contribution “The 
American Road to INF, 1986–1987,” contemporaries as well as historians have had 
difficulties reconciling themselves to the idea “that armament and disarmament 
always went together.” To some extent the future fortieth President contributed 
to this confusion, because in 1976, as well as in 1980, he had run as a staunch 
critic of the disarmament process. The “zero option” idea, while rejected by some 
(more “dovish”) members of his Administration, was shared by Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger and the hardliners within the Pentagon.51 The same 
45 Ryan Carpenter, Researching Reagan. A Guide for Scholars of National Security Policy 
during the Ronald Reagan Presidency, in: Coleman and Longley (eds.), Reagan and the 
World, pp. 293–306; Jeffrey L. Chidster and Paul Kengor (eds.), Reagan’s Legacy in a World 
Transformed, Cambridge, Mass. 2015.
46 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, Columbia 
1997.
47 On SDI, most recently, Ralph Dietl, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO 
Europe, and the Nuclear and Space Talks, 1981–1988, Lanham 2019. 
48 See also Beth Fischer, A Question of Morality: Ronald Reagan and Nuclear Weapons, in: 
Coleman and Longley (eds.), Reagan and the World, pp. 31–49.
49 See Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution. A Crisis of Credibility 1966–1967, 
Oxford 2005. 
50 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983, 
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/32383d (last accessed February 3, 2020). 
51 See also Ronald J. Granieri, Beyond Cap the Foil. Caspar Weinberger and the Reagan Era Defense 
Buildup, in: Bradley Coleman and Kyle Longley (eds.), The Enduring Legacy. Leadership 
and National Security Affairs during the Reagan Presidency, Lexington, KY 2017, pp. 51–80. 
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group was also most enthusiastic about SDI. Yet, if it had not been for Reagan’s 
consistent commitment to the abolition of the nuclear arsenal, the INF Treaty 
might never have come about. After all, many members of the national security 
establishment could not imagine that abolishing a whole class of nuclear weapons 
would be feasible.52 
Granieri also reminds us of the very mundane, domestic political context 
that helped pave the way to the INF Treaty. Part of the winding road to the INF 
Treaty was the “near-death experience” of the Iran-Contra affair, during which 
Reagan’s team, in direct violation of Congressional orders, sold arms to Iran and 
used the proceeds to support the anti-Sandinista “Contra” rebels in Nicaragua.53 
The scandal left Reagan exposed to accusations of criminality or incompetence, 
because he claimed not to know what his underlings had done. A severely 
wounded Reagan urgently needed a success. As the historian Sean Wilentz has 
written, Reagan “found, in his work with Gorbachev, an escape route out of his 
political morass.”54 As Gorbachev gave him a helping hand, Reagan managed to 
accomplish what he had set out to do from the beginning. As Granieri writes, “an 
understanding of the winding path should temper the enthusiasm of [Reagan’s] 
hagiographers.” The INF Treaty was not the result of chance, but of a “combina-
tion of principles and the political realities of the moment.”
This brings us to the second father of the INF Treaty, Mikhail Gorbachev, who 
introduced his own landmark proposal to abolish nuclear weapons in January 
1986. As Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton argue in their chapter “The 
Nuclear Abolition Package of 1986 and the Soviet Road to INF,” Soviet nuclear 
thinking had started to change even before Gorbachev came to power in March 
1985. As early as the mid-1970s, Soviet military planners had come to realize that 
the nuclearization of European war scenarios “would negate the Soviet / Warsaw 
Pact’s advantages in conventional forces over NATO.” However, the NATO Dual-
Track Decision as well as the increasingly hostile Soviet–American relationship 
limited the space for “new thinking” among Soviet military planners. Thus, 
Gorbachev’s election to General Secretary helped the military reformers gain the 
upper hand in the Soviet political machine at the end of 1986, and finally prevail 
in 1987.55 
According to Savranskaya and Blanton, Gorbachev was not initially the radical 
reformer we think of today; but he “was committed to stopping the arms race 
which he saw as both dangerous for humankind and devastating for the Soviet 
economy.” Even though the INF Treaty cut deeper into the Soviet nuclear arsenal 
than the American one, Gorbachev and his supporters came to see it as being in 
52 See Wilson, Ronald Reagan’s Engagement, pp. 11–29. 
53 See James F. Siekmeier, The Iran-Contra Affair, in: Andrew L. Johns (ed.), A Companion to 
Ronald Reagan, Malden / Oxford 2015, pp. 321–338. 
54 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan. A History, 1974–2008, New York 2009, p. 244.
55 See also Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin 
to Gorbachev, Chapel Hill 2007, pp. 294–296; Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War. From the 
October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall, New Haven / London 2011, pp. 354–363. 
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the interest of Soviet security. Early into his tenure Gorbachev was exposed to 
the thinking of leading military figures not normally seen as part of his reform 
team, such as the Chief of General Staff, Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, and 
these men promoted their own Soviet version of the “zero solution.” Though 
they did not expect the Americans to accept “zero,” if they were actually to do 
so, the Soviets would be able to get by on their conventional superiority. When 
Gorbachev revealed this plan in the spring of 1986, the American side was not 
yet ready. While U. S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz seems to have seen the 
beauty in it—in part because the Reagan Administration was plunging into the 
Iran-Contra abyss—negotiations did not lead to any results in 1986.56 
It was the failed Summit at Reykjavik in October 1986 that opened the road 
to the INF Treaty, as Savranskaya and Blanton show. At this point, the Soviet 
military was stalling, because SDI was going ahead and the American side 
refused to compromise on it. In 1983, when Reagan first introduced SDI, the 
Soviets still believed that it could be workable. By early 1987, however, Gorbachev 
and his associates had come to understand from their own experts that SDI was 
technologically not feasible, at least not in the foreseeable future. Moreover, and 
“perhaps even more important,” Savranskaya and Blanton propose, “the percep-
tion of threat from the United States was giving way to the new sense of trust and 
productive cooperation that emerged from the experience of the two previous 
Summits” and this “promised important payoffs in the future.” Gorbachev and 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze therefore sidestepped the Defense Ministry and 
forced the Soviet military to make concessions. The Soviets were even willing to 
go beyond American expectations when it came to the all-important verification 
regime, which became “remarkably extensive and intrusive.” This turned out to 
be the most potent symbol yet of trust between the superpowers.57 
3. Europe: Left Out in the Cold? The Uneasy Reaction  
of the Western Allies
Any history of the INF Treaty also needs to bring the 1979 NATO Dual-Track 
Decision in at the start. After all, the negotiations between Soviets and Americans 
about intermediate-range nuclear forces hoped to put a perceived military imbal-
ance in Europe right.58 In 1979 NATO had been addressing a growing European 
56 See Granieri’s contribution in this volume. 
57 Accordingly, the demise of further INF verification after 2001 was part of the growing 
tensions between the Russians and Americans; see the contribution by Wolfgang Richter in 
this volume. 
58 While it had serious ramifications for the situation in East Asia, which contributed to the 
recent demise of the INF Treaty, concerns about China were tabled in 1987. The genesis of 
the NATO Dual-Track Decision is covered by the contributions of Oliver Barton and Tim 
Geiger in this volume; see also Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg; 
Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), Nuclear Crisis; as well as Nuti et al. (eds.), Euromissile Crisis.
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security problem, when it answered the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles with 
a threat to deploy 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 land-based Cruise Missiles if 
negotiations over the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear arsenals failed to 
yield success. From NATO’s point of view, it was the Soviet challenge that had 
been the catalyst for a Western arms upgrade, for, as West German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl put it in hindsight, since the mid-1970s the Warsaw Pact had 
taken advantage of détente and “acquired substantial military predominance 
in Europe.”59 This was creating a problem for NATO because its doctrine of 
flexible response, adopted in 1967, required a commensurate reaction to military 
aggression. Since NATO had no weapon equivalent to the SS-20, if there were a 
case of nuclear aggression the U. S. could only stand by its Allies by threatening 
to use its own strategic arsenal, and this might well provoke a retaliatory Soviet 
intercontinental strike on the American homeland.60 
While the logic of NATO’s nuclear doctrine has always been contested, it is 
important to realize that the 1979 Dual-Track Decision was at least as much about 
the credibility of the Alliance and the strength of West European–American 
ties as it was about the Soviet threat. Therefore, to see the Dual-Track Decision 
as a direct response to a unilateral nuclear arms buildup by the Eastern bloc is 
only half the story. As is clear from today’s vantage point, it was to some extent 
an unintended consequence of the relaxation of Cold War tensions during the 
1960s and 1970s. As the “father of the Dual-Track Decision,” West German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt argued in a speech delivered in October 1977 to the 
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the SALT negotiations 
on intercontinental ballistic missiles between the superpowers had “forgotten” 
the intermediate-range missiles.61 The SS-20 fell into a “grey area” because 
of its target range of under 5,000  km, which only threatened Europe and the 
East Asian allies of the U. S., but not the American mainland. Since the SS-20 
was not considered to be an intercontinental weapon, the European theater of 
war could potentially be isolated, if the American President decided not to use 
intercontinental weapons in response to an SS-20 attack on Western Europe. 
The SS-20 therefore created a problem for NATO because the doctrine of flexible 
59 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, Munich 2005, p. 140.
60 The concept of “flexible response” harks back to the late 1950s. It became NATO’s official 
policy in December 1967 through MC 14/3, see Report of the Military Committee of NATO, 
January 16, 1968, http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf.
61 Helmut Schmidt, The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, in: Survival 20/1 (1978), 
pp. 2–10; on Schmidt’s geopolitical nightmares see Philipp Gassert, Did Transatlantic Drift 
Help European Integration? The Euromissiles Crisis, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the 
Quest for Political Cooperation, in: Kiran Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode (eds.), European 
Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s, New York 2013, pp. 154–176, here 
pp. 161 f.; Tim Geiger, Die Regierung Schmidt-Genscher und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss, 
in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds), Zweiter Kalter Krieg, pp. 95–122, here pp. 97–100; 
Kristina Spohr, The Global Chancellor. Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the Interna-
tional Order, Oxford 2016, pp. 85–101. 
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response it had adopted in 1967/68 required an appropriately nuanced reaction to 
military aggression. Since NATO had no equivalent weapon to match the SS-20, 
this inequality in the escalation continuum allegedly destabilized the nuclear 
balance of power. 
Obviously, there would not have been the need for an INF Treaty if NATO had 
not come up with its 1979 Dual-Track Decision. Since the INF Treaty addressed 
the military balance of power in Europe, America’s European allies observed 
what was going on between the superpowers with great apprehension. The huge 
strides made by Reagan and Gorbachev towards an INF Treaty took care of the 
threatening SS-20s. But these negotiations did nothing to address the still very 
considerable military superiority of the Warsaw Pact in Europe. West European 
leaders like Kohl and Thatcher had been wedded to pushing the NATO Dual-
Track Decision through their reluctant parliaments and publics. Grudgingly, 
they had to go along with Reagan and Gorbachev and the public mood in the 
West, which reacted enthusiastically to an impending INF Treaty because it was 
sold as a first step towards even bigger disarmament.62 After all, the Vienna 
negotiations on Mutual and Balanced (conventional) Force Reductions (MBFR) 
in Europe had been dragging on without success for more than a decade—since 
1973. No one in 1987 expected these negotiations to yield any meaningful results 
anymore, so first thoughts were ventilated about a new forum for conventional 
arms reductions.63 On paper, the Soviets still held a huge military advantage with 
respect to conventional, short-range nuclear forces (SNF), and chemical weapons 
in Europe. Accordingly, some feared that after an INF Treaty, NATO would not 
be able to deter the Soviets adequately—at least not within the framework of its 
still binding nuclear doctrine.
Early on, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, voiced her misgiv-
ings about “Ronnie’s” nuclear abolitionist agenda, as Oliver Barton shows in his 
contribution “‘The Most Staunch and Dependable of the Allies’? Britain and the 
Zero Option.” Thatcher admitted in her memoirs that she always had “mixed 
feelings” about the INF talks, because they enshrined the “zero option” and thus 
brought back the very thing that Schmidt had been concerned about: a possible 
decoupling of European NATO partners from the American nuclear security 
guarantee and the creation of a “gap” in NATO’s deterrence continuum.64 So 
when, in November 1981, Reagan came up with the “zero option” as a political 
goal for the opening Geneva negotiations, the “Iron Lady” publicly welcomed it, 
but in reality she and her defense officials had “deep misgivings about Reagan’s 
declared negotiating objective.” Moreover, the British security establishment 
62 On public opinion see the contributions by Barton, Gassert, Kemper, and Juntunen in this 
volume. 
63 Only in 1989 were the MBFR negotiations replaced by the Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) negotiations (also in Vienna), which would then lead to huge cuts in conventional 
armaments; see the contribution by Tim Geiger in this volume. 
64 Margaret Thatcher, Downing Street Years, London 1993, p. 771. 
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harbored similar misgivings about Schmidt’s idea, that just by securing the 
removal of the SS-20, all would be well and dandy: “Britain’s overriding strategic 
interest was in INF modernization; arms control was the price, not the prize.” 
This was quite the opposite of what Reagan and Schmidt seemed to be thinking. 
Because of the political affinity between Reagan and Thatcher, as well as 
the peculiar nature of their “special” security (and in particular their nuclear 
“sharing” partnership), the British were in a unique position to try to influence 
the American side. But, as Barton tells us, the ways in which Reagan’s call for the 
“zero option” on November 18, 1981 had come about, “were a galling reminder of 
the limitations to Britain’s insight and influence in Washington, at least when it 
came to arms control.” The British (together with the French, who from 1966 were 
outside NATO military integration anyway) were successful in keeping their own 
nuclear capabilities outside the INF disarmament talks, but they were now find-
ing themselves less successful in keeping the Americans from embracing “zero.” 
Nevertheless, with the negotiations in Geneva heading nowhere and the Soviets 
politically stalled during the final Brezhnev years, the Thatcher Administration 
achieved its main goal of having the Dual-Track Decision implemented, and 
this created the hoped-for “seamless robe of deterrence” as well as a position of 
strength that the British thought was essential to stunt any Soviet efforts at the 
“decoupling” of Western Europe.65 
Margaret Thatcher always took pride in having been the first of the major 
Western European leaders to have met Gorbachev. This was even before he 
became General Secretary, when he visited London in 1984 and she famously 
proclaimed that he was “a man we can do business with.”66 This did not prevent 
her from pursuing a strong anti-Communist agenda and from having a vision 
of Communism coming to an end in Eastern Europe.67 Thatcher, like Kohl, was 
very outspoken about Soviet military strength. She drove the point home during 
her seminal visit to Moscow in March 1987: “You have superior intermediate-
range weapons and strategic offensive weapons, if we count warheads, as well as 
chemical and conventional arms. You are very powerful, not weak.”68 Now, this 
perceived military strength of the Soviet Union presented conservative Western 
65 Kristan Stoddart, Creating the “Seamless Robe of Deterrence”: Great Britain’s Role in 
NATO’s INF Debate, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), Euromissile Crisis, pp. 176–195, here p. 191; 
Beatrice Heuser and Kristan Stoddart, Großbritannien zwischen Doppelbeschluss und 
Anti-Kernwaffen-Protestbewegungen, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter 
Krieg, pp. 305–324. 
66 The Thatcher–Gorbachev Conversations, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing 
Book No. 422, ed. by Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB422/.
67 Ilaria Poggiolini, Thatcher’s Double-Track Road to the End of the Cold War. The Irreconcil-
ability of Liberalization and Preservation, in: Bozo et al. (eds.), Visions, pp. 266–279. 
68 Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher, March 30, 1987, 
Moscow, in: Thatcher–Gorbachev Conversations, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSA EBB422/docs/Doc%201%201987-03-30%20Gorbachev-Thatcher%20memcon.pdf.
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leaders like Thatcher and Kohl with a problem: the INF Treaty would not only 
interrupt the Western nuclear deterrence continuum, but would also resurrect 
the old problem that had already haunted NATO in the 1950s and had led to 
the setting up of nuclear deterrence in the Eisenhower period. The problem was 
that in sheer numbers the Warsaw Pact was always stronger than NATO. This 
explains the unenthusiastic reaction of the Thatcher government to the doomed 
idea of total denuclearization put forward at the Reagan–Gorbachev Reykjavik 
Summit in the fall of 1986. To the prospect of a real breakthrough for an INF zero 
option in spring 1987, the British reacted in a similar fashion. In February 1987, 
British Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe bluntly told his German counterpart 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher that he had reservations about the zero option. While 
NATO’s Dual-Track Decision lasted, however, there could be no rejection of it.69 A 
month later, Thatcher confided to French President François Mitterrand that she 
feared that, through an additional offer to include shorter range nuclear missiles, 
“Gorbachev wanted to tempt Europe down a path towards de-nuclearisation, 
including getting rid of the British and French deterrents. This must be resisted 
firmly.”70 
Despite Thatcher’s dislike of the final “double zero option”—the abolition 
of both the LRINF as well as the SRINF—she followed her supreme principle 
that the United Kingdom must always stay firmly and steadily at the side of the 
United States. In June, general elections were scheduled in Britain. Because there 
was no doubt that the Reagan Administration favored “double zero,” the “Iron 
Lady” made a complete U-turn. From May 1987 she publicly supported Reagan’s 
approach, willy-nilly and very much to the dismay of Chancellor Kohl of West 
Germany.71 At the end of the day, the most important aspects for Britain were first 
that its own nuclear deterrent was sure to remain unaffected by the superpowers’ 
disarmament agreement, and second that there would be a “firebreak” in the 
anticipated stampede to disarmament. This pause was considered necessary in 
order to thwart any Soviet conspiracy to bring about a complete denuclearization 
of Western Europe. In view of this, right up to 1990, London stubbornly insisted 
on a rapid modernization of NATO’s arsenal of short-range nuclear weapons 
(with ranges under 500  km) even though this was total anathema to West 
69 Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) between Howe and Genscher in Bonn, February 
25, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Munich 2018, Doc. 54, p. 254. Thatcher repeated this argument in 
her Bonn talk with Chancellor Kohl on March 23, 1987, ibid, Doc. 79, p. 254.
70 Memcon between Thatcher and Mitterrand in Normandy on March 23, 1987, The National 
Archives Kew, PREM19/2182f67, https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/205881 
(accessed March 8, 2020).
71 On May 11, 1987 Mitterrand told German Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker that he 
had received a letter in which the British Prime Minister supported double zero; see diary of 
Weizsäcker’s Press Secretary Friedhelm Pflüger, Richard von Weizsäcker. Ein Porträt aus der 
Nähe, Stuttgart 1990, p. 225. In mid-May, another letter from Thatcher to Kohl in support 
of the double zero option was leaked in West Germany, see “Nichts gelernt”, in: Der Spiegel 
No. 21, May 18, 1987, p. 20.
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Germany for self-evident reasons. One of the consequences of the INF Treaty was 
therefore to bring serious strain in Anglo–German relations.72 
On a personal level, Thatcher and Kohl did not get along very well, right from 
the beginning, despite their political consensus as staunch pro-American, anti-
Communist political leaders. The West German Chancellor, who had replaced 
Schmidt in 1982, had even less enthusiasm for the INF Treaty than his British 
counterpart. As Tim Geiger explains in his contribution “Controversies Over the 
Double Zero Option: The Kohl–Genscher Government and the INF Treaty,” the 
prospect of an INF Treaty almost ripped the Kohl government apart and was not 
at all seen as something that would help the cause of German reunification. Kohl 
had gotten off to a bad start with Gorbachev as well:73 his publicly comparing 
the Russian leader to Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels did not help.74 
Although Foreign Minister Genscher was a frequent visitor to Moscow, Kohl and 
those on the conservative wing in his government, were suspicious of what the 
Soviet General Secretary was up to. They were also uneasy about Reagan’s appar-
ent willingness to make huge concessions to the Soviets, leaving the Europeans 
(as it were) out in the rain. As Geiger indicates, it was the coalition partner of 
Kohl’s Christian Democrats, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) under Genscher’s 
leadership, that benefitted from the renewed détente. 
Again according to Geiger, the Soviet–American rapprochement, starting 
with the Reykjavik meeting, “disclosed the fundamental inconsistencies and 
paradoxes of Bonn’s security policy. Until then, the Germans had been worried 
by the arms race and the nuclear buildup, and because the superpowers had not 
talked enough or effectively with each other. However, now with Soviet–U. S. 
rapprochement and a looming chance of real disarmament, the Germans were no 
less concerned.” In a strange reversal of the usual order of things, the erstwhile 
staunch “Atlanticist” Kohl was at odds with the Reagan Administration, while 
Genscher, and to some extent the Social Democratic opposition, were in sync with 
their “American friends.” The debate was further complicated by the looming 
discussion about NATO’s “short-range” deterrent (SNF, up to 500  km), which 
of course would have devastated the two German states (as well as adjacent 
countries such as Czechoslovakia). In this context, there seemed to be a return 
of the “German Question.”75 In the end, West Germany’s isolated Christian 
72 See Percy Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests. Reflections on Foreign Policy under 
Margaret Thatcher and John Major, London 1999, pp. 80–85. See also the essay by Tim Geiger 
in this volume.
73 During their first meeting at Chernenko’s funeral, Kohl felt insulted by Gorbachev, who 
accused him of “standing at attention” on orders from Washington. See Ambassador Kastl to 
Auswärtiges Amt, March 15, 1985, in: AAPD 1985, Munich 2016, Doc. 68.
74 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, Munich 2012, p. 456 calls 
this a “disaster in communication” (“Kommunikationsdesaster”). See also Hermann Wentker, 
Vom Gegner zum Partner: Gorbatschow und seine Politik im Urteil Helmut Kohls, in: 
Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen 22 (2015), pp. 1–34, here pp. 7–10.
75 See also the contribution by Hermann Wentker in this volume. 
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Democrats had to accept that neither the German public nor their main ally, 
the mighty U. S., would support any of the demands being made by Kohl and 
the conservative wing of the Christian Democrats.76 Cunningly, the Soviets 
seized their moment and urgently pressed that the 72 Pershing IA weapons 
of the West German Bundeswehr should be included in the Western share of 
INFs to be destroyed following an INF treaty—despite the fact that the Geneva 
Talks had always been exclusively about Soviet and American missiles. Here 
again, a divided Kohl government was forced, grudgingly, to give in and bend to 
international pressure and to overwhelmingly anti-nuclear opinion amongst the 
public at home. However, in the longer run this apparent defeat turned out to be 
a decisive step for improving Soviet–West German relations.
The French, like the British, disliked a “zero solution”, as Christian Wenkel 
highlights in his chapter on “Resuming European Détente and European Integra-
tion. France and the INF Treaty.” Moreover, like the British, they were skeptical 
when it came to superpower deals, partly for the same reasons, and partly 
because of their own specific interests. President Mitterrand had been elected in 
1981. Despite adhering to the Socialist Party and not being one of the “founding 
fathers” of the NATO Double-Track Decision, he staunchly supported the deploy-
ment of the Euromissiles, thus helping the Christian Democrat Kohl against his 
Social Democratic domestic adversaries.77 This was the case even though France 
had not been a member of NATO military integration since 1966 and did not 
participate in the INF buildup of 1983. Moreover, Wenkel argues, the French, 
like the British, were “far from convinced by the West German conception of 
the strategic imbalance in Europe.” Nevertheless, Mitterrand supported Kohl, 
whom he expected in turn to take a stance against inclusion of the French nuclear 
deterrent in the Geneva negotiations.78 
In addition to keeping the Force de Frappe out of an INF deal at all costs, 
Mitterrand (like Thatcher) wanted to gain political capital from his position as 
a bridge-builder between East and West. While he encouraged Reagan to talk to 
76 In addition to Geiger, see also the contribution by Philipp Gassert in this volume. 
77 Most famously in a speech in the German Bundestag on January 20, 1983: for Mitterrand’s 
speech see Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. Stenographischer Bericht, 9th 
Legislation Period, 143rd Session, pp. 8978–8992; on Mitterrand’s role during the Euromis-
siles crisis see Georges-Henri Soutou, Mitläufer der Allianz? Frankreich und der NATO-
Doppelbeschluss, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg, pp. 363–376.
78 As the Kohl-Genscher government dutifully did. The West German government regularly 
reiterated NATO’s political position: that INF negotiations were exclusively about the nuclear 
systems of both superpowers, see for example letter from Genscher to Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko, August 24, 1983, in: AAPD 1983, Doc.  241, p. 1231, fn.  24; Defense 
Minister Wörner at NATO’s Defense Planning Committee Ministerial Meeting on July 1/2, 
1983, ibid., Doc. 166, p. 872. In contrast, the SPD opposition supported the renewed Soviet 
demands to include both Western European nuclear arsenals in the Geneva INF talks, see 
for example letter from Willy Brandt to General Secretary Andropov, September 22, 1983, 
in: Willy Brandt, Berliner Ausgabe, Vol. 10: Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Internationale Beziehu-
ngen und deutsche Frage 1982–1992, Bonn 1992, Doc. 8, p. 155.
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his Soviet counterparts, in his conversations he comes across as an even more 
ardent hawk than the supposedly arch-anti-Communist Reagan. Wenkel quotes 
Mitterrand, who gave Reagan the following advice: 
With regard to the USSR, it is necessary: 1) not to give up anything, 2) not to concede 
anything, 3) to place yourself in a good psychological situation for the day when the 
Soviets want to discuss.
Domestically, however, Mitterrand was dealing with the French public, and, 
like the publics of Britain, West Germany, and to some extent the United States, 
people were truly smitten by Gorbachev. Moreover, it was not only those on 
the leftist spectrum who were hugely in favor of an INF Treaty. Here, for once, 
France was not so different from the rest of Europe. But its policies diverged from 
Britain with regard to the process of European integration. For Mitterrand the 
INF Treaty made it necessary to push forward with plans for deeper European 
integration, not just in the field of defense. It did not escape his notice, nor that 
of British observers, that the INF Treaty was bringing the “German question” 
to the fore (though most Germans did not realize this at the time). Like Geiger, 
Wenkel therefore sees the INF Treaty as a dynamic factor in the process leading 
toward the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union, as well as 
to closer Franco–German military cooperation during the 1990s. 
4. Looking Forward to the Easing of Cold War Tensions:  
The Reactions of the Eastern Allies
Unlike their Western counterparts, who had many qualms about Reagan’s “zero 
option” plans and the impending INF Treaty, the Eastern allies of the Soviet 
Union welcomed the prospect of the removal of intermediate nuclear forces from 
all of Europe. The reasons were manifold and not the same in all Warsaw Pact 
countries: First of all, Eastern bloc leaders like Erich Honecker and Wojciech 
Jaruzelski were genuinely worried about the short and intermediate-range 
nuclear weapons, which could devastate their territories far more than those of 
the Soviet Union.79 Second, in narrow military “balance of power” terms, the 
undoing of NATO’s Double-Track Decision with the scrapping of the American 
INFs might have reassured Warsaw Pact countries that they would have the 
advantage in numeric conventional superiority. However, that was not the most 
common perception in the capitals of the Eastern alliance. Quite to the contrary, 
military and political leaders there were particularly concerned about the grow-
ing conventional strength they saw in NATO, thanks to an ongoing “revolution 
in military affairs.”80 That was the reason why in May 1987, at the Warsaw Pact 
79 See the contributions by Hermann Wentker and Wanda Jarząbek in this volume. 
80 See Oliver Bange, SS-20 and Pershing II: Weapon Systems and the Dynamization of East-
West Relations, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), Nuclear Crisis, pp. 70–86.
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Summit in East Berlin, a new military doctrine was announced which replaced 
the war planning that had hitherto relied on offensive tactics with a new one, 
appropriately based on the primacy of defense. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact also 
agreed to a new Vienna Forum for Conventional Armed Forces Reductions in 
Europe (CFE) to replace the ailing MBFR talks. Third, most East Europeans hoped 
for the “peace dividend” of a new détente. The crippling arms race demanded 
many resources, which could not be used for consumer goods that might help 
to buy acquiescence amongst the people of the Socialist countries. Fourth, they 
also hoped to gain economically from increased East–West trade. Countries like 
Poland, the GDR, Hungary, and Romania were dependent on Western loans and 
trade relations with the capitalist “class enemy.”81 And finally, there seems to 
have been a tactical element. Some Perestroika-critical Communist leaders like 
Honecker and the Romanian President Nicolae Ceauşescu could lend support to 
Moscow on an INF Treaty while being critical of Gorbachev’s agenda for reform-
ing the Communist system.82 So, we must understand, the Eastern allies were not 
just paying lip service to the peace moves of their “big brother.” 
The generally welcoming stance of the Eastern allies with regard to an INF 
Treaty should also be seen in the context of their longstanding criticism of the 
Kremlin’s handling of the Euromissiles issue (normally not publicly voiced). 
The implementation of the NATO Dual-Track Decision turned out to be a disas-
ter for the Warsaw Pact, while simultaneously both “imperial overstretch” in 
Afghanistan and the economic crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s were hitting 
COMECON members hard.83 The Polish crisis of 1980/81 was a clear sign of 
the bloc’s inability to cope with the fallout of the oil price hike. Despite all the 
public displays of “unity,” the Euromissiles crisis had “had a bruising impact on 
Warsaw Pact members.”84 And this was just one constituent of a much broader 
malaise in the Eastern bloc; it “highlighted a number of institutional and systemic 
weaknesses that for years had been eroding the Warsaw Pact and the political-
81 See Stephen Kotkin, The Kiss of Death. The East Bloc Goes Borrowing, in: Niall Ferguson, 
Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent (eds.), The Shock of the Global. The 
1970s in Perspective, Cambridge, Mass. 2010, pp. 80–93.
82 For the different attitudes to Perestroika among Communist party leaders in Eastern Europe 
see Francesco Di Palma (ed.), Perestroika and the Party. National and Transnational Perspec-
tives on European Communist Parties in the Era of Soviet Reform, New York / Oxford 2019, 
especially Tamás Péter Baranyi, Perestroika Made in Hungary? The HSWP’s Approach to the 
Soviet Reform of the Late 1980s, pp. 88–104; Wanda Jarząbek, The Polish United Workers’ 
Party and Perestroika, pp. 118–131; Hermann Wentker, SED and Perestroika: Perceptions 
and Reactions, pp. 132–152; Stefano Bottoni, Between External Constraint and Internal 
Crackdown: Romania’s Non-reaction to Soviet Perestroika, pp. 153–175.
83 On the economic situation see Chris Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy. 
Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR, Chapel Hill, N. C. 2016; on “imperial 
overstretch” and Afghanistan see Zubok, Failed Empire, pp. 227–264.
84 Malcolm Byrne, The Warsaw Pact and the Euromissile Crisis, 1977–1983, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), 
Euromissile Crisis, pp. 104–120, here p. 104. 
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economic-ideological order that underpinned it.”85 Moscow had underestimated 
NATO’s ability to pull itself together. During the final years of the Brezhnev 
era and the devastating Andropov and Chernenko interim, the Kremlin had 
an increasingly gerontocratic leadership, and lacked the resources either for an 
energetic, coordinated response to the immediate international relations issue in 
the Geneva negotiations, or for overcoming the economic, cultural, and social 
crisis of Communism.86
The ascent of Gorbachev to the Chairmanship of the CPSU thus made a huge 
difference to the international relations of the Eastern allies. Erich Honecker, 
Chief of the East German Communist Party (SED) and GDR Head of State, came 
into the equation, too. As Hermann Wentker writes in his contribution “The 
German Democratic Republic, Gorbachev, and the INF Treaty,” Honecker “was 
not a friend of nuclear weapons in Europe,” and very much favored a “double 
zero” solution in Europe. As he argued in a speech delivered to the SED Central 
Committee in November 1986, shortly after the Reagan–Gorbachev meeting in 
Reykjavik: “If the INF question is solved, it will no longer be necessary to have 
tactical missiles […] in the GDR.”87 While, in domestic policy, the East German 
leadership eyed Gorbachev’s reform Communist agenda very warily, it welcomed 
the new line in international affairs. In that area, the East German–Soviet 
relationship improved after 1985. In 1983, after NATO had gone ahead with the 
deployment of Pershing II and nuclear-armed Cruise Missiles, the GDR leader 
had cautiously distanced himself from Moscow’s plans to increase the Soviet 
nuclear arsenal deployed on the territory of its East European allies.88 Now things 
looked set to change.
As Wentker shows, Honecker did not follow up on Soviet demands that he 
should make it clear “to the FRG how much the situation had changed after 
the deployment of the missiles.” Surprisingly, he was able to get away (for a 
while)  with his veiled critique of Soviet counter-deployments after the NATO 
Dual-Track Decision. At that time the gerontocratic Soviet leadership was weak 
and confused about how to react to Western rearmament, and Honecker had 
to engage in damage control because of the GDR’s economic dependency on 
West German loans and trade. Moreover, a “peacenik” East German population 
seemed to welcome Honecker’s “peace power” stances, even though the GDR gov-
ernment did not command much respect with regard to its economic and social 
policies—it still had to rely on frequent crackdowns on dissent. For Honecker, this 
85 Ibid., p. 117. 
86 Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, New York 2009, pp. 481–618. 
87 “Mit Initiative, Schöpfertum und Tatkraft verwirklichen wir die Beschlüsse unseres XI. 
Parteitages. Aus dem Schlußwort auf der 3. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED”, November 
21, 1986, in: Erich Honecker, Reden und Aufsätze, Vol. 12, Berlin (East) 1988, p. 203. 
88 “In kampferfüllter Zeit setzen wir den bewährten Kurs des Parteitages für Frieden und 
Sozialismus erfolgreich fort. Aus der Diskussionsrede von Erich Honecker, Generalsekretär 
des Zentralkomitees der SED”, in: Neues Deutschland, November 26/27, 1983, p. 3.
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made it even more imperative to avoid going back to the heightened East-West 
tensions that had characterized the early 1980s. Kohl’s constructive approach 
vis-à-vis Honecker’s “peace” moves pushed the East Germans still further into 
the disarmament camp. When Honecker coined the term “coalition of reason,” 
Kohl gladly took up the formula of his East German counterpart.89 
So, when Gorbachev came to power, Honecker could happily demonstrate 
that, at least in international affairs, he was in line with the new Soviet team. 
This gradually increased in importance, as Gorbachev was moving ahead with 
domestic reforms that the GDR leadership remained adamantly opposed to. 
Honecker also needed to stress détente as a means to keep the East–West German 
relationship going. Constantly in search of legitimacy, he was eager to realize 
his long-term goal of making a visit to the Federal Republic. He also wanted to 
prove to Moscow that the GDR was pushing Bonn towards an agreement, thereby 
exaggerating his role “enormously,” as Wentker comments. Furthermore, for the 
East Berlin government, the INF Treaty was in the interest of its own security, as 
it would contribute to the removal of Soviet nuclear missiles from East German 
soil. To further this, the relationship with Bonn was critical, because it was 
one way to influence the process on the Eastern side. It also helped in securing 
the all-important trade and financial relationship with the FRG. Furthermore, 
according to Wentker, it was good domestic politics as well, since the East German 
population was hugely in favor of détente, even though Honecker’s “popularity 
seems not to have benefitted from this identity of views.”
When discussing the winding road to the INF Treaty, we therefore have to take 
Eastern bloc public opinion into account, even though there was no such thing in 
the strict sense of the term. As Wentker demonstrates in his analysis of reports in 
the East German secret police files, the GDR population gave Gorbachev most of 
the credit, while holding Reagan in low regard. In that at least, the Communist 
“anti-Imperialist” propaganda fell on fertile ground.90 The East Germans hoped 
for a “peace dividend” and saw the easing of international tensions as the prologue 
to domestic reform, which was decidedly not Honecker’s idea of the INF agree-
ment. In Poland, too, “fear of war” and “love of peace” worked toward an overall 
positive perception of the INF talks and in favor of Gorbachev’s international 
role in particular. As Wanda Jarząbek shows in her contribution, the Poles seem 
to have expected an easing of the economic burden of defense, even though the 
Polish contribution to Warsaw Pact armaments was on the conventional side, 
89 Letter from Honecker to Kohl, October 5, 1983; letter from Kohl to Honecker, October 
24, 1983, in: Innerdeutsche Beziehungen. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1980–1986. 
Eine Dokumentation, ed. by Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Bonn 
1986, pp. 154 f., pp. 158 f. 
90 On Anti-Americanism in Eastern Europe see Jan C. Behrends, Árpád von Klimó, and Patrice 
G. Poutrus (eds.), Antiamerikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Studien zu Ost- und Westeuropa, 
Bonn 2005. 
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and at best only indirectly affected by an INF deal. Moreover, she finds, the Poles, 
unlike the East Germans, perceived the impact of the INF Treaty as not equal 
for all sides. While everyone’s security was supposed to be growing, that of the 
Soviet Union was likely to be growing to a greater degree than that of Poland. 
For Poland, as for West Germany, it was therefore important to complement the 
INF arrangement with a resumption of new Vienna talks about conventional 
armaments.
Poland, like the GDR and all other Warsaw Pact members, was not directly 
involved in the INF Treaty negotiations and was kept at arm’s length by the Soviet 
leadership. Given the salience of the “German question” and earlier Polish “peace 
initiatives,” such as the 1957 Rapacki Plan, however, the proposed INF Treaty 
fitted well into long-standing Polish (and other Eastern bloc)  efforts to make 
the 1945 Potsdam Conference post-war settlement permanent.91 What the Poles 
seemed to anticipate was an issue that the East German government apparently 
failed to see: that a relaxation of East–West tensions could lead to a situation in 
which the “German question” would come up with force. While the Jaruzelski 
government wanted to intensify the dialogue with both German states and hoped 
that the GDR and FRG would present “some elements of the Polish initiative as 
their own,” he certainly did not want German unification. Moreover, given their 
geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, the Poles were very keen on having 
the INF Treaty implemented once it had been signed and ratified. Today, Poland’s 
current government, despite being a staunch supporter of NATO and the Trump 
White House, believes there could be much to lose from the recent turn in 
Russian–American relations, with new missiles being introduced in the Russian 
military enclave of Kaliningrad. 
Though it has not been possible to supply further essays covering other 
Eastern allies of the Soviet Union, similar stories can probably be told about 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Within the Eastern Pact organization, the ČSSR 
was among the staunchest supporters of Moscow, once the country had stabilized 
after the 1968 crackdown. As Malcolm Byrne has shown, in the case of Prague, 
it took a lot of cajoling and “convincing” on the part of the Soviet leadership to 
get the government to accept the deployment of new SS-12 and SS-23 missiles as 
part of the Warsaw Pact countermeasures against the deployment of Western 
Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in 1983.92 In this, the Czechs were reacting like 
the East Germans.
Although the East European populations were in general supportive of the 
thaw and welcomed the easing of tensions that came after 1985, they did not 
91 Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, 1945. The “Bitter Victory”. Poland and its “Liberation”, in: Jürgen Luh 
(ed.), Potsdam Conference 1945. Shaping the World, Dresden 2020, pp. 114–125.
92 Byrne, Warsaw Pact, pp.111–116; see also Ivo Pejčoch, Kernwaffenträger in der tschecho-
slowakischen Armee, in: Oliver Bange (ed.), Zwischen Bündnistreue und staatlichen 
Eigeninteressen. Die Streitkräfte der DDR und der ČSSR 1968 bis 1990, Potsdam 2016, 
pp. 151–163.
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really trust the Western peace movements. Given Poland’s historically well 
founded suspicion of the Soviet Union, “peace” was the wrong term. The Polish 
government suppressed Solidarność while at the same time propagating its own 
work towards “peace.” It is fair to say that the West European peace movements 
were viewed with suspicion by Polish and other Eastern European dissidents.93 
5. Mobilizing for Peace and Security:  
Public Opinion and Protest Movements 
Peace movements have a long history in North America and Europe, going back 
to the decades before World War I.94 Yet the nuclear buildup of the 1980s gave 
the various societal actors organizing protest demonstrations for peace a new 
urgency and a common goal. During the 1980s, Western Europe as well as the 
United States saw one of the largest protest mobilizations in post-war history. 
During the Euromissile debate, millions took to the streets to voice their opposi-
tion to NATO’s Dual-Track Decision. While the general story of the 1980s peace 
movement is well known, historians have long debated its impact on the end of 
the Cold War. Scholars like Lawrence S. Wittner have highlighted the impact of 
the peace movement on the Kremlin as well as on the Western side.95 Recently, 
the historian Angela Santese has credited the U. S. peace movement with pushing 
Ronald Reagan towards disarmament and “Freeze.”96 In his contribution to this 
volume, Tapio Juntunen, even sees “widespread agreement among Cold War 
historians” that the anti-nuclear campaign had a decisive impact on NATO’s 
decisions within the Euromissiles crisis. Other historians, are more guarded in 
their judgement, and propose a multi-causal model to explain the end of the Cold 
War.97 
As Claudia Kemper argues in her contribution “More than a FREEZE. Political 
Mobilization and the Peace Movement in 1980s U. S. Society,” perennial debates 
93 Idesbald Goddeeris and Małgorzata Świder, Peace or Solidarity? Poland, the Euromissile 
Crisis, and the 1980s Peace Movement, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), Euromissile Crisis, pp. 291–308, 
here p. 303. 
94 Benjamin Ziemann, Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War. 
Introduction, in: Benjamin Ziemann (ed.), Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and 
the USA during the Cold War, Essen 2008, pp. 11–38; David Cortright, Peace. A History 
of Movements and Ideas, Cambridge 2008; Holger Nehring, Peace Movements, in: Stefan 
Berger and Holger Nehring (eds.), The History of Social Movements in Global Perspective. 
A Survey, London 2017, pp. 485–513. 
95 Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition. A History of the World Nuclear Disarma-
ment Movement, 1971 to the Present, Stanford 2003, pp. 395–401. 
96 Angela Santese, Ronald Reagan, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the Nuclear 
Scare of the 1980s, in: The International History Review 39 (2017), pp. 496–520. 
97 See for example Florian Pressler, A Triumph of Disarmament? The 1980s and the Interna-
tional Political System, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), Nuclear Crisis, pp. 348–351. 
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over “who could claim the implementation of the INF Treaty as their political 
success” may not lead us very far. As always in history, success has many parents, 
while failure is an orphan. What was popular, however, were superpower deals 
that cut nuclear arsenals, while unilateral disarmament never went down very 
well with the American audiences who “vacillated between long-term uneasiness 
about nuclear weapons” and “distrust of the Soviet Union.” Like their President, 
Americans supported more military spending while favoring a nuclear “zero” at 
the same time.98 Though the U. S. peace movement was successful in mobilizing 
millions for peace, its impact on the actual political decision process leading to 
the NATO Dual-Track Decision, was negligible, even though the FREEZE motion 
passed Congress. Afterwards, nothing happened until Reagan and Gorbachev 
started their negotiations, beginning in 1985.99 
FREEZE was a very peculiar American umbrella campaign, involving tra-
ditional peace movement activists—Quaker Organizations like the American 
Friends Service Committee, anti-imperial groups like the War Resisters League 
and professional organizations like the Union of Concerned Scientists and the 
Federation of Atomic Scientists. But it also included politicians, such as Senator 
Edward Kennedy, “critical” experts and scientists like Carl Sagan, and some 
celebrities like the actor Meryl Streep. To some extent, Kemper argues, FREEZE 
also focused a general critique of society, providing an outlet “to express gen-
eral dissatisfaction with public policy and with political decision makers,” and 
voiced a general cultural-critical perspective. Thus, against the backdrop of the 
re-election of Ronald Reagan in 1984, the American peace movement became 
disillusioned and saw a general decline. Now the future of the peace move-
ment has moved into the hands of professional organizations, such as ICAN, 
the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which was founded 
in 2007. These new-model peace movements have built on the experiences of 
1980s movements like FREEZE, and, as Kemper explains, have developed into 
more focused and “extremely professional” networks, striving for a UN nuclear 
weapons ban treaty. Though ICAN was presented with the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2017, it was unable to prevent the recent round of rearmament, especially on the 
Russian side.100 
98 J. Michael Hogan and Ted J. Smith III., Polling on the Issues: Public Opinion and the Nuclear 
Freeze, in: Public Opinion Quarterly 55/4 (Winter 1991), pp. 534–569. 
99 Wilfried Mausbach, Vereint marschieren, getrennt schlagen? Die amerikanische Friedens-
bewegung und der Widerstand gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss, in: Gassert, Geiger, and 
Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg, p. 302; on the ability of the U. S. peace movement to 
mobilize hundreds of thousands of street demonstrations see Kyle Harvy, American Anti-
Nuclear Activism, 1975–1990. The Challenge of Peace, New York 2014. 
100 ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 2017 “for its work to draw attention to the 
catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and for its ground-
breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons.” See https://www.
nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2017/summary/.
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Up to the mid-1980s, the supporters of the U. S. peace movement could not 
put a stop to the deployment of new nuclear weapons. Yet like their European 
counterparts, they created a framework for peace, which in turn helped to 
support the societal momentum and positive climate of public opinion in the 
Western countries where the INF Talks were taking place. As Philipp Gassert 
argues in his contribution “West German Politics, the INF Treaty, and the 
Popular Dynamics of Peace,” a “dovish” political context forced West German 
Chancellor Kohl’s hand. Grudgingly he had to comply with the “double zero 
option” and he was then obliged to make even more concessions with regard to 
West Germany’s outdated Pershing IA missiles. Initially reluctant, Kohl sided 
with his liberal coalition partner against the conservative wing of his own party. 
He was also acting against the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the CSU, whose 
chairman, the baroque Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauß, thought this to be 
a “totally irresponsible” act, endangering West Germany’s future security and 
making the country susceptible to Soviet pressure.101 But Kohl, a shrewd and 
expedient politician, knew exactly where the West German public stood, thus, 
Gassert writes, “giving in to the prevailing sentiment of the German population 
as well as a majority of deputies in the Federal Parliament.” 
One of the deep ironies of the second half of the 1980s is the slow death of the 
peace movement, against the backdrop of a final round of détente that would 
contribute to the demise of the complete Cold War order. As Gassert argues, 
years of talk about “peace,” “disarmament,” and “making peace with ever fewer 
weapons” (a slogan that had been pioneered by the CDU) “had moved the 
emphasis of West German political culture into the direction of the peace move-
ment’s core positions.” Kohl, who had risen to the Federal Chancellery’s office 
in 1982/83 in part by steadfastly supporting the deployment of Pershing II and 
Cruise Missiles following the NATO Dual-Track Decision, now chose to shed the 
mantle of the “Cold War hawk” and realign himself with his dovish public and 
coalition partner. He knew very well that West Germany could not go through 
another “hot autumn” of protests like the one in 1983. With Gorbachev at the top 
of the Kremlin’s hierarchy, old enemy images were crumbling. Germans were 
seized by Gorbimania, maybe taking it even further than was shown in similarly 
enthusiastic receptions in Britain, France, and Italy where, in 1989, Gorbachev 
was greeted throughout his visits by cheering crowds.102
There is a second irony here. Not only did the West German peace movement 
fall apart after 1983, but West Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) lost 
power in 1982, in part because a significant portion of its membership and 
parliamentary representatives felt they must break with Chancellor Schmidt over 
101 Franz Josef Strauß, Die Erinnerungen, Berlin 1989, p. 552. 
102 Hermann Wentker, Die Deutschen und Gorbatschow. Der Gorbatschow-Diskurs im dop-
pelten Deutschland 1985–1991, Berlin 2020; William Taubman, Gorbachev. His Life and 
Times, New York / London 2016, pp. 475–478 and p. 495; on Gorbimania in the U. S. see 
Kristina Spohr, Post Wall, Post Square. Rebuilding the World after 1989, London 2019, p. 11.
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the deployment of the Euromissiles at that time.103 After 1987, Kohl reaped the 
benefits of détente. Having been re-elected in March 1987 (with some losses), he 
now sided with the “peace camp,” or at least the informal coalition of parliamen-
tarians across both wings of the German Bundestag, whether of his own party 
or not. The INF Treaty, while it created difficulties and fractures within Kohl’s 
Christian Democrat-led coalition government, was very much in sync with 
the majority of West Germans, or at any rate of those who responded to public 
opinion surveys. This, Gassert argues, concluded the “move toward peace” and 
the acceptance of the “Potsdam” status quo in Europe that had begun in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. 
It fell to the Danes to bring the new term “footnote policy” into the vocabulary 
of NATO and the Cold War. As Tapio Juntunen remarks in his contribution to 
our volume, the Danish government’s tendency to add “several reservations on its 
participation in NATO’s operations and procedures” was one of the “most evident 
examples of the effect of public opinion and transnational peace movements” 
on the 1980s foreign policy practiced by the NATO countries. For a long time, 
the governments of the NATO states Denmark and Norway, and also of neutral 
Finland, had been confronted with strong anti-nuclear sentiment from their 
citizens. Increasingly they warmed to the idea of a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone 
(NNFZ), which went back to 1963 when it had first been introduced by the Finnish 
government. Even though Denmark and Norway, the NATO members, took a 
skeptical stance toward the NNFZ initially, by the late 1970s and early 1980s such 
proposals had “matured into a shared practical connection between anti-nuclear 
movements and certain parts of the Nordic political elite.”
Juntunen also shows some results of disarmament and the INF Treaty that 
were unwelcome or paradoxical for the Nordic countries. While the Danes, Nor-
wegians and Finns were very much in favor of nuclear disarmament, they were 
afraid of an impending nuclearization of the Northern seas. They anticipated 
that the removal of land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles would lead 
to more sea-based nuclear weapons on submarines, which, of course, were not 
covered by the INF Treaty. Thus, the Nordics feared that the denuclearization of 
Central Europe would lead to a sea-borne nuclearization of the North of Europe 
and the Arctic. So, while the countries of this area welcomed the INF Treaty “as a 
historically and symbolically significant political achievement,” they highlighted 
the fact that one superpower treaty would not solve all strategic uncertainties, 
especially in the North. The Danish parliament even passed a resolution that 
reminded the world that warships visiting Danish harbors were not allowed to 
103 Even though it remains difficult to measure the exact impact of the peace movement on 
the establishment; see Tim Geiger and Jan Hansen, Did Protest Matter? The Influence of 
the Peace Movement on the West German Government and the Social Democratic Party, 
1977–1983, in: Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon (eds.), Nuclear Threats, 
Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s, Cambridge 2017, p. 309; Jan Hansen, Abschied 
vom Kalten Krieg? Die Sozialdemokraten und der Nachrüstungsstreit (1977–1987), Munich 
2016.
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carry nuclear weapons. Therefore, on the sub-regional level, the INF Treaty cre-
ated new problems of a nuclear as well as non-nuclear balance of power. This was 
not really taken into serious consideration within the superpower negotiations. 
6. Back to the Future: The World After the INF Treaty
While in hindsight, the INF Treaty has looked like an opening gambit in the 
overcoming of the East–West division of Europe, blazing a trail towards the fall 
of the Wall, such a perspective is more of a “post-Cold War” one and was not a 
very widely held view among contemporary observers, at least in Germany.104 
When he spoke in Berlin on June 12, 1987, the challenge Ronald Reagan made to 
Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” seemed too much like a public relations stunt 
that willfully neglected the political basics in Europe. From a West German point 
of view, the speech appeared to be mostly for domestic U. S. consumption and, 
in the eyes of many, an almost comic return to an outdated Cold War rhetoric. 
The words did not square easily with the same President’s ground-breaking 
work towards achieving disarmament in Geneva. The INF Treaty thus seemed 
like just one more effort to ratify and ultimately consolidate the European order 
established by the victorious powers with the 1945 Potsdam Agreements.
Today, it is obvious that the INF Treaty was indeed an important step in 
overcoming the Cold War order. It was part and parcel of the momentous “con-
versations” held between Reagan, Gorbachev, Bush Sr., and the foreign ministers 
and advisors who contrived to “end the Cold War.”105 On September 11, 1990, 
less than a year after the Berlin Wall had fallen, President George H. W. Bush 
(Sr.) addressed both houses of Congress in a famous speech, in which he saw the 
dawn of new era: 
stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which 
the nations of the East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. 
A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand 
wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to 
be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of 
law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared 
responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the 
weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other 
leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage 
this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.106
104 See the contribution by Philipp Gassert in this volume. 
105 To use Blanton’s and Savranskaya’s inspired phrase.
106 George H. W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Persian Gulf Cri-
sis and the Federal Budget Deficit, September 11, 1990, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/
archives/public-papers/2217 (last accessed February 27, 2020); see also George H. W. Bush 
and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, New York 1999. 
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Bush’s 1990 vision of a new multipolar order that would emerge from the Cold 
War did not materialize. Due to the decomposition of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
the 1990s and early 2000s have been described as a “unipolar” moment, especially 
by conservative American pundits.107 During the first two post-Cold War decades 
the United States tried to assert a power that amounted to “global hegemony.” 
This could not be sustained after 2008/09, and is now being dismantled by the 
U. S. itself. This dismantling process started with President Obama, and is now 
in full swing under the leadership of President Trump. 
For 30 years, however, the INF Treaty worked surprisingly well. This was 
because of its verification system. In his conversations with Gorbachev and in 
his public speeches, Reagan himself had repeatedly quoted the Russian proverb: 
“Trust but verify.” Following this precept, the INF Treaty established a detailed 
system of rules for defining, counting, and verifying all relevant armaments 
and accompanying equipment, and then for monitoring their final destruction 
within the three years of its coming into force (on June 1, 1988). Through addi-
tional protocols and Memoranda of Understanding, it laid down a complicated 
system of intrusive mutual control and observation. The rigor of verification was 
unprecedented: nothing before it had been so comprehensive and reliable—or 
so necessary. This central aspect of the INF Treaty is usually skipped over by 
historians and journalists—perhaps because following the detail has seemed to 
be too complicated or too technical, or even too “boring”. In the present volume, 
Wolfgang Richter, an expert who has worked in the German Bundeswehr Verifica-
tion Center, is able to offer the reader insights into the provisions and actual 
practice of verification—right up to the year 2001, when the verification system 
expired according to the Treaty’s terms.
As Oliver Bange outlines in his essay, the INF Treaty, along with the other 
extraordinary disarmament measures negotiated between 1985 and the early 
2000s, did indeed make Europe a more secure place, at least in the perceptions 
of the public in the various European countries, and of the majority of their 
politicians. The recent demise of the Treaty thus raises fears that we might “return 
to the future”—to the uneasy state of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when 
nuclear weapons seemed to destabilize what only in hindsight looks like a stable, 
post-World War II order.
This perception of stability, however, is a Eurocentric one. People in the 
“Global South,” which had become the main battleground of the “Global Cold 
War” from the 1960s on, have never been able to share this point of view.108 
And even in the so-called “First World” (the West) and “Second World” (the 
East), it would be wrong to take too rosy a view of the tense situation when two 
107 See Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, in: Foreign Affairs 70/1 (Winter 1990/91), 
pp. 23–33. See also Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment. U. S. Foreign Policy and the 
Rise of the Post-Cold War Order, Ithaca 2016.
108 See first and foremost Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions 
and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge 2005.
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ideologically, politically, economically, and militarily antagonistic alliances faced 
each other with “over-kill” capacities of nuclear weapons, with—in the worst 
case scenario—the possibility of nuclear Armageddon unleashed in less than 
one hour.109
As Ulrich Kühn reminds us in his contribution, the INF Treaty was not just a 
“landmark arms control and disarmament treaty.” Despite its global ambition, it 
was first and foremost about the security of the European–Western Hemisphere, 
of which the Soviet Union was a part. While the symbolism of the signing 
ceremony in Washington carried meaning way beyond Europe, the Treaty had 
serious flaws because it had a purely European perspective. This laid it open 
to its demise in the post-Cold War order. As Bange shows, the INF Treaty did 
not address the East-Asian nuclear balance of power. China has risen in global 
importance, and both Russia and the U. S. feel that they need to contain its 
growing power. By the 2010s the INF Treaty was increasingly being seen as an 
impediment to global security. Moreover, in present-day Russia the INF Treaty 
has become a symbol of an unequal post-Cold War order that has kept Russia in 
check and rendered it geopolitically more vulnerable than need be, while the U. S. 
has remained unconstrained, especially after 9/11.110 
Since the turn of the millennium, we have had to witness the decline of the 
security architecture that was so successfully built in the last decade of the Cold 
War and the following years. The INF Treaty was a center-piece in this structure. 
Its termination in 2019 is the result of a long chain of events, starting in December 
2001 with George W. Bush (Jr.)’s decision to renounce the ABM Treaty of 1972, 
which had been the foundation block of all later Soviet–U. S. disarmament agree-
ments. Subsequent key events have ranged from Russia’s withdrawal from the 
1990 CSE Treaty in 2007 to the failed attempts to renew the seriously outdated 
“Vienna Document” on Confidence and Security Building Measures which 
had its last overhaul in 2011. Worse, after ending the INF Treaty, the Trump 
Administration is threatening to cancel the Open Skies Treaty (another pillar for 
verification measures). As at present (spring 2020), there are no convincing signs 
that there will be a suitable replacement for the new START Treaty of 2010, which, 
if nothing is done, is due to expire in February 2021. Should this happen, for the 
very first time since 1972 (SALT I) there will be no treaty or other legal instrument 
between Washington and Moscow that restrains nuclear armament. 
Consequently, while the INF Treaty in 1987 signaled the beginning of the end 
of the Cold War, the end of the INF Treaty in 2019 may thus signal the beginning 
of the post-post Cold War world, for which we do not yet have a name.
109 See Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon, Introduction: Between Accidental 
Armageddons and Winnable Wars: Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Fears in the 1980s, in: 
Conze, Klimke, and Varon (eds.), Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear, pp. 1–23.
110 See Parker, U. S. Foreign Policy Towards Russia, pp. 7–10. 
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Nuclear Abolitionism, the Strategic Defense 
Initiative, and the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces Treaty
How is it that the President who launched the largest peacetime military buildup 
in U. S. history and who introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was also 
the leader who proposed and signed the only treaty to eliminate an entire class of 
nuclear weapons? To many, the Reagan Administration’s military buildup and SDI 
seem inexplicably at odds with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. On 
the one hand, the President introduced massive increases in defense capabilities 
but, on the other, he called for nuclear disarmament. However, from President Rea-
gan’s perspective these policies were perfectly consistent. This chapter examines 
Reagan’s unorthodox views about security, his policy goals, and the intellectual 
connection between SDI and the reduction of nuclear arsenals. It also considers 
SDI’s role in the conclusion of the landmark INF Treaty. 
When President Reagan entered office in January 1981, he announced a 
massive increase in defense spending. The Administration claimed that the 
Soviet Union had been engaging in a military buildup during the 1970s and was 
poised to overtake the U. S. in the arms race. A U. S. buildup was necessary so as 
to counter increased Soviet strength and global aspirations. Although Reagan 
was slashing expenditures in most sectors, defense spending would increase by 
seven per cent per year between 1981 and 1985 and constitute more than 30 per 
cent of the federal budget. Military expenditures would cost $1.5 trillion over the 
next four years, and these resources would be used to strengthen forces, improve 
combat readiness, and enhance force mobility.1 
In March 1983 Reagan also introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI 
was a research program that sought to develop a space-based system of lasers 
that would destroy Soviet nuclear missiles should they ever be launched in an 
attack. SDI generated a storm of controversy, not only in the USSR and Western 
Europe, but in the U. S. as well. Although Reagan portrayed SDI as a defensive 
system that would protect civilians from a nuclear attack, critics feared it would 
1 Reagan’s predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had significantly increased defense expenditures before 
leaving office, rendering Reagan’s buildup all the more noteworthy. Richard Halloran, Wein-
berger Begins Drive for Big Rise in Military Budget, in: New York Times, March 5, 1981; 
Richard Halloran, Reagan to Request $38B Increase in Military Outlays, in: New York 
Times, March 5, 1981; and Hedrick Smith, US Priorities: Basic Reversal, in: New York Times, 
March 5, 1981. 
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prompt an arms race in space. Others believed it to be an exorbitant pipe dream, 
pointing out that the technology for such a system did not exist. Arms control 
experts claimed that SDI would undermine nuclear security, as enshrined in the 
doctrine of “Mutual Assured Destruction,” or MAD. The central idea of MAD was 
that both superpowers would be deterred from launching a nuclear attack on the 
other by the fact that neither side had defenses. If one side were to attack, the other 
would retaliate and both would be obliterated. A first strike would prove suicidal, 
thus deterring a would-be aggressor. Arms control experts insisted that this ever-
present prospect of nuclear annihilation had deterred the Soviets from waging 
war. It was this logic that led the superpowers to sign the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty in which they pledged to forego nuclear defenses. Building 
a defensive system would upend this delicate system of mutual vulnerability.
The military buildup and SDI seemed at odds with the Administration’s “Zero 
Proposal,” which it introduced in November 1981.2 This proposal called for the 
elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe and later became 
the basis for the 1987 INF Treaty. At the time it was introduced, however, the 
Soviets were the only ones with such forces in Europe. The Soviets had deployed 
SS-20s since 1976 and in response NATO had pledged to deploy similar forces. 
American Pershing II and Cruise Missiles were scheduled to arrive in Western 
Europe in late 1983. 
To many, the Zero Proposal appeared to be both inequitable and disingenuous. 
The Reagan Administration was asking the Soviets to dismantle a deployed 
arsenal while the Americans would simply forego a deployment which was 
years in the future and which faced increasingly strong resistance from citizens 
in Western countries.3 Some suspected the Zero Proposal was nothing more 
than a public relations campaign intended to make the Soviets appear to be the 
ones opposing arms control. Thus, it came as no surprise when the Kremlin 
immediately rejected the offer, calling it a “propaganda ploy.”4
1. Reagan’s Unconventional Views about Security
In order to appreciate the connection between the military buildup, SDI, and 
the INF Treaty it is important to understand President Reagan’s views about 
security, which were unconventional for the time. Simply put, Ronald Reagan 
abhorred nuclear weapons and sought to eliminate them. He believed nuclear 
2 Ronald Reagan, Speech at the National Press Club in Washington on November 18, 1981, 
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/111881a. 
3 Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy, New York 1984, pp. 229, 
355 f. See also Kenneth Adelman, Interview for the Miller Center of Public Affairs Presidential 
Oral History Project (2003). Available at http://millercenter.org/president/reagan/oralhistory/
kenneth-adelman.
4 Reagan’s Arms Proposal Assailed, November 20, 1981, in: Current Digest of the Soviet Press 
33:47, 7. 
Nuclear Abolitionism, Strategic Defense Initiative, and the 1987 INF Treaty 45
weapons to be morally repugnant, owing to the fact that they targeted civilians 
and threatened to destroy civilization. A nuclear war was also unwinnable, 
Reagan reasoned, owing to the destructive capacity of the weapons. Moreover, 
the vast stockpiles that had been accumulated during the Cold War raised the 
probability of a catastrophic accident. “No one could win a nuclear war,” Reagan 
observed in his memoirs. “Yet as long as nuclear weapons were in existence, there 
would always be risks they would be used, and once the first nuclear weapons 
was unleashed, who knew where it would end? My dream, then, became a world 
free of nuclear weapons [… F]or the eight years I was president I never let my 
dream of a nuclear-free world fade from my mind.”5 Martin Anderson, Reagan’s 
long-time friend and advisor, recalled that “the concern about nuclear war and 
the challenge to diminish that war was always foremost in [Reagan’s] mind. It 
was not something he talked about a lot in public. But he had strong feelings and 
strong convictions about what could and should be done.”6 
Reagan also rejected the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. Foregoing 
defenses defied reason, he believed, and left American citizens vulnerable to 
nuclear annihilation. Such a policy was unconscionable. “MAD [was] madness,” 
the President maintained. “It was the craziest thing I ever heard of.” It rendered 
the world “a button push away from oblivion.”7 MAD depended upon the 
superpowers threatening each other’s survival forever, with no mistakes, no 
miscommunications, and no technical failures.8 Reagan thought such expecta-
tions were unreasonably high, and the stakes even higher. 
President Reagan rejected traditional approaches to arms control, which 
sought to limit the rate at which arsenals could continue to grow. Instead, he 
called for the reduction and eventual elimination of these weapons. During his 
first press conference in 1981, the President told reporters, “We should start nego-
tiating [with the Soviets] on the basis of trying to effect an actual reduction in the 
number of nuclear arms. That would then be real strategic arms limitation.”9 
Reagan repeatedly called for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and for him, the 
Zero Proposal was a first step toward this larger goal.10 Eliminating INF weapons 
from Europe would be a positive step in the right direction. “I believe there can 
only be one policy for preserving our precious civilization in this modern age: 
a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought,” the President 
explained in November 1983. “I know I speak for people everywhere when I say 
our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the 
5 Ronald Reagan, An American Life, New York 1990, p. 550, see also p. 265.
6 Martin Anderson, Revolution, New York 1987, p. 72. 
7 Reagan, An American Life, pp. 13, 547, 550.
8 Ronald Reagan, Remarks to the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, March 14, 1988. Text 
of speech is accessible at The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=35547#axzz1nhyn0pZ8.
9 Ronald Reagan, The President’s News Conference, January 29, 1981, in: Public Papers of the 
Presidency, 1981, pp. 55–62.
10 Ronald Reagan, An American Life, pp. 293–297.
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earth.”11 By the time he left office Reagan had called for the elimination of nuclear 
arsenals approximately 150 times.12 
2. Reagan’s Military Buildup 
Reagan’s military buildup was part of his plan to reduce and eventually eliminate 
nuclear weapons. Administration officials called this policy “peace through 
strength” and it had three objectives.13 The most immediate goal of the buildup 
was to match Soviet military capabilities. Reagan officials believed that the USSR 
had been engaged in a military buildup and was about to overtake the United 
States in the arms race.14 
The second objective was to deter Soviet expansionism. The Administration 
assumed that the USSR had invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 because 
Moscow believed the United States was too weak to challenge them. Reagan 
11 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Japanese Diet, November 11, 1983; Lou Cannon, President 
Hails Japan as Partner, in: Washington Post, November 11, 1983. 
12 Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson, Reagan’s Secret War: The Untold Story of his Fight 
to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster, New York 2009, pp. 93 f. 
13 See Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on Arms Reduction and Deterrence, November 
22, 1982, in: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 18, p. 1519; Ronald Reagan, 
Address to the Nation, March 23, 1983, in: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
1983, pp. 442–448; Ronald Reagan, The US–Soviet Relationship, January 16, 1984, in: 
Department of State Bulletin (February 1984), pp. 2–4; Ronald Reagan, Address to the 
United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 1984, in: American Foreign Policy Current 
Documents, Washington, D. C. 1984, pp. 220–227.
14 There were disagreements within the Administration as to whether the U. S. was in the 
process of falling behind the USSR in the arms race, or already in second place. More 
importantly, both arguments were wrong. They were based on U. S. intelligence assessments 
which indicated that the Soviets had been acquiring weapons at an increasingly faster pace 
during the 1970s. By 1982 the CIA had revised this assessment. New information indicated 
that Moscow had not been acquiring new weapons at an increasingly faster pace during 
the 1970s as previously believed. In fact, the growth rate in Soviet military expenditures 
had peaked in the mid-1970s, and was unlikely to increase in the near future. Nonetheless, 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey continued to 
suggest that the Soviets had been engaged in a threatening buildup. For example, see Soviet 
Defense Spending: Recent Trends and Future Prospects (written in 1982 but published in 
July 1983), and CIA, Office of Soviet Analysis, Joint Economic Committee Briefing Paper, 
September 14, 1983, pp. 8–11, 18. For a discussion about the process of reassessment and 
its aftermath, see Noel E. Firth and James H. Noren, Soviet Defense Spending: A History 
of CIA Estimates, 1950–1990, Texas 1998, pp. 75–97; James Noren, CIA’s Analysis of the 
Soviet Economy, in: Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Legget, Watching the Bear: Essays on 
CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, Washington, D. C. 2003. Available at https://www.cia.
gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/
watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-union/article02.html; Raymond 
L. Garthoff, The Great Transition, Washington, D. C. 1994, pp. 41 f.
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officials reasoned that a stronger U. S. would prevent the Soviets from seeking to 
further expand their sphere of influence.15 
President Reagan’s ultimate objective, however, was to persuade the Kremlin 
to reduce its arsenal. Administration officials assumed that Moscow would only 
make concessions if confronted by a strong and determined adversary. The 
U. S. needed to compel the Soviets to agree to arms reductions, these advisors 
reasoned. Thus, their strategy was to increase U. S. military capabilities so as to 
convince the Kremlin to enter into arms reductions talks.16 The buildup was 
meant to bring about a decrease in superpower arsenals. 
President Reagan explained his reasoning in 1982. “Some may question what 
modernizing our military has to do with peace,” he acknowledged. “[A] secure 
force keeps others from threatening us, and that keeps the peace. And just as 
important, it also increases the prospects of reaching significant arms reductions 
with the Soviets, and that’s what we really want. The United States wants deep 
cuts in the world’s arsenal of weapons, but unless we demonstrate the will to 
rebuild our strength and restore the military balance, the Soviets, since they’re 
so far ahead, have little incentive to negotiate with us. Let me repeat the point 
because it goes to the heart of our policies. Unless we demonstrate the will to 
rebuild our strength, the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate.”17 Although 
it seemed paradoxical, Reagan hoped the buildup would ultimately lead to arms 
reductions. 
3. SDI and the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
SDI was another critical component of Reagan’s quest to eliminate nuclear 
weapons. The President reasoned that even if nuclear arsenals were reduced by 
90 per cent the world would not be truly secure. “Peace” would still be achieved 
through the on-going threat of nuclear annihilation. Defenses were necessary to 
protect citizens from both accidental and intentional attacks. “Every offensive 
weapon ever invented by man has resulted in the creation of a defense against it,” 
he observed. “[Wasn’t] it possible in this age of technology that we could invent a 
defensive weapon that could intercept nuclear weapons and destroy them as they 
emerged from their silos?”18
15 This assumption was incorrect. The Kremlin decision to send armed forces to Afghanistan 
was based on a perceived need to support an ideological ally. Members of the Politburo were 
somewhat reluctant about the mission and within a month were looking for a face-saving 
way out. 
16 These assumptions were incorrect. For a variety of military, strategic, and financial reasons, 
the Kremlin favored an end to the arms race. 
17 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on Arms Reduction and Deterrence, November 22, 
1982, in: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 18, p. 1519. 
18 Reagan, An American Life, p. 547.
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When Reagan unveiled SDI in March 1983 he explained, “I’ve become more 
and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above 
dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence. 
Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to avenge them? […] What if free people 
could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat 
of instant U. S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and 
destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our 
allies. […]”19
Moreover, Reagan believed that an effective defensive system could pave the 
way for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. If the United States could 
defend itself from a nuclear attack, Soviet nuclear arsenals would be rendered 
useless, he reasoned. And if both the U. S. and the USSR had effective defenses, the 
weapons would become obsolete. Thus, they could be abolished. Consequently, 
the President repeatedly offered to share SDI technology with the Soviets. If both 
superpowers could defend themselves against a nuclear attack, Reagan explained 
to General Secretary Gorbachev, retaining such arsenals would be pointless. 
Thus, from the outset the President offered to share SDI technology with the 
Soviets.20 During the Geneva Summit and the Reyjavik meeting, as well as in 
letters to Soviet leaders, the President repeatedly offered to share SDI technology 
so as to pave the way for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
In short, from President Reagan’s perspective the U. S. military buildup, SDI, 
and the INF Treaty were all part and parcel of the same quest to abolish nuclear 
weapons. The U. S. buildup would persuade the Soviets to agree to arms reduc-
tions, SDI would render nuclear weapons impotent, and the Treaty would be the 
first step toward abolishing superpower arsenals. In Reagan’s mind there were no 
contradictions whatsoever. 
4. Rifts Between the President and His Advisors
For the most part, Reagan’s advisors did not share his unorthodox views about 
security. For one thing, they opposed the abolition of nuclear weapons. The 
experts believed that nuclear weapons had successfully deterred the Soviet Union 
from initiating a war with the West and expanding its empire. If the weapons were 
removed Moscow would embark on a series of military adventures intended to 
fulfill its territorial ambitions. 
19 Ronald Reagan, Address, March 23, 1983, in: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States, Ronald Reagan, 1983, Washington, D. C. 1984, pp. 442 f.
20 For example, see Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters, March 29, 1983, in: Public 
Papers of the President, 1983, pp. 463–470; and the transcripts from NSC meetings in: Jason 
Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: The Untold Story of Reagan’s Top-Secret Efforts to Win 
the Cold War, Pacific Palisades, CA 2010, pp. 349–422.
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Reagan’s advisors also supported MAD, claiming that this arrangement had 
kept the peace since the end of World War Two. Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig wrestled with the President over this issue in 1981. As Haig tells it, during a 
visit to Camp David, Reagan had drafted a personal letter to the Soviet General 
Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, which expressed his hope for “meaningful dialogue” 
and ultimately, the abolition of nuclear weapons. “[When I read it] I found myself 
astonished at his attitude when I measured it against the backdrop of what he was 
saying publicly and what was attributed to him as a classic cold warrior,” Haig 
told Reagan biographer, Lou Cannon. The letter “talked about a world without 
nuclear weapons, it talked about disarmament. […] It reflected a demeanor that 
if only those two men could sit down as rational human beings, the problems of 
the world would be behind us.” Haig considered the letter “naïve,” so he strongly 
advised against sending it. Reagan ultimately agreed not to send the letter, but he 
did not change his views about MAD or the need to abolish nuclear weapons.21 
Haig’s successor, George Shultz, found himself waging the same ideological 
battle. Shultz, who was normally quite deferential, repeatedly tried to persuade 
Reagan to support MAD. In late 1983 he prepared a paper for the President 
outlining the reasons to stick with the doctrine. “But I made little real impact on 
the president,” he conceded. “He stuck with his own deeply held view of where 
we should be heading.”22 
Most of Reagan’s advisors also opposed the Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI 
had been the President’s pet project. The development of the initial concept, along 
with the speech unveiling the program, had been conducted in secret. Reagan 
had wanted to ensure that his idea did not fall victim to bureaucratic battles or 
naysayers. Thus, neither the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of Defense was 
part of the venture. The normally placid Shultz was incensed when he learned 
of the program—two days before it was publicly unveiled. Assistant Secretary 
of State Richard Burt was “flabbergasted.”23 Both men, along with National 
Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, vehemently argued against the project. The 
program would be perceived as destabilizing and undermine Western security, 
they argued. The technology did not exist, the costs would prove exorbitant, and 
the program would cause serious rifts with Allies. 
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was the only senior advisor who backed 
SDI enthusiastically. Like Reagan, he believed the mutual vulnerability enshrined 
in MAD was nonsensical and thought defenses against Soviet nuclear missiles 
would be a positive step forward. The $26 billion flooding into his department 
was also a plus.24
21 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, New York 1991, p. 301.
22 George P.  Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, New York 1993, 
pp. 466, 509.
23 For more on the Reagan Administration officials’ reactions to SDI and the ensuing internal 
battles see ibid., pp. 246–264; Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in 
the Pentagon, New York 1990, pp. 291–329; and Martin Anderson, Revolution, pp. 80–99. 
24 Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, pp. 291–329.
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After repeatedly trying to talk the President out of the SDI program, Reagan’s 
advisors grudgingly came to accept it. Reagan was so enamored of the idea that 
they had little choice but to go along. Moreover, McFarlane and others came 
to believe that it could be a useful bargaining chip for extracting arms control 
concessions out of the Soviet Union. SDI could be traded away in exchange for a 
Soviet pledge to reduce its nuclear arsenals, these advisors reasoned.25
But Reagan’s advisors emphatically opposed his idea of sharing SDI technol-
ogy with the Soviets. They repeatedly beseeched the President to stop making 
such offers. The plan was not only untenable, they argued: sharing SDI would 
constitute the largest transfer of Western technology during the Cold War. 
Washington would be giving away its most valuable advantage over the Soviets. 
As Weinberger advised Reagan in February 1987, the idea of sharing SDI “scared 
the pants off” some of his officials, including the Defense Secretary himself.26 
“President Reagan was not only a true believer in SDI, he was definitely a true 
believer in sharing,” Jack Matlock, the Soviet expert on the National Security 
Council at the time explained in 1993. “[T]his was something that most of the 
bureaucracy, virtually the entire bureaucracy […] said we can’t do.”27 Frank 
Carlucci, who served as both Reagan’s National Security Advisor and Secretary of 
Defense recalls, “[The President] did, as best I could tell, sincerely believe that he 
could give [SDI] to the Russians and everything would be fine. And I and others 
tried to explain to him that technically that just was not feasible. And the only 
thing that finally convinced him, I remember [was] one day I said to him, ‘Mr. 
President, you have just got to stop saying that because Gorbachev, among others, 
doesn’t believe you.’ And he said, ‘Well, I guess you are right. He really doesn’t 
believe me.’ […] But it took a number of years to get him to that realization.”28 
25 Robert McFarlane, Consider What Star Wars Accomplished, in: New York Times, August 24, 
1993; McFarlane’s remarks, in: Nina Tannenwald (ed.), Understanding the End of the Cold 
War 1980–1987, oral history conference at Brown University 7–10 May 1998 (provisional 
transcript 1999), pp. 47 f., henceforth ‘Brown Conference’. See also the memo from Thomas 
Thorne, INR to Secretary Shultz, July 26, 1985, in: Tannenwald (ed.), Brown Conference. On 
the views Reagan’s officials held on SDI see Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to 
Abolish Nuclear Weapons, New York 2005, especially pp. 145–170. Reagan never saw SDI as 
a bargaining chip, however, and was adamant that it should not be treated as such. 
26 NSC Meeting, February 10, 1987, transcript in: Saltoun-Ebin, The Reagan Files, p. 370.
27 Jack Matlock’s remarks, in: A Retrospective on the End of the Cold War, oral history 
conference sponsored by The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 
Princeton University, February 26–7, 1993, Session II, pp. 81 f., henceforth “Princeton Con-
ference”. 
28 Carlucci’s remarks, in: Princeton Conference, Session II, p. 54. 
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5. SDI and the INF Treaty
From President Reagan’s perspective SDI and the INF Treaty were perfectly 
consistent. SDI would protect civilians from an intentional or accidental nuclear 
attack while the superpowers began the process of reducing their arsenals. And if 
both the U. S. and the USSR could build effective defenses, nuclear weapons would 
become useless, thus enabling them to be abolished. SDI and the INF Treaty 
would both facilitate the abolition of nuclear arsenals. 
But, as Reagan’s advisors anticipated, others had a different view. The Soviets 
found the two programs to be at odds. Reagan repeatedly called for the elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons yet he launched a military buildup and introduced 
what they called “space weapons.” From Moscow’s perspective SDI threatened 
to extend the arms race to space. If effective, it would enable the U. S. to attack 
the USSR without fear of a reprisal, thus upending the fragile peace between the 
superpowers. At the very least SDI contravened the 1972 ABM Treaty. 
While the Soviets were initially troubled about SDI these concerns dissipated 
as military scientists studied the matter.29 In the late 1970s the Soviets had 
considered launching a similar research program of their own and were conse-
quently deeply familiar with the technical challenges of building a space-based 
defensive system.30 This expertise enabled them to conclude that it was unlikely 
SDI would come to fruition any time soon. Experts advised the Kremlin that the 
Soviet Union should not invest resources trying to match SDI. If the system was 
ever built and deployed—and this was a big “if”—the Soviet Union could build 
inexpensive countermeasures that would overwhelm it.31 By the time Mikhail 
Gorbachev came to power in 1985 Soviet officials had begun to suspect that 
SDI was a ruse intended to lure the Soviets into wasting their resources on a 
comparable project, or perhaps a bargaining chip that Reagan would offer to trade 
away in exchange for Soviet pledges to reduce their arsenal.32
29 Vladimir Slipchenko, in: Tannenwald (ed.), Brown Conference, pp. 51–54; Aleksander Bess-
mertnykh, in: Princeton Conference, 1993, pp. 22–24. Yuri Andropov interview in: Pravda, 
March 26, 1983. 
30 In 1978 Soviet military scientist Vladimir Chelomei had proposed the construction of small 
space shuttles that would carry anti-satellite weapons into space. Like SDI, Chelomei’s 
proposal envisioned a space-based system of lasers capable of destroying incoming missiles. 
A key difference, however, was that President Reagan envisioned a purely defensive system, 
whereas the Soviet proposal included the ability to attack enemy satellites. See Steven 
J.  Zagola, Red Star Wars, in: Jane’s Intelligence Review 9/5 (May 1, 1997), pp. 205–208; 
David E.  Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and 
its Dangerous Legacy, New York 2009, pp. 215–218; Roald Z.  Sagdeev, The Making of a 
Soviet Scientist, New York 1994, especially pp. 96, 99, 123–124, and 202–211; and Matthew 
Evangelista, Unarmed Forces, Ithaca, NY 1999, pp. 233–248.
31 Evangelista, Unarmed Forces, p. 239.
32 Alexander Yakovlev, as cited in Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue, New York 
2000, p. 411. Oleg Grinevsky relates that Marshall Akhromeev called SDI “a chimera.” See 
Beth A. Fischer52
Like Reagan, Gorbachev abhorred nuclear weapons, and for a variety of stra-
tegic, military, and financial reasons, the Politburo sought to end the arms race. 
But SDI made it more difficult to do so. Soviet conservatives claimed that Reagan 
was launching a new arms race in space and therefore resisted arms reductions. 
The more belligerent Reagan seemed, the more these Soviet hard-liners resisted 
Gorbachev’s reforms. 
Gorbachev therefore sought to counter SDI in the most cost-effective manner 
possible: through diplomatic pressure. The Soviet leader tried to persuade Reagan 
to abandon SDI, or at the very least, to restrict it to the laboratory. Gorbachev 
reasoned that if he could get such assurances from the President, he could 
proceed with his main task, which was to end the arms race and eliminate nuclear 
weapons. Gorbachev’s strategy was to link SDI with arms reductions. The Soviets 
would agree to reduce their nuclear arms, he explained, if the President would 
forego SDI. In letter after letter and meeting after meeting Gorbachev tried to sell 
Reagan this “package.” 
But Reagan refused to budge. SDI was not a bargaining chip, he insisted. It was 
a means to protect civilians from nuclear Armageddon. The President thought it 
would be unconscionable to trade such protection away. 
Thus, the Strategic Defense Initiative stymied progress on the reduction of 
nuclear arsenals. The stand-off over SDI slowed progress on the conclusion of 
the INF Treaty. Both leaders bear the blame for this situation. Reagan’s initially 
belligerent rhetoric, combined with the military buildup and SDI, undermined 
his quest to abolish nuclear weapons. From Moscow’s perspective, launching a 
new weapons system while calling for the elimination of nuclear arms seemed 
contradictory. The Soviet camp questioned Reagan’s sincerity about both nuclear 
abolition and the objectives of SDI. The President also undermined progress 
on arms reductions by refusing to agree to restrict SDI to the laboratory, as 
Gorbachev requested. Realistically, the research program would have remained 
a laboratory experiment for two decades. As Secretary Shultz later remarked, 
Tannenwald (ed.), Brown Conference, p. 41. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, 
Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985, 
London 1991, pp. 112, 114, 106–115. Soviet suspicions were not entirely misplaced. In 1993, 
after an internal investigation, the then Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, confirmed that the 
United States did indeed have a program aimed at deceiving the Kremlin about SDI. The 
internal investigation determined that during the 1980s the Pentagon developed a deception 
program designed “to feed the Kremlin half-truths and lies about the project” and to prevent 
the Soviet Union from obtaining accurate information about SDI research. See Tim Weiner, 
Lies and Rigged ‘Star Wars’ Test Fooled the Kremlin, and Congress, in: The New York Times, 
August 18, 1993, p. A6; Tim Weiner, General Details Altered ‘Star Wars’ Test, in: The New 
York Times, August 27, 1993; Eric Schmitt, Aspin Disputes Report of ‘Star Wars’ Rigging, 
in: The New York Times, September 10, 1993; and U. S. General Accounting Office, Ballistic 
Missile Defense: Records Indicate Deception Program Did Not Affect 1984 Test Results, 
GAO NSIAD-94–219 (July 1994).
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agreeing to such a restriction would have been like “giving [Gorbachev] the 
sleeves from our vest.”33
But Gorbachev made the tactical error of linking SDI and nuclear arms reduc-
tion. Consequently, no progress could be made on reducing nuclear weapons until 
Reagan conceded on SDI. Linking the issues enabled SDI to become a roadblock. 
By 1987 Gorbachev’s advisors were urging him to de-link SDI and nuclear 
arms reductions. “The package” had backfired. There had been no progress on 
the main goal—arms reductions—because the process had been held hostage 
to SDI. The advisors urged him to deal with each issue separately. On February 
28, 1987, Gorbachev “untied the package,” announcing that the Soviet Union 
would be willing to discuss the reduction of nuclear missiles separately from the 
Strategic Defense Initiative. This led to a major breakthrough and was pivotal in 
ending the Cold War. Alleviated of the need to find common ground on SDI, the 
two sides quickly reached an agreement to eliminate intermediate-range forces in 
Europe. Ten months later Gorbachev and Reagan signed the historic INF Treaty. 
6. Conclusion
President Reagan had unconventional views about security which led to policies 
that could appear to be contradictory. The President’s repeated calls for the 
elimination of nuclear weapons seemed inconsistent with his military buildup 
and SDI. Such seeming inconsistencies proved frustratingly perplexing to both 
Reagan’s advisors and the Soviet leaders. But for Reagan the ultimate goal was 
the abolition of nuclear weapons. The buildup, SDI, the Zero Proposal, and the 
INF Treaty were all part of the President’s quest for a more stable system of global 
security. President Reagan sought to replace mutual assured destruction with 
mutual assured survival.34 The INF Treaty was meant to be a major step on this 
journey. 
33 George Shultz, Oral History at Miller Center, December 18, 2002, http://web1.millercenter.
org/poh/transcripts/ohp_2002_1218_shultz.pdf.
34 Reagan, An American Life, p. 550.
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It’s Only Easy in Retrospect:  
The American Road to INF, 1986–1987
We should not allow the emerging consensus on the INF Treaty’s historical 
significance to obscure the complexity of its origins. As with so many historical 
events, things that appear inevitable in retrospect were predicted by few in 
advance. Both then and now, informed observers have struggled to explain the 
circuitous, decade-long path that wound from Helmut Schmidt’s stern warnings 
about Soviet missile deployments to NATO’s Double-Track Decision, and then, via 
a deployment that contributed to the collapse of détente, to that final Washington 
signing ceremony. It’s a story set to the background music of an increasingly shrill 
and apocalyptic rhetoric of anti-missile protest marches, which ended at a summit 
between a reformist Soviet leader and an American President who had once called 
the Soviet Union “the focus of evil in the modern world.”1 
This fascinating story has only gained in appeal in the last few years. The 
present essay was originally written for a conference to mark the thirtieth anni-
versary of the Washington Treaty, but now appears in print after a subsequent 
U. S. President has withdrawn from the agreement in response to alleged Russian 
violations. It remains to be seen whether any new negotiations will result in a 
more satisfactory agreement, as negotiators on both sides have suggested. The 
future remains as hidden from us as it always has been, but, as we experience 
the politics surrounding the Treaty’s death, it is appropriate that we consider the 
developments and decisions that brought it to life in the first place.
The American road to the INF Treaty was the product of both long- and short-
term elements, all of which were important; neither the long-term factors nor the 
short would have been sufficient on their own. The long-term element was the 
particular vision of Ronald Reagan, who rose to the leadership of the Republican 
party as an avatar of hardline anti-Communist conservatism but who also 
pursued a nuclear abolition agenda that was out of line with that held by many of 
his supporters. In the short term, the American political developments of 1986 
and 1987 that weakened the Reagan Administration, along with the domestic and 
international pressures that moved Gorbachev to reach a compromise, created an 
opportunity for the President to close this nuclear deal and end his term of office 
1 Ronald Reagan, Speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, Orlando, Florida, March 
8, 1983. Text at https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/30883b (accessed March 
14, 2020). See also Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan, 
Washington D. C. 1983, p. 364.
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on a historically positive note. This brief essay will attempt to sketch these two 
sides of the story, to help us understand both how a historical agreement can be 
the product of such disparate forces, and how similar forces can work against such 
deals in the future. It aims to contribute to an understanding of the late Cold War 
era that is post-revisionist (for want of a better term) and which highlights the 
surprising interplay of long-held beliefs and political opportunities that led to a 
success many had dreamt of, but few had predicted.
1. Ronald Reagan, “Secret Dove?”
Our understanding of the American position on the INF issue has to begin with 
a recognition that INF was a natural culmination of the Reagan defense buildup. 
This aspect is underappreciated, even by some of the most recent scholarship, 
which continues to frame the Reagan Administration’s embrace of disarmament 
as a “reversal.”2 Beth Fischer and the scholars who have learned from her path-
breaking work are correct in noting the apparent change of course in Reagan’s 
arms control policy. This, they say, began in late 1983, when Reagan moved away 
from the position taken during his first term—at that time, stressing the need to 
close an alleged “window of vulnerability” through substantial increases in the 
American defense budget—and moved toward an openness to arms control.3 
According to that long dominant narrative, Soviet overreaction to NATO’s Able 
Archer exercise, which an increasingly nervous Soviet leadership thought was 
preparation for an actual attack, combined with concerns about the approaching 
1984 Presidential elections to make Reagan rethink his rhetorical approach to the 
Soviets.4 That rethinking coincided with the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev, 
who had his own reasons for offering Reagan the opportunity to strike the 
historic deal in Washington.5 
That visible break, however, should not obscure the basic continuity in 
 Reagan’s own thinking about nuclear weapons. Even now that Reagan’s historical 
image has been “rehabilitated” by scholars like Fischer, there is still a tendency 
amongst commentators to imagine those moves as the product of external forces 
influencing the President rather than to credit them to his agency. Reagan’s critics 
were so wedded to his image as a trigger-happy cowboy that, unsurprisingly, his 
2 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, Columbia 
1997.
3 Fischer has now significantly revised her original position, see Beth A.  Fischer, Building 
Up and Seeking Peace: President Reagan’s Cold War Legacy, in: Jeffrey L. Chidster and Paul 
Kengor (eds.), Reagan’s Legacy in a World Transformed, Cambridge / Mass. 2015, pp. 165–177; 
as well as her contribution to this volume.
4 Nate Jones (ed.), Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise That Almost 
Triggered Nuclear War, New York 2016; Marc Ambinder, The Brink: President Reagan and 
the Nuclear War Scare of 1983, New York 2018. 
5 See the contribution by Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton in this volume. 
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embrace of arms control caused cognitive dissonance; and this has lasted from his 
own time to subsequent historical interpretations.6 Even scholars who consider 
themselves even-handed with Reagan have struggled to accept the possibility that 
rearmament and disarmament always went together. 
Reagan himself asserted a continuity in his policy vision that neither crit-
ics nor admirers have completely understood or consistently applied in their 
analyses. One-time critics who now have kind words for Reagan tend to shift 
responsibility for his previous sins onto his more conservative advisors, while 
praising the sensible moderate advisors who guided him onto wiser paths.7 
Among the latter, they particularly single out Secretary of State George Shultz. 
But conservative activists, then and now, tend to do the opposite, blaming alleged 
moderates like Shultz and the Chief of General Staff, James Baker, for betraying 
the Reagan Revolution, as they criticize some of the Reagan policies. So, in their 
search for the “Real Reagan,” scholars have often only found the Reagan they 
wanted to find in the first place. As speechwriter Aram Bakshian noted, when 
people said “Let Reagan be Reagan,” they usually meant, “Let me be Reagan.”8
This is unfortunate, because it not only misses the complexity of Reagan as a 
character, but also the complexity of his team and the role they played in produc-
ing the Washington Treaty. I say this not to claim any of the mystical qualities 
attributed to Reagan that dot the hagiographic literature on the man,9 but rather 
in a plea for scholars to apply the same serious Verstehen to the relationship 
between Reagan’s intentions and results that scholars apply to the protesters 
who denounced the President’s policies.10 Whether or not those protesters were 
correct in their assumptions about the President and in their predictions of 
imminent nuclear disaster, scholars do understand the value of treating them on 
their own terms. Like many a peace marcher, however, many Reagan research-
ers have not fully appreciated that the President was actually serious in his 
belief that the point of the arms buildup—the buildup he called “peace through 
strength”—might actually have been to make the U. S. strong enough to negotiate 
when the time was right; and he certainly assembled a team of advisors who made 
6 Laurence I. Barrett, Gambling with History. Reagan in the White House, New York 1984 
(paperback ed.) is a perfect example of the conventional wisdom during the Reagan Era. 
Among the well known post-Reagan works, France FitzGerald, Way out There in the Blue, 
New York 2000, also emphasized Reagan’s irresponsible rhetoric on missile defense, treating 
the INF Treaty as largely Gorbachev’s accomplishment.
7 James Graham Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation. Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s 
Engagement and the End of the Cold War, Ithaca 2014.
8 Interview with Aram Bakshian, in: Miller Center, Ronald Reagan Oral History [MCOH], Jan-
uary 14, 2002, pp. 31, 42, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/
aram-bakshian-jr-oral-history-director-speechwriting.
9 Peter Schweizer, Victory. The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the 
End of the Cold War, New York 1994; idem, Reagan’s War. The Epic Story of his Forty-Year 
Struggle and Final Triumph over Communism, New York 2003.
10 Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon (eds.), Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear, and 
the Cold War of the 1980s, New York 2017.
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that possible. For all their occasionally intense disagreements on details, those 
advisors who worked with Reagan the longest, including the pair most often 
described as polar opposites, Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger, did so because they shared an overall strategy for 
advancing American interests. It was one in which a military buildup and an 
arms control strategy were intimately bound together.11
A central element of that strategy was Reagan’s deep aversion to nuclear weap-
ons, which distinguished him from other conservatives, who advocated strength 
and distrusted arms control.12 This is what led Reagan to embrace the “zero 
option,” something he advocated for all nuclear weapons and which eventually 
found expression in the INF Treaty. More conventional arms control experts—of 
both parties—viewed the zero option as either a dangerous delusion or a clever 
dodge to avoid negotiations. Whether inside or outside the Reagan Administra-
tion, they were generally shocked when Reagan actually followed through on it as 
a practical policy. Reagan aide Annelise Anderson argues that Shultz and others 
in the arms control world initially thought Reagan’s anti-nuclear positions were 
“nuts.” But the pragmatic Shultz also warned his staff, “You better get used to it 
because that’s what he thinks.”13 
Shultz found a way to channel Reagan’s enthusiasm for arms reduction in the 
direction of opening talks with the Soviets. His success and his positive press 
image allowed many writers to imagine that he had somehow taken Reagan 
somewhere the President did not want to go, missing the point that, despite his 
advocacy of the largest defense buildup in peacetime American history, Reagan’s 
goal was always zero. To acknowledge that, however, threatened to confuse those 
who already thought they had Reagan clearly categorized.
The confusion goes back to Reagan’s first embrace of the zero option, in his 
November 18, 1981 speech to the National Press Club.14 Reagan gave that speech, 
shortly before American and Soviet negotiators were getting ready to meet in 
Geneva as part of the negotiation package of NATO’s Double-Track Decision. 
NBC’s Marvin Kalb struggled to make sense of Reagan’s musings about a world 
without nuclear weapons, and asked Secretary Weinberger half-jokingly, “Have 
you always been secret doves?” Weinberger asserted that he did not “see any 
change from dove to hawk […] or anything of that kind at all. I see a perfectly 
clear evolution of a policy which the President enunciated many times last year 
11 Ronald J. Granieri, Beyond Cap the Foil. Caspar Weinberger and the Reagan Era Defense 
Buildup, in: Bradley Coleman and Kyle Longley (eds.), The Enduring Legacy. Leadership and 
National Security Affairs during the Reagan Presidency, Lexington KY 2017, pp. 51–80.
12 Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, New York 2006.
13 Annelise Anderson, MCOH, Interview (December 17, 2002), pp. 56 f., https://millercenter.
org/ the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/annelise-anderson-oral-history-associate-
director-office.
14 Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and 
Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/ 
111881a. (accessed March 14, 2020).
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[…] to arm and regain the strength of the United States so that we can enter into 
effective negotiating discussions.”15
Getting from that idea to the actual Washington Treaty was, of course, not 
always so simple. One of the foremost historians of the Cold War, Melvyn Leffler, 
offers an example of how scholars can gain a better understanding of what was 
happening in a recent essay in which he emphasized the significance of Reagan’s 
“desires to abolish nuclear weapons, tamp down the strategic arms race, and 
avoid Armageddon.” Even though many of his advisors were more suspicious of 
Soviet intentions and reluctant to pursue radical change, Leffler writes, “Reagan’s 
sincerity, goodwill, strong desire for negotiations, and shared commitment to 
nuclear abolition (however abstract) reassured Gorbachev, helping to sustain a 
trajectory whose end results the Soviet leader did not foresee or contemplate. 
Paradoxically, then, Reagan nurtured the dynamics that won the Cold War by 
focusing on ways to end it.”16 
As much as Reagan disliked nuclear weapons personally, however, his rise to 
power depended in no small part on the coalescence of a conservative critique 
of arms control. Both his 1976 and 1980 campaigns built on his suspicion of 
the arms control process. Along the way, Reagan gathered a diverse collection 
of arms control critics, giving them coherence and a common home, enabling 
them to become an authentic conservative counterculture. That counterculture 
had helped alter the direction of the arms control narrative with the emergence 
of the Second Cold War after 1979. Historians generally agree that the success of 
conservative opinion leaders like William F. Buckley Jr. in marginalizing fringe 
elements and bringing together the main strands of conservatism in the 1960s 
created a movement with which Ronald Reagan could ride to victory in 1980. But 
arms control, too, provided a particularly useful issue to attract disparate groups 
to Reagan’s banner.17
Too much work on the historical development of the foreign- and security-
policy views of the American Right tends to collapse definitions rather than 
refine them. Thanks especially to the bruising political debates inspired by the 
Bush (43rd) Administration’s foreign policy, terms such as “neo-conservative” 
and “hard-liner” have been tossed around so much that they have lost their 
specific meanings. Even good books tend to ignore very real differences in detail 
that separated, and continue to separate, them.18 While not advocating splitting 
15 Weinberger and Kalb on Meet the Press, November 22, 1981, in: Public Statements of 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 1981, Vol 5, Washington 1981, p. 3427.
16 Melvyn P. Leffler, Ronald Reagan and the Cold War. What Mattered Most, in: Texas National 
Security Review, 1/3 (May 2018), http://hdl.handle.net/2152/65636 (accessed July 15, 2018).
17 On the development of the Reagan coalition and the Conservative movement in general, see 
Rick Perlstein, The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan, New York, 
2015. See also George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 
1945, 30th Anniversary Edition, Wilmington DE 2006.
18 Len Colodny and Tom Schachtman, The Forty Years War. The Rise and Fall of the Neocons, 
from Nixon to Obama, New York 2009.
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for its own sake, I think it is important that we don’t lose all sense of the trees 
when describing the forest. Understanding differences in origin and goals can 
help us understand both how political coalitions emerge and also how and why 
they break up.
A line of simply opposing arms control was neither unique nor a sufficient 
description of Reagan’s positions. A segment of the American policy elite had 
been arguing in this way throughout the Cold War, but simple rejectionism had 
been defeated in the 1970s, when the emergence of the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT) process altered the political debate.19 Conservatives needed to 
regroup if they hoped to shape any future debate, and this forced them to refine 
both the nature of their critique and their vision for the future. 
The most important distinction between groupings in the Reagan team was 
that between the anti-nuclear hawks and the hard bargainers. The first group 
got its name from a term used by one of the men Reagan appointed to direct 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman. It was how 
he described his boss’s basic outlook. According to Adelman, Reagan wanted a 
strong national defense but “couldn’t stand nuclear weapons; he wanted to get 
rid of nuclear weapons.”20 Secretary of Defense Weinberger also admitted in a 
private conversation that “Ronald Reagan detests [nuclear weapons] more than 
anyone I’ve ever dealt with.”21 That attitude was not immediately apparent to 
all those who supported Reagan nor to those who feared him. Many Reagan 
supporters, hardened by the arms control debates of the 1970s, assumed that 
conservatism required an attachment to nuclear weapons and a rejection of all 
deals. Adelman himself admitted “All of us who were conservative thought that 
when [Jimmy] Carter said, ‘I want to eliminate nuclear weapons,’ that was the 
stupidest thing we’d ever heard. We all made fun of it, and then we have our hero 
who says things really more extreme than Carter ever does, and he’s unstoppable 
on doing it.”22 As we have pointed out, subsequent literature has emphasized the 
nuclear abolitionism that ran consistently through Reagan’s policies. He opposed 
conventional arms control because it did not aim at reductions, and believed that 
an arms buildup was the best way to respond to the Soviet threat until reductions 
became possible. Reagan’s critique of SALT II was twofold. Essentially, he attacked 
the treaty from both the left and the right. He believed it wrong merely to limit 
future growth of stockpiles, preferring to negotiate on reducing existing forces. 
19 Matthew J. Ambrose, The Control Agenda. A History of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, 
Ithaca 2017.
20 Kenneth Adelman, MCOH, Interview (September 30, 2003), p. 38, https://millercenter.org/
the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/kenneth-adelman-oral-history-director-arms-
control-and.
21 Weinberger comment in conversation with Clare Booth Luce, quoted in: William F. Buckley, 
Jr., The Reagan I Knew, New York 2008, p. 190.
22 Adelman, MCOH, Interview (September 30, 2003), p. 38, https://millercenter.org/the- presi 
dency/presidential-oral-histories/kenneth-adelman-oral-history-director-arms-control- and. 
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On the other hand, he was convinced that the Soviets “cheated” or “fudged” on 
the limitations.23 
Thus, when in office, he rejected the traditional arms control path and instead 
embraced the “zero option” idea presented by Weinberger and the Pentagon (an 
idea they themselves had borrowed from the Europeans). As early as October 
1981, Weinberger had argued that the administration “might need to consider a 
bold plan, sweeping in nature, to capture world opinion,” and advocated zero.24 
He stood by that position even as political pressure built to abandon it, both for 
larger strategic reasons and for political purposes. As a Defense Department 
paper argued in 1983, “European opponents of deployments now have a stake in 
the negotiations because they might lead to a zero outcome; abandon ‘zero’ and 
their interest will diminish sharply.”25 The zero option rejected intermediate 
steps, accepting short- and medium-term increases in arms in return for the long-
term vision of abolition. This vision was certainly paradoxical, but that does not 
necessarily mean it was dishonest, and we cannot understand the Reagan record 
on arms control without appreciating how sincerely held, yet contradictory, his 
convictions were. 
Reagan’s attitude found its most profound expression in his advocacy of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which in its ideal form was intended to made 
nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.”26 The anti-nuclear hawk vision added 
an important long-term idealism to what could otherwise sound and look like 
simple rejectionism. And it had important political consequences, since it made 
Reagan’s significant and (for many) shocking flirtation with nuclear abolition 
at Reykjavik possible in October 1986, which ultimately led to the INF Treaty in 
Washington a year later. 
The second group, the hard bargainers, included those security professionals 
who did not reject arms control per se, but who felt that previous administra-
tions had negotiated bad agreements. Reagan sometimes spoke in this vein, but 
the more consistent advocates of this position were veterans of the Nixon and 
Ford Administrations, such as Secretary of State Alexander Haig and National 
Security Advisor Robert McFarlane. The hard bargainers did not reject the arms 
control process. They argued, rather, that they could manage that process better 
than their Democratic predecessors. They claimed to be realists, not idealists, 
somewhat to the right but clearly within a generalized arms control consensus. 
23 Douglas Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries, p. 297, 332 (January 29; June 3 and 4, 1985).
24 Meeting of the National Security Council on October 13, 1981, in: FRUS 1981–1988, 
Vol. 3 (Soviet Union 1981–1983), ed. by James Graham Wilson, Washington 2016, Doc. 92, 
pp. 309–315, especially p. 313.
25 Defense Paper, cited in: Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security 
Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan, January 1983, in: ibid., p. 852; Reagan Diaries, p. 125 
(January 13, 1983).
26 Reagan’s televised speech, March 23, 1983, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/ 
32383d.
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Haig, for example, prided himself on being tough with the Soviets, famously 
revoking Ambassador Dobrynin’s privileged access to the State Department 
parking garage once he took over at Foggy Bottom.27 An important link between 
Reagan and the security policy establishment, Haig believed that the arms control 
process should continue. He was therefore appalled by the zero option, arguing 
that it was a bad idea to take a position that could not, he felt, be the basis for 
negotiations.28 Convinced that it was his job to be the voice of reason, speaking 
for the entire American foreign policy community, Haig never quite grasped the 
differences between his position and Reagan’s. In an NSC meeting on the eve 
of Reagan’s announcement of the zero option, he argued against making zero 
the official administration line. Seeking a basis for negotiations, he suggested 
instead that American policy should seek “the lowest possible number” of nuclear 
weapons. When Reagan and Weinberger pushed back, Haig responded that he 
agreed zero was the ultimate goal, only to have Weinberger reply: “then we should 
say so.”29 Reagan concurred.
McFarlane, who took over as National Security Advisor in 1983, after serving 
as Counselor to Haig in the State Department as well as Deputy National Security 
Advisor, echoed Haig’s sentiment and was often frustrated by Reagan’s attitude. 
For example, after Congress rejected plans for the MX missile, a new ICBM 
that was originally intended to modernize the American land-based deterrent, 
McFarlane endorsed using SDI as a possible bargaining chip in getting the Soviets 
to reduce their own ICBM force. He was genuinely shocked when Reagan made 
it clear that he did not intend to negotiate SDI away, no matter what the Soviets 
might be willing to give up in return.30 These were the positions that Shultz 
called “nuts.”
Reagan was willing to wait a long time for the right deal, and to walk away 
from half-measures. Thus when the Soviets showed little interest in the zero 
option, and when the 1983 deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise Missiles led 
them to break off the Geneva talks, Reagan took a less tragic view than some of 
his advisors—and certainly less than the Democratic opposition in Congress or 
the media. “Some on our side want us to come up with an additional proposal” 
to keep the Soviets from walking away, Reagan confided in his diary. “That is 
lousy negotiating strategy […] We can’t keep changing our proposals every time 
they say nyet.”31 ACDA director Adelman followed Reagan’s position closely. “My 
objective was to get a good treaty if we could do it, and if we didn’t have a treaty 
at the end of four years, then we didn’t. I didn’t need a treaty; the United States 
27 Alexander M. Haig, Caveat. Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy, New York 1984, pp.100 f. 
28 Ambrose, Control Agenda, pp. 183–185.
29 Memorandum for the Record of the National Security Meeting, November 12, 1981, p. 4, 
in: box 91282, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Meeting Files, Ronald Reagan 
Library, Simi Valley, CA. 
30 Wilson, Triumph of Improvisation, pp. 107 f.
31 Reagan Diaries, p. 186 (October 12, 1983).
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didn’t need a treaty. Maybe the President’s political guys needed a treaty, but if 
they did, they’d need someone else to get them a treaty.”32 
Variety within the conservative coalition was essential for Reagan’s success, but 
also contributed to the apparent incoherence of the Administration’s policies, not 
to mention the eventual crisis the Republican Party faces today. In arms control 
the differences were not immediately problematic, as the generalized critique of 
the Carter Administration’s approach worked well in blurring differences among 
conservatives, and the alternately threatening and sclerotic Soviet leadership 
of the early 1980s did not offer a terribly appealing negotiating partner for any 
arms control breakthroughs. But the coalition suffered significant strains during 
Reagan’s second term, as its abolitionist President moved towards negotiations. 
When the concrete opportunity for talks appeared, once Mikhail Gorbachev had 
come to power in Moscow in 1985, Reagan moved cautiously but determinedly 
to seize it. Nevertheless, domestic politics as well as the changing international 
climate influenced the shape those talks eventually took.
2. The Politics of Diplomacy and the Diplomacy of Politics
Even with a clearer understanding of Reagan’s motivations, we still need to 
appreciate the political context that made the Washington Treaty possible. It was 
a success for Reagan and Gorbachev, but it was not the success that either had 
initially hoped to reach. The specific form of the agreement reflected the politics 
of the late Reagan Administration, and although Reagan would defend the agree-
ment by emphasizing its connection to his larger vision, our historical perspective 
reveals the interplay between long-term strategy and immediate political tactics.
The path to INF wound through two summits and the Administration’s 
near-death experience in the Iran-Contra scandal, all of which, along with the 
increasing global popularity of Gorbachev’s reform agenda, prepared the ground 
for the Treaty. Despite his career of anti-Communist rhetoric, Reagan had been 
eager to meet with Soviet leaders ever since he came into office. Even from his 
hospital bed, as he recovered from a spring 1981 assassination attempt, Reagan 
composed a long letter to Leonid Brezhnev, concluding with his hope for a “mean-
ingful and constructive dialogue which will assist us in our joint obligation to 
find lasting peace.”33 Such a meeting did not become a real possibility, however, 
until Gorbachev’s arrival on the scene. Many conservatives—those who had 
denounced previous Soviet leaders for being Communist true believers—were 
32 Adelman MCOH, 36–7. Adelman recounts with some resentment that Colin Powell, at that 
time one of Reagan’s military assistants, joked that Adelman was head of ACDA and opposed 
arms control. He claims he retorted, “Yes, you were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and you 
didn’t like war.”
33 Quoted in Barrett, Gambling with History, pp. 31–33. See also Reagan Diaries, pp. 13–15 
(April 18, 22, and 23, 1981).
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not mollified by Gorbachev’s calls for Glasnost and Perestroika. Indeed, they saw 
him as even more dangerous than his predecessors, as his popularity in the West 
might undermine Western solidarity. Reagan himself was not unaware of these 
dangers, but, encouraged by Shultz, he was committed to pursuing dialogue. 
The course of true détente never did run smooth. After a first meeting in 
Geneva in 1985, the two sides began a wary dialogue. Significant differences 
remained on fundamental issues, such as the relationship between strategic and 
intermediate-range forces and the role of SDI. For all his commitment to nuclear 
abolition, Reagan’s attachment to “Star Wars” threatened the progress of arms 
control. He may have sincerely believed that SDI could be a force for peace by 
removing the danger of nuclear attack, but he failed to appreciate what the project 
must look like from Moscow’s perspective. For the Russians, as for Reagan’s 
critics, SDI appeared to be either a colossal boondoggle or a roundabout way of 
preparing the United States to launch a devastating first strike.34
At the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, Gorbachev and Reagan flirted with 
the idea of massive cuts in their strategic nuclear forces, and the occasion has 
taken on mythic proportions in the Reagan literature, including a recent memoir 
by Kenneth Adelman.35 But it is worth remembering that, at the time, skeptical 
observers thought Reagan’s rash entertainment of the abolition of all nuclear 
weapons and his ultimate refusal to sacrifice SDI for the purpose at the “slapdash 
summit” were equally irresponsible stances. They concluded that “the casual way 
in which Reagan played at gambling away the West’s nuclear deterrent is beyond 
question and without match.” For critics writing in the immediate aftermath, 
the success of Reagan’s team in their bid to spin the summit into “Reagan’s finest 
hour” was both inexplicable and infuriating.36
Observers back home viewed Reykjavik within the context of a much bigger 
story arising at the same time: the Iran-Contra scandal.37 Instead of hailing 
theoretical developments in arms control, the American press and public saw a 
President who had become so detached from the details of government, or blinded 
by his own ideological prejudices, that he had allowed rogue elements of his own 
government not only to sell arms secretly to enemies of the United States in 
Teheran, but to use the proceeds from those sales to finance the anti-Communist 
Contras in Nicaragua—all of which was in direct contravention of Congressional 
34 FitzGerald, Way out There in the Blue, pp. 248–254; Ralph Dietl, The strategic defense 
initiative: Ronald Reagan, NATO Europe, and the nuclear and space talks, 1981–1988, 
Lanham / New York / London 2019.
35 Kenneth Adelman, Reagan at Reykjavik. Forty-Eight Hours that Ended the Cold War, New 
York 2014. See also Wilson, Triumph of Improvisation, pp. 111–130.
36 Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, Landslide. The Unmaking of the President, 1984–1988, 
Boston 1988, pp. 282–284. A more even-handed assessment of Reykjavik can be found in Sean 
Wilentz, The Age of Reagan. A History, 1974–2008, New York 2008, especially pp. 254–259.
37 For discussions of Iran-Contra generally, here and below see Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 
pp. 209–244. An indispensable source remains Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), 
The Iran–Contra Scandal. The Declassified History. New York 1993.
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resolutions and perhaps of the Constitution. From the fall of 1986 through the 
summer of 1987, President Reagan and his supporters struggled, and largely 
failed, to explain what had happened in any way that could satisfy the American 
public. Reagan’s own closest advisors Weinberger and Shultz had advised against 
the Iran deal, but Reagan, moved by the plight of Western hostages in Lebanon, 
had allowed secret contacts to go forward. Even if he denied knowledge of 
the financial machinations, the scandal rocked his Administration. National 
Security Advisor McFarlane had especially encouraged the policy. He had hoped 
a successful secret opening to Iran would provide a breakthrough in the Middle 
East—something equivalent to Henry Kissinger’s work to open relations with 
China. Instead, he exposed his President to the same sort of constitutional danger 
that brought down Kissinger’s boss. Televised congressional hearings were just 
the most obvious connection between this scandal and the Watergate scandal 
that had driven Richard Nixon from office barely a decade earlier.38 
Reagan survived the scandal, but his popularity and his reputation suffered a 
sharp and immediate blow. In early December 1986, for example, he noted with 
dismay: “71 % of the people like & think I’m a nice fellow. But 60 % don’t think 
I’m telling the truth.”39 Eventually, primary responsibility for both the arms 
sales and the diversions to the Contras fell on McFarlane (who had resigned his 
position earlier) and on his successor John Poindexter, but especially on NSC 
staffer Lt. Col. Oliver North, who had done most of the ground-level work on 
both the arms sales and the diversion. Each took their turn before the Congres-
sional investigating committee and the television cameras during the summer of 
1987, forced to confess their guilt. More importantly for the President, they also 
absolved Reagan of criminal culpability, claiming that they had acted without his 
direct knowledge of the details. Reagan’s escape, however, came at a steep per-
sonal price. Some critics may have believed he was more or less innocent, having 
already concluded that he was either too old, too incurious, or too incompetent to 
mastermind a conspiracy against the Constitution. Even his defenders, however, 
hastened to blame enthusiastic underlings who had acted without the President’s 
notice. Only recently have scholars been able to piece together the degree to which 
Reagan was not only aware, but also strongly supportive, of many aspects of the 
scandal.40 
38 Ibid. For a history of the hearings written by two Senators who participated, see William 
S. Cohen and George J. Mitchell, Men of Zeal. A Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra 
Hearings, New York 1988. See also The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On, National Security 
Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.  210, 2006, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/
NSAEBB210/index.htm. 
39 Reagan Diaries, p. 455 (December 1, 1986).
40 Malcolm Byrne, Iran–Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential 
Power, Lawrence KS 2017. See also The Iran–Contra Affair 30 Years Later: A Milestone in 
Post-Truth Politics, National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 567, edited by Malcolm 
Byrne, 2016. 
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By early 1987, a weakened President needed a policy success to restore his 
standing and get his Administration going again for its final act. At this moment, 
Gorbachev rode to the rescue. As Sean Wilentz argues, Reagan “found, in his 
work with Gorbachev, an escape route out of his political morass.” For reasons of 
his own, Gorbachev offered Reagan “a helping hand to lift him out of the riptide 
of the Iran–Contra Affair.” Facing criticism at home for failing to deliver the 
promised international breakthroughs in arms control that would allow further 
reforms, Gorbachev helped break the Reykjavik deadlock. In February 1987, he 
offered to decouple the INF issue from broader discussions of SDI and strategic 
weapons, making a significant INF deal possible. Reagan had also managed to 
regain some of his ideological élan with a speech made in Berlin that June, in 
which he called on Gorbachev to “tear down this wall.”41 The speech, though not 
as important as some later analysts have tried to claim by linking it to the actual 
collapse of the Berlin Wall more than two years later, did serve an important 
purpose. By calling for the elimination of the wall as something that could be 
accomplished through appeals to Gorbachev, the President declared, at the same 
time, both his commitment to Cold War ideals and his willingness to negotiate 
with the Soviet leader.42
From that point, things moved quite rapidly. Negotiations for the INF Treaty 
on the basis of “double zero” progressed to their conclusion, and Gorbachev’s visit 
to Washington for the signing was a public relations triumph for him.43 Reagan 
built on the success of the Treaty in his own visit to Moscow the following May. 
There, Reagan and Gorbachev walked through Red Square, and Reagan had his 
chance to greet excited Russians. When asked how he could relate this reception 
to his previous statements about the “evil empire,” he responded: “I was talking 
about another time and another era.”44
The INF Treaty has emerged as one of Reagan’s signal triumphs, and contrib-
uted to the upswing in personal popularity that not only carried him through 
the rest of his term but also helped guarantee the election of his Vice President, 
George H. W.  Bush, as his successor in November 1988. Even that success, 
however, had to be filtered through the lens of American politics. Reagan’s 
critics focused on his previous image as a cold warrior and on his failures in the 
Iran–Contra scandal; they were slow to accept the INF Treaty as a success. One of 
the bestselling analyses of Reagan’s presidency, Landslide by veteran Washington 
reporters Jane Mayer and Doyle McManus, which was published during his final 
year in office, offered a narrative of Reagan’s second term as a series of calamities. 
Denouncing the Reykjavik meeting as a “slapdash summit,” these authors dis-
played even less enthusiasm for the INF Treaty, which barely merited a paragraph 
41 Reagan’s remarks at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, June 12, 1987; https://www.reaganlibrary.
gov/research/speeches/061287d.
42 Wilentz, Age of Reagan, pp. 244, 259–261. 
43 Wilson, Triumph of Improvisation, pp. 132–137.
44 Ibid., p. 140.
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in a 400-page book. Contrasting the Treaty with Reagan’s alleged failure to make 
progress in “other, more critical aspects of arms control” (never specified), Mayer 
and McManus dismissed the INF Treaty and the follow-up in Moscow as the end 
of a process in which “a Presidency once known for its ideological fervor now 
seemed to be devolving into a series of pleasing photo opportunities.”45
Hard-core Reagan critics who found reasons to dislike him both when he 
showed too much “ideological fervor” and when he showed too little could never 
have been satisfied. As the Washington Treaty made the zero option a reality, 
however, Reagan did not meet serious opposition from the Joint Chiefs, the 
press, or even the Democratic majorities in Congress. The strongest opposition 
came from within his conservative camp, opposition from ideological firebrands 
and hard bargainers who could never believe that zero was realistic, and who 
distrusted any possible agreement with the Soviets. Echoing the criticisms made 
by his protégé Haig, Henry Kissinger, for example, lobbied Reagan against pursu-
ing the zero option one last time in May 1987. Reflecting the concerns of many 
other traditional conservative arms control hard-liners, Kissinger worried not 
only about the feasibility of reliable inspections to guarantee Soviet compliance 
but also feared that an effectively denuclearized Central Europe would be at the 
mercy of Soviet conventional superiority.46 
Kissinger’s doubts were only to be expected, as arms control veterans were 
never able to make much sense of the zero option. More notable, however, 
was the reaction of various conservative activists who had been Reagan’s most 
reliable supporters. Many rose up in vociferous opposition to the Treaty. One 
denounced Reagan as “a useful idiot for Kremlin propaganda,” while scholarly 
conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer accused Reagan of being “dizzy 
over Gorbachev.” The conservative daily Washington Times compared Reagan to 
Neville Chamberlain at Munich, selling out Western interests in the name of an 
illusory peace.47 Even William F. Buckley Jr.’s National Review, a magazine that 
had strongly supported Reagan’s rise, positioned itself against its once-favorite 
President. In anticipation of the Treaty being signed that fall, the cover of its May 
22, 1987 issue blasted “Reagan’s Suicide Pact.” It included essays by many conser-
vative luminaries, including one jointly written by Kissinger and Richard Nixon, 
who were anxious about the strategic folly of pursuing nuclear abolition without 
conventional force reductions. Buckley himself was so concerned about the 
45 Mayer and McManus, Landslide, p. 388.
46 Reagan Diaries, pp. 482–483 (March 12 and 13, 1987). Kissinger had raised similar concerns 
in Moscow. See Record of Conversation of Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, 
Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeev, and H. Brown, C. Vance, H. Kissinger, and 
D. Jones, February 4, 1987 at the National Security Archive online: https://nsarchive2.gwu.
edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB238/russian/Final1987-02-04Akhromeev-Americans.pdf (accessed 
November 20, 2018). For the ratification fight in Congress see also Maynard W. Glitman, 
The Last Battle of the Cold War. An Inside Account of Negotiating the Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty, New York / Basingstoke 2006, pp. 223–232.
47 Wilentz, Age of Reagan, p. 261.
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implications of taking a strong position against Reagan that he sent an advance 
copy to the President, assuring him of his personal friendship despite this intense 
disagreement. Therewith, Buckley justified his concerns about concessions to the 
Soviets and was at pains to argue that opposition to the Treaty extended beyond the 
“knee-jerk Right” to include Jeane Kirkpatrick and Alexander Haig, among others.48
It’s in a crisis that one’s real friends emerge. Reagan discovered the truth 
of this in the upshot. As conservatives lined up against the Treaty, the alleged 
“hard-liner” Caspar Weinberger stayed loyal to the President’s vision of nuclear 
abolition. Although he was openly skeptical about the “new stage” in Soviet-
American relations and rejected the universal enthusiasm for Gorbachev which 
was sweeping Washington after the summit, he embraced the Treaty as “very 
good” and endorsed its ratification.49 Press reports tried to link Weinberger’s 
retirement from the Pentagon in November 1987 to a perceived opposition to the 
Treaty, leading him to comment that such a view was “ironic, because I had pro-
posed the treaty in the first place.” A long-term advocate of the zero option, Wein-
berger saw the INF Treaty as proof of how one could negotiate from strength.50 
Reagan made the same arguments in his own friendly response to Buckley.51 
When the Treaty came up for the vote, the efforts of a few right-wing critics 
were unable to stop it. The Senate voted 93–5 to ratify the Washington Treaty 
in May 1988.52 Reagan’s reputation was on the upswing as well. By the time he 
left office in January 1989, he was enjoying the highest approval rating of any 
President at the end of his term since the Second World War: some 71 per cent of 
those surveyed particularly approving of his handling of foreign policy and rela-
tions with the Soviets.53 It had not been as easy as it might appear in retrospect, 
but Reagan had not only survived the last crisis of his Presidency, he emerged 
triumphant. He concluded his televised Farewell Address with the words: “All in 
all, not bad, not bad at all.”54
48 William F. Buckley, Jr. to Reagan, 29 April and 18 October 1987. Summarized in: Kiron Skin-
ner, Martin Anderson, and Annaliese Anderson (eds.), Reagan. A Life in Letters, New York 
2003, p. 418. Reprinted in: Buckley, The Reagan I Knew, pp. 204–207. See also Hedrick Smith, 
The Right Against Reagan, in: New York Times Magazine, 17 January 1988, http://www.
nytimes.com/1988/01/17/magazine/the-right-against-reagan.html?pagewanted=1 (accessed 
November 24, 2017).
49 Maureen Dowd, Summit’s aftermath, in: New York Times, December 12, 1987. http://www.
nytimes.com/1987/12/12/us/summit-aftermath-washington-summit-song-is-off-key-for-
weinberger.html (accessed November 24, 2017).
50 Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace. Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, New York 
1990, pp. 331–352, especially p. 347.
51 Reagan to Buckley, May 5, 1987, in: Reagan, A Life in Letters, pp. 418 f.
52 Wilentz, Age of Reagan, p. 262.
53 Steven V. Roberts, Reagan’s Final Rating Is Best Of Any President Since 40’s, in: New York 
Times, January 18, 1989. https://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/18/us/washington-transition-
reagan-s-final-rating-best-any-president-since-40-s.html (accessed November 20, 2018).
54 Ronald Reagan Farewell Address to the American People, January 11, 1989, https://www.
reaganfoundation.org/ronald-reagan/reagan-quotes-speeches/farewell-address-to-the-nation-2/ 
(accessed November 20, 2018).
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3. Conclusion: It’s Only Easy in Retrospect
The American path to the INF Treaty cannot be understood without appreciating 
the role of Ronald Reagan and his consistent commitment to the goal of nuclear 
abolition. That commitment distinguished him from being merely a “hard-liner,” 
and explains both his resistance to the arms control movements of the 1970s and 
his ultimate enthusiasm for the zero option that led to the INF Treaty. Over the 
course of 1987, through a combination of determination and good luck, Reagan 
managed both to save his Presidency and to accomplish his long-held goal of 
eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons. Those are significant achieve-
ments, but they are not merely the product of a single elderly politician’s will. The 
political environment has to be considered as well.
Just as a recognition of his accomplishments should encourage former Reagan 
critics to reconsider their estimations of the man, an understanding of the 
winding path should temper the enthusiasm of hagiographers. The INF Treaty 
did not spring fully formed from Reagan’s principles, even if his attachment to 
those principles shaped the course he chose. Politics determined the limits of 
the possible. That does not mean the ultimate result was merely the product of 
chance. It means that only a combination of principles and the political realities 
of the moment made the INF Treaty. (It would be the same with any treaty.)
The INF Treaty has come to occupy a central place in the current Reagan 
revisionism, in which scholars are coming to appreciate that the old conservative 
was actually, in his way, a rebel against a stagnant status quo.55 That is all to the 
good, if we want to have the full picture of the man, and makes sense as we try 
to understand the end of the Cold War in historical perspective. But for such 
an understanding, we should take care to avoid replacing one set of truisms for 
another. “Reagan the cowboy” did not simply or suddenly become “Reagan the 
apostle of peace.” Closer examination shows that he was both of these things, and 
neither. To appreciate such paradoxes, we need most of all a sense of historical 
irony. In this case, the most ironic thing is that so many people were surprised 
by how things turned out, when one of the men at the center had been telling 
them all along that he wanted to do exactly what he did. Although it’s certainly 
true that no one at the time would have been able to predict the ultimate result 
of his Administration’s arms control policies (except perhaps Reagan himself), 
historians should avoid the Columbus fallacy: just because we stumble across 
something we did not expect to find does not mean we are discovering something 
brand new. After all, somebody may already be there. 
As we enter an era in which the agreements and alliance structures of the Cold 
War era face extreme challenges, and transformations in both the principles of 
American leaders and the realities of international politics have undermined the 
55 James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, New York 2009.
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INF Treaty itself, we would do well to remember both the accomplishments of 
a previous generation of statesmen and the fragility of even the most inspired 
agreement. The nuclear nightmares of the 1980s, thankfully, did not become 
reality. But avoiding them took wisdom and foresight and luck. Whether we will 
be as fortunate in the face of a new century’s dilemmas is far from certain.
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1. Introduction
The Soviet road to the INF Treaty started many years before the historic Rea-
gan–Gorbachev meeting in Washington, at the exact date and time determined 
by Nancy Reagan’s astrologer. To understand how this ground-breaking treaty 
became possible, we need to look back to the mid-1970s’ thinking about nuclear 
war in both the Soviet Union and the United States, and also to the story of SS-20 
deployment, to subsequent Soviet attempts to negotiate mutual reductions in 
the late 1970s, and to the negotiating stalemate starting in 1983 and lasting till 
Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. The story of INF is the story of 
nuclear learning and the building of trust. Thirty years after the signing of the 
INF Treaty, it looks as though both learning and trust have been lost in U. S.–Rus-
sian relations.
Mikhail Gorbachev’s proposal for global nuclear abolition, made in January 
1986, ranks as a landmark in the process that led to the historic 1987 Treaty to 
eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).1 At the most obvious level, the 
first stage of the proposal included eliminating INF in Europe along with 50 per 
cent of both sides’ strategic forces. At a deeper level, the abolition package rep-
resented the first public airing of a sea-change in Soviet military thinking about 
fighting a nuclear war—a major shift that would give Gorbachev the necessary 
foundation for his radical arms control proposals to go forward.
Remarkably, the authors of the proposal were not Gorbachev’s “new thinkers.” 
Rather, the abolition package originated with the Soviet General Staff, specifi-
cally Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, working with a small group of General Staff 
experts including General Nikolai Chervov, and with input from senior diplomat 
Georgy Kornienko.2 Yet Gorbachev would ultimately go much further than 
Akhromeyev ever intended, both on conventional arms cuts and on sacrificing 
some of the Soviet military’s most advanced systems, especially the Oka missile 
1 For an overview and key primary sources from the time, see Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas 
Blanton, Gorbachev’s Nuclear Initiative of January 1986 and the Road to Reykjavik, National 
Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 563, October 12, 2016, https://nsarchive.gwu.
edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault-russia-programs/2016-10-12/gorbachevs-nuclear-initiative-
january-1986.
2 See the joint memoir by Sergey Fyodorovich Akhromeyev and Georgy M.  Kornienko, 
Glazamy marshala y diplomata, Moscow 1992, Chapter 3.
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(SS-23). INF was all that the Soviets were able to salvage from the nuclear abolition 
proposal after they had failed to receive any positive response from the Reagan 
Administration on the abolition package. New evidence suggests that President 
Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz did in fact take it seriously but 
encountered staunch resistance from the U. S. government and its NATO Allies.3 
For the Soviets, the INF Treaty was a big leap. They were entering into a hugely 
unequal agreement that was nevertheless seen as being in the Soviet national 
interest. This Treaty—which shook Soviet traditional military thinking, negotiat-
ing style, and several deep concepts of how international relations worked—was 
a logical result of the “new thinking” that had originated even before Gorbachev 
announced it publicly. 
2. Changes in Soviet Military Thinking About War in Europe
Soviet nuclear thinking, at least among the senior military, had already changed 
dramatically before Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. We now know this 
from Soviet military journals and internal doctrinal studies;4 from declassified 
Warsaw Pact files from across Central Europe;5 from extensive interviews with 
high-level Soviet military planners by U. S. defense contractors (the BDM firm) 
working for the Office of Net Assessment at the Pentagon at the end of the Cold 
War;6 from the series of “critical oral history” conferences looking at the col-
lapse of détente during the Carter-Brezhnev period, which included senior Soviet 
veterans;7 and from a remarkable oral history roundtable in 2006 focused on 
military planning.8 Still missing, of course, is any access to the Soviet General 
Staff archives, a major gap for which the relatively full openness of Warsaw Pact 
files in former member countries only partially compensates.
3 See the Reagan Presidential Library documents published in: Savranskaya and Blanton, 
Gorbachev’s Nuclear Initiative of January 1986. 
4 See Joan Bird and John Bird (eds.), CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces: The Importance 
of Clandestine Reporting, Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Collections Division, Lang-
ley, VA 2012.
5 Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the 
Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991, Budapest / New York 2005. 
6 See William Burr and Svetlana Savranskaya, Previously Classified Interviews with Former 
Soviet Officials Reveal U. S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades, National Security 
Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 285, September 11, 2009, analyzing and publishing the 
BDM study, Soviet Intentions 1965–1985, Volumes 1 and 2, 1995, declassified in 2009, https://
nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/index.htm. 
7 For the documents and transcript from each of these seminal conferences, see the National 
Security Archive, Carter-Brezhnev Project page, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/.
8 Jan Hoffenaar and Christopher Findlay (eds.), Military Planning for European Theatre 
Conflict During the Cold War: An Oral History Roundtable, Stockholm, April 24–25, 2006, 
Zurich 2007.
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Yet the main outlines of the story are clear, illuminating several key themes on 
the road to the INF Treaty. First, of course, was the interactivity between Soviet 
planning and U. S. and NATO planning, so that the Soviet decision to deploy 
the SS-20s, for example, occurred during extensive Western discussions about 
the necessity of modernizing nuclear forces, including the prospect of bringing 
in the neutron bomb.9 Next was the power of the military–industrial complex 
in driving decisions without real consideration of the political consequences. 
The Deputy Head of the Military–Industrial Sector of the Central Committee 
apparatus, Vitaly Kataev (who would certainly know from his lengthy tenure in 
the Soviet Central Committee’s Defense Industry Department), told the BDM 
interviewers that the SS-20 decision was made not at the political level, but by a 
troika of Central Committee Secretaries for Defense and the military-industrial 
complex with the Defense Minister alone. There was no expert input, but lots of 
push from the missile design bureaus and factories.10 During this period, which 
started in 1976, the Soviet Defense Minister was not a combat commander, but a 
military industry manager. This was Dmitry Ustinov. On promotion to Minister 
he was quickly given the rank of General in April 1976, and was a Marshal by July, 
ultimately achieving the all-time record for Orders of Lenin—eleven of them. The 
Deputy Head of the General Staff, General Makhmut Gareev, commented, that 
that was when the armed forces had “been taken over by the enemy.”11 
Yet as early as the mid-1970s, Soviet General Staff war planners had come to 
the realization that a nuclear war in Europe would negate the Soviet / Warsaw 
Pact’s advantages in conventional forces over NATO, and indeed make impossible 
any conventional war fighting along the lines of long-standing Pact plans, such as 
Czechoslovak forces reaching Dijon, France, in nine days.12 
According to Colonel Vitaly Tsygichko,13 key studies by the General Staff 
think-tank in 1968 and 1972 identified what David Rosenberg would later term 
the “smoking radiating ruin” problem—the absolutely inhospitable environment 
for conventional advance or counterattack in the context of an already radioactive 
battlefield in central Europe.14 Conventional Soviet and Warsaw Pact doctrine 
had insisted on advances of 150 kilometers per day, but the studies showed that 
9 Kristina Spohr, Germany and the Politics of the Neutron Bomb, 1975–1979, in: Diplomacy 
and Statecraft 21 (2010), pp. 259–285.
10 Kataev interview, BDM study, Soviet Intentions 1965–1985, Vol. 2, p. 98.
11 Gareev interview, BDM study, Soviet Intentions 1965–1985, Vol. 2, p. 75.
12 On the impact of the NATO Double-Track Decision on Warsaw Pact Strategic planning, see 
Oliver Bange, SS-20 and Pershing II: Weapon Systems and the Dynamization of East-West 
Relations, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Maus-
bach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and 
the German Peace Movement of the 1980s, New York / Oxford 2016, pp. 70–86.
13 Tsygichko, quoted in: Hoffenaar and Findlay (eds.), Military Planning for European Theatre 
Conflict, pp. 65–68.
14 See David Alan Rosenberg, ‘A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours’: Documents 
on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954–1955, International Security 
6/3 (Winter 1981/1982), pp. 3–38.
Svetlana Savranskaya / Thomas Blanton74
in a nuclear battlefield, not even 50 kilometers was possible, and even then most 
of the soldiers would have died from radiation poisoning.15 
Simultaneously, Soviet planners re-thought their requirements for tactical 
air support, basing this on analysis of Israeli operations in 1967 and 1973, and 
U. S. movements in Vietnam. They reached the conclusion that the conventional 
balance in Europe was maybe not so much in their favor, considering NATO’s 
tactical air resources and likely use of tactical nuclear weapons. One CIA compila-
tion based on clandestine reporting (including some from key Warsaw Pact assets 
like Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski in Poland who passed top secret Warsaw Pact 
documents to the U. S. throughout the 1970s) describes “intellectual ferment” 
in the 1970s and, even among the Soviet air operations planners, there was 
“a certain sense of desperation” despite major investments by 1980–81 in tactical 
air weaponry.16
As the former Soviet and Warsaw Pact officials participating in the 2006 
Stockholm discussion on military planning described it, this new military under-
standing of the impossibility of winning a nuclear war was not allowed to surface 
as stated Soviet policy, given the primacy of Communist Party doctrine about 
winning any conflict with imperialism / capitalism. Formal military scenarios 
were therefore required to posit “victory” rather than state the more likely reality. 
The new military realizations did, however, develop in parallel with initiatives 
like Leonid Brezhnev’s famous Tula speech in January 1977, which was intended 
as an olive branch for incoming U. S. President Jimmy Carter, but was largely 
ignored by a U. S. foreign policy elite preoccupied by internal debates (“Team 
B versus Team A”) over Soviet intentions.17 As Raymond Garthoff later com-
mented, the U. S. was in real need of a Team C that might entertain the possibility 
of future Soviet collapse.18
The collapse of détente under Carter in 1979 and the rising sense of U. S.–
Soviet crisis through to the end of 1983 restricted the new Soviet military analysis 
against nuclear war fighting to the confines of the General Staff planners, until 
15 See the comments on the war plans as “science fiction” by Tadeusz Pioro, formerly of the Pol-
ish General Staff, in: Hoffenaar and Findlay (eds.), Military Planning for European Theatre 
Conflict, pp. 77 f. and 91 f., referring to a Polish plan of 1970 and the Czechoslovak plan of 
1964; and the agreement by former Soviet general Aleksandr Liakhovskii, who served in the 
Main Operational Department of the General Staff, pp. 93 f.
16 Bird and Bird (eds.), CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces, p. 35.
17 See the discussion of the Tula speech, in: Anna Melyakova and Svetlana Savranskaya (eds.), 
Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary, 1977, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 
No.  594, May 25, 2017, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/ 2017- 
05-25/anatoly-s-chernyaev-diary-1977. Team B, a group of conservatives appointed by CIA 
director George H. W. Bush in 1976 to question CIA assumptions, argued that the standard 
CIA analysis (Team A) of rough strategic parity between the U. S. and the USSR was wrong, 
and that the Soviets sought and were achieving nuclear superiority.
18 See the discussion in Raymond Garthoff, A Journey Through the Cold War: A Memoir of 
Containment and Coexistence, Washington, D. C. 2001, pp. 325–337, the Team C reference 
is on p. 333.
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the coming of Gorbachev in March 1985. Up to that point, the extraordinary 
incapacity of Soviet leadership, in a highly centralized system, from the decrepit 
Brezhnev to the sick Andropov to the dying Chernenko, meant only increased 
paranoia and inertia. 
Again, interaction with U. S. planning had a significant impact. For example, 
in August 1980, there was front page U. S. coverage of leaks of a new Presidential 
Directive (PD-59) exposing Carter’s White House planning for flexible nuclear 
war options, in place of what National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski 
derogatorily called “the spasm plan” of the SIOP (the Single Integrated Opera-
tional Plan).19 Brzezinski persuaded Carter that having only a spasm plan 
actually increased the risk of nuclear war—in stark contrast, say, to President 
Eisenhower in the 1950s, who concluded the opposite, that having limited strike 
options encouraged their use and risked escalation.20 
The front pages certainly caught Soviet attention. The long-time General 
Staff war planner Colonel General Adrian Danilevich, for example, told the 
BDM interviewers in 1992 that “you confused us terribly” with the discussion of 
limited nuclear strike options which would have “asymmetrical consequences,” 
since the theater would obviously be limited to Europe or the European territory 
of the Soviet Union.21 Also confused was the U. S. Secretary of State, Edmund 
Muskie, who found out about PD-59 from the newspapers. His top aide on Soviet 
matters, Marshall Shulman, warned that the reported emphasis on leadership 
and C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence)  targets could 
“only increase Soviet perceptions of vulnerability” and introduce “further insta-
bility in the strategic balance.”22
The Pentagon official who commissioned the BDM interviews, Andy Marshall, 
had a different view. The Director of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment—
nicknamed “Yoda” after the wise and often inscrutable movie character in Star 
Wars—believed that PD-59 was a justified reaction to the Defense Intelligence 
Agency findings that the Soviets had built so many bunkers for leadership that 
they must be planning nuclear war fighting. So “the objective was to clarify and 
personalize somewhat the danger of warfare and nuclear use to Soviet decision 
makers.”23 
19 See Michael Getler, Carter Directive Modifies Strategy for a Nuclear War, in: Washington 
Post, August 6, 1980, p. A1.
20 See William Burr, Jimmy Carter’s Controversial Nuclear Targeting Directive PD-59 Declas-
sified, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 390, September 14, 2012, 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb390/.
21 Danilevich interview, BDM study, Soviet Intentions 1965–1985, Vol. 2, pp. 37, 40.
22 See Document 17, Shulman to Muskie, September 2, 1980, in: William Burr, Jimmy Carter’s 
Controversial Nuclear Targeting Directive PD-59 Declassified, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/
nukevault/ebb390/.
23 Marshall interview, BDM study, Soviet Intentions 1965–1985, Vol. 2, pp. 118 f.
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3. Gorbachev and Nuclear Learning
A new stage in U. S.–Soviet arms control negotiations started with Gorbachev’s 
selection as General Secretary in Moscow. Though not a radical reformer from 
the start, Gorbachev was committed to stopping the arms race, which he saw 
as both dangerous for humankind and devastating for the Soviet economy. 
Although this view was widely shared within the more progressive military 
and political leadership, the traditional Soviet thinking and negotiating style 
focused on numerical equality in armaments, especially where reductions were 
concerned. The Reagan Administration did not help either. As the longtime 
Soviet Ambassador to the U. S., Anatoly Dobrynin, pointed out in his memoirs, 
“Reagan’s belligerence backfired:” it was producing results that were “just the 
opposite of the one intended by Washington.”24 Rather than come up with any 
new proposals, the Soviet side had dug in for a long confrontation, and denounced 
U. S. militarism. In this situation, Gorbachev needed a breakthrough to get out 
of the vicious cycle.
His own background and his open-minded approach to entrenched problems 
and learning helped Gorbachev leap from total stalemate in arms control negotia-
tions, symbolized by the Soviet walkout from the Geneva talks in the fall of 1983, 
to his eventual agreement to a Treaty with highly asymmetrical cuts. Gorbachev 
and his supporters came to see the INF Treaty as being in the interest of the Soviet 
Union and as a first step toward universal nuclear disarmament. Gorbachev had 
very little prior experience with arms control but, as Janice Gross Stein showed 
in her early research, he “learned in part from those in the Soviet Union who 
had been thinking about security for a long time, in part from the meetings with 
senior officials abroad, and in part through the trial-and-error experimentation 
that he and his colleagues initiated. […] Over time, learning from others and 
from behavior became self-reinforcing and self-amplifying.”25 The Soviet leader 
elevated his close allies like Alexander Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, and 
Anatoly Chernyaev to key positions in the Soviet Party apparatus. Essentially, he 
used the power of the office of General Secretary to enable their ideas to come to 
the fore and to change policy.26 
Gorbachev also learned by interacting with foreign leaders, whom he even-
tually came to perceive as his main interlocutors on arms control and most 
foreign policy issues. Importantly, starting from the meeting in Geneva, he also 
came to understand, that Reagan did not merely represent the interests of the 
24 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence. Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War 
Presidents (1962–1986), New York 1995, p. 545.
25 Janice Gross Stein, Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and 
Motivated Learner, in: International Organization 42/2 (Spring 1994), p. 180.
26 See the discussion on the power of appointments and the power of ideas in the groundbreak-
ing early book by British political scientist Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, Oxford 
1996, and in Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West, New York 2000.
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military–industrial complex, but that he represented his electorate and the real 
interests of U. S. citizens—and that he was also constrained by them. The most 
important understanding, however, was the meeting of two minds, each believing 
that nuclear weapons could be completely eliminated, which took place between 
the two leaders in Geneva and then, especially, Reykjavik 
4. Gorbachev’s Nuclear Initiative of January 1986
According to first-hand accounts by the top officials who developed the proposal, 
the history of the Soviet abolition program dates back to the spring of 1985. Soon 
after Gorbachev came to power in March of that year, the Chief of General Staff, 
Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, first revealed to Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy 
Kornienko that he and the head of the Legal and Treaty Department of General 
Staff, General Nikolai Chervov, along with military experts from the General 
Staff, were secretly preparing a detailed program of total elimination of nuclear 
weapons. Kornienko supported the idea, and Akhromeyev ordered selected 
military experts to study the issues and prepare a draft. This was basically ready 
by mid-summer 1985. Very few people knew about the program until the end of 
that year, however. Although the program was ready, its authors were looking for 
an occasion to present it to the top leadership when it would have most chance 
of being accepted by the Soviet leaders, and might be received favorably by the 
United States. Soviet arms control expert General Viktor Starodubov writes in his 
memoir that the planners felt the time was right to present it to Gorbachev after 
his meeting with Reagan in Geneva.27 
Akhromeyev first reported the plan to Minister of Defense Sergey Sokolov at 
the end of December 1985, and Kornienko took the draft to Foreign Minister She-
vardnadze.28 General Chervov was instructed to take the program to Gorbachev, 
who was vacationing in Crimea. The military’s hunch proved right. After dis-
covering that Reagan was an abolitionist in Geneva, Gorbachev was enthusiastic 
about making a bold proposal, and the fact that the program was ready made it all 
the more practical. He approved it and presented it to the Politburo in early Janu-
ary 1986. Not everybody was enthusiastic about the program. Interestingly, the 
“new thinkers” around Gorbachev, including Chernyaev, later came to distrust it, 
because it originated from the General Staff and was embraced by “old thinkers” 
like Kornienko. But at the time, Chernyaev was very impressed with Gorbachev’s 
public statement. On January 18, 1986, he wrote in his diary: “Gorbachev’s 
statement. It seems he [has] really decided to end the arms race at all costs. He is 
going for that very ‘risk,’ in which he has boldly recognized the absence of risk, 
27 Viktor Starodubov, Ot razoruzheniya k kapitulyatsii (From Disarmament to Capitulation), 
Moscow 2007, pp. 261 f. See also Akhromeyev and Kornienko, Glazamy marshala y diplo-
mata, Chapter 3.
28 Ibid.
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because no one will attack us even if we disarm totally. And in order to revive the 
country and set it on a steady track, it is necessary to free it from the burden of 
the arms race, which is depleting more than just economics.”29 But later, in his 
memoirs, Chernyaev was skeptical about the proposal and thought it was mainly 
propaganda by the military. So was it just propaganda, or was it the first serious 
step toward universal disarmament? 
Rather transparently, the Akhromeyev proposal meant to retain Soviet con-
ventional superiority and get rid of the West’s European nuclear weapons— par-
ticularly the Pershing II deployed in late 1983, which, to the Soviets, looked like 
the ultimate decapitation weapon. American specialists, including Ambassador 
Jack Matlock and CIA analyst Douglas MacEachin, deprecated this possibility, 
basing their calculations on lower assessments of range and accuracy, but they 
were never believed by the Soviets, including Gorbachev, who, in one Summit 
preparatory session, described the Pershing IIs as “a gun pressed to our temple.”30 
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin remarked in his memoirs that “it would not be 
honest to deny that Gorbachev’s proclamation carried elements of propaganda.” 
Nevertheless, the strategic thinking was exactly what Gorbachev had in mind: 
bringing the Cold War to an end.31
According to Gorbachev’s spokesman and biographer, Andrei Grachev, the 
drafters of the program envisioned it in terms somewhat similar to those of the 
U. S. drafters of Reagan’s “zero option” INF solution of 1981. They thought that 
the chances of the U. S. side accepting abolition were close to zero, but that mak-
ing the proposal would provide strong negotiating grounds as well as propaganda 
points for their own side. General Starodubov later claimed that Akhromeyev’s 
reasoning was that “if by any chance the Americans accepted the idea, the Soviet 
side would be able to make full use of its advantage in conventional weapons.”32 
Gorbachev, however, saw the program differently. For him, it was an opportu-
nity to advance the U. S.–Soviet arms control discussion that had stalled after 
Geneva with a bold, radical stroke. He thought it would be acceptable to Reagan 
because of his strongly expressed belief in a nuclear-free world. Also, according 
to Grachev, by accepting an initiative drafted by Akhromeyev and Kornienko, 
Gorbachev, was able to “trap” his own military into supporting very deep cuts in 
armaments across the board.33
29 The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev 1986. National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 
No. 220, May 25, 2007, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB220/Chernyaev_1986.
pdf, pp. 6 f.
30 See Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (eds.), The Last Superpower Summits. 
Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush. Conversations that Ended the Cold War, Budapest / New York 
2016, p. 163.
31 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 597.
32 Starodubov, Ot razoruzheniya k kapitulyatsii, pp. 261–262. See also Akhromeyev and Korn-
ienko, Glazamy marshala y diplomata, Chapter 3.
33 Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble. Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, 
Cambridge 2008, p. 69.
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The program envisioned three stages. The first stage was a 50 per cent reduc-
tion of strategic nuclear weapons (to be achieved over 5 to 8 years) and an 
agreement to eliminate all medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. In the 
second stage, starting in 1990, Britain, France and China would join the process 
by freezing their arsenals, and all nuclear powers would eliminate their tactical 
weapons and ban nuclear testing. In the third stage, “starting in 1995, liquidation 
of all still remaining nuclear weapons [would be] completed.”34 Other important 
elements of the Soviet program were a ban on space weapons, strict adherence to 
the ABM Treaty, and a comprehensive nuclear testing ban. 
Because of the lack of immediate response, Gorbachev always believed that his 
program was never taken seriously in the West, and had simply been dismissed as 
propaganda. For example, on April 4, 1986, he complained to a visiting delegation 
of U. S. congressmen that “the United States decided to hide behind the opinions 
of its Allies—West European countries and Japan, otherwise, it would be hard 
for them to justify their negative position […]. We are often accused of making 
propaganda proposals. Well, if it is propaganda, then why not catch Gorbachev at 
his word, why not test his intentions by accepting our proposal?”35
However, the highest level declassified U. S. documents show that Reagan 
took the abolition proposal very seriously (as few others in the U. S. government 
did) and that he forced through an extensive policy process including multiple 
consultations with Allies (who, except for Helmut Kohl, almost unanimously 
opposed any such abolition). On January 15, 1986, after a long meeting with 
Secretary of State George Shultz and National Security Adviser John Poindexter, 
Reagan wrote in his diary: “we’d be hard put to explain how we could turn it 
down.” On February 3, after a senior National Security Planning Group meeting, 
Reagan wrote, “Some wanted to tag it as publicity stunt. I said no. Let’s say we 
share their overall goals & now want to work out the details. If it is a publicity 
stunt it will be revealed by them.”36
Shultz told the State Department’s senior group for arms control on January 17, 
1986: 
I know that many of you and others around here oppose the objective of eliminating 
nuclear weapons. You have tried your ideas out in front of the president from the outset, 
and I have pointed out the dangers too. The president of the United States doesn’t agree 
with you, and he has said so on several very public occasions both before and since the 
last election. He thinks it’s a hell of a good idea. And it’s a political hot button. We need 
to work on what a world without nuclear weapons would mean to us and what additional 
steps would have to accompany such a dramatic change. The president has wanted all 
along to get rid of nuclear weapons. The British, French, Dutch, Belgians, and all of you 
34 Gorbachev Letter to Reagan, January 14, 1986, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc= 
3131897-Document-01-General-Secretary-Mikhail-Gorbachev. 
35 See Savranskaya and Blanton, Gorbachev’s Nuclear Initiative of January 1986, Doc. 22.
36 Douglas Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries, Vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, New York 
2009, pp. 562, 568. 
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in the Washington arms control community are trying to talk him out of it. The idea can 
potentially be a plus for us: the Soviet Union is a superpower only because it is a nuclear 
and ballistic missile superpower.37 
In the end, the Reagan Administration did not dismiss the abolition proposal as 
propaganda, but did come to the conclusion that it was not ready for a program of 
such a scope. The opposition of the Allies and what senior negotiator Paul Nitze 
called the “free-for-all” battle between Shultz’s State Department and Caspar 
Weinberger’s Pentagon ultimately deterred Reagan from expressing his fulsome 
support, and left Gorbachev fuming that Washington had dissed him. Reagan’s 
letter to Gorbachev of February 22, 1986 engaged only with the INF issue and 
left the rest out.38 That became a pattern. At least as of spring 1986, the two ships 
had passed in the night, even though, at the highest level, both actually shared a 
commitment to getting rid of nuclear weapons. The astute Congressman Dante 
Fascell, long-time Chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, provided 
a coda for this dynamic when he met with Gorbachev in Moscow in April 1986, 
before the Iran–Contra scandal plunged the Reagan Administration into total 
dysfunction that fall. Fascell said of the nuclear abolition proposal: “The reality 
is such that the United States is not ready, for some reason—either political or 
military, I don’t know—they are not capable to make the big leap, which you are 
calling for, at this time.”39
Although the Soviet side was dissatisfied with the U. S. response, frequent 
meetings and interactions pushed both sides to work harder on negotiating 
positions and think about deep disarmament for the next Summit. In fact, active 
Soviet diplomacy and the American effort to use the opportunities offered 
by Gorbachev resulted in a comprehensive review of the entirety of the U. S. 
arms control policy and long-term nuclear strategy in preparation, a process 
which continued throughout the spring and summer of 1986. Meanwhile, the 
Reagan Administration actively engaged the Soviets in all negotiating formats. 
As a result, the Soviets accepted the U. S. “zero option” on INF, agreed to radical 
verification measures, and started internal discussions on dramatic reductions in 
conventional weapons. Gorbachev’s January 1986 initiative and the U. S. response 
laid the first paver on the road to the most dramatic summit in U. S.–Soviet 
history, the one at Reykjavik in October 1986, which, despite its failure, prepared 
the ground for the INF Treaty signed in 1987.
37 George P.  Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New York 1993, 
p. 701. See also M. Charles Hill Papers, Ronald Reagan Library, RAC Box 3, Spiral Notebook 
(01/06/86–01/23/86).
38 For Reagan’s letter see Savranskaya and Blanton, Gorbachev’s Nuclear Initiative of January 
1986, Doc. 18. 
39 See ibid., Doc. 22.
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5. De-linking as a Political Initiative
At Reykjavik, the Soviet side agreed to leave the British and French nuclear 
weapons out of the equation, and accepted the idea of cuts or even a complete 
elimination of medium-range ballistic missiles in the Asian portion of the USSR. 
This significant and unanticipated change in their position in effect meant a com-
plete acceptance of the original U. S. proposal for a “zero option.” However, the 
Ministry of Defense—represented by Akhromeyev—had agreed to that solution 
at Reykjavik only as part of a compromise that firmly linked the intermediate-
range weapons with strategic and space issues, including adherence to the ABM 
Treaty and limits on SDI, all to be negotiated as one package.40 The U. S. side 
rejected such linkage, and argued for negotiating INF as a separate agreement. 
Therefore, to make progress towards their top priority—a comprehensive START 
treaty that would cut strategic arms in half across the strategic triad while Reagan 
was still President—Gorbachev and his aides realized they would have to revisit 
the package deal and focus on just those parts, such as INF, where agreement was 
more likely. 
Aiding this realization, by early 1987 there was a significant change in the 
perception of SDI on the part of Gorbachev and his close associates. Fear of SDI as 
a potential first strike weapon from space, which Gorbachev had tried to explain 
to Reagan over and over again at Geneva and Reykjavik, had by now faded. Part 
of this change was due to the influence of progressive Soviet scientists, like the 
academicians Evgeny Velikhov and Roald Sagdeev, who did not believe in the 
technological feasibility of the SDI concept. Perhaps even more important was 
that the perception of threat from the United States was giving way to a new 
sense of trust and productive cooperation, emerging from the experience of the 
two previous Summits. This new understanding promised important payoffs in 
the future. 
In January 1987, Gorbachev pushed on two fronts at once to advance Per-
estroika. Domestically, the January Central Committee Plenum concentrated 
on political reform and democratization and scheduled a CPSU conference to 
address those issues for the summer of 1988. In foreign policy, to preserve and 
strengthen the momentum of Reykjavik, Gorbachev convened an international 
forum which had the title “For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Human-
ity.” This forum focused on the threat of nuclear weapons and the need for deep 
reductions as a step towards their complete elimination. Academician Andrei 
Sakharov, recently released from exile, was permitted to speak at the forum. 
40 Sovetsko-Amerikanskaya vstrecha na vysshem urovne, Reikjavik, 11–12 Oktyabrya 1986 
goda (Transcript of the Soviet-American Summit. Reykjavik, October 11–12, 1986. Meeting 
of the working group of experts on military issues), Information about the position of the 
Defense Ministry provided by Colonel-General Chervov in an interview, Moscow, June 15, 
1996.
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Along with many other participants, he called for swift progress on arms control, 
even if this meant negotiating on INF separately.41 Sakharov also met privately 
with two U. S. scientists and talked about the need to untie the strategic arms 
control package and to stop allowing SDI to be the major stumbling block in 
the negotiations. Gorbachev had called on his Politburo members to “stop being 
afraid of SDI” as early as March 1986, but it took him almost a year to follow his 
own advice. Untying the arms control package was a very sensitive political issue, 
since it amounted to a unilateral concession, and it took a great deal of internal 
discussion and an impassioned memorandum from Yakovlev, on February 25, 
1987, for Gorbachev to make the decision.42 
Ironically, the argument that persuaded Gorbachev alluded mainly to the U. S. 
domestic political agenda. Yakovlev argued that considering the strength of the 
right wing in the Republican Party and the upcoming Presidential elections, if 
Gorbachev was counting on signing a major strategic arms control treaty while 
Reagan was still in power, he had to sign a separate INF accord as soon as possible. 
On February 26, 1987, the Politburo ratified the decision to untie the package as a 
means to jumpstart negotiations, and to invite George Shultz to Moscow in April. 
Gorbachev made the formal announcement on February 28.43 It was received 
with concern among the Soviet military, who viewed it as caving in to Reagan’s 
demands, but nobody, at first, wanted to openly oppose the General Secretary.44
At this point, preparations for a successful INF Summit became the foreign 
policy priority of the Soviet leadership. Just as in the period before Reykjavik, 
Gorbachev understood that he had to take serious steps to accommodate U. S. 
interests, perhaps even invoking the hated word “concessions.” The test of seri-
ousness would come during the visit by Shultz in April 1987. In preparation, in 
late March the Soviets announced new radical proposals on verification, basically 
introducing the principle of “anytime anywhere,” which went well beyond what 
the U. S. side was proposing or willing to accept at the time. April brought with it 
even more rethinking Shultz’s trip were Margaret Thatcher’s visit to Moscow and 
Gorbachev’s visit to Prague. During Thatcher’s stay, the British Prime Minister 
accused the Soviet leader of exporting Communism to third world countries 
and explained to him how the Soviet military posture in Europe, combined with 
41 Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There In the Blue. Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold 
War, New York 2000, p. 409–411, goes so far as to credit Sakharov’s speech at the forum with 
“breaking the spell” of the tied package, but the internal Gorbachev documents point to other 
key players in the ultimate decision.
42 Alexander Yakovlev memorandum to Gorbachev, February 25, 1987 in: Savranskaya and 
Blanton (eds.), Last Superpower Summits, pp. 269–277. 
43 For this decision see Elizabeth C. Charles, Gorbachev and the Decision to Decouple the Arms 
Control Package: How the Breakdown of the Reykjavik Summit Led to the Elimination of the 
Euromissiles, in: Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), 
The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War, Washington, D. C. / Stanford, CA 2015, 
pp. 66–84.
44 Savranskaya Interview with General-Colonel Anatoly Gribkov, Moscow, November 13, 1996.
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memories of 1956 and 1968, conveyed a sense of threat to Europeans.45 Gor-
bachev was moved by her explanation and mentioned it repeatedly in Politburo 
discussions of Soviet and the Warsaw Pact military doctrine. The Prague visit 
in April 10, 1987 helped Gorbachev realize that soon he would have to confront 
major changes in Eastern Europe and the issue of Soviet troops stationed there. 
In a way these two visits helped him approach negotiations with Shultz in a more 
decisive and even radical mode. 
6. Concessions and the Soviet Military
The most controversial development in the entire INF negotiations was the Soviet 
decision to consider the SS-23/Oka tactical missile with a tested range of 400 km 
(well under the 500  km stipulated by the INF Treaty) as an item that should 
nonetheless be covered by the Treaty. The inclusion of Oka stirred up a major 
controversy between Gorbachev and Shevardnadze on one side and the Soviet 
military on the other, and by the fall of 1987 had led to the first real break between 
the political and the military leadership. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze acted 
against the strong opposition of the military, including that of Defense Minister 
Marshal Sokolov and of Akhromeyev, who was Gorbachev’s major supporter in 
the military and the author of many disarmament initiatives himself.
During his talk with Shultz on April 13, Shevardnadze agreed in principle on 
the inclusion of the shorter-range missiles in the systems counted under the INF 
Treaty. This Soviet concession was confirmed by Gorbachev during his meeting 
with the Secretary of State the following day. Gorbachev was under pressure from 
Shultz, who insisted that if the Soviet Union did not count the SS-23 as having a 
range of more than 500 kilometers, then the United States would have to deploy 
similar systems in Europe.46 Throughout the meeting Gorbachev repeatedly 
accused the American side of forcing the Soviet side to make more concessions 
and not treating the Soviet Union as a great power, to which Shultz made his 
famous response: “I’m weeping for you.”47
It was only possible to make the concession on Oka by sidestepping the mili-
tary and by isolating them from the decision-making. According to Akhromeyev 
and Kornienko, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze intentionally did not invite the 
Marshal, who would normally be present at all the meetings at which INF issues 
were discussed, as a top Soviet arms control negotiator. He was invited to the 
45 Gorbachev-Thatcher Memorandum of Conversation, March 30, 1987, in: Svetlana Savran-
skaya and Tom Blanton (eds.), The Thatcher-Gorbachev Conversations, National Security 
Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 422, April 12, 2013, Doc. 1, https://nsarchive2.gwu.
edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB422/docs/Doc%201%201987-03-30%20Gorbachev-Thatcher%20
memcon.pdf. 
46 Memorandum of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and G. Shultz, April 14, 1987, in: 
Savranskaya and Blanton, (eds.), Last Superpower Summits, pp. 278–284. 
47 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 894.
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meeting immediately after the concession was made, and the talk turned to the 
unresolved issues of START. The Marshal was not informed of the Oka decision, 
but in the next day’s press coverage it appeared as if he was present during the 
entire meeting and therefore must have approved the inclusion of the SS-23.48
This, in fact, is exactly the impression Shevardnadze later gave in his memoirs, 
responding to criticism of his “concessionary position” on INF, and on the Oka 
missile in particular:
Why don’t the deputies from the Soyuz Group for example, ask not just me, as they are 
so zealously doing, but Marshal S. F. Akhromeyev, a man I respect, about the reasons for 
dismantling the Oka Missile Compound? He sat next to the General Secretary during 
the negotiations about this class of weapons. Surely a Marshal would know much better 
than I, who gave their consent to this and why, as he would also know that without the 
consent of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff such a decision 
would not have been made.49 
Transcripts of the meetings of Shevardnadze with Shultz on April 13, and of 
Gorbachev with Shultz on April 14, show that Akhromeyev did not participate 
in, or even attend the discussion about shorter-range missiles. Only Gorbachev, 
Shevardnadze, and Dobrynin were present at the first part of the meeting. After 
Akhromeyev arrived at the Kremlin to participate in the meeting on April 14, not 
a single word was said about the shorter-range systems, and the discussion moved 
on to strategic offensive weapons. In fact, the final position agreed to by the politi-
cal leadership was not coordinated with either the Defense Minister or the Chief 
of General Staff, precisely because they were on record as strongly opposing it. 
As time went on, opposition to including Oka in the Treaty grew stronger, and 
the idea of making such a concession to the United States was regarded by some 
as treason. It was a highly technological new weapon, which had only recently 
been deployed and was both a source of pride to the military and could be a strong 
bargaining chip for diplomats. Marshal Sokolov openly criticized the decision 
in the Central Committee building, calling it a “state crime” and comparing 
it to Khrushchev’s “destruction of the navy and the aviation.”50 At that point, 
events intervened in a bizarre way, when a West German amateur pilot named 
Mathias Rust flew a single-engine Cessna across hundreds of miles of Soviet 
airspace, landing in the middle of downtown Moscow (close enough to taxi over 
to Red Square). This inexplicable breach of Soviet air defenses gave Gorbachev an 
opening to remove members of the top military brass who opposed new thinking 
and were especially against the new INF Treaty. Sokolov was replaced by the more 
loyal and less ambitious Dmitry Yazov at the end of May 1987. 
48 Akhromeev and Kornienko, Glazami Marshala i Diplomata, pp. 131–133. More detailed 
information on the inner politics of the SS-23 concession was given to Savranskaya by Georgy 
Kornienko, Interviews, Moscow, June 13, and June 28, 1996.
49 Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, New York 1991, pp. 96 f.
50 Quoted in Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble, p. 96.
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Even though he made the decision to include shorter-range weapons in April, 
Gorbachev announced it to the Politburo only on July 9, after the decision by 
Kohl that the German Pershing IA missiles would be eliminated. In his state-
ment Gorbachev presented it as a major step toward “clearing Europe from 
nuclear weapons” and called for adding a “third zero”—eliminating all tactical 
nuclear weapons in Europe.51 The Soviet Union issued a formal announcement 
of a global double zero platform—going beyond the initial Reagan initiative 
of 1981. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles would be eliminated 
both in Europe and in Asia. Thereby, a whole class of nuclear weapons would 
be destroyed for the first time in nuclear history—and under conditions of the 
strictest verification.
According to Akhromeyev, Shevardnazde’s disregard of the position of the 
Defense Ministry on Oka resulted in the “first serious crack” between the Defense 
Ministry and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. All attempts by the military to 
return to the issue of shorter-range missiles in the summer and fall 1987 were 
sidelined by threats of party disciplinary measures. This is how Akhromeyev 
describes it his memoirs: 
Efforts by the military to return to the issue of Oka before the treaty was signed were 
immediately thwarted using all means, including threats of applying party disciplinary 
measures to servicemen who participated in the negotiations and who criticized this 
misstep at party meetings. It finally ended by the military simply having to retreat literally 
a week before the Washington summit, where the INF Treaty was going to be signed, 
and only then our internal decision about including the missile SS-23 in that Treaty.52 
According to advisers close to Akhromeyev, the political leadership eventually 
forced the military leadership to accept the position that Gorbachev had agreed 
to with Shultz. They did so only after six months of pressure, and some never 
signed the agreement.53 The Soviet Union would now have to destroy 239 SS-23/
Oka missiles completely—a blow against the military’s prestige. On top of this, 
Oka was expensive to destroy.
Although the story of Oka is quite often told in Russian military and political 
memoirs, documents that have become available recently put the narrative in 
a somewhat different light. Oka was tested only for the range of 400 km, but 
the developers of the system and a small circle of top military knew very well 
that it could fly farther than that. On October 16, 1987, on the eve of Shultz’s 
trip to Moscow to finalize the draft Treaty and to set the dates for the Summit, 
the Five—the Soviet main decision-making body on military–industrial and 
arms control issues—gathered for its regular meeting, chaired by Lev Zaikov. 
The entire agenda was devoted to INF issues. Item 2 on the agenda read, “About 
51 Notes of a CC CPSU Politburo Session, July 9, 1987, translated and published in Savranskaya 
and Blanton (eds.), Last Superpower Summits, p. 289.
52 Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble, p. 133.
53 Savranskaya Interview with Georgy Kornienko, May 18, 1996.
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expediency of presenting the American side with factual [information about] 
the range of the Oka missile,” and item 3 read, “About providing the delegation 
data on our INF and shorter-range missiles (RMD [rakety men’shey dal’nosti]) for 
inclusion in the Memorandum.” The presenter of both items was Akhromeyev. 
The reference information attached to the agenda (which is in the Vitaly Kataev 
papers collection at the Hoover Institution) shows that the “factual” capability of 
Oka was up to 600 km, with modification Oka-U. The drafters suggested that the 
Soviet side should not inform the U. S. side about the actual range, and insisted 
that Oka be classified as having a 400 km range (as tested). Since the concession 
had already been made, the Soviet side should propose to expand the parameters 
of the treaty to include all systems with the range 400–1,000 in the shorter-range 
category.54 If the U. S. side agreed to it, the new range would cover the Lance-2 
missile and would remove the issue of upgrades to those missiles, which indeed 
became a problem for the Soviets in the spring of 1989.
Reverberations about the way the INF Treaty was negotiated and the lack 
of consultation between the military and the political leadership continued 
throughout the fall and even after the signing of the Treaty. On December 29, 
the Party organization of the Legal and Treaty Department of the General Staff 
held a meeting, which allowed participants to air their hurt feelings and concerns 
about the process of negotiation and the concessions made in the INF Treaty. 
Although the report, signed by Zaikov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yazov and 
Dobrynin, is overall positive in tone, it mentions problems of communication 
between ministries, significant concessions given by the Soviet side, and the 
fact that Akhromeyev talked with members of the Legal and Treaty Department 
about the issues raised at the meeting.55
7. Conclusion—The Most Important Treaty
Gorbachev and Reagan never achieved their dream of universal nuclear disarma-
ment. They were unable to sign the START Treaty while Reagan was in office. 
Though many of their dreams did not materialize, the INF Treaty stands as a 
towering achievement—a breakthrough in scope and an agreement bringing in 
an unprecedented model of verification. 
Under the Treaty, the Soviet Union destroyed 889 of its intermediate-range 
missiles and 957 shorter-range missiles, while the U. S. destroyed 677 and 169 
respectively. From the point of view of Gorbachev’s supporters in the military, 
those the U. S. agreed to scrap were the missiles with a very short flight time to 
targets in the Soviet Union, which made them the most dangerous in starting off 
54 Plan rassmotreniya voprosov na soveschanii u tov. Zaikova L. N. October 16, 1987, Kataev 
Papers Collection, Hoover Institution, Box 13, Folder 29.
55 Memorandum to Gorbachev, M. S. from Zaikov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yazov and 
Dobrynin, February 17, 1988, Kataev Papers Collection, Box 13, folder 28.
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possible escalation to a general nuclear war. These weapons were perceived as 
the most threatening, and that was why the Soviet military supported the Treaty, 
even though there was significant opposition among them to the inclusion of 
shorter-range weapons.
The Treaty included remarkably extensive and intrusive verification inspec-
tion and monitoring arrangements, based on the “any time and place” proposal 
of March 1987, which, to the Americans’ surprise, was accepted by the Soviets; 
and the documents show that the Soviets were willing to go even beyond the 
American position in the depth of the verification regime. The new Soviet posi-
tion on verification not only removed the hurdle that seemed insurmountable, 
but according to the then U. S. Ambassador to the USSR, Jack Matlock, it became 
a symbol of the new trust developing in U. S.–Soviet relations, which made the 
Treaty and further progress on arms control possible.
To understand why the Soviet leadership agreed to such unequal cuts and such 
uncharacteristic transparency, we have to be aware of what the Soviets saw in this 
Treaty—a first step on the road to a nuclear-free world and also a first step to a 
Soviet-American partnership to end the Cold War and fundamentally change the 
international system itself.

II. Reactions of the Western Allies

Oliver Barton
“The Most Staunch and Dependable  
of the Allies”?
Britain and the Zero Option
President Reagan regarded the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty1 as one 
of the crowning achievements of his Presidency: a critical step towards ending 
the Cold War, and achieving his vision of a world without nuclear weapons.2 
Although Margaret Thatcher played an important role in facilitating this outcome, 
as a committed believer in nuclear deterrence the British Prime Minister had 
reservations about the INF Treaty and the “zero option” that it codified: the total 
elimination of all U. S. and Soviet intermediate-range, land-based systems. In her 
memoirs, Thatcher professed to have “always had mixed feelings about the INF 
‘zero option’ […] First, it threatened precisely what Helmut Schmidt had wanted 
to avoid when he originally urged NATO to deploy them: namely the decoupling of 
Europe from NATO […] Second, the INF ‘zero option’ also cast doubt on—though 
as I always argued it did not in fact undermine—the NATO strategy of ‘flexible 
response’.” Finally, the “removal of the intermediate-range missiles might be argued 
to create a gap” in NATO’s deterrence posture.3
A comprehensive archival-based study of the British reaction to the INF 
Treaty awaits the release of the outstanding relevant government files from 1986 
to 1988.4 However, a close examination of Britain’s role during the first phase 
of the INF negotiations from 1981 to 1983 can help to shed valuable light on the 
origins and substance of Thatcher’s “mixed feelings” about the zero option. It can 
also help us to understand why Britain not only acquiesced, but gave active sup-
1 Thanks go to Dr Roham Alvandi, Prof Nigel Ashton, Dr Alistair Feltham, Prof David 
Holloway, Prof Matthew Jones, Dr Adam Lyons, Sir Richard Mottram, Prof Leopoldo Nuti, 
Prof David Yost, the editors of this volume, and others unnamed for their comments on this 
chapter. Any errors that remain are my own.
 This chapter includes material subject to © Crown copyright (2018), Dstl. This material is 
licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence except where otherwise stated. 
To view this licence, visit http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/
version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 
4DU, or email: psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk.
2 Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography, New York 1990, pp. 699 f.
3 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London 1993, p. 771.
4 Britain’s role in implementing the Dual-Track decision will be covered in detail by the 
author’s forthcoming PhD thesis in International History at the London School of Economics, 
provisionally entitled “Dual Track Diplomacy: Britain, Intermediate Nuclear Forces, and 
Transatlantic Relations, 1977–87”.
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port, to an Allied negotiating position about which it held such deep misgivings 
from its earliest inception. As a NATO nuclear power and a prospective basing 
nation for American ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), Britain was at 
the heart of Allied debates in 1981 over when to resume the INF negotiations, 
and what negotiating position to adopt. President Reagan’s decision in November 
1981 to seek the elimination of all U. S. and Soviet land-based, intermediate-range 
missiles defined the scope and the objectives of the INF negotiations. This chapter 
helps to explain the uneasiness Thatcher felt about the zero option by considering 
to what extent and why Britain lived up to its self-appointed role as “the most 
staunch and dependable of the allies” when it came to INF.5 In so doing, it sheds 
light on transatlantic relations and the inner workings of the Anglo-American 
“special relationship” during the Thatcher–Reagan years.
In October 1980, the Carter Administration held inconclusive, exploratory 
INF talks with the Soviets in Geneva.6 When President Reagan took office in 
January 1981, he faced calls from the European Allies for an early resumption 
of these negotiations.7 Britain stood in the middle between a new American 
administration that was determined to pursue “peace through strength” and 
the European Allies, who remained committed to détente and were far less 
skeptical about arms control.8 In a bid to resume U. S.–Soviet talks, Britain 
helped to foster mutual understanding and to cultivate unity amongst the Allies. 
Thatcher was quick to welcome the talks, although she and her officials harbored 
deep misgivings about Reagan’s declared negotiating objective, the zero option, 
whereby the U. S. offered to forego deployment of its land-based, intermediate-
range missiles in return for the Soviets eliminating all of theirs.9
One episode, in particular, illustrates the ambivalence of Britain’s views about 
the zero option from the very outset. On October 20, 1982, faced with growing 
public unease about the forthcoming deployment in the UK of GLCMs and 
stalemate in the INF negotiations, John Nott, the British Defence Secretary, wrote 
to Thatcher, calling for a “more positive tone” on arms control. Nott called, in 
particular, for consideration of a “British initiative” on arms control so that Her 
5 The National Archives (TNA), PREM19/979, Pym to Thatcher, October 25, 1982.
6 Maynard W. Glitman, The Last Battle of the Cold War. An Inside Account of Negotiating the 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Basingstoke 2006, p. 48.
7 Ralph Dietl, Beyond Parity. Europe and the SALT Process in the Carter Era, 1977–1981, 
Stuttgart 2016, p. 258.
8 Ronald Reagan, Address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention in Chicago, August 18, 
1980, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85202 (accessed February 20, 2018); Kristina 
Spohr, The Global Chancellor. Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the International Order, 
Oxford 2016, pp. 111–120. See also Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker 
(eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-
deutscher und internationaler Perspektive, Munich 2011.
9 Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and 
Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid 
=43264 (accessed February 20, 2018). See the contributions by Beth Fischer and Ronald 
Granieri to this volume. 
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Majesty’s Government (HMG) would “no longer […] look—as the public sees 
it—to be the creature of the Americans.”10 In a brief note five days later, the 
Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, cautioned against taking any precipitous action 
that risked undermining the modernization of NATO’s INF and, by extension, 
the special relationship:
So far we have been the most staunch and dependable of the allies in our support for the 
modernisation programme. Any hint at this stage that we were having second thoughts 
about the 1979 decision […] could put at risk the whole enterprise. The impact of this, 
in particular on the Americans, would be extremely serious.11
On similar grounds, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the lead gov-
ernment department for arms control, was resisting calls from European Allies 
for a shift in NATO’s negotiating position that would show greater flexibility 
than the Americans’ strict focus on complete elimination allowed.12 Nonetheless, 
behind closed doors, the FCO and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) harbored 
reservations about both the achievability and desirability of the zero option, and 
had, since the summer, been busy investigating so-called “fallback positions”.13
What explains this apparent contradiction? Why did Pym and the FCO deem 
it so important to maintain “staunch and dependable” support for a negotiating 
position about which HMG held deep misgivings, for which it was paying an 
increasing political price, and to which it was privately exploring alternatives?
Although British officials eschewed unilateral diplomatic initiatives regarding 
INF, Britain played a prominent role behind the scenes, ensuring that transatlan-
tic ties were not strained to breaking point and that progress was made on both 
the arms control and deployment tracks. At times, Britain acted as a “transat-
lantic bridge” fostering mutual understanding and mediating differences that 
threatened NATO unity. On other occasions, Britain acted more like an enforcer, 
reminding Allies on both sides of the Atlantic of their obligations and the 
consequences for transatlantic and East–West relations should they renege. Two 
assumptions that were held across Whitehall were firstly that Britain’s credibility 
to perform the roles of mediator and enforcer stemmed from its dependability as 
an Ally, and secondly that Britain’s dependability was the bedrock to its jealously 
guarded special relationship with the Americans. Following the suspension of 
all high-level engagement with the Soviets after their invasion of Afghanistan, 
any influence Britain exerted over the INF negotiations would have to come via 
the Americans. This put an additional premium on the special relationship and 
Britain’s dependability as an Ally, particularly since HMG was dependent upon 
the Americans for protecting its most vital interest in the INF negotiations: 
10 TNA, PREM19/979, FCO46/3101, Nuclear Issues, Nott to Thatcher, October 20, 1982.
11 TNA, PREM19/979, Pym to Thatcher, October 25, 1982.
12 TNA, FCO46/3136, Record of Discussion with Herr Egon Bahr (SPD) on Arms Control 
matters, FCO, 16 February 1982, March 2, 1982.
13 TNA, FCO46/3098, INF Negotiations—Future Work, Price to Gozney, September 20, 1982.
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ensuring that the sacrosanct British independent deterrent remained outside 
the arms control framework. The price of American protection was Britain’s 
support of a negotiating position that it hoped privately would never come to 
pass: the elimination of all INF under a zero option. Nonetheless, the Thatcher 
Government never fully reconciled itself to the zero option and hoped to exploit 
the political capital it had earned by supporting the Americans at a difficult time 
to wrest a change in the negotiating position when the time was right. However, 
Anglo-American relations were both more vexed and complex than the public 
bonhomie between Thatcher and Reagan would suggest.
1. The Significance of INF for Britain
In 1977, the Soviets had begun fielding SS-20s, giving them a capability to 
strike significant military and political targets across Western Europe with little 
warning. NATO had fielded no equivalent land-based system since President 
John F.  Kennedy’s decision to remove Thor and Jupiter missiles from Europe 
after the Cuban Missile Crisis.14 Helmut Schmidt, the West German Chancel-
lor, feared that the SS-20 would undermine regional stability by creating an 
imbalance at the theater-level. Without a Western response, Soviet superiority at 
the “Eurostrategic” level would undermine the credibility of American security 
guarantees by raising the prospect of “decoupling” European security from U. S. 
central strategic systems.15 Only by securing negotiated reductions in Soviet 
systems or by responding symmetrically and deploying their own INF could 
NATO Allies shore up the “Eurostrategic balance” and re-establish the credibility 
of U. S. extended deterrence guarantees.16 
Over the next two years an Alliance consensus formed around pursuing arms 
control and INF modernization in parallel, the so-called Dual-Track Decision. 
However, views varied amongst the prospective basing nations as to the ratio-
nale and imperative behind INF modernization.17 Understanding the different 
strategic assessments that underlay each Ally’s support for deployment helps to 
explain the different emphasis that they placed on arms control and the different 
reactions that they later had towards the zero option. Michael Quinlan, the 
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy and Programmes at the MOD and the doyen 
of British deterrence thinking, disagreed with Schmidt’s reasoning, if not the 
14 Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars. Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam, Oxford 2000, p. 222.
15 Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response. NATO Strategy and Theater 
Nuclear Forces Since 1967, New York 1991, pp. 16,9 f.
16 Spohr, Global Chancellor, pp. 59, 93; Tim Geiger, The NATO Double-Track Decision: 
Genesis and Implementation, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, 
Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold 
War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s, New York / Oxford 2016, 
pp. 53 f.
17 Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response, pp. 182–190.
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imperative, for modernizing NATO’s INF. Quinlan believed it was Schmidt’s talk 
of separate regional balances that risked decoupling, by drawing an artificial, 
conceptual distinction between American and European security. Instead, it was 
the lack of credible NATO response options between tactical nuclear use and the 
resort to strategic nuclear weapons that risked decoupling and gave rise to the 
requirement for modernizing NATO’s INF.
According to the November 1978 Duff-Mason Report—commissioned by 
Thatcher’s predecessor, Jim Callaghan, to prepare the ground for a potential suc-
cessor to the Polaris strategic delivery system—in a period of parity, “[s]trategic 
nuclear forces […] cannot in themselves directly deter Warsaw Pact aggression at 
substantially lower levels” than general nuclear war.18 NATO’s policy of flexible 
response required the Allies to possess a range of scalable response options that 
could be employed in a graduated manner to manage the escalation of a nuclear 
crisis with the USSR. In part to offset the Warsaw Pact’s conventional superiority, 
NATO had a significant preponderance in tactical nuclear weapons. In order 
to meet NATO’s strategic requirement, the UK and U. S. assigned Polaris and 
Poseidon submarines respectively to NATO. In between, at the theater-level, 
NATO’s nuclear forces consisted of aging Vulcan and F-111 medium-range bomb-
ers, whose ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses was increasingly in doubt.19 
The nature and characteristics of British and French nuclear systems meant they 
could not meet this sub-strategic role, leaving a gap in NATO’s deterrence pos-
ture.20 This structural deficiency risked the “sanctuarization” of Moscow, and 
that the European Allies would conclude that the U. S. might not be prepared to 
make the leap from tactical to strategic nuclear employment for fear of escalation 
to an all-out nuclear exchange.21 This deterrence gap could lead to decoupling 
and the erosion of the Allies’ confidence in American extended deterrence, and 
risk ceding escalation dominance to the Soviet Union, and potentially “victory” 
in any hot war in Central Europe that might occur. In order both to deter the 
Soviets and to reassure the Allies, NATO needed a sub-strategic capability for a 
deep strike to ensure a “visible ladder of escalation with no rungs missing.”22 The 
consequence of “the rapid growth in Soviet long-range nuclear capability” and 
the “increasing age and vulnerability” of “the Alliance’s own equivalent forces” 
meant that INF modernization was “essential if we are to avoid a dangerous gap 
emerging in NATO’s theatre nuclear capability. Such a gap would weaken the 
18 Duff-Mason Report, quoted in: Kristan Stoddart, Creating the “Seamless Robe of Deter-
rence”: Great Britain’s Role in NATOs INF Debate, in: Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, 
Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold 
War, Washington, D. C. / Stanford, CA 2015, p. 185.
19 Tanya Ogilvie-White, On Nuclear Deterrence. The Correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan, 
London 2011, p. 179.
20 TNA, FCO46/2703, Legge to Gozney, Exclusion of UK Strategic Deterrent from LRTNF 
Negotiations, August 20, 1981.
21 Daalder, Nature and Practice of Flexible Response, p. 152.
22 Ibid., pp. 179–180.
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Alliance’s strategy of flexible response and so cast doubt on the credibility of our 
deterrent.”23
Schmidt’s focus on addressing a perceived theater nuclear imbalance gave him 
a greater interest in arms control than the emphasis on correcting structural defi-
ciencies in NATO’s nuclear posture gave Quinlan. Taken to its extreme, Schmidt’s 
position implied that if the Soviets withdrew all of their INF, there would be 
no imbalance; the Allies could therefore forego deploying any intermediate-
range missiles of their own. By contrast, Quinlan believed that the deficiencies 
in NATO’s force structure existed irrespective of the SS-20. Flexible response 
required a spectrum of capabilities regardless of whether the Soviets fielded 
intermediate-range systems of their own; arms control could reduce, but not 
eliminate, the requirement for INF modernization. In short, Schmidt’s strategic 
analysis allowed for a zero option; Quinlan’s did not.
Quinlan’s analysis was widely shared by British officials and ministers alike. 
Ultimately, Britain’s overriding strategic interest was in INF modernization; arms 
control was the price, not the prize, for maintaining Allied consensus. As the 
basing nation with the largest share of INF and the only Ally to host Pershing II 
missiles, West Germany was the key to Dual-Track. By January 1981, the growth 
in anti-nuclear sentiment across Western Europe led the FCO to conclude that the 
resumption of the INF negotiations had become “a political sine qua non for [INF] 
modernisation particularly in FRG”.24 Progress was necessary on both tracks 
if the fragile Allied consensus on Dual-Track was to hold. With preparations 
for deployment already underway, the priority in January 1981 was to begin 
substantive negotiations.
2. Beginning Substantive Negotiations
Despite occasional flurries of ministerial activity, day-to-day responsibility for 
implementing Dual-Track and engaging Allies rested with officials. The Defence 
Department in the Foreign Office was responsible for INF arms control and for 
staffing NATO’s Special Consultative Group (SCG) whereas Defence Secretariat 
17 (DS17) in the MOD was responsible for INF deployment and for staffing 
NATO’s High Level Group (HLG). Despite the creative tensions inherent to 
Dual-Track, there was a large degree of consensus between the FCO and the MOD 
concerning how it should be implemented. Forced to choose, both diplomats and 
defense officials would have prioritized deployment over arms control. However, 
both would have rejected the choice as a false dichotomy. The same underlying 
analysis guided both departments: Alliance cohesion rested on preserving the 
23 Pym in: Hansard, December 13, 1979, Vol. 975, cc. 1540–1556.
24 TNA, FCO46/2700, Prime Minister’s Visit to the United States, 25–28 February 1981, 
East / West Relations, February 19, 1981.
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uneasy compromise at the heart of Dual-Track by implementing both tracks in 
parallel and beginning the negotiations promptly.
The British government, unlike its Dutch and German counterparts, actively 
avoided projecting a distinctive, national voice on INF. In April 1982, Sir Curtis 
Keeble, Her Majesty’s Ambassador to Moscow, proposed a dialogue between Brit-
ish and Soviet experts to discuss the INF balance. London rejected the proposal 
because of the risk that comparing figures with the Soviets:
may be seen as pre-empting a US role. It would come at a time when the Europeans, 
including the UK, are trying to impress upon a reluctant American Administration the 
need to speed up steps towards the resumption of talks. Even if we kept the US fully 
informed of what we were doing, the risk that they would misunderstand our motive and 
suspect that we were applying pressure by the back door is great […] It might also lead to 
UK involvement in negotiations which, because of our concern to exclude UK systems, 
it is strongly in our interest should remain a US / USSR bilateral matter.25
Any differences in the Allies’ approach or objectives would provide the Soviet 
Union with opportunities to drive wedges between the Allies, and between 
European governments and their publics. As a political test of Alliance unity, 
it was imperative that all Allies abided by Alliance policy on INF and did not 
promote their own national policy. As a NATO nuclear power and a prospective 
basing nation for GLCMs, Britain felt that it had a particular duty to act as a role 
model in this respect. This was one reason why Britain was determined to be the 
“most staunch and dependable of the allies” when it came to INF. The other was 
to maximize British insight and influence in Washington, and thus to ensure 
American protection of the UK’s independent deterrent.
Britain’s direct, early engagement with the Reagan Administration helped to 
temper perceived excesses, to bridge transatlantic differences, and ultimately to 
begin the INF negotiations. The depth of the UK–U. S. nuclear relationship and 
the political affinity between their respective governments helped British officials 
to have the insight, influence, and rapport with their American counterparts 
necessary to conduct their first bit of mediation and enforcement of 1981.26 
Reagan’s anti-Communism and the skepticism towards arms control shown by 
Administration hard-liners like Richard Perle, the new Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and the Department of Defense (DoD) lead 
for INF, jarred with many Europeans’ continued interest in détente and dialogue 
with the East. References by Caspar Weinberger, the new Secretary of Defense, to 
the possible manufacture and deployment of the Enhanced Radiation Warhead 
(ERW) and by Reagan to the preparedness of the Soviet leadership to “commit any 
25 TNA, FCO46/2728, Proposal for a UK / Soviet Discussion on TNF Figures, Gillmore to 
Moberly, undated.
26 Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher. The Authorized Biography. Volume 1: Not for Turning, 
London 2014, p. 565.
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crime, to lie, and to cheat” only exacerbated European doubts that Dual-Track 
would survive the change in administration.27
The “Iron Lady” shared many of Reagan’s views about East–West relations, 
including his desire for a more robust approach to arms control. Thatcher was 
certainly not prepared for Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent to be included 
in arms control negotiations. To her, the SS-20 was just the latest evidence that the 
“threat of the Soviet Union is ever present. It is growing continually.”28 Leonid 
Brezhnev’s offer on February 23, 1981 of a moratorium on SS-20 deployments in 
return for NATO abandoning modernization provided scant evidence that an 
equal, verifiable INF arms control agreement was possible, at least in the short-
term.29 The process of reaching the Dual-Track Decision in December 1979, 
however, had alerted Thatcher to the strength of European concerns and the risk 
posed to transatlantic relations should the new Administration be seen to renege 
on the arms control track.30
Early efforts by the Foreign Office to persuade the Reagan Administration 
to announce a start date for the INF talks revealed that the Americans were 
not willing “to be rushed on arms control negotiations”.31 In January 1981, the 
Administration launched a comprehensive review of U. S. arms control policy. 
Consequently, the start date for negotiations and the Allied negotiating position 
became ensnared in a vicious interagency debate that pitched critics of SALT like 
Perle against SALT-era holdovers like the new chair of the SCG, Assistant Secre-
tary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.32 The Assistant Under Secretary of State for 
Defence and International Security at the FCO, Patrick Moberly, described the 
American policy review as “understandable, indeed commendable”; however, he 
cautioned that until it reported INF “will be awkward for us and our European 
Allies”, especially “if the Americans take matters as slowly as they may prefer.”33 
Reports from Bonn of the increasing frictions over INF within Schmidt’s own 
party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), only confirmed Moberly’s suspicion.34 
In May 1981, Schmidt threatened to resign should the SPD reverse its support for 
INF modernization. The fate of the Schmidt government hung on the resumption 
of negotiations.
27 TNA, FCO46/2771, Washington TELNO 1203, Bonn to FCO TELNO 273, April 16, 1981; 
The President’s News Conference, January 29, 1981.
28 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: Vol 1, p. 559.
29 R. W.  Apple Jr., Brezhnev Proposes Talks with Reagan to Mend Relations, in: The New 
York Times, February 24, 1981, p. A1, A5, https://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/24/world/
brezhnev-proposes-talks-with-reagan-to-mend-relations.html (accessed February 26, 2020); 
Leonid I. Breschnew, Auf dem Wege Lenins. Reden und Aufsätze. April 1979–März 1981, 
Bd. 8, Berlin (East) 1982, p. 756.
30 Moore, Margaret Thatcher, p. 568.
31 TNA, FCO46/2700, TNF Arms Control, Moberly to Private Secretary to Secretary of State 
(PS / SoS) for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, February 20, 1981.
32 TNA, FCO46/2704, Eagleburger and Perle, Renwick to Weston, September 22, 1981. 
33 TNA, FCO46/2700, TNF Arms Control, Moberly to PS / SoS, February 20, 1981.
34 TNA, FCO46/2715, State of the Coalition, Bonn to FCO TELNO 069, January 30, 1981.
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Like many European Allies when it came to arms control, Britain enjoyed 
closer relations with the State Department than the DoD. Eagleburger was 
con cerned that the Europeans were not being more vocal, and encouraged them 
to “make their views known to others in Washington beside the State Depart-
ment.”35 Deputy Under Secretary of State Julian Bullard cautioned against Britain 
“becoming involved in Washington wrangles” but appreciated that “it would 
be unfortunate to say the least if opponents of arms control in Washington, 
particularly in the DoD, were allowed to get the wrong impression simply because 
we and other Europeans failed to speak up.”36 On February 27, 1981, Thatcher 
and her Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, met Weinberger in Washington. 
They stressed the realities of European politics and tried to dispel Weinberger’s 
misconception that some Europeans were trying to “escape” from the Dual-Track 
Decision. The tone of Weinberger’s public remarks improved, but he remained 
reluctant to commit to a start date until the Administration had concluded stud-
ies on the interrelationship between arms control and the planned rearmament 
program.
Alexander Haig, the U. S. Secretary of State and former Supreme Allied 
 Commander Europe, proved more sympathetic to European concerns, although 
even his views demanded some gentle correction. Carrington persuaded Haig 
that a lack of Allied consultation, not a lack of American leadership, was the 
biggest short-term risk to Allied cohesion and that an early SCG meeting was 
essential.37 As a dependable Ally, Carrington could afford to be blunt. At a later 
meeting in July, Carrington told Haig that “full consultations would help to 
dispel the suspicions of the ill-natured that the Americans were simply indulg-
ing in a charade.”38 Carrington also corrected Haig’s misapprehension that the 
European Allies were in the grip of radicals. “In Britain, for example, very many 
middle of the road people were worried about the increasing lethality of nuclear 
weapons and wished to see a reduction on numbers. But these people were not 
neutralists.”39 
Carrington had left an impression. At the National Security Council (NSC) 
meeting on April 30, 1981, Haig cited Carrington and Thatcher’s testimony that 
“European leaders cannot maintain domestic consensus behind [INF] modern-
ization without a specific date for the start of [INF] negotiations.”40 Britain’s 
influence over the DoD, however, remained limited. Weinberger’s deputy, Frank 




38 TNA, FCO46/2703, Record of a Meeting between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs and the United States Secretary of State: State Department, Washington, 
Friday 17 July 1981, undated.
39 Ibid.
40 Minutes of NSC Meeting 8: Theater Nuclear Forces, April 30, 1981, http://insidethecoldwar.
org/part-3/chapter-11 (accessed January 31, 2018).
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Carlucci, refused to be rushed by Allies whom he regarded as “really not inter-
ested in theater nuclear deployments or survivability. They regard [INF] simply 
as a tripwire which would lead to use of US strategic systems.”41 By contrast, 
Haig’s reference to a dependable Ally like Britain, who saw a vital role for INF 
in strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture, carried weight with Reagan. The 
President would not commit himself to a specific date, but did agree that Haig 
could announce that negotiations would resume by the end of 1981.42 
British pressure, sensitively applied, helped to cajole the Reagan Administra-
tion into making small, but decisive steps towards the resumption of negotiations. 
The fragility of Schmidt’s political position and the centrality of West Germany 
to NATO’s modernization program gave the Federal Government considerable 
leverage over the Americans. Britain’s dependability and discretion, however, 
gave it a standing in American eyes that less reliable Allies lacked. Nonetheless, 
there were limits to Britain’s insight and influence over American decision-
making and consequently to Britain’s ability to reassure the Europeans. Ulti-
mately, Britain could not defuse the explosive interagency debates that delayed 
the conclusion of the American policy review. If anything, the strength of the 
relationship British diplomats enjoyed with their State Department counterparts 
undermined their influence when it came to the Pentagon.43 The heavy reliance 
upon the U. S. Department of State for insights into Beltway politics narrowed, 
if not distorted, the insight the Foreign Office had into the American policy 
review.44 Britain’s relationship with the State Department had helped secure a 
start to the negotiations, but would stymie Britain’s attempts to influence the 
debate in Washington about the INF negotiating position.
3. The Zero Option
Although, at the Rome North Atlantic Council (NAC) in May 1981, Haig commit-
ted the U. S. to resuming the INF talks by the end of the year, the Reagan Admin-
istration remained deeply divided about the objectives of these negotiations. 
When announcing the Dual-Track Decision, the Allies were deliberately vague 
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 British diplomats would not have improved their stock had the Pentagon realized the number 
of barbed anecdotes that London and the British Embassy Washington exchanged via the 
diplomatic bag about Perle and other so-called hard-liners in the Administration. See e.g. 
TNA, FCO46/2703, Richard Perle, Weston to Renwick, July 28, 1981.
44 The majority of MOD files on INF arms control remain classified, therefore it is not possible 
to reach definitive conclusions about the extent of MOD–DoD contacts, and the insight 
that this provided. However, the FCO files contain many MOD documents, including MOD 
reports from NATO and bilateral meetings with the Americans. The majority concern INF 
modernization and the deliberations of the HLG, which Perle chaired.
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about the scale of reductions to NATO’s INF deployments that they envisaged as 
a result of any arms control agreement.45 The Dutch were keen to signal that all 
NATO deployments could be cancelled as a result of an arms control agreement; 
the UK and U. S. rejected this out of hand, believing that it would detract from 
the rationale and resolve to modernize INF.46 The final language of the NATO 
communiqué papered over these differences, stating simply that “limitations 
should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.”47 The (still) 
classified Integrated Decision Document that accompanied the communiqué 
was more specific in describing NATO’s objective as the negotiation of equal 
ceilings at the “lowest possible level,” whilst noting that the complete elimination 
of all INF was “highly unlikely” given the current Soviet monopoly.48 At least 
privately, therefore, the Alliance had not ruled out the possibility of a zero option: 
the cancellation of NATO’s INF modernization program in exchange for the 
elimination of all equivalent Soviet systems.
When, in early 1981, Britain lobbied the Reagan Administration to make an 
explicit commitment to the Dual-Track Decision, this included a restatement of 
the American commitment to the objective of equal ceilings at the lowest possible 
level. Nonetheless, the Foreign Office continued to consider the adoption of a 
strict zero-only option as NATO’s public position “divisive”.49 Firstly, it would 
allow Brezhnev to ask disingenuously “what the West wanted in return” for zero, 
if not the moratorium he had already offered. Secondly, “in the highly unlikely 
situation that the Russians agreed” to withdraw all their INF, “the strategic 
requirement for […] modernisation would remain.”50 Finally, the FCO worried 
that the sheer unnegotiability of the zero option could lead to pressure to widen 
the scope of the INF negotiations when they inevitably stalled, and thus put the 
British strategic deterrent at risk of inclusion.
The Foreign Office was very glad to learn in July 1981 that the German 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Auswärtiges Amt, shared its misgivings about 
the zero option. Adolf von Wagner, one of the leading German officials for INF 
arms control, confided to British diplomats that the zero option offered “endless 
scope for ‘twisting’ by the Soviet Union, particularly if the emphasis were placed 
on ‘zero’ NATO missiles as the starting-point,” as prominent left-wingers in the 
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SPD stressed, “and not on the need to reduce SS-20s.”51 However, in the space of 
a month the Federal Government concluded, under growing domestic pressure, 
that a reference to the zero option in the Allies’ public negotiating position 
was unavoidable.52 Nonetheless, the Germans preferred that NATO adopt what 
became known as the “zero plus option” to a strict zero-only option.53 NATO 
should announce that although elimination was the ultimate objective of the INF 
negotiations, the Allies were prepared to consider (and by implication thought 
more realistic) a verifiable agreement that established equality in INF somewhere 
above zero.
Concerned as they were about the fragility of the German Government, British 
officials were even more worried about the suggestion made by some Allies that 
there were grounds for some flexibility about the exclusion of British and French 
nuclear systems from the INF negotiations. Ultimately, the only thing more 
important to Britain than preserving Allied cohesion and strengthening NATO’s 
seamless web of deterrence was keeping the sacrosanct British independent 
deterrent out of the negotiations. For all that, British officials were conscious 
of the fragility of their arguments about Polaris being strategic in nature, if 
intermediate in range. As Quinlan put it, “our interest in ensuring exclusion is 
perhaps rather stronger than our logical case for it.”54 Consequently, Britain was 
reluctant to countenance as dramatic a shift in the Allies’ public position as the 
zero option lest it undermine the rationale for INF modernization and mark the 
start of a slippery slope towards expanding the scope of the negotiations, and thus 
jeopardize the exclusion of the British strategic deterrent.
From its previous interactions with the DoD, the Foreign Office fully expected 
that Perle and the hard-liners would oppose both the zero and zero plus options. 
Although Perle was highly critical of what he regarded as the Europeans’ fickle 
attitude towards deployment, he was himself at best ambivalent about INF 
modernization.55 For all his zealous attachment to deterrence, Perle did not 
find Quinlan’s argument compelling that INF modernization was essential to 
maintain a seamless web of deterrence, or to prevent decoupling. The weapons 
were too few in number, and the political costs involved in deploying them too 
great. Perle did not therefore share Britain’s concern about the consequences 
should the Soviets accept the zero option. Instead, Perle embraced the political 
opportunities presented by zero to call the Soviets’ bluff, and to entrap Allies into 
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pursuing deployment when the negotiations inevitably failed. At the October 13, 
1981 NSC Meeting, Weinberger spoke to Perle’s brief, describing the zero option 
as a win-win. We:
need to consider a bold plan, sweeping in nature, to capture world opinion. If refused 
by the Soviets, they would take the blame for its rejection. If the Soviets agree, we would 
achieve the balance that we’ve lost. Such a plan would be to propose a ‘zero option’ […] 
If we adopt the ‘zero option’ approach and the Soviets reject it after we have given it a 
good try; this will leave the Europeans in a position where they would really have no 
alternative to modernization.56
The Pentagon’s surprise embrace of the zero option caught the FCO off-guard. 
Contacts at the State Department reassured British diplomats that the Adminis-
tration would never adopt a strict zero-only option.57 Nonetheless, Gillmore did 
not keep quiet about his misgivings. In an uncharacteristically direct interven-
tion at the September SCG meeting, Gillmore expressed three reservations about 
the zero option:
First, it must not form the main plank of the approach to negotiations. If it did NATO 
would have to breach its own aim in late 1983. Secondly, there was a risk of building up 
false expectations of what arms control could do. Thirdly, there was a danger of putting 
the cart before the horse. Public presentation had to be kept in perspective to avoid a 
situation where the public posture began to dictate the negotiating position.58
Gillmore’s MOD counterparts shared his misgivings, but were less vexed since 
they were confident that the Soviets would not accept zero, and that in the 
unlikely event of the Soviets doing so, they believed that the elimination of the 
SS-20s would outweigh all other considerations, including “the strategic rationale 
for [INF] modernisation.”59 
Gradually the ground began to shift under the British position as an Allied 
consensus formed around zero plus. On October 13, Gillmore hosted a meeting 
of the SCG Inner Group at Chevening.60 Gillmore discovered that the Ger-
mans remained “strongly attached” to a reference to the zero option in Allied 
public statements: “we may have to make some concession on the zero option 
which is assuming considerable importance in the public debate in the Federal 
Republic.”61 Gillmore was prepared to recommend acquiescence to zero plus 
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and to support the new NATO consensus only after Eagleburger gave him an 
unambiguous assurance “that the United States Government was firmly wed-
ded to the principle that neither British nor French nuclear systems should be 
included in the negotiations, nor should ‘compensation’ be offered to the Russians 
for these systems.”62 At the September SCG, Eagleburger gave such an assurance, 
stressing that this was “a matter of deep principle and the Allies could not expect 
any change in the future.”63 
With Britain’s vital interest secured and Allied consensus reached on zero 
plus, the British regarded American endorsement of the negotiating position 
largely as a formality. Certainly, British officials felt that a decision in favor of the 
strict, zero-only option “would make nonsense of the processes of consultation 
so far conducted in the SCG.”64 Five days after the NSC meeting, Gillmore was 
confident that Haig and zero plus had won the day.65 Only on November 18, 1981, 
the day of the speech during which Reagan would announce the negotiating posi-
tion, did the Foreign Office learn that Reagan had opted for the strict zero-only 
option.66 Haig’s lackluster performance in successive NSC meetings, the smug 
disregard that the hard-liners showed towards European concerns, and Reagan’s 
own enthusiasm for the simplicity and abolitionist potential of the zero option 
had tipped the balance in the Pentagon’s favor.
The episode was a galling reminder of the limitations to Britain’s insight and 
influence in Washington, at least when it came to arms control. Despite repeated 
reassurances from Haig over the summer that the Reagan Administration “would 
not play the Carter game of presenting its allies with faits accomplis on vital 
issues,” Britain had no warning and was given no choice but to accept the zero 
option.67 Officials had held back from playing Britain’s trump card—Thatcher’s 
relationship with Reagan—out of the mistaken belief that the Americans would 
endorse the Allied consensus already reached on zero plus. With little leverage 
over the Pentagon, the Foreign Office was dependent upon the State Department 
to make the running. Consequently, Britain was subject to, and ultimately found 
itself the victim of, interagency dynamics beyond its control.
Only the day before Reagan’s speech, at a briefing ahead of the Anglo-German 
Summit, Thatcher had:
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expressed some misgivings about the zero option which she thought might be defined by 
some of our allies as meaning a good deal more than zero for the Russians. She thought, 
in particular, that it would be a mistake to create public expectations which would lead 
to widespread disappointment when they were unfulfilled.68
Nonetheless, Thatcher did not just acquiesce to the zero option; she championed 
European support for a negotiating position that she hoped would never come to 
pass.69 At a joint press conference with Schmidt only a few hours after Reagan’s 
speech, the Prime Minister welcomed the zero option as “a most important 
initiative” offering the prospect of “massive reductions” in nuclear arms.70 Why 
the apparent contradiction?
As she attests in her memoirs, Thatcher’s approach to the Anglo–American 
special relations was heavily shaped by the Suez Crisis of 1956, when Britain and 
France failed ignominiously to recapture the Suez Canal from the Egyptians, in 
large part thanks to American opposition. She drew the lesson from Suez that it 
was vitally important that Britain should never be at odds with the Americans 
over an issue at which Britain’s vital interests were at stake.71 Britain’s influ-
ence in Washington stemmed ultimately from its loyalty and reliability. “We in 
Britain stand with you,” Thatcher declared during her first visit to see Reagan as 
President. “Your problems will be our problems, and when you look for friends 
we will be there.”72 As important as INF modernization and the adoption of a 
credible negotiating position were to Britain, Britain’s preeminent national inter-
est was the exclusion of its strategic deterrent from the negotiations. Britain had 
pursued its objections to the zero option with tact and discretion, but in the end 
the British had lost the argument. The Americans had committed to protecting 
Britain’s deterrent in the full knowledge that this would complicate negotiations, 
and that not all Allies would agree. Britain’s duty in return, Thatcher felt, was to 
accept the outcome with loyalty and good grace, to welcome the zero option, and 
to continue the role of “staunch and dependable” ally, presenting a common front 
with the United States, and resolving any outstanding disagreements privately.
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4. The Interim Option
When the chief U. S. negotiator, Paul Nitze, formally tabled the zero option at 
the start of the negotiations on November 30, 1981 his negotiating instructions 
contained no fall-back options.73 Privately, Nitze, the State Department, and the 
Foreign Office doubted the long-term viability of the zero option.74 Gillmore rec-
ognized that with such a sharp disparity between the U. S. and the Soviet Union 
in terms of the number of deployed INF systems, the U. S. would need to pursue 
equal levels above zero—a so-called “interim option”—if any INF  agreement 
was to be reached. The question was when, not if, to make a move in the Allies’ 
negotiating position. Until NATO convinced the Soviets that deployment would 
proceed as planned, the Soviets would not negotiate seriously and would only 
pocket any premature concessions that the Allies made. Assuming that the 
“Russians were to sit on their hands for the rest of 1982 […] any changes in the 
NATO position had to be produced very sparingly.”75 The Allies should retain the 
zero option for the foreseeable future; the Americans agreed.
Although sticking with the zero option made sense diplomatically, it also 
meant that the Allies ceded the initiative to the Soviets, putting NATO at a 
disadvantage when it came to the battle for hearts and minds in Western Europe. 
The Soviets proved adept at making frequent presentational changes to their 
negotiating position, which gave the appearance of activism and accommodation 
without making their proposals any more attractive to the Allies.76 Nonetheless, 
European public opinion began to turn against the zero option; opponents 
viewed the all-or-nothing approach as evidence that the Americans were not 
taking the negotiations seriously.77 By mid-1982, with the two sides little closer 
after six months of negotiation, pressure began to build within the Alliance for 
the Americans to show greater “flexibility” in its negotiating position. British 
and French nuclear systems continued to be a focus of Soviet propaganda and 
were at the core of the Soviet negotiating position.78 The Soviets continued to 
stress that a balance already existed in Europe, and that NATO’s superiority in 
European-based systems, including the British and French strategic deterrents, 
legitimized deployments of the SS-20. In Brussels, Britain circulated paper after 
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paper challenging Soviet claims.79 These efforts did not prevent critics, including 
the architects of Ostpolitik, Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr, from echoing Soviet 
calls for compensation for British and French forces and the cancellation of NATO 
deployments in return for marginal reductions in Soviet systems. In September 
1982, the British Minister in Bonn, Christopher Mallaby, reported that the 
popular interpretation of “flexibility” and zero plus in SPD circles was for NATO 
to allow the Soviets to keep some SS-20s as compensation for the British and 
French deterrents.80
In June 1982, Schmidt concluded that an interim option was required to head 
off the opposition from within his own party to INF modernization, which 
threatened to topple his fragile coalition. The FCO deemed the call for an interim 
option ill-timed, if not ill-judged. “It would be profoundly damaging,” Gillmore 
believed, “if the Alliance was to work itself now into a state of jitters […] It is 
probably right that the zero / zero outcome is not negotiable.”81 However, the 
timing of any move “will be of the essence […] There must be no question of 
considering alternatives to zero until [the Soviets] have displayed a greater readi-
ness to approach the INF negotiations with a real intent to negotiate for a sensible 
result.”82 The Americans agreed with Gillmore’s analysis and rejected Schmidt’s 
proposed interim option.
Nonetheless, the FCO found the growing frequency of U. S.–German interac-
tions disquieting. In September 1982, Gillmore’s deputy, John Weston, learned 
that Nitze would be: 
having a private exchange of views with the leader of the Soviet delegation […] before 
going on to ‘brief the Germans over the weekend’ […] It is perhaps perfectly natural that 
Nitze should be making a point of keeping the Germans closely informed at this very 
fluid juncture in the German political scene. But we shall presumably wish to ensure 
that US / German bilateral contacts on INF do not assume the proportions of a ‘special 
relationship’.83
Signs that Nitze was “finding it more difficult to deal conceptually with the 
problem of the exclusion of allied systems in INF” only made the FCO more 
nervous about where a U. S.–German special relationship could lead, and the 
other concessions Schmidt might feel forced to make to shore up his governing 
coalition.84 In order to safeguard its independent deterrent, Britain needed 
to strengthen its own special relationship with the Americans, and to make 
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preparations for a positive shift in the negotiating position. In September 1982, 
Gillmore broached the subject of Anglo–American collaboration on preparing 
fall-back options with Richard Burt, Eagleburger’s successor as Chair of the 
SCG.85 Gillmore stressed the “great difficulty” they would have in discussing 
possible alternatives to the zero option:
since, as soon as any whiff of it leaked out, the present position would be untenable. If 
some forward thinking were not done, however, we could find ourselves in real difficulty 
next year; and could come under sudden and intense pressure from the Germans to 
make some move which might not be well considered or make much sense in terms of 
arms control.86 
Burt had been one of the leading proponents of zero plus, and remained sore about 
losing the interagency debate to Perle the previous November. Burt welcomed the 
opportunity to work with Britain, believing that cooperation, if handled care-
fully, could help strengthen the State Department’s hand within the interagency 
process.87 Perle and the hard-liners were already in a weaker position than they 
had been in November 1981. The Administration faced not just growing pres-
sure from the Europeans but calls from Congress to accept a “nuclear freeze.”88 
According to one FCO desk officer, the European Allies could be forgiven if they 
found themselves “unable, privately at least, to resist a feeling of relief that the 
American Administration is now having a first-hand taste of the sort of public 
pressure which the European Governments have faced for several years.”89 
Nitze shared Burt’s frustration with the stalemate in Geneva. In early October 
1982, the FCO learned that in July Nitze had established on his own authority a 
private back-channel to sound out the Soviets about a possible interim option, 
the so-called “Walk in the Woods.”90 Although the White House rejected Nitze’s 
proposal (thanks in part to Perle) the new U. S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, 
supported Nitze’s efforts to find a compromise.91 Burt hoped that with British 
help he could get Shultz to approve the development of fall-back options for use 
in 1983. Having sounded out Perle and learned that even he “acknowledged that 
an Allied move was likely to be necessary” at some point, the FCO felt confident 
to press the matter with Shultz.92 Indeed, the FCO regarded Pym’s meeting with 
Shultz on December 17, 1982 as of “critical importance” in helping the Depart-
ment of State “break the log-jam in Washington […] [N]o voice is likely to weigh 
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more persuasively in the matter than that of the United Kingdom.”93 Although 
Shultz was not prepared to countenance a shift in NATO’s public position in the 
immediate future, since the Soviets had made no meaningful concessions of 
their own, he recognized that it would be “irresponsible for the Americans not to 
think about other positions behind closed doors.”94 Burt was ecstatic and thanked 
Gillmore profusely for Britain’s help in winning over Shultz.95
It was against this background of delicate engagement with the U. S. about 
possible fall-back options that the Defence Secretary, John Nott, wrote his letter to 
Thatcher calling for a “British initiative” on arms control.96 The idea Nott had in 
mind was a move to reduce the number and salience of tactical nuclear weapons 
in NATO’s posture, not a move on INF. Nonetheless, the FCO remained cautious 
about any effort that could be perceived as placing “semi-public pressure on the 
Americans to move” lest this detract from Britain’s role as the “most staunch and 
dependable of the allies”, and thus undermine British influence in Washington.97 
The irony was that the FCO rejected calls from MOD for an early move on arms 
control precisely because the FCO wished to persuade the Americans to be ready 
to make a move on INF in early 1983. The FCO’s analysis of the zero option had 
never changed. The interim option had always been a question of when, not if.
By January 1983, the British had concluded that the time for a move in the 
negotiating position was fast approaching. This was not because they felt that the 
Allies had succeeded in demonstrating to the Soviets their resolve to see through 
the deployments. Rather it was because public support for deployment was 
looking increasingly vulnerable. In particular, a new, more credible negotiat-
ing position could help to head off calls from the likes of Bahr for a one-year 
postponement in deployment in order to allow additional time for negotiation.98 
The British feared that postponement, even for a year, would undermine the 
momentum then building behind deployment, perhaps fatally. Indeed, the 
Soviets were quick to capitalize on the growing opposition throughout Western 
Europe to deployment by announcing a new negotiating position of their own. 
On December 21, 1982, the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, gave a speech in which he labeled the zero option 
a “mockery”.99 In its place, he offered his own interim option, whereby the Soviet 
Union would retain in Europe only as many medium-range missiles as Britain 
and France already possessed “and not a single one more”. By making this new 
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offer, Andropov had attempted to portray the issue of British and French nuclear 
forces as the main obstacle to progress in the negotiations. This alone gave Britain 
every reason to want the U. S. to announce their own interim option.
By February 1983, Britain, along with the majority of the other European 
Allies, had concluded that the time had arrived for the U. S. to offer an interim 
option. However, FCO officials cautioned against putting collective pressure on 
the Administration to change track. The Reagan Administration already had a 
strong tendency to view defense issues through a domestic political lens; the chal-
lenge posed by the FREEZE Movement only exacerbated this. Gillmore argued 
that “if it was believed that the Europeans were ‘ganging up’ on the Administra-
tion in order to encourage a new initiative in the negotiations, this would merely 
serve the arguments of those who oppose any shift from the zero option, even on 
an interim base.”100 It was for this reason that, on January 24, Pym declined an 
invitation from Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German Foreign Minister, to meet 
with their Italian counterpart to discuss INF. Later Pym persuaded Genscher not 
to lobby the Americans for an early NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting to discuss 
INF for the same reason.101 Nonetheless, in making the case to the Americans for 
an interim option, German support would be key. The new German Chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl, favored an interim option, but wished to delay any move until after 
the Federal Elections.102 “[F]ighting for his political life”, the FDP leader, Gen-
scher, did not want the Americans to wait any longer.103
Their determination to avoid ganging up on the Americans did not preclude 
the British from lobbying the Administration bilaterally or continuing to collabo-
rate on the development of fall-back options. On February 18, Thatcher wrote to 
Reagan, warning that the recent public revelations about the Walk in the Woods, 
had “aroused public expectations that we are now considering the possibility of an 
intermediate step on the road to our final objective, the zero outcome.”104 Reagan 
himself needed little convincing. On January 27, the British Embassy in Washing-
ton reported that the “President’s own inclination was towards some flexibility”.105 
However, Reagan was “reluctant to force the issue with Weinberger”, and “Shultz 
did not want to bring the matter to a head until he was convinced that there was 
no alternative”.106 By the time Vice-President Bush visited London on February 9, 
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opinion in Washington had begun to shift; “some of the staunchest opponents to 
any move from the zero option within the Administration now appear to accept 
that a new initiative […] may now be inescapable.”107 Even amongst the NSC Staff, 
there were those who recognized that the United States would have to “work very 
hard to combat the prevailing view here and abroad that R[onald]R[eagan] is not 
serious about arms control, won’t compromise, that the policy is in disarray with 
major splits in the Administration.”108
Against this background, Pym seized the opportunity presented by the Vice-
President’s visit to tell Bush that “[i]n the UK view, the moment to move from 
the zero option might be very close, although […] it might be best to leave it 
until after the FRG elections.”109 In his report to Shultz, Burt recounted the 
conversation somewhat differently: “Pym was brutal in asserting that zero / zero 
is unobtainable and has outrun its political usefulness.”110 Despite Weinberger’s 
continued opposition to any move away from zero, Burt reassured British officials 
that the President had given Shultz the authority to conduct a prompt review of 
the U. S. negotiating position.111
Although welcome, talk of a prompt review brought back bad memories of 
when Allied consultation had broken down shortly before Reagan had first 
announced the zero option.112 Gillmore was determined to avoid a repeat: “It is of 
course important not to nag the Americans unnecessarily. But under the pressure 
of time, proper consultations could become a casualty”.113 Gillmore received 
additional justification for his concerns when, on March 23, President Reagan 
announced “his desire to move from a US strategy based on the deterrent effect 
of a retaliatory capability to one based on adequate anti-ballistic missile defences 
by pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative.”114 The President’s speech “came as a 
complete and unwelcome surprise” to many in his own Administration, let alone 
to his NATO Allies.115
The same day Reagan informed Thatcher of the results of Shultz’s review: 
“the United States is prepared to negotiate an interim agreement”.116 Having 
lost the argument in Washington, Perle was furious with what he regarded as 
British interference. On the margins of the Nuclear Planning Group on March 23, 
107 TNA, PREM 19/973, INF: The Zero Option, Bone to Coles, February 9, 1983.
108 RRPL, NSC Subject File, Arms Control (1 Jan 83–20 Jan 83), Arms Control Public Affairs, 
Allin to Clark and McFarlane, January 13, 1983.
109 TNA, PREM 19/973, Secretary of State’s discussion with Vice-President Bush: 9 February: 
Defence Issues, Bone to Coles, February 9, 1983.
110 National Security Archive, Washington, An Overview of the Vice President’s Talks in 
Europe on INF, U. S. Embassy London to U. S. Secretary of State, February 10, 1983.
111 Ibid.
112 TNA, PREM 19/979, Reagan to Thatcher, March 14, 1983.
113 TNA, FCO46/3472, UKDel NATO Telegram Number 83: INF, FCO to Washington TELNO 
469, March 21, 1983.
114 TNA, FCO46/3472, SITREP 14–25 March, Weston to Wright, March 24, 1983.
115 Ibid.
116 TNA, PREM 19/979, Reagan to Thatcher, March 23, 1983.
Oliver Barton112
Perle opened a meeting with his MOD counterpart “with a heated denunciation 
of what the British were up to in, as he saw it, mobilizing European opinion to 
apply pressure on the US Administration to make a move in the INF arms control 
negotiations.”117 Gillmore put Perle’s outburst down to him being “aggrieved at 
having lost the battle in Washington in spite of having spilt a good deal of blood 
on a large number of carpets. But then we are all getting used to that.”118
Did Perle overstate Britain’s influence? Certainly, there is little evidence to 
suggest that the British perfidiously masterminded a conspiracy by the European 
Allies to lobby the Reagan Administration to pursue an interim option. Indeed, 
the British had actively discouraged attempts by Genscher and others to mount 
such a coordinated lobbying campaign.119 However, Perle had stronger grounds 
to allege that the Foreign Office had been “ganging up with the State Department 
in some way” even if this fell short of the “unfair pressure” Perle claimed that the 
British had placed on the interagency decision-making process.120 Behind the 
scenes, FCO officials had been working hard with Burt and his team for nearly 
six months, exploring alternative interim options. In so doing, the British were 
able to inject their thinking at the very earliest stage of the American policy devel-
opment process. In parallel, at the political level, Pym engaged with Secretary 
Shultz, and Thatcher kept up a regular correspondence with President Reagan. In 
short, the British had learnt the lesson from the zero option debacle “that dealing 
with the State Department is no substitute for more widespread exchanges; and 
that views delivered early carry twice the weight of those that come later.”121
Some in the Reagan Administration, like Perle, grated at “the role the British 
cherish: to straddle the differences between the U. S. and Europe.”122 However, the 
MOD was confident that HMG had pursued the “right” approach:
[T]he most productive way of seeking to influence US thinking has been to feed in the 
UK view through intensive contact between senior US officials and our Chargé [d’Affairs] 
in Washington […] [W]e have been consequently taken into the confidence of State 
Department officials as their thinking develops and I doubt whether this would have 
happened if Mr Shultz or the President had been responding [only] to high level mes-
sages from us. There is no doubt that our views are respected and carefully listened to.123
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Were the British any more influential in Washington than their European Allies 
because they adopted this approach? Like any success, the interim option had 
many parents. The Italians were quick to claim their share of responsibility for the 
move.124 However, Kohl’s views about the timing of any move were unquestion-
ably the single biggest factor weighing upon American decision-making once 
the President had accepted the need for greater flexibility in the U. S. negotiating 
position. Nonetheless, Burt believed that when it came to INF both “the FRG and 
Britain are the crucial countries”; indeed, Burt argued that the U. S. “should put 
special weight on what was heard in London.”125 While other Allies “are reluctant 
to offer us advice on sensitive nuclear matters”, the British “rely on the ‘special 
relationship’ and are always more candid. They view themselves as ‘explaining 
Europe to the Americans and vice versa’”.126 British intervention may not have 
influenced the timing of Reagan’s announcement. However, FCO officials kept 
up their quiet, but consistent engagement with their counterparts in the State 
Department, conveying the message, echoed by Pym and Thatcher, that a move 
of some sort, early in 1983, would be essential if the U. S. were to maintain 
Allied support for deployment. It was, in no small part, thanks to this that 
President Reagan reluctantly took on the hard-liners within his Administration, 
and decided to pursue an interim option.
5. The Zero Option Redux
As NATO’s self-imposed deadline of December 31, 1983 either to reach an arms 
control agreement or to begin NATO deployment fast approached, the interim 
option underwent several further revisions. These modifications of NATO’s 
negotiating position pushed the zero option further into the distance, although it 
remained ostensibly the Allies’ ultimate objective in the negotiations. When the 
first NATO deployments began in November 1983 and the Soviets subsequently 
walked out of the negotiations in Geneva, the zero option was effectively dead. 
Coming on the back of the Soviet shoot-down of Korean Airlines Flight 007, and 
the concern provoked in the Kremlin by the NATO command exercise, ABLE 
ARCHER 83, East–West relations reached a new nadir.127
When the INF negotiations finally resumed in Geneva on March 12, 1985, 
under the umbrella of the expanded Nuclear-Space Talks, the prospect of an 
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INF agreement, let alone the zero option, appeared little closer. Indeed, the 
linkage established between the arms control negotiations in Geneva had tied the 
fate of the INF negotiations to that of START and the outer space tasks. The 
British had long argued against the merger of INF and START for fear that it 
would undermine their argument that, as strategic systems “by definition”, the 
British and French strategic deterrents “had no place in the INF negotiations.”128 
However, in February 1984, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the new Foreign Secretary, 
wrote to Thatcher, saying that for the sake of East–West relations “if a genuine 
opportunity presents itself for the resumption of nuclear arms control […] the 
West should be in a position to respond positively without pre-conditions”.129 The 
U. S. ended up accepting the merger of INF, START, and the outer space talks as 
the price of resuming negotiations with the Soviets. However, Maynard Glitman, 
Nitze’s successor as the chief U. S. negotiator for INF, believed that linkage had 
presented the Soviets with only greater opportunity to present “Alliance-splitting 
proposals”, and to sabotage SDI. Only by unravelling this grand package, Glitman 
argued, could progress in the INF negotiations be made.130 Thatcher’s advisor for 
foreign affairs, Sir Percy Craddock, agreed.131
Rather than the threat that linkage posed to SDI, Thatcher was more concerned 
about the threat that SDI posed to the progress of nuclear arms control. Thatcher 
agreed with her private secretary, Charles Powell, that “the key is […] not to 
allow” the Americans to make “any irrevocable decisions affecting deployment of 
an SDI which would sabotage the short-term possibilities of limiting and reducing 
nuclear arms.”132 To that end, on December 22, 1984 at Camp David, Thatcher 
secured President Reagan’s commitment that while research into ballistic missile 
defence could proceed unconstrained, any deployment of SDI-type capabilities 
would be subject to negotiations.133 Shultz regarded the joint statement that 
Powell drafted and that Reagan and Thatcher issued after the meeting as “excel-
lent” since it neatly “bypassed” opposition from Weinberger and the Pentagon to 
any aspect of the SDI program being subject to negotiation.134 
Linkage and SDI were not the only potential obstacles to progress in the INF 
negotiations. The U. S. and Soviet negotiating positions remained far apart, with 
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little obvious way of bridging them.135 Despite NATO’s ongoing moderniza-
tion program, the Soviets continued to possess a significant superiority in the 
number of deployed INF systems and understandably remained deeply opposed 
to making the disproportionate reductions that parity in intermediate-range 
missiles would have entailed. Finally, and most troubling for the British, the 
Soviets continued to claim that third-party systems must be taken into account 
in the negotiations.136 Although Reagan reassured Thatcher that the U. S. would 
continue to reject any such proposals, this did not preclude the new General-
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev proposing that Britain and the Soviet Union engage 
in a “direct dialogue” to discuss the “nuclear balance in Europe”.137 Nor did it 
stop Nitze, now Reagan’s special advisor for arms control, suggesting that Britain 
and France would participate in multilateral talks once the superpowers had 
made 50 % reductions in their strategic arsenals, a prospect that both Britain and 
France strenuously opposed.138 
Only when Gorbachev made successive unilateral concessions were the 
obstacles to progress in the INF negotiations removed. When he met Reagan 
for the first time at Geneva, Gorbachev indicated that a separate agreement on 
INF might be possible.139 On January 14, 1986, Gorbachev wrote to Thatcher, 
in parallel to other Allied leaders, setting out a dramatic proposal to eliminate 
all nuclear weapons within 15 years.140 Dismissing much of it as propaganda, 
the British Embassy in Moscow commented that “[t]he most striking feature 
of Gorbachev’s programme is the apparent acceptance […] of the original US 
‘zero option’ on INF”, albeit only in Europe, not in Asia.141 By making disarma-
ment conditional upon the U. S. renouncing space weapons, the main target of 
Gorbachev’s dramatic initiative was clearly SDI. However, his proposal also came 
with the condition that the U. S. would agree not to transfer strategic or medium-
range systems to other countries, which “would seem at least to catch the Trident 
programme”.142 More positively, Gorbachev appeared to have dropped “demands 
for compensation for third country systems”, and to have accepted the principle 
of superpower, rather than bloc, parity.143 Nonetheless, in order to maintain 
a common front against the inclusion of their systems in the negotiations, the 
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British stepped up cooperation with the French, who were, if anything, even more 
hostile towards Reagan and Gorbachev’s shared dream of a world without nuclear 
weapons than Thatcher was.144
At the same time, the British continued to work hard to maintain their 
influence upon American thinking. With the zero option having resurfaced as 
a serious prospect following Gorbachev’s January 1986 disarmament initiative, 
Thatcher told Nitze that she continued to have “misgivings” about the elimination 
of INF since “it would call into question the NATO decision to deploy Pershing 
II and Cruise missiles as an essential part of the Alliance’s spectrum of nuclear 
deterrents [sic].”145 Ultimately, Thatcher was reluctant to give up systems that she 
believed plugged an important gap in NATO’s nuclear posture, and that she had 
expended considerable political capital to deploy. On February 11, 1986, Thatcher 
wrote to Reagan to share her views on Gorbachev’s proposals, and to reiterate her 
“anxieties about your ideas on INF”, namely the President’s apparent interest in 
accepting Gorbachev’s proposal for a zero option in Europe as a stepping-stone 
towards his wider goal of nuclear abolition. She hoped “that our experts can stay 
closely in touch on this as well as on wider issues.”146 To this end, Howe sent 
Shultz a 15-page paper that set out the Prime Minister’s “own detailed ideas” on 
how to handle SDI and the negotiations in Geneva.147 In parallel, Howe wrote 
to Shultz, expressing his hope that the Americans would “bear in mind our 
continued preference for an agreement which would take account of the military 
rationale for the Alliance decision to deploy” INF, i. e. the interim option.148
Whilst the FRG was “unconditionally in favour” of pursuing the zero option, 
if need be only in Europe, the other basing nations, France, and Japan shared 
Thatcher’s misgivings.149 “[T]he strength of Allied and Japanese objections” 
prompted an intense interagency debate about how best to respond to Gorbachev’s 
proposals for INF.150 Eventually, the President retreated from his initial decision 
to accept Gorbachev’s proposal of a zero option only in Europe, not in Asia.151 
Instead, Reagan reaffirmed his original position that any zero option pursued 
would need to be on a global basis; failing that, only an interim agreement that 
preserved some INF in Europe would be possible.152
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Thatcher was reassured by, if not entirely satisfied with, the President’s reversal, 
the product of what Sir Oliver Wright, the British Ambassador to Washington, 
described as “[f]or once […] a genuine consultation exercise.”153 However, this 
episode turned out to be the high watermark of British and Allied influence 
upon American policy towards the INF negotiations. In a prescient statement 
a year before, Wright had warned: “[w]hile we can reasonably expect to be kept 
in close touch with the strategy and tactics and the course of the negotiations 
as they proceed, we cannot expect that the hand will be necessarily played our 
way.”154 Betraying his growing exasperation with the Americans’ handling of the 
chemical weapons negotiations and their decision no longer to respect the SALT 
II constraints, in May 1986, Howe advocated taking a more distinctive British 
approach to arms control, including strengthening cooperation with Britain’s 
European Allies, and trumpeting the efforts that the British made behind the 
scenes. Although this approach might not increase British influence over the 
arms control process, Howe believed that it would help to ensure that Britain 
received greater credit publicly for the contributions it made, and to make it less 
vulnerable to the charge of slavishly supporting American policy.155 Powell and 
the Prime Minister, however, were quick to dismiss Howe’s suggestion, claiming 
that “[t]here is nothing to gain from swapping discreet but real influence over the 
US for hortatory European statements”, particularly when it was the Americans, 
not the Europeans, who were participating in the arms control negotiations.156 
“The best way to maintain our record”, Powell believed, “is to continue to come 
forward with practical proposals, even if relatively modest ones, which will 
nudge arms control negotiations steadily forward.”157 Although this approach 
had proven successful to date—none more so than with the interim option—the 
British government soon experienced its limitations. As the pace of the INF nego-
tiations increased, so the opportunities diminished for the British to inject their 
thinking privately at an early stage of deliberations in Washington. Likewise, the 
risk grew that the British might be rudely surprised. 
Looking ahead to Reykjavik, Thatcher told Reagan on February 22, 1986 
that she believed that Gorbachev would “come to your next Summit without 
any serious expectation of reaching definitive agreements on the main arms 
control issues”. Rather, Gorbachev’s purpose might “be to spin out negotiations 
in the hope of being able to rely on a steadily mounting volume of pressure from 
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Western public opinion to remove the ‘blockage’ represented by the SDI.”158 
Instead, Gorbachev arrived in Reykjavik with an even more ambitious set of 
proposals than his January 1986 disarmament initiative. To Thatcher’s horror, 
President Reagan came close to agreeing to eliminate all ballistic missiles by the 
year 2000, and possibly all nuclear weapons within ten years, both of which would 
have put at risk the future of the British strategic deterrent.159 Powell declared that 
the elimination of all nuclear weapons within ten years would be “devastating 
militarily and politically. One is tempted to say thank God for the Russians for 
having turned the proposal down.”160 The priority, in Powell’s views, was to 
ensure that “the arms control process slow down, to give time to get the American 
proposal modified or knocked off the table”. Nonetheless, it was important that 
the British not “be seen publicly to be blocking or slowing down progress”.161 
When Reagan called to discuss the outcome of the Summit, Thatcher told him 
that he “had performed marvellously”. However: 
the President’s proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapons within ten years 
caused her considerable concern. Given the great imbalance in conventional forces in 
Europe in the Soviet Union’s favour, nuclear weapons would remain essential to our 
defence.162
Inadvertently underscoring the different strategic calculations that underlay 
their thinking, Reagan replied that he did “not believe the conventional balance 
is so imbalanced.” On a more positive note, Reagan reported that Gorbachev had 
appeared to accept that British and French nuclear forces could not be included 
in the INF negotiations, and that “it looked like we had the framework of an INF 
agreement”.163 However, the framework that Reagan described was very similar 
to the Europe-only zero option that Gorbachev had offered in January, which 
the British and other Allies had lobbied the Americans so strenuously to reject. 
Days before the Reykjavik Summit, the Foreign and Defence Secretaries had 
been “concerned at the possibility of being placed in the position of being seen 
to be blocking […] agreement on low numbers for INF in Europe. This would be 
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especially damaging when we originally supported the zero-zero solution, and 
have supported the US search for equal ceilings at any level.”164 After Reykjavik, 
the dilemma facing the British was even starker. “[N]ow that proposals for zero-
zero INF in Europe have been tabled publicly and apparently accepted in principle 
by the US and the Soviet Union,” Powell noted, “it may well be that this is the only 
INF agreement on offer.”165 However, Ministers and officials quickly adjusted to 
the new reality, treating the pursuit of a separate INF agreement—if needs be, 
eliminating systems only in Europe—as a means of avoiding something much 
worse. On October 21, George Younger, Heseltine’s successor as Defence Secre-
tary, told Weinberger on the margins of the NPG at Gleneagles: “we could accept 
the zero solution for INF, but strategic weapons were another matter for us”.166 
The British preference remained for an interim agreement that would preserve 
“some residual US LRINF deployment in Europe”, especially “if the Russians were 
to insist on higher Asian SS-20 numbers”.167 However, Thatcher recognized that 
“a zero outcome for Europe […] must in the light of previous public statements be 
accepted by us if the Russians themselves are ready to accept it.”168
Despite giving Shultz “unshirted hell” when she visited Washington on 
November 15, once Thatcher had secured renewed public assurances from 
Reagan at Camp David about the supply of Trident, and a restatement of the 
importance he attributed to nuclear deterrence, she reluctantly, if pragmatically, 
gave her assent to the elimination of all INF in Europe.169 However, talk of a so-
called “double zero” and the elimination of short-range INF as part of a broader 
agreement threatened to reinvigorate her concerns. On the one hand, a double 
zero would address the problem of potential Soviet circumvention. On the other, 
Thatcher feared that a double zero could yet become a triple zero, if the U. S. 
heeded calls from Chancellor Kohl and other European Allies to make large-scale 
reductions in NATO’s arsenal of short-range, battlefield nuclear weapons. Having 
set out to plug a gap in NATO’s “seamless web of deterrence”, Thatcher feared that 
an INF Treaty could yet result in widening the gap in NATO’s nuclear posture. 
However, having long publicly endorsed the zero option, the Prime Minister 
realized that she was not in a position to disavow it, nor to oppose a double zero. 
Instead, she sought to contain the risks that the two zeros presented. On the one 
hand, she accepted as a fait accompli an INF Treaty that codified a global double 
zero; on the other, she sought a commitment from President Reagan that NATO 
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would modernize its remaining theater nuclear forces, and that there would be a 
renewed focus on conventional arms control. Events came to a head at the Venice 
G7 Summit on June 8, 1987, when Thatcher and Kohl clashed over dinner about 
the future of NATO’s short-range nuclear forces. Reagan agreed with Kohl that 
disarmament should not stop with a double zero; however, greater progress was 
required first in controlling chemical weapons and conventional arms before a 
third zero could be entertained.170 With that the path to an INF agreement lay 
open.
Shortly before the Washington Summit, at which Reagan and Gorbachev 
were to sign the INF Treaty, Powell wrote to Thatcher worried that Gorbachev’s 
“willingness to stay longer in Washington if there were good prospects of reach-
ing agreement on strategic nuclear weapons” risked “a replay of Reykjavik.”171 
Ultimately, British concerns about the direction of U. S.–Soviet arms control 
proved overblown. Although it was undoubtedly a singular achievement that 
unlocked progress in other areas of East-West relations, in terms of nuclear 
arms control the INF Treaty proved something of a swansong for the Reagan 
Administration. As Reagan entered his final year in office, the impetus behind 
the arms control process began to slow, much to Thatcher’s relief.
6. Conclusion
The Germans were right to observe that, as a nuclear power, Britain had “special 
interests” when it came to INF,172 none more special than Britain’s interest in 
preserving an independent strategic deterrent. Britain’s approach towards the 
zero option was guided by its three overarching objectives for Dual-Track: to 
maintain Allied cohesion; to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture; and, above 
all, to ensure that the UK’s nuclear capabilities remained outside any arms 
control negotiations. Britain played a leading role in encouraging the Reagan 
Administration to begin negotiations, in order to shore up European support 
for deployment. British officials tried to persuade the Americans to adopt zero 
plus, leaving open the possibility that some NATO INF would be preserved by 
an interim agreement. However, the British were caught out by the Pentagon’s 
surprise embrace of the strict zero-only option, and Haig’s clumsy politicking. In 
order to hold together a fraying Alliance and to repay American support for the 
exclusion of the British deterrent, Britain portrayed itself publicly as a resolute 
supporter of an Allied negotiating position about which it privately held deep 
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reservations, and which Thatcher hoped that “the Soviets would never accept”.173 
Outwardly, Britain displayed instinctive Atlanticism, placing Allied consensus 
first, burying its private misgivings, and professing loyal support. However, the 
British were also motivated by self-interest. Supporting the zero option would 
help to preserve British influence in Washington, and thus protect Britain’s 
preeminent national interest in the INF negotiations: the continued exclusion 
from the arms control process of Britain’s independent strategic deterrent.
Despite growing pressure from the European Allies, the peace movement, 
and the U. S. Congress, American and British officials initially resisted calls for 
an interim option in the absence of compelling evidence that the Soviets were 
prepared to make meaningful concessions of their own. Nonetheless, Britain 
continued to regard the zero option as fundamentally un-negotiable, and feared 
that events might force NATO into an ill-considered move unless preparations 
were made first. To that end, the British proposed collaborating with the Ameri-
cans on contingency plans for the inevitable shift in NATO’s negotiating position 
towards an interim option.
Apart from a handful of routine exchanges at a ministerial level, in 1981–82 
British engagement with the Americans on INF was conducted by officials. 
Although she had her misgivings, Thatcher did not confront Reagan about the 
zero option until much later. She was not above confrontation, as the Soviet gas 
pipeline episode showed; however, she learned of Reagan’s decision to adopt the 
zero option too late for her to effect a reversal. British officials had not raised 
the matter with the Prime Minister sooner, in the mistaken belief that Reagan 
had decided in favor of zero plus. Nevertheless, had British officials learned 
of Reagan’s decision in time, it is doubtful that they would have encouraged 
Thatcher to intervene. Given the limited prospects of the INF negotiations, the 
question of the U. S. negotiating position was simply not important enough to risk 
jeopardizing Allied unity, expending political capital, or squandering Britain’s 
reputation for reliability. Ultimately, the probability that the Soviets would accept 
the zero option seemed remote in 1981–82, and the UK had already secured its 
key objective: American support for the exclusion of the British deterrent from 
the negotiations.
From 1983 onwards, Thatcher played a much more active role in the INF 
negotiations. First, in March 1983, she lobbied Reagan to pursue an interim 
option. Later, after Reykjavik, she urged the President to back away from his 
proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles within ten years, and to focus instead 
upon achieving an INF agreement. In both cases, whilst the majority of Anglo-
American engagement continued to be conducted by officials, the balance of 
interests had shifted towards prompt and direct Prime Ministerial intervention. 
In early 1983, Thatcher judged that it was essential for the U. S. to make a swift 
move in its negotiating position lest European public support for deployment be 
lost. Only by having adopted an interim option would the European public blame 
173 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 472.
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the Soviets, and not the exclusion of British and French nuclear forces, for the 
continuing stalemate in the negotiations.
When in early 1986 the zero option returned as a serious prospect, Thatcher 
continued to have serious misgivings about this outcome. However, these paled 
by comparison with her concerns about President Reagan’s proposal to eliminate 
all ballistic missiles within ten years, which put at risk the future of the UK’s 
strategic deterrent. With such fundamental interests at stake, Thatcher concluded 
that only her swift personal intervention with Reagan could avert catastrophe. 
Not even (or perhaps especially not) her Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, could 
be trusted with such a delicate mission. Ultimately, while she continued to harbor 
concerns about the impact it would have on NATO’s deterrence posture, Thatcher 
viewed the zero option as the lesser evil, especially when compared to nuclear 
abolition. That she was successful in persuading Reagan to focus his attention 
on pursuing an INF agreement, and to park loftier ambitions only reinforced 
Thatcher’s belief that her intervention had been critical.174
Nonetheless, the INF Treaty, and the Allied consultations that contributed to 
it, illustrate the limits as much as the extent of British influence upon American 
arms control policy. Ultimately, the British could live with the INF Treaty in the 
very different political climate presented by renewed East / West détente. How-
ever, the elimination of INF was at odds with Britain’s primary objective at the 
time of the Dual-Track Decision, namely the strengthening of NATO’s deterrence 
posture. Furthermore, the negotiating process had highlighted Britain’s critical 
dependency upon the U. S. for the continued viability of its independent deter-
rent. Nonetheless, by refraining from airing their concerns publicly, and instead 
working with the Americans behind closed doors, the British had remained 
a staunch Ally, providing loyal, but not uncritical support to the Americans. 
Indeed, according to Chris Patten, then a junior Conservative minister, staunch 
was Thatcher’s “favourite word”, and the quality that she most prized in herself 
and others.175 Despite narrowly avoiding catastrophe at Reykjavik, and ultimately 
having to acquiesce to the zero option, the British approach paid off. With the 
signing of the INF Treaty, Thatcher and her government had succeeded in pro-
tecting their most vital national interest—the exclusion of British nuclear forces 
from the arms control process—whilst helping to hold together the fragile North 
Atlantic Alliance, and to bring the Euromissile Crisis to a close.
174 Ibid., p. 473.
175 Moore, Thatcher, Vol 3, p. 767.
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Controversies Over the Double Zero Option
The Kohl–Genscher Government and the INF Treaty
With the benefit of hindsight, Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) claimed that 
NATO’s “Dual-Track Decision was the most important decision [made] on the way 
to German unification.” Kohl counted its implementation, against the protests of 
the peace movement and all the diplomatic pressure from the East, amongst his 
greatest political successes.1 
One might assume that the prospect of the destruction and removal of hun-
dreds of deadly nuclear weapons by a superpower agreement like the INF Treaty 
of December 6, 1987 would cause enthusiasm in a divided country that had 
the highest proportion of weapons of mass destruction worldwide on its soil. 
However, the opposite happened. The looming of an INF Treaty caused a serious 
rift in West Germany’s government and threatened to tear its Christian-Liberal 
coalition apart. This chapter tries to explain this paradox. It also shows that some 
patterns and practices in the struggle for the INF Treaty were repeated in 1989/90 
during the course of German unification. 
The article starts with a policy analysis, looking at the attitudes of the various 
West German parties towards nuclear rearmament (Nachrüstung) up to 1986, 
and how they regarded the zero option. In a second step, it scrutinizes the 
controversy about the double zero option of spring 1987. The third part deals 
with the debate that followed in the summer of 1987 concerning the proposed 
inclusion of the 72 German Pershing IA missiles in an INF agreement.
1. West German Parties, the Zero Option and Rearmament,  
1977–1986 
The Kohl-Genscher government (1982–1992) owed its life to controversy about 
the implementation of NATO’s Dual-Track Decision, though it was Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl’s predecessor, Helmut Schmidt from the rival SPD, who had been 
one of the driving forces for that decision in the first place.2 As early as 1977, in his 
1 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1930–1982, Munich 2004, p. 557; Helmut Kohl, Mauerfall und 
Wiedervereinigung, in: Die Politische Meinung 54/479 (2009), pp. 5–12, here p. 9.
2 Tim Geiger, Die Regierung Schmidt–Genscher und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss, in: Philipp 
Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewe-
gung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive, 
Munich 2011, pp. 95–122; Tim Geiger, The NATO Double-Track Decision: Genesis and 
Controversies Over the 
Double Zero Option
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famous speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Schmidt 
had warned that, with an imminent SALT II agreement coming up, NATO’s spiral 
of escalation was at risk, due to a strong Soviet arms buildup with intermediate 
nuclear weapons. The infamous SS-20 missiles were a particular menace, as they 
threatened most Western European countries, but not NATO’s leading member, 
the United States. Doubts about the reliability of the United States’ extended 
deterrence were therefore growing and also strong awareness of the danger of a 
“decoupling” of the American nuclear umbrella for its European allies. 
NATO’s Dual-Track Decision of December 12, 1979 announced that this dan-
ger could be countered by the deployment of 108 American Pershing II missiles 
(replacing the same number of the older Pershing IAs) and 464 ground-launched 
Cruise Missiles (GLCM) in Western Europe at the end of 1983, should disarma-
ment talks between the U. S. and the USSR fail. 
In West Germany (where all the Pershing IIs and a share of 64 GLCMs were 
to be deployed), the CDU and CSU opposition parties wholeheartedly supported 
this modernization of NATO’s nuclear arsenal. These parties believed, even 
more strongly than the SPD / FDP government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, that the Pershing II especially—a 
ballistic missile with a range of 1,800 km and a short flight-time of only 15 to 20 
minutes—would improve deterrence. For the first time ever, the Soviet Union 
itself was directly threatened by these nuclear missiles, which would be fired 
from West German territory in case of a Warsaw Pact attack. Thus, in a future 
war the USSR would no longer remain a “sanctuary” but would become a nuclear 
battlefield right from the beginning—just as Germany was. According to the 
logics of deterrence it was this abhorrent danger that reduced the risk of any war 
and kept the fragile peace alive.
Within the SPD / FDP coalition government, NATO’s Dual-Track Decision was 
much more controversial. Especially in the SPD there was resentment against 
Schmidt’s course, because détente had been central to the party’s identity ever 
since Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Many Social Democrats feared a new Cold War 
and a deadly arms race.3 The struggle over implementing NATO’s Dual-Track 
Implementation, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried 
Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War 
Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s. New York / Oxford 2016, pp. 52–69; 
Klaus Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis. Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutsch-
amerikanischen Beziehungen, Berlin 2005; Kristina Spohr, NATO’s Nuclear Politics and the 
Schmidt-Carter Rift, in: Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother 
(eds.), The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War, Stanford 2015, pp. 139–157.
3 Jan Hansen, Abschied vom Kalten Krieg? Die Sozialdemokraten und der Nachrüstungsstreit 
(1977–1987), Munich 2016; Tim Geiger and Jan Hansen, Did Protest Matter? The Influence 
of the Peace Movement on the West German Government and the Social Democratic Party, 
1977–1983, in: Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon (eds.), Nuclear Threats, 
Nuclear Fear, and the Cold War of the 1980s, Cambridge 2017, pp. 290–315; Anton Notz, 
Die SPD und der NATO-Doppelbeschluß. Abkehr von einer Sicherheitspolitik der Vernunft, 
Baden-Baden 1990. 
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Decision eroded the domestic base of the Schmidt–Genscher government. The 
peace movement became a mass phenomenon in West Germany from late 1980. 
Its adherents tried hard to prevent the deployment of new American missiles 
in Western Europe by mass demonstrations and spectacular actions of civil 
disobedience. It was a movement that reached far into the ranks of both the SPD 
and the FDP. Schmidt and Genscher tried to counter this challenge with a carrot-
and-stick policy. On the one hand, they hoped to exercise discipline over their 
parties by threatening to resign; on the other, they tried to take the wind out of the 
peace protesters’ sails by pushing for a “zero option” as the Western negotiation 
target in the superpowers’ INF disarmament talks, scheduled for autumn 1981 
in Geneva. By the terms of such a “zero option,” if the USSR would remove all of 
its (existing and future) SS-20s and other ground-launched INF forces, NATO, in 
return, would refrain from deploying any new Pershing IIs or GLCMs.4 
The Schmidt-Genscher government lobbied for this approach right through 
1981. It lobbied the new Reagan Administration,5 its rather hesitant European 
NATO partners,6 and the Soviet leadership as well. During Leonid Brezhnev’s 
last visit to Bonn in November 1981, just a week before the opening of the Geneva 
talks on November 30, it urged the Soviet side to take the zero option seriously, 
especially as, on November 18, President Ronald Reagan had publicly endorsed it 
as the official American negotiating position.7 To the public, the Schmidt–Gen-
scher government presented itself as one of the driving forces of this proposal.8
However, Moscow resolutely rejected the zero option. It would not only mean 
an end to further SS-20 deployment but also the radical elimination of the vast 
Soviet nuclear superiority in the medium-range scale—and all this merely in 
exchange for the elimination of far fewer American INF missiles. These proposed 
missiles did indeed worry the USSR a lot, but they had not even been deployed 
in Western Europe yet, and Moscow hoped that the ever-rising resistance from 
peace movements all across Western Europe would prevent them from ever 
arriving.
4 Marilena Gala, The Euromissile Crisis and the Centrality of the ‘Zero Option’, in: Nuti et al. 
(eds.), Euromissile Crisis, pp. 158–175.
5 Conversation Genscher with U. S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, September 14, 1981, in: 
Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1981, ed. by Daniela 
Taschler, Matthias Peter, and Judith Michel, Munich 2011, Doc. 356, p. 1368.
6 Conversation between Genscher and his British and French colleagues Lord Carrington 
and Cheysson in Chevening, July 5, 1981, in: AAPD 1981, Doc. 205, p. 1111; conversation 
Genscher with Italian Foreign Minister Colombo, July 17, 1981, in: ibid., Doc. 211, p. 1149. 
For the British skeptical approach see the essay by Oliver Barton in this volume.
7 For the conversations of Schmidt-Brezhnev and Genscher-Gromyko on November 23/24, 
1981 see AAPD 1981, Docs. 334–341; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen, Berlin 1995, 
p. 424.
8 In German Television’s Late Night News on November 17, 1981, Schmidt claimed that the 
zero option was “a chance for negotiations that the Americans adopted after long talks with 
us.” See Memorandum Paschke, February 11, 1983, in: Political Archive of the Foreign Office 
(Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts: PA / AA), Berlin, B 9/178493.
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Within the German peace movement, many people also rejected a zero solu-
tion.9 They judged that it would be absolutely unacceptable to the Soviet Union, 
and therefore feared that such an approach would immediately cause a deadlock 
in the Geneva disarmament talks. Proponents of arms control within the State 
Department had the same worries, too. By contrast, the anti-Soviet “hawks” of 
the Reagan Administration, gathered around Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger 
and Richard Perle, supported a zero option for exactly the same reason.10 In the 
end, in 1981, it was a weird coalition of the social-liberal Federal Government 
and arms control opponents in the Reagan Administration that helped to enforce 
the zero option as the significant formula that became central to the INF Treaty 
of 1987. 
Initially, the German opposition parties—the CDU and the CSU—were clearly 
against the zero option. Manfred Wörner, the defense expert in the CDU / CSU 
parliamentary grouping, and Franz Josef Strauß, Chairman of the CSU and 
Minister President of Bavaria (who as Defense Minister from 1956 to 1961 had 
pushed for nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr and who had been the Union’s 
Chancellor-candidate in the Federal elections of 1980) attacked the zero option 
as a chimera. They regarded it as the wishful thinking of those in the SPD / FDP 
government who were trying to duck away from the necessity of modernizing 
the West’s nuclear arsenal (which NATO had been urging since the mid-1970s, 
irrespectively of the Soviet SS-20 threat). However, once Reagan had endorsed 
the zero option, the CDU / CSU soon changed their tune. Following the American 
lead, Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the CDU and of the CDU / CSU grouping in the 
Bundestag, officially embraced the zero option and argued for the party’s slogan 
“Make peace with fewer weapons.”11
In autumn 1982 the social-liberal government broke down—in part because 
an ever-growing number of people within the SPD were resisting Schmidt’s 
allegiance to the Dual-Track Decision and opted to support the peace movement. 
Unshaken by all public protests, the newly-formed Christian–Liberal coalition 
under Kohl’s Chancellorship promised to stick to West Germany’s obligation 
to accept NATO’s Dual-Track. Kohl left no doubt whatsoever that he would give 
the highest priority to solidarity within the Western Alliance, and that he was 
determined to act in close collaboration with the United States. On his first visit 
to Washington as Chancellor, Kohl even overturned one of the key planks of 
Bonn’s foreign policy—the axiom of German “non-singularization” concerning 
re-armament.12 In his talks with Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, 
Kohl reaffirmed that his government would stick to the promised deployment 
9 Memorandum of Ambassador Ruth about meeting with Erhard Eppler, the exponent of the 
peace movement within the SPD, August 18, 1981, in: AAPD 1981, Doc. 235, p. 1240.
10 See the essay by Ronald Granieri in this volume.
11 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Null-Lösung. Entscheidungsprozesse zu den Mittelstreckenwaffen 
1970–1987, Frankfurt a. M. / New York 1988, pp. 103 f.
12 Geiger, Regierung Schmidt-Genscher, pp. 102, 112. 
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of American INFs even in a worst-case scenario in which all other Europeans 
“would quit.”13 That concession took even long-experienced staff members of 
the Federal Chancellery by surprise.14 
Neglecting all strong anti-nuclear protests, Kohl stood firm to his NATO 
allegiance and took responsibility for the deployment of the Euromissiles in 
1983. This earned him an impeccable reputation as a trustworthy ally whom 
Washington could unconditionally rely on—a reputation that remained for years 
to come.15 
A central episode that helped build this rapport was one that took place in 
June 1983, at the climax of anti-nuclear peace protests in West Germany. In that 
month, Kohl and U. S. Vice President George H. W. Bush met in Krefeld to cel-
ebrate the tercentenary of “the first German immigrants in the U. S. A.,” who had 
come from this town in the lower Rhineland. Krefeld was also the place where, 
three years previously on November 15/16, 1980, the Krefelder Appell had been 
adopted. This manifesto demanded that the Federal Government should with-
draw its pledge to deploy American INF missiles and henceforward should pursue 
a policy that no longer risked paving the way to a nuclear arms race—which 
would endanger Europeans first and foremost. Although the manifesto some-
what lopsidedly blamed the West and was obviously inspired by communists, 
it was (initially) endorsed by prominent figures like Petra Kelly and the former 
Bundeswehr General Gert Bastian, two prominent figures in the burgeoning 
Green Party. By 1983, more than four million Germans had signed the Krefelder 
Appell, which thus became one of the most influential pronunciamentos of the 
peace movement.16 
Not surprisingly, peace activists took a meeting of two such staunch propo-
nents of rearmament in this very town as a provocation. On June 25, 1983, the 
occasion at the Krefeld venue was massively disrupted. During the ceremonial 
act, the lights went off when protesters cut off the electricity; afterwards Bush 
and Kohl were trapped for several minutes in an underground garage; and in the 
13 Telegram No.  4933 of Ambassador Hermes, Washington, November 15, 1982, in: AAPD 
1982, ed. by Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski, and Judith Michel, Munich 2013, Doc. 306, 
p. 1599; Telegram No. 3061 of Political Director Pfeffer November 16, 1982 in: ibid., Doc. 309, 
p. 1611.
14 Ulrich Weisser, Strategie als Berufung. Gedanken und Erinnerungen zwischen Militär und 
Politik, Bonn 2011, p. 85. Weisser was head of the Bureau for Security Policy in the Federal 
Chancellery under Schmidt and Kohl.
15 Andreas Rödder, Bündnissolidarität und Rüstungskontrollpolitik. Die Regierung Kohl-
Genscher, der NATO-Doppelbeschluss und die Innenseite der Außenpolitik, in: Gassert, 
Geiger, and Wentker (eds.): Zweiter Kalter Krieg, pp. 123–136.
16 Erklärung des Krefelder Forums vom 15./16. November 1980, in: 100(0) Schlüsseldoku mente 
zur deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c 
=dokument_de&dokument=0023_kre&object=translation&l=de; Rudolf van Hüllen, Der 
‘Krefelder Appell’, in: Jürgen Maruhn and Manfred Wilke (eds.), Raketenpoker um Europa. 
Das sowjetische SS 20-Abenteuer und die Friedensbewegung, Munich 2011, pp. 216–253; 
Becker-Schaum et. al (eds.), Nuclear Crisis, p. 19 f., 190 f.
Tim Geiger128
streets their motorcade was violently attacked. Bush played it cool and quipped, 
“It’s like in Chicago. Some cheer us, some throw stones—here and there.” But 
Kohl was upset about the Public Relations disaster and blamed the SPD govern-
ment of North Rhine-Westphalia who had been in charge of the police, accusing 
them of mishandling the affair.17 
In the long run, however, the Krefeld incident proved to be a milestone in 
building trust between Bush and Kohl. Their close relationship turned out to be of 
enormous importance—especially in 1989/90. Despite massive international res-
ervations about German unification, Bush and his Administration trusted Kohl 
and his pledge to keep a united Germany firmly within the West. In the short 
run, Krefeld underpinned the American perception that the German Chancellor 
was absolutely loyal, but domestically bitterly embattled. As Bush signaled to 
Reagan: “While keeping absolutely firm on our schedule, we must be sympathetic 
to Kohl’s problems and do all we can to ease his way through them.”18 
Part of that strategy emerged at the Geneva talks. There, in March, September, 
and November 1983, the U. S. offered different kinds of “interim solutions”. 
This move ensured that the zero option was not killed off, but signaled to the 
global public that Washington was ready to compromise. In order to achieve 
some success in pursuing disarmament, it would not stick to a take-it-or-leave-it 
position. This was of enormous importance to West European governments, who 
were fighting for their publics’ hearts and minds against the persuasions of the 
peace protesters. For exactly this reason the Kohl-Genscher government had been 
lobbying in Washington for just such an interim solution.19
On November 22, 1983 there was a heated 23-hour debate in the Bundestag. 
With its parliamentary majority the CDU / CSU and FDP coalition reaffirmed 
the need to deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs. These new American missiles 
were required, it was claimed, because the Geneva disarmament talks had not 
delivered any viable results. Only a few hours later, the first Pershing IIs were 
brought in; and the next day the Soviets left the Geneva talks.20 After that, the 
bitter domestic debate about rearmament gradually ebbed away, although the 
actual deployment went on for at least two further years.21 
17 Wie in Chicago, in: Der Spiegel Nr. 27, July 4, 1983, p. 32; conversation of Kohl with Bush in 
Krefeld, June 25, 1983, in: AAPD 1983, ed. by Tim Geiger, Matthias Peter, and Mechthild Lin-
demann, Munich 2014, Doc. 189, pp. 983–987; Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, pp. 192–194.
18 Letter Bush to Reagan, June 27, 1983, in: George H. W. Bush, All the Best, George Bush. My 
Life in Letters and other Writings, New York 2013, p. 328.
19 Conversation Genscher with Bush, January 31, 1983, in: AAPD 1983, Doc.  27; Telegram 
No. 1729 of Ambassador Ruth to Genscher, March 23, in: ibid., Doc. 75; Letters of Kohl to 
Reagan, September 15, November 3; AAPD 1983, Doc.  267 and 326, pp. 1338–1340 and 
1623 f.
20 Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition. American–Soviet Relations and the End of the 
Cold War, Washington D. C. 1994, p. 566.
21 At the end of 1984, there were still 54 out of 108 Pershing IIs deployed in West Germany. 
After an incident with a Pershing II in Heilbronn in January 1985, deployment was disrupted 
for some months, Memorandum of Political Director Pfeffer, May, 6, 1985, in: AAPD 1985, 
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By that time significant changes within the Christian-Liberal coalition had 
taken place. Up to 1982, within the (former) coalition with the détente orientated 
SPD the tiny Liberal Party had made its name by advocating close transatlantic 
relations and the strengthening of NATO. But that approach became much more 
difficult to uphold after 1982, because of the ostentatious closeness of Chancellor 
Kohl to the U. S. Administration and the almost unconditional pro-American 
bias of the CDU / CSU generally. Hence, with its front-runner Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, the FDP started to distinguish itself in the coalition by demonstratively 
upholding Ostpolitik and détente, and by paying special deference to the USSR 
and its satellites. So Genscher (who was personally not at all close to the new 
American Secretary of State George Shultz and had to make a great effort to 
achieve a working relationship with him)22 remained very skeptical towards Rea-
gan’s SDI project. The German Foreign Minister did not believe that any Strategic 
Defense Initiative was realistic, but did believe that the project could endanger the 
fragile balance of power between East and West.23 To the American Ambassador 
in Bonn, Richard Burt, and to many others in Washington “tricky Genscher” 
(who always had a loophole at hand) was primarily a “slippery man” whom one 
couldn’t rely on: “Genscherism” became a pejorative term in Washington.24 
Nevertheless, the political situation in West Germany seemed quite stable up 
to the mid-1980s. In many ways, the party lines resembled those of the 1950s. 
As in the past, the CDU and CSU presented themselves as staunch defenders of 
close ties with the West and as close friends with the U. S. A. They got on well 
with France, too, because in January 1983, just weeks before the snap elections 
in the FRG, President François Mitterrand, a Socialist, had ardently endorsed 
the deployment of Euromissiles in the Bundestag—thus backing Kohl against 
the SPD.25 And, as before, the Union attacked the opposition parties—the SPD 
ed. by Michael Ploetz, Mechthild Lindemann, and Christoph Johannes Franzen, Berlin 2016, 
Doc. 116, pp. 583 f. In the fall of 1986 the deployment of all Pershing IIs was completed, the 
finalization of GLCMs’ deployment in Wüschheim was scheduled for December, Memo of 
VLR Bertram, September 19, 1986, in: PA / AA, B 150/651.
22 Dietrich von Kyaw, Auf der Suche nach Deutschland. Erlebnisse und Begegnungen eines 
deutschen Diplomaten und Europäers, Berlin 2012, p. 213. In November 1984, Genscher sent 
Shultz a personal note to protest against the German Foreign Office being too often sidelined 
by the Reagan Administration, Telegram No. 4879 of Ambassador van Well, in: AAPD 1984, 
ed. by Tim Szatkowski and Daniela Taschler, Munich 2015, Doc. 303, p. 1412.
23 Andreas Wirsching, Abschied vom Provisorium. Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land 1982–1990, Munich 2006, pp. 501 f.; Stefan Fröhlich, “Auf den Kanzler kommt es an”: 
Helmut Kohl und die deutsche Außenpolitik. Persönliches Regiment und Regierungshandeln 
vom Amtsantritt bis zur Wiedervereinigung, Paderborn / Munich / Vienna 2001, pp. 151–153.
24 When Burt’s “slippery man” quote was published (SDI: Beinbruch mit Kukident, in: Spiegel 
Nr. 3, January 13, 1986), the Ambassador disclaimed it in a letter to Genscher, January 14, 
1986, PA / AA, B 1/178925. 
25 Georges-Henri Soutou, Mitläufer der Allianz? Frankreich und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss, 
in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker (eds.): Zweiter Kalter Krieg, pp. 373 f. See also Christian 
Wenkel’s essay in this volume.
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and even more the new Green Party—for being soft on Communism and naïvely 
leaning towards neutralism. 
The situation became blurred when the Geneva talks between the superpowers 
were resumed in March 1985. The delegates were now discussing three intercon-
nected but segregated tables: on strategic weapons (START), on INF, and on 
Defense and Space Weapons. Moreover, the new strong man of the USSR, General 
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, had started flooding the West with disarmament 
proposals. 
Soon, one of the crucial points became the question of how profound and seri-
ous the change in Soviet policy really was. For the German Federal Government, 
that question was especially tricky because, even under Gorbachev, Moscow was 
still pursuing its course of “punishment” against Bonn. After the deployment of 
Pershing IIs, the USSR ostentatiously sidelined West Germany and courted other 
powers in Western Europe, especially Mitterrand’s France and Thatcher’s Great 
Britain. Bonn was ignored.26 This did not stop Moscow having contacts with the 
SPD opposition, however. Its Chairman, Brandt, was received in the Kremlin only 
two months after Gorbachev had seized power.27 And the stand-off only affected 
the Liberal Foreign Minister to a degree: Genscher kept on meeting with his 
Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko. Both men were the longest-serving Foreign 
Ministers around, and they had become used to each other.28 Later on, Genscher 
also met with Eduard Shevardnadze, and, on July 21, 1986, he was received by 
Gorbachev himself.29 Meanwhile, Chancellor Kohl was constantly vilified as 
Reagan’s poodle—just as he had been at his first, very confrontative meeting 
with Gorbachev on March 14, 1985 at the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko in 
Moscow.30 The Soviet leadership demonstratively ignored Kohl and snubbed his 
repeated invitations to them to visit West Germany.31
26 Memo of Political Director von Braunmühl, March 6, 1985, in: AAPD 1985, Doc. 55; Hans-
Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, Munich 2012, pp. 451–457.
27 Conversation of Gorbachev with Brandt, May 27, 1985, in: Willy Brandt, Berliner Aus-
gabe, Vol. 10: Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Internationale Beziehungen und die deutsche Frage 
1982–1992, Bonn 2009, Doc. 20, pp. 219–229. SPD Foreign and Security expert Egon Bahr 
also kept on meeting with his Soviet partners.
28 Gromyko had been in office since 1963, Genscher since 1974. In a last-minute bid for a 
breakthrough in the ailing Geneva disarmament talks, just five weeks before the arrival of 
new American INF in Europe, Genscher and Gromyko had met on October 15/16, 1983 
in Vienna for talks that lasted over 11 hours. AAPD 1983, Docs. 303–306, 310, Genscher, 
Erinnerungen, pp. 431–433. 
29 Telegram No.  3 of von Braunmühl from Moscow, July 22, 1986 concerning conversation 
between Gorbachev and Genscher on July 21, in: AAPD 1986, ed. by Matthias Peter and 
Daniela Taschler, Berlin 2017, Doc. 209; Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 490–508; Julij A. Kwiz-
inskij, Vor dem Sturm. Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten, Berlin 1993, pp. 408–412.
30 Telegram No. 813 of Ambassador Kastl, Moscow, to AA, March 15, 1985, in: AAPD 1985, 
Doc. 68. Staatssekretär Meyer-Landrut characterized the meeting as “unusually sharp” and 
“no fun”, ibid., Fn. 24, p. 381. See also Michail Gorbatschow, Erinnerungen, Berlin 1992, p. 702. 
31 Letter Kohl to Gorbachev, August 30, 1985, in: AAPD 1985. Neither Gorbachev nor She-
vardnadze were ready to receive this letter that had to be handed over to the Deputy Foreign 
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Kohl’s frustration may have played a role when, only two weeks after the 
spectacular summit of Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik on October 11/12, 
1986, with its near breakthrough to total nuclear disarmament,32 the Chancellor 
gave his infamous Newsweek interview. Asked how he would judge Gorbachev 
and his intentions, Kohl replied: “I’m not a fool: I don’t consider him to be a 
liberal. He is a modern communist leader who understands public relations. 
Goebbels, one of those responsible for the crimes of the Hitler era, was an expert 
in public relations, too.”33 This clumsy comparison of the Soviet leader with the 
Nazi Minister of Propaganda brought bilateral relations to a freeze. For most of 
the West German media, the blunder was perfectly in line with the image they 
almost uniformly projected onto Kohl already—the “bumpkin” politician.
It was Foreign Minister Genscher and his Liberal party that profited. In the 
Federal elections in January 1987, the Christian-Liberal coalition was re-elected, 
but the FDP gained in strength while the CDU and CSU lost votes. Genscher made 
the best use of the momentum. In a bold speech at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos, he passionately asked the West “to take Gorbachev at his word.” According 
to Genscher, it was obvious that real change was taking place within the USSR. 
The West should no longer sit and wait wondering what this might mean for 
East–West relations. Rather, it should cooperate, and thereby force Gorbachev 
to prove that he meant business with his new cooperative style.34 With this 
appeal, the Foreign Minister was striking out on a notably different line from 
the Chancellor and his coalition partner;35 indeed, he was going further than 
any other Western politician. International reception of Genscher’s trail-blazing 
speech was quite mixed: in Moscow, it augmented his credibility; in the West, it 
stirred further reservations about “Genscherism.”36 
Minister, ibid., Doc. 246. Gorbachev’s reply in October completely ignored the invitation, 
ibid., Doc. 300. Thus, Kohl repeated it in his next letter of January 30, 1986, AAPD 1986, 
Doc. 27.
32 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 203, The Reykjavik File. Previously 
Secret Documents from U. S. and Soviet Archives on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, 
https://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm. 
33 Kohl to Reagan: ‘Ron, Be Patient’, in: Newsweek No. 43, October 27, 1986, p. 20.
34 Genscher’s speech of February 1, 1987, in: Bulletin der Bundesregierung, ed. by the Presse- 
and Informationsamt, Bonn 1987, pp. 93–97. 
35 A week after Genscher’s Davos speech, CSU Chairman Strauß reiterated doubts about 
Gorbachev’s trustworthiness in an article for the CSU’s Party paper. A real litmus test for 
Soviet sincerity would be a withdrawal from Afghanistan. See Franz Josef Strauß, Auftrag für 
die Zukunft. Beiträge zur deutschen und internationalen Politik 1985–1987, Munich 1987, 
pp. 489–496. 
36 Telegram No. 1793 of Ambassador Günter van Well, Washington, April 15, 1987, in: AAPD 
1987, ed. by Tim Szatkowski, Tim Geiger, and Jens Jost Hofmann, Berlin 2018, Doc. 114, 
p. 572. Konrad Seitz, head of the AA’s planning department and ghost-writer of the Davos 
speech, recalls that in NATO’s “Atlantic Policy Advisory Group”, Genscher was criticized for 
going too far; see Matthias Peter, Geplante Außenpolitik? Der Planungsstab des Auswärtigen 
Amts, in: Elke Seefried and Dierk Hoffmann (eds.), Plan und Planung. Deutsch-deutsche 
Vorgriffe auf die Zukunft, Berlin / Boston 2018, p. 176. Conservative French Foreign Minister 
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2. The Controversy Over the Double Zero Solution,  
November 1986–June 1987
When a real prospect of an INF Treaty being agreed emerged in spring 1987, there 
was bound to be trouble within West Germany’s government. On February 28, 
Gorbachev announced that Moscow would finally accept a decoupling of the INF 
talks from the still controversial START and SDI issues in Geneva.37
Since Reykjavik, the main features of such an INF agreement that the super-
powers consented to were that all (ground-launched) long-range INF (LRINF) in 
Europe with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 km should be completely abolished, 
but that both superpowers could keep an equal maximum of 100 nuclear war-
heads in their own territory. In practice, then, the USSR could keep 33 SS-20s 
(with three warheads on one carrier) in its Asian part east of the Urals, and the 
U. S. 100 GLCMs (with one nuclear warhead per carrier) in Alaska.38 So this was 
not yet a real global LRINF zero solution but a purely European zero; and it meant 
that West Germany (like most of Western Europe) was still within reach of the 
remaining, very mobile Soviet LRINF missiles,39 even though these might be 
principally intended as weapons against China. It is worth keeping in mind that it 
was not until July 21, 1987 that Gorbachev changed tack by completely abolishing 
this remaining stock of 100 permitted warheads. It was at this moment that he 
agreed to a real global zero. 
The debate that flared up in West Germany revealed the fundamental incon-
sistencies and paradoxes of Bonn’s security policy. Up to this time, the Germans 
had been worried because of the arms race: they feared the nuclear buildup and 
thought that the superpowers had not talked enough or been sufficiently effective 
in dealings with each other. But now, with a Soviet–U. S. rapprochement and 
the looming chance of real disarmament, the Germans were no less concerned. 
After some serious trouble within the coalition and contingency meetings with 
Genscher, Kohl announced the government’s position on November 6, 1986 in 
the Bundestag. The government, he said, would support any LRINF zero option 
(preferably a global one, but a European one could be accepted); it would also 
support compulsory concurrent constraints on shorter-range INF (SRINF), with 
ranges between 500 und 1,000 km, which should in time be cut down to a lower 
equal level on both sides, but not to zero.40 This announcement did not pacify 
the situation. 
Jean-Bernard Raimond claimed France would check Gorbachev’s policy with “double alert-
ness”: on the one hand, thoroughly registering any improvements, on the other, not giving 
concessions for mere non-committal promises. See conversation of Genscher and Raimond 
in Paris, February 6, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 25, p. 118.
37 Telegram No. 625 of Gesandter Arnot, Moskow, March 1, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 60. 
38 Memo of Ambassador Ruth, October 14, 1986, in: AAPD 1986, Doc. 284.
39 Memo of Political Director von Richthofen, May 19, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 142.
40 Wirsching, Abschied, p. 567.
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It was largely the prospect of the Soviet proposal thought likely to follow—a 
demand for a second zero option for SRINF—that stoked the debate to red 
heat. And this was well before Moscow proposed exactly that to Secretary Shultz 
during his visit on April 13–15, 1987. As the NATO Secretary General, Lord 
Carrington, detected during a visit to Bonn, a double zero option was an absolute 
dogma for Foreign Minister Genscher, while Chancellor Kohl showed sympathy 
for a solution leaving a remnant of SRINF but with a lowered ceiling, as was 
also favored by the influential U. S. Senator Sam Nunn.41 If we remember the 
differing involvements both German politicians had had with the genesis of 
the zero idea in 1981, that fact is hardly surprising. For the Christian-Liberal 
coalition government, however, it created an explosive situation because, just like 
the opposition parties, Genscher and the FDP demanded a double zero solution. 
They pointed out that the Soviets had a vast superiority in the SRINF area and 
therefore would have to destroy many more nukes than NATO. Moreover, even 
though NATO had only demanded a LRINF zero and concurrent constraints for 
SRINF missiles,42 they argued that an unrestricted zero option was what the West 
had been demanding for years; so it seemed a mere matter of trustworthiness to 
remove as many nukes as possible in the present (a sentiment that was popular 
amongst the public, too). Last but not least, a double zero option was clearly the 
approach that the Reagan Administration favored. 
At the debriefing of his Moscow talks at NATO’s Ministerial Council, Shultz 
made it clear that the only alternative to the rejection of a global SRINF zero 
solution would be a modernization of NATO’s SRINF arsenal.43 It remained 
unclear how this could happen militarily. The most likely option was to convert 
the Pershing II into a new “Pershing IB” missile by eliminating the second 
propulsion stage and thus transforming it from an LRINF into a SRINF system. 
But that would be highly problematic politically: it would not really remove 
the controversial Pershing II from German soil but leave it in place, merely 
downgraded technically. Moreover, such a conversion would completely con-
tradict all former promises of the Federal Government. In the past, both the 
Eastern bloc and the peace movement had attacked the fast-flying Pershing IIs as 
dangerous “decapitation weapons” against the Soviet leadership, and the Federal 
Government had always repudiated this allegation by pointing to their limited 
range of just 1,800 to 2,000 km: they could never reach the Soviet capital.44 If it 
41 Conversation of Kohl with Lord Carrington in Bonn, March 26, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, 
Doc. 83, p. 400.
42 Memo of AA’s Head of Disarmament Unit, Holik, March 31, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 90; 
Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 559–563.
43 Telegram No.  521–523 of Ambassador Hansen, NATO, April 16, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, 
Doc. 115.
44 That was constantly repeated in all official information booklets, e.g. Auswärtiges Amt 
(ed.), Es geht um unsere Sicherheit. Bündnis, Verteidigung, Rüstungskontrolle, Bonn 1980; 
 Aspekte der Friedenspolitik: Argumente zum Doppelbeschluß des Nordatlantischen Bünd-
nisses, ed. by the Federal Government, Bonn 1981.
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was now declared possible to simply downgrade the missiles’ range, that would 
confirm the argument of the other side that an upgrade could be done just as 
easily. The Federal Government therefore rejected, point-blank, any plans for a 
Pershing II conversion.45 By pointing to the alternative prospect of an inevitable 
SRINF modernization, Shultz greatly increased the pressure on Europeans, and 
especially Bonn, to accept an INF double zero solution.
In a strange reversal of the previous political frontlines, it was now the CDU 
and CSU who were in disagreement with the United States. Attacking Genscher’s 
embrace of the double zero solution, Alfred Dregger, Chairman of the CDU / CSU 
parliamentary group, complained that the Foreign Minister should be pursuing 
German, not American, interests.46 Dregger belonged to the so-called “steel hel-
met faction” within the Union—a small, but rather vociferous group of right-wing 
traditionalist politicians like Strauß, Dregger and the CDU defense expert Jürgen 
Todenhöfer, staunch anti-Communists who often criticized the continuity of the 
Kohl-Genscher government’s Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik with its social-liberal 
predecessor. But it was not just this group who rejected the double zero solution. 
Opposition from within the Union also came from well known centrists and con-
vinced “Atlanticists” like Defense Minister Manfred Wörner (who at the end of 
1987 was elected to be the next Secretary General of NATO) and the CDU foreign 
policy spokesman Volker Rühe.47 Of course, the rejection of a double zero option 
by the Union soon created an uncomfortable political situation. The vast majority 
of Germany’s population, the media and all the other parties in the Bundestag 
favored a radical reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe to be made as soon as 
possible,48 and the hesitant CDU and CSU looked like reactionary warmongers 
addicted to nukes. No one seemed to listen any more to their solid argument 
(valid for the last decade) that for the “escalation continuum” of NATO’s “flexible 
response” the Alliance needed at least some INF that could reach directly into 
the USSR. Mysteriously, with the prospect of the evaporation of a whole category 
of nuclear weapons, the danger of “decoupling” seemed to vanish into thin air. In 
a conversation with Belgian Prime Minister Winfried Martens, Chancellor Kohl 
bitterly lamented that the U. S. was now repeating the same old argument as the 
peace movement, claiming that America’s strategic forces alone would be enough 
to counter any Soviet threat.49
45 Conversation Ruth with Nitze in Bonn, February 8, 1986, in: AAPD 1986, Doc. 33. Kohl 
underscored this in a letter to Reagan, February 14, 1986, ibid., Fn. 22, p. 204.
46 Nichts gelernt, Der Spiegel Nr. 21, May 18, 1987, p. 20.
47 Tim Matthias Weber, Zwischen Nachrüstung und Abrüstung. Die Nuklearwaffenpolitik der 
Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands zwischen 1977 und 1989, Baden-Baden 
1994, pp. 306–317.
48 See the contribution of Philipp Gassert in this volume.
49 See conversation of Kohl with Martens, May 6, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 125, p. 634. Shultz 
had claimed just that at a press conference on April, 23 in order to disperse critics of U. S. 
conservatives like Nixon or Kissinger and of Europeans allies.
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In a meeting held on March 31, Kohl, Defense Minister Wörner, and Foreign 
Minister Genscher officially reconfirmed the compromise of the fall of 1986 that 
the Christian-Liberal coalition would support any LRINF zero and a reduction 
of SRINF to a reduced and equally balanced level (but not to zero).50 Despite this, 
the agile press department of Genscher’s Ministry pushed for more—in an under-
hand way, as Wörner complained in a “strictly personal” letter to the Chancellor. 
Summing up the arguments against a second zero option, the Defense Minister 
warned that an INF double zero solution could endanger American commitment 
to European defense. It could also exacerbate the military balance, because the 
conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact would gain even more weight. In 
case of a double zero, NATO’s military experts like SACEUR Bernard Rogers51 or 
the Military Committee would doubt if a “flexible response” could be viable in 
the future. By eliminating systems that could reach Soviet territory deterrence 
would crumble. Worse, only the short-range nuclear weapons (SNF, with ranges 
below 500 km) would be kept in place. These SNF would destroy only German 
territory (both east and west of the Iron Curtain). Some Allies, like Margaret 
Thatcher, would already argue for SNF modernization (and buildup) in order 
to have a “firebreak” against a “third zero option,” which, it was thought, would 
probably be the next Soviet gambit in its sinister conspiracy to denuclearize West-
ern Europe. Such an SNF modernization would trigger off a new “rearmament” 
debate which would be worse than the one over the Dual-Track Decision because, 
this time, Germany, as the only country concerned, would stand all alone.52
With the catch-phrase “ je kürzer die Reichweiten, desto toter die Deutschen” 
(“the shorter the nukes’ range, the deadlier for the Germans”), the foreign and 
defense experts of the Union fought acrimoniously against this trend; they 
warned that such a development would necessarily endanger close ties with the 
West and feed into a dangerous trend towards nationalism and “neutralism” in 
Germany. 
That argument was something that hit a nerve abroad. In the context of 
the Euromissiles debate of the 1980s, the “German problem”—the question of 
German unity—had returned to the international agenda. Faced with Allied 
troops and nukes on German ground, proponents of the peace movement were 
raising questions about the limits of the country’s autonomy of decision, and of 
its sovereignty.53 The Allies were puzzled by the German peace movement, with 
its claims of equidistance from both superpowers, and calls for demilitarized 
50 This compromise proposal exactly was transmitted in a letter from Kohl to Reagan, April 7, 
1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 100.
51 For Rogers’ critique of a double zero solution, ‘What’s wrong with Zero.’ NATO’s boss speaks 
out, in: Newsweek, April 27, 1987, pp. 9 f.
52 Letter from Wörner to Kohl, April 19, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 116, pp. 581–584.
53 Philipp Gassert, Viel Lärm um Nichts? Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss als Katalysator gesell-
schaftlicher Selbstverständigung in der Bundesrepublik, in: Gassert, Geiger, and Wentker 
(eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg, p. 194 f. 
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zones in Central Europe,54 and even of quitting NATO.55 Its demands fanned 
fears about the stability of the FRG and its anchorage in the West; also about a 
new German national neutralism.56 Old fears in the West about a new kind of 
German–Soviet “Rapallo Deal” came to the fore. These fears were exacerbated 
by rampant debates among intellectuals in Germany and in the Middle-Eastern 
European states about a possible re-emergence of Mitteleuropa after the mid-
1980s.57 Already in 1984, the Italian Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti, had 
warned of “Pan-Germanism” and had publicly commended the fact that there 
were two separate German states.58 Only some months before, a French socialist 
had allegedly proclaimed that the deployment of Pershing IIs was excellent at least 
in one way: it would prevent German unification for at least another 20 years.59 
So what would become of the “incertitudes allemandes” when the missiles were 
dismantled? 
Since the Reykjavik Summit, some maverick CDU back-benchers like Bernhard 
Friedmann had been urging the government to insist on a package deal between 
disarmament and progress toward German unification. This was a fallback to 
positions of the 1950s, and so completely out of touch with reality that no one 
took the idea seriously, although it was reiterated before President Richard von 
Weizsäcker met with Gorbachev in Moscow in July 1987.60
In June 1987, an unexpected incident in the GDR underscored the subcutane-
ous presence of the “German question.” As part of the festivities celebrating the 
750th anniversary of Berlin, a big rock concert took place in West Berlin in front 
of the Reichstag, which was just next to the Wall. In East Berlin, young people 
trying to listen to the rock music were driven off by the police, and this led to 
the biggest unauthorized demonstration in the GDR for years. The stand-off 
54 In 1985 and 1987, together with the ČSSR, the GDR proposed initiatives for a zone free of 
chemical weapons and nuclear weapons in Central Europe. The idea of a chemical weapons 
free zone was based on a joint paper that the West German SPD and the GDR’s State Party, 
the SED, had adopted some months earlier, Memorandum of Ruth, July 26, 1985, in: AAPD 
1985, Doc. 205.
55 Oskar Lafontaine, Minister President of Saarland since 1985, had demanded this in 1983, see 
Wirsching, Abschied vom Provisorium, p. 88.
56 In regard to the INF Treaty, French Defense Minister Giraud complained about a German 
“growing irrational pacifism (fired by the Greens), the ‘Fata Morgana’ (le mirage) of reunifica-
tion and the German desire for close economic relations with the East”. Telegram No. 2331 
of Military Attaché Fraidel, Paris, October 15, 1987, PA / AA, B 14/143334.
57 Memorandum head of planning department, Seitz, April 3, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 95, 
pp. 480–488.
58 Telegram Head of Italian Bureau, Kuhna, to Rome embassy, September 14, 1986, and 
Memorandum of MDg Hans Schauer, September 28, 1986, in: AAPD 1984, Docs. 236 and 
255.
59 Wo ist der Deutschen Vaterland?, in: Der Spiegel Nr. 48, November 28, 1983, p. 21; Willy 
Brandt, Erinnerungen, Berlin 1997 (paperback edition), p. 321; Egon Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 
Munich 1998, p. 512.
60 Karl-Rudolf Korte, Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft. Regierungsstil und 
Entscheidungen 1982–1989, Stuttgart 1998, pp. 309–311; AAPD 1987, Doc. 212, Fn. 19–21.
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escalated, and the protesters began to chant both “We want Gorbachev” and 
“Die Mauer muss weg” (“The Wall must go”).61 A couple of days later, in front of 
the Brandenburg Gate, this request was memorably repeated by U. S. President 
Ronald Reagan as he demanded that General Secretary Gorbachev should “tear 
down this Wall.”62
In the run-up to von Weizsäcker’s visit to Moscow rumors spread that Gor-
bachev might try to tease the Germans with a new kind of “Stalin Note.”63 In 
1952, the USSR had proposed a model of a reunified, but neutral Germany that 
would not be part of NATO. Gorbachev did not do anything of that kind. When 
Weizsäcker—more for the record than through real conviction—brought up 
the wish of the German people for reunification, Gorbachev repeated the Soviet 
argument that two Germanies were the verdict of history that had to be accepted. 
However, he also said that no one could know what things would be like in a 
hundred years’ time.64 That a Soviet General Secretary should indicate that there 
might be change in Germany’s divided condition (albeit in a faraway future) was 
indeed a new development and impressed his visitors.
In a nutshell: due to the INF debate, the “German problem” had returned to 
international politics. It is striking that this development was better perceived 
abroad than it was within Germany. This does not mean, however, that there 
was a teleological path up to German unification, which came three years later. 
Most contemporaries felt quite the contrary. In September 1987, the leader of the 
GDR, SED General Secretary Erich Honecker, made an official visit to the Federal 
Republic. This was rightly perceived, all over the world, as the final recognition 
of the GDR as a second German state by its long-term rival. Indeed, Honecker’s 
visit was the climax of Zweistaatlichkeit (the two-state solution).65
In April 1987, both German unification and an end to the Cold War seemed 
highly unlikely. For delegates of the Union, the USSR was still a dangerous 
adversary and definitively not to be trusted. If taken in the narrow perspective 
of the German national interest and from a purely military point of view, some 
of the CDU / CSU arguments against the second zero solution even made sense. 
61 DDR-Sicherheitskräfte behindern westdeutsche Journalisten, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ), June 10, 1987, pp. 1 f.
62 For Reagan’s speech on June 12, 1987, see Public Papers, Reagan 1987, p. 635. Confidentially, 
at the margins of a Warsaw Pact meeting in East Berlin on May 28/29, 1987, Gorbachev and 
the Soviet Foreign Minister had indeed proposed exactly that to Honecker who rejected any 
removal of the Wall. See Vladislav Zubok, With his back against the Wall: Gorbachev, Soviet 
demise, and German reunification, in: Cold War History 14/4 (2014), pp. 621 f. In the official 
records of the meeting, however, there are no hints of this episode.
63 Memorandum of Political Director, von Richthofen, July 15, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 212, 
p. 1059.
64 Conversation Gorbachev with Weizsäcker, July 7, 1987, German Memcon in: AAPD 1987, 
Doc. 206; Soviet Memcon in: Aleksandr Galkin and Anatolij Tschernajejew (eds.), Michail 
Gorbatschow und die deutsche Frage. Sowjetische Dokumente 1986–1991, Munich 2011, 
Doc. 16.
65 See the contribution by Hermann Wentker to this volume.
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NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group had passed new “General Political Guidelines 
(GPG) for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons in Defense of NATO” at its 
Ministerial meeting in Gleneagles on October 21/22, 1986 (only a week after the 
Reagan–Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik). For West Germany, the crucial merit 
of these GPG was that they finally shifted the Alliance’s strategy away from the 
military–operational use of tactical nuclear weapons to appreciating the political 
function of a nuclear strike. The latter was defined as the ultimate signal to the 
enemy to stop its aggression at once—and such nuclear strikes were to be made 
directly and immediately against Soviet territory itself. Almost since it first 
entered the Alliance in 1955, West Germany had hoped that this calculus would 
become NATO’s strategic approach. If a double zero solution for INF were adopted, 
it seemed that the tools to implement this philosophy would immediately be put 
at risk: With the remaining U. S. strategic nuclear weapons (as well as those of 
France and Britain) the old problem of “decoupling” arose again: would the Allies 
really go nuclear for the FRG and thus risk the destruction of their own coun-
tries? Moreover, with the (outdated and outnumbered) SNF that remained, there 
was no threat to the territory of a Soviet aggressor (nor, indeed, to any Anglo-
Saxon Ally): all the destruction would be wreaked on German territory alone! 
This complex military calculus was the reason why CDU / CSU politicians 
clung to retaining at least some SRINF. Additionally, they demanded that any 
nuclear agreement of the superpowers should be accompanied by a total ban 
on chemical weapons and by a swift beginning to disarmament talks in Vienna 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact about conventional forces in Europe (CFE). 
Chemical weapons and conventional forces were less in the focus of public inter-
est (even though the East had an enormous quantitative superiority) but were also 
a lethal threat to the West, and especially to its front-line state, West Germany.
However, the proponents of the CDU / CSU philosophy were faced with a 
phalanx of overpowering adversaries. Firstly, public opinion in Germany was 
predominantly anti-nuclear.66 A majority of West Germans had grudgingly 
accepted Euromissiles as an unwanted but necessary reaction to a dangerous 
Soviet armaments buildup; and when the Soviets said they wanted to get rid of as 
many nukes as possible, most people euphorically agreed. They did not bother to 
go into the complicated logic of nuclear deterrence. On a psychological level, the 
peace movement had prevailed: disarmament had become an end in itself. It was 
in vain that Chancellor Kohl reiterated that disarmament was only sensible when 
it led to more, not less security. 
Secondly, the Union was totally isolated in West Germany’s political system. 
Its Liberal coalition partner insisted on a double zero solution just as firmly as 
the opposition parties, the SPD and the Greens. The split within government was 
brutally exposed in the Bundestag on May 7,67 but already, on April 27, Genscher 
66 See the contribution by Philipp Gassert to this volume. 
67 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, 11th Legislation 
Period, 10th Session, pp. 524–565; http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11010.pdf. 
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had been saying that the government was in the “most difficult situation since 
the coalition’s formation in 1982”68—thus premonitorily recalling that the FDP 
had swapped its coalition partner in a controversy over INF missiles once before. 
Thirdly, the United States, which had been the CDU / CSU’s mightiest inter-
national ally in the past, was now taking a stand on the opposite side. During 
a visit to Washington on May 11, Genscher had talks in the State Department, 
the Pentagon and the NSC. He was also briefly received by President Reagan—a 
demonstrative protocolic signal to Bonn.69
Nevertheless, CDU / CSU politicians hoped to find support against the double 
zero solution from European Allies. It almost looked like a flashback to the 1960s 
with a return to a kind of German “Gaullism” within the two parties. Just as they 
had some decades ago, politicians like Strauß, Dregger, and Todenhöfer expressed 
fears that the United States would be prepared to sacrifice the national interests 
of Germany and Europe in favor of an agreement between the superpowers 
alone. In their view, this was just what the U. S. had done at Yalta and Potsdam in 
1945. Out of distrust towards America, these politicians dreamed of creating a 
“European Security Union,” especially by closing ranks with France, which was a 
nuclear power.70 However, just as in the 1960s, France had absolutely no intention 
of sharing its Force de Frappe with Germany. Nor did CDU centrists like Kohl and 
Rühe have interest or illusions about the scheme. 
To complicate things, for the first time ever in the Fifth Republic, France had 
a cohabitation government (1986–1988). The Socialist President, Mitterrand, 
was having to make do with a Conservative government. Prime Minister Jacques 
Chirac, Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond, and Defense Minister André 
Giraud made no secret of their resentment at the prospect of a double zero 
option.71 Mitterrand, by contrast, indicated to Kohl, early on, that he would 
not be averse to it.72 In public, Mitterrand kept silent for a long time in order 
to save Kohl’s domestic position. This silence fostered illusions. On May 13/14, 
the Bundestag leader Alfred Dregger visited Paris hoping to forge a continental 
68 Genscher spricht von der schwierigsten Situation der Regierung seit 1982, in: FAZ, April 28, 
1987, p. 1.
69 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 567; Nichts gelernt, in: Der Spiegel Nr. 21, May, 18, 1987, p. 19; 
conversation Genscher with Weinberger, May 11, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 128.
70 Dregger für eine Neuorientierung der deutschen Sicherheitspolitik, in: FAZ, June 19, 1987, 
p. 2. For German Gaullism in the 1960s see Tim Geiger, Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten. Außen-
politischer Konflikt und innenpolitischer Machtkampf in der CDU / CSU 1958–1969, Munich 
2008.
71 Telegram No. 970 Ambassador Schoeller, Paris, April 30, 1987 on Conversation of Chirac 
with Thatcher in Chequers, in: PA / AA, B 43/130134; Memo von Ploetz, May 8, 1987, about 
Kohl’s Strasbourg meeting with Chirac on May 3, see PA / AA, B 150/666.
72 Conversation of Kohl with Mitterrand at Chambord Castle, March 28, 1987, in: AAPD 
1987, Doc.  89; Jacques Attali, Verbatim, Tom 2: Chronique des années 1986–1988, Paris 
1995, pp. 287–291; Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, pp. 584 f.; see also the essay by Christian 
Wenkel in this volume. 
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alliance of resistance against the U. S.—and against Bonn’s Foreign Office—with 
the conservative French government. 
CDU foreign policy expert Rühe tried the same in Britain.73 Thatcher, too, was 
highly critical of any zero option.74 However, at the ministerial meeting of the 
Nuclear Planning Group in Stavanger, British Defence Minister George Younger 
made it public that Britain would endorse a double zero option for LRINF and 
SRINF if NATO’s deterrence could be kept viable by other nuclear systems and if 
the disarmament of chemical and conventional weapons proceeded. This left the 
FRG standing all alone as the main obstacle preventing a common NATO view on 
banning SRINF being reached.75 Thatcher’s surprising U-turn was primarily due 
to the fact that she faced general elections in June. An even worse stab in the back 
for Kohl and his fellow party members, however, was the massive pressure the 
British were exerting for a “firebreak” in further disarmament talks—employing 
a term (Brandschneise) that even linguistically went down badly with Germans. 
Through a “firebreak”, the “Iron Lady” wanted to stop the headlong rush to 
disarmament.76 Instead of cutting down, or even abolishing, the short-range 
nuclear forces (SNF) which would “only” do damage in the immediate theater 
of war (obviously Germany), she insisted on a modernization and buildup of 
these SNF. This was because, in that category of weapons, just 88 Lance systems 
deployed by NATO faced a sixteen-fold numeric superiority of systems from the 
Warsaw Pact. From the German perspective, that meant ending up in the worst 
of all nuclear worlds.
In a conversation with a high-ranking politician from Hungary on May 
15, Kohl protested that, of course, he was interested in real disarmament. On 
the other hand, he could not let Germany be sold down the river—either by 
the Soviets or by his American friends.77 Under pressure from all sides, both 
domestically and internationally, Kohl made a desperate dart forward, that same 
73 Telegram No. 867 of Ambassador von Wechmar, London, May 15, 1987, in: PA / AA, B 43/ 
144772.
74 See Oliver Barton’s essay in this volume. On March 23, 1987 in Bonn, Thatcher told Kohl that 
Britain would support a LRINF zero, whatever the cost, because the West had to stick by its 
word; but she would not accept a SRINF zero. See Memo of Political Director von Richthofen, 
March 24, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 79.
75 Wörner fand kaum Verbündete, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, May, 15, 1987, p. 1; Nichts 
gelernt, Der Spiegel Nr. 21, May 18, 1987, p. 20.
76 Telegram No. 1020 from Gesandter von Stein, London, June 5, 1987, in: PA / AA, B 150/668. At 
the G7 summit in Venice on June 8, Thatcher vehemently attacked Kohl, whom she suspected 
to be angling for a third (SNF) zero. Her behavior shocked even Mitterrand, and Reagan 
tried to calm her down, The National Archives, Kew, PREM19/2090 f135, Charles Powell’s 
record of conversation of G7 leaders at dinner, (online https://www.margaretthatcher.org/
document/211271); Margaret Thatcher, Downing Street Years, London 1993, p. 587; The 
Reagan Diaries, ed. by Douglas Brinkley, New York 2007, p. 505; conversation of Kohl with 
Mitterrand in Venice, June 9, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 166.
77 Conversation of Kohl with Hungarian member of Politbureau Havasi, May 15, 1987, in: 
PA / AA, B 150/667. 
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day. Without any consultation with Genscher’s Foreign Office or with the Allies, 
the Federal Chancellery put out a declaration, announced by the government’s 
spokesman, that a SRINF zero solution would ignore the very weapons that were 
the most dangerous to the Federal Republic, and that therefore, weapons of all 
ranges between 0 and 1,000  km should be included in the Geneva talks. The 
declaration added that attention also had to be paid to the clear conventional and 
chemical superiority of the Warsaw Pact.78
Kohl’s initiative exacerbated an already chaotic situation by puzzling everyone. 
This became obvious the next day when contradictory headlines appeared in 
the papers. Some papers ran the headline “Kohl against zero option”; others ran 
“Kohl in favor of total zero.”79 The Disarmament Unit of the Foreign Office took 
stock in an extremely negative way, since Kohl’s amateurish initiative did not 
differentiate between nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons, the latter 
two never part of the Geneva talks. Even if the Chancellor’s unfortunate choice 
of words were taken to mean nuclear weapons only, his proposal could bring 
back dual-capable artillery or air-launched nukes, when, for years, the West had 
fought hard (and successfully) to reduce the Geneva talks to ground-launched 
missiles alone.80 
Most observers judged Kohl’s attempt to jump ahead as primarily a domestic 
maneuver, because two days later there were to be elections in Rhineland-
Palatinate and in Hamburg.81 If so, that calculation failed: in Mainz, the CDU 
lost its absolute majority, and in Hamburg, the SPD retained the majority it 
already had. It is generally agreed that the Union’s quarrels over disarmament 
had a decisive share in this election outcome.82
In the CDU executive committee, the next day, Kohl admitted this; but he 
defiantly insisted that without the politics of the Union there would never have 
been any disarmament agreement at all. He recalled that the implementation of 
NATO’s Dual-Track Decision had been the precondition for any zero option—and 
without the Union the tiny FDP could never have secured its implementation. 
Kohl accordingly demanded that the unfair “worksharing” within the coalition, 
where some profiled themselves as (the only) friends of disarmament at the 
expense of the others, should henceforth come to an end.83 Germany’s biggest 
tabloid, Bild, had already made the Chancellor’s thoughts public in a well-
informed article which also addressed the deep and enduring rift the debate over 
78 Bulletin der Bundesregierung 1987, pp. 413 f.
79 Archiv der Gegenwart 57 (1987), p. 31071. Wolfgang Schäuble, Minister of the Federal 
Chancellery, had to explain Kohl’s initiative to American Ambassador Burt, May 18, 1987, 
in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 138.
80 Memo of Referat 220, in: PA / AA, B 43/130126.
81 Telegram No. 2228 of Ambassador van Well, Washington, May 18, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, 
Doc. 141.
82 Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, p. 527.
83 Helmut Kohl, Berichte zur Lage 1982–1989. Der Kanzler und Parteivorsitzende im Bundes-
vorstand der CDU Deutschlands, Düsseldorf 2014, pp. 533–536 (May 18, 1987). 
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the zero option had caused in the once close personal relationship between Kohl 
and Genscher.84
In the whole controversy, Kohl cut an unfortunate figure. He had been away 
from Bonn at a health spa when the controversy within the coalition escalated 
in April, stayed there too long, and appeared indecisive and weak in leadership 
when he returned. It was not so much Party Chairman Kohl who now brought 
his estranged coalition government together, but the CDU’s ambitious Secretary 
General Heiner Geißler. As a skilled strategic thinker, Geißler ruthlessly overrode 
intra-party resistance to the double zero option by insisting that the Christian 
Democrats must not longer appear to the public as Cold Warmongers addicted 
to nukes and hostile to détente and disarmament.85 In this way, Geißler, who 
preened himself on being “Executive Party Chairman,” overcame the politi-
cal deadlock and saved the government. However, applauded by the liberal-
progressive press, he became overambitious. Thus began an internal rivalry with 
Kohl, which finally ended in Geißler’s failed revolt against the Chancellor in 
summer 1989.
In spring 1987, Geißler was successful because, within days, it became evident 
that any hope of finding European Allies against a double zero option had gone 
altogether. Once the British government had endorsed the double zero option, 
Italy followed suit.86 At the Franco-German summit in Paris on May 21/22, 
Mitterrand made it crystal clear that he, as President, not the Conservative 
government, was in charge of Foreign Affairs, and that France would not oppose 
double zero.87 
In fact, contrary to the lofty hopes of some CDU / CSU politicians, Bonn and 
Paris were at odds over many defense issues, not just the double zero option. Talks 
in the (UN-based) Conference on Disarmament (CD), also in Geneva, had been 
concentrating particularly on chemical weapons and had reached a stalemate 
because the French insisted on keeping a “security stock” of these. The French 
had also blocked a proposed mandate for new talks in Vienna over “Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe” (CFE)—which it was hoped would replace the ailing 
“Mutual and Balanced Forces Reductions” (MBFR) discussions as from spring 
84 Raketen: So leidet die Freundschaft Kohl / Genscher, in: Bild am Sonntag, May 17, 1987. 
Genscher reacted the same day with a handwritten letter that reaffirmed his allegiance to 
Kohl, AAPD 1987, Doc. 139.
85 Strauß: ‘Geißlers Politik führt zur Katastrophe’, in: Der Spiegel Nr. 22, May 25, 1987, pp. 17–19.
86 Although, on April 27, 1987, the Italian representative in NATO’s Special Consultative Group 
(SCG) made a case for a SRINF base level solution (Telegram No. 553 of Holik, Brussels, April 
28, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 119), Foreign Minister Andreotti indicated in a telephone 
conversation with Genscher, on May 14, 1987, that there would be Italian support for double 
zero, PA / AA, B 1/178903. Andreotti made this public on May 19. Prime Minister Amintore 
Fanfani confirmed it the following day in talks with Kohl in Bonn, Archiv der Gegenwart 57 
(1987), p. 31071.
87 Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, p. 585; Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 568, conversation of 
Kohl, Mitterrand and Chirac in Paris, May 22, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 147.
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1989. France wanted to include the neutral and non-aligned countries, but the 
U. S. would not accept this. Germany, however, was desperate that the talks 
should go ahead. 
Despite this friction, the uncertainties caused by the INF Treaty within the 
Western Alliance did lead to an intensification of Franco-German security coop-
eration. After Reykjavik and in the wake of the INF Treaty, Kohl and  Mitterrand 
activated parts of the Elysée Treaty of 1963 that covered defense and that had 
not yet been implemented.88 In November 1987, a month before the signing of 
the INF Treaty and two months after a spectacular first joint Franco-German 
army maneuver (“Kecker Spatz / Moineau hardi”), a Franco-German summit 
was held in Karlsruhe. Here the highly symbolic decision was made to set up a 
joint Franco-German Brigade and a common Council of Foreign and Defense 
Ministers as well as a common Council of Economic and Financial Ministers.89 
As a quid pro quo for intensified military collaboration, Paris demanded closer 
economic and monetary cooperation from Bonn. The French wanted to get 
control over West Germany’s dominant economy and its currency, the D-Mark, 
which Mitterrand’s Diplomatic Advisor, Jacques Attali, went as far as calling “the 
German Nuclear bomb.”90 This started to pave the way for the new European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) which took shape in 1988 with the 
“Delors package” and the European Council of Hannover.91 So, in a way, even 
some of the origins of the Euro go back to the debate surrounding the INF Treaty.
On June 1, 1987, West Germany’s Christian-Liberal government finally settled 
for an acceptance of the double zero solution:92 Genscher’s line had prevailed. In 
the CDU / CSU parliamentary group this caused outrage; but that did not change 
anything.93 On June 4, Chancellor Kohl presented the government’s decision in 
the Bundestag. He did so in a rather complicated way, emphasizing that Germany 
could only agree to a zero option for SRINF if this were accompanied by a 
comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament. This should include 
a 50 per cent cut of American and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, a global ban 
on chemical weapons, and real progress in the disarmament of conventional 
88 Urs Leimbacher, Die unverzichtbare Allianz. Deutsch-französische sicherheitspolitische 
Zusammenarbeit 1982–1989, Baden-Baden 1992, pp. 133–192; Schwarz, Kohl, pp. 423–433.
89 Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 126/1987, pp. 170 f.; Christoph Lind, Die deutsch-franzö-
sischen Gipfeltreffen der Ära Kohl—Mitterrand 1982–1994, Baden-Baden 1998, pp. 133–142.
90 Cf. conversation of Teltschik with Attali in Paris, August 27, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 239, 
p. 1209. Mitterrand repeated that aphorism in 1988 in the French Ministerial Council, 
Jacques Attali, Verbatim III: 1988–1991, Paris 1995, p. 47 (August 17, 1988).
91 Wirsching, Abschied, pp. 531–544; Schwarz, Kohl, pp. 431–439.
92 The compromise was forged into a resolution proposal that was brought to the Bundestag 
by the CDU / CSU and FDP parliamentary group on June 3, 1987, Deutscher Bundestag, 
Drucksache No. 11/405, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/11/004/1100405.pdf. 
93 Stürmische Debatte der Unionsfraktion über die doppelte Null-Lösung, in: FAZ, June 3, 
1987, p. 1.
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and SNF forces. The 72 German Pershing IA missiles were mentioned as being 
explicitly no part of the deal.94 
In Geneva, the Soviets were still waiting for the official American response 
to their SRINF zero proposal, because the Reagan Administration had told them 
that it had to consult with its NATO Allies first, and the Alliance was waiting 
for the Europeans—and especially the West Germans—to sort themselves out. 
At the G7 Summit in Venice, Reagan promised Kohl that the U. S. would accept 
the German demand for a comprehensive NATO disarmament plan that would 
include negotiations on SNF systems with a range below 500 km.95 Finally, on 
June 11/12, NATO’s next Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) in Reykjavik was able to give Washington the green light to go ahead in 
Geneva. 
It underlines the crucial importance of West Germany in the whole INF matter 
that the NAC communiqué at Reykjavik repeated the wording of the German 
coalition paper almost exactly.96 Nevertheless, even hours before the NAC’s 
session, at the traditional preliminary quadripartite meeting of the American, 
British, French, and German Foreign Ministers, Genscher was having to fight 
hard to keep the plan afloat. Britain and France did not want any commitment to 
follow-on negotiations on SNF, so as not to endanger the “firebreak” they favored; 
both Howe and Cheysson made strong attempts to water down the relevant 
passage.97 Although Genscher repeatedly emphasized that no one in the Federal 
Government wanted a third zero option, the Allies did not trust his assurance, 
because Genscher had assured just the same with regard to a SRINF zero only half 
a year ago.98 This was just a foretaste of further controversies that would come 
within the Atlantic Alliance in the next years. Nor was the controversy over the 
INF Treaty yet over in West Germany itself.
94 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, 11th Legislation 
Period, 16th Session, pp. 923–928.
95 Conversation of Kohl with Reagan, June 8, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 164.
96 Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council at Reykjavik, June 11/12, 1987, http://archives.
nato. int/statement-on-ministerial-meeting-of-nac-at-reykjavik-on-11th-and-12th-june-1987. 
97 Conversation of Genscher, Howe, Raimond and Shultz, June 11, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, 
Doc. 170.
98 Memo of AA’s head of NATO unit, VLR I Dreher, June 15, 1987, in: PA / AA, B 150/668. For 
Genscher’s former rejection of an SRINF zero, see his meeting with Howe, Raimond and 
Shultz at Chevening, December 9, 1986, in: AAPD 1986, Doc. 353, p. 1826.
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3. The Abandoning of the Pershing IA, Summer 1987
From late April 1987, the Soviet side complicated things further by demanding, 
as an ultimatum, that the 72 Bundeswehr Pershing IAs should be included in 
an INF Treaty99—this, despite the fact that, ever since their beginnings in 1981, 
the Geneva talks had been confined to American and Soviet land-based nuclear 
systems (to be precise: to carriers, not the nuclear warheads themselves). 
The Pershing IA (P IA) was a SRINF system with a range of approximately 
750 km. In other words, it could hit the deployment area of the second echelon 
of the Warsaw Pact at the Vistula River in Poland. The P IA had been used by 
the Luftwaffe since 1963. It could be armed with nuclear warheads, though these 
were always under American control and custody.100 Germany’s share in NATO’s 
nuclear weaponry (Nuklearteilhabe), crucial for a country at the front line of the 
Cold War, basically relied on these Pershing missiles and on the multi-role com-
bat aircraft, the “Tornado”. In 1987, it was first and foremost the political asset 
that remained of this arrangement; the military value of the evermore outdated 
Pershing IA had declined rapidly and the lifespan of the P IA system would come 
to an end in the early 1990s. Modernization had been debated within NATO since 
the mid-1980s,101 and the former 108 American Pershing IAs in Germany had 
already been replaced in 1983 with an improved successor model, the Pershing 
II, thanks to the Dual-Track Decision. 
The official position of the Federal Government, of the U. S., and of NATO was 
that the Pershing IA, as an “established pattern of co-operation” system, could 
not be part of an American–Soviet INF agreement—just as was the case with 
the British and French nuclear arsenals. This position was reaffirmed again and 
again on various occasions throughout the summer of 1987. The State Depart-
ment confirmed it in a press release of April 29;102 Defense Secretary Weinberger 
reconfirmed the non-inclusion of the P IA in an INF Treaty at NATO’s Defense 
Planning Committee (DPC) in Brussels on May 26/27;103 Secretary Shultz again 
99 The Leader of the Soviet INF Delegation in Geneva, Obukhov, demanded this in his oral 
presentation of the Soviet draft for an INF Treaty on April 28 (whereas the written form 
did not mention it, nor even a SRINF zero solution). Obukhov’s Press statement, in: Doku-
mentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit, Vol. XXIV, 1987/88, p. 150; Telegram No. 553 of 
Ambassador Holik, Brussels, April 27, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 119. In NAC on April, 
16, Secretary Shultz informed that at his Moscow visit no Soviet had asked him about the 
German Pershing IA, Telegram No. 521 of Ambassador Hansen, NATO, in: AAPD 1987, 
Doc. 115. This was confirmed by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov who, on May 
6, was telling Genscher that without the inclusion of these missiles there would be no real 
zero solution, AAPD 1987, Doc. 126. 
100 Memo of Referat 201, January 26, 1987, in: PA / AA, B 150/659.
101 Memo of Staatssekretär Sudhoff and LR I Adamek, both May 20, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Docs. 
144 and 145.
102 Archiv der Gegenwart 57 (1987), p. 31068.
103 Telegram No. 731 of Hansen, NATO, May 27, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 155.
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affirmed it at the North Atlantic Council in Reykjavik on June 11;104 and at the 
G7 Summit in Venice, President Reagan himself assured Kohl that “the question 
of the 72 P IA is now off the table.”105 But the Soviets kept on pressing, and even 
indicated that the proposed INF Treaty could come to nothing just because of 
this issue.106 
Moscow’s threats had an immediate effect in West Germany. The opposition 
parties vociferously demanded that Bonn should comply, instead of blocking 
the prospect of real nuclear disarmament.107 The FDP made yet another U-turn, 
abandoning the coalition’s consent, and joined in demands for the abolition 
of the Pershing IAs. For the Liberals, preserving these outdated systems (or 
modernizing them, which would be extremely controversial and might endanger 
East–West détente)108 was simply not worth it, if Germany were to become the 
final obstacle to an INF Treaty. Although the coalition’s difficult compromise 
over the double zero option of June 1 had explicitly underlined the established 
position that Pershing IA missiles must be kept out of the Geneva talks, only the 
next day Genscher secretly indicated to an emissary of the GDR that he himself 
would not mind getting rid of them.109 He could be sure that this intimation 
would be heard not only in East Berlin, but also in Moscow.
Thus, the Foreign Minister was hardly surprised when his Soviet colleague 
tried to grill the German delegation on the Pershing issue during President 
von Weizsäcker’s visit to Moscow in July. Shevardnadze complained that the 
Soviets felt they were being cheated because, whether they talked to Germans 
or Americans, the responsibility for the P IA was always passed from one side 
to the other: the Americans would declare that the systems were German (so 
they could not negotiate about them); the West Germans would claim that the 
nuclear warheads were solely American, and that Bonn was no party at all at the 
Geneva disarmament table. Moscow was now saying that the P IA had become 
104 Ortez No. 36 of VLR Stöcker, June 16, 1987, in: PA / AA, B 150/669. See also Shultz in the 
preceding meeting with Genscher, Cheysson and Howe, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 170.
105 AAPD 1987, Doc.  164 (June 8, 1987). In the CDU executive committee, Kohl therefore 
showed confidence that the Pershing IA would be kept out of an INF Treaty: Kohl, Berichte 
zur Lage 1982–1989, p. 541 (June 18, 1987).
106 Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze labeled the refusal to include the German P IA in a 
double zero solution a “grave obstacle for disarmament”, Europa-Archiv 1990, Z 135 f.
107 E.g. the Defense spokesman of the SPD fraction, Erwin Horn, on his visit to the U. S. A., in: 
Telegram No. 3140 of Ambassador van Well, Washington, in: PA / AA, B 43/135403.
108 Ambassador van Well, Washington, reported on June 27 that Shultz had told him again 
that the Pershing IA could not be part of an American–Soviet INF deal. However, Shultz 
indicated at the same time that, for Washington, modernization of the P IA had no alterna-
tive, AAPD 1987, Doc. 214, Fn. 2.
109 Memo of the Rector of the Academy for Life Sciences at the Central Committee of the SED, 
Otto Reinhold, for General Secretary Erich Honecker, June 5, 1987 about Reinhold’s conver-
sation with Genscher in Bonn on June 2, in: Detlef Nakath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan (eds.), 
Von Hubertusstock nach Bonn. Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch–deutschen 
Beziehungen auf höchster Ebene 1980–1987, Berlin 1995, Doc. 52, p. 313.
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“the main obstacle” standing in the way of an INF solution, and Shevardnadze 
asked what the USSR could do to facilitate West Germany “voluntarily” giving up 
these missiles. Would a real global LRINF zero help—an elimination of the 100 
remaining LRINF nuclear warheads?110 A fortnight later, Gorbachev announced 
precisely this step.
In the meanwhile, controversies dragged on in the Bonn coalition. Whereas 
the FDP clearly favored the abandonment of the P IAs, the CDU / CSU “steel 
helmet” hardliners around Strauß and Dregger insisted that these SRINF missiles 
be kept at all costs: not only to retain at least a remnant of the direct threat West 
Germany could pose to the East (and thus keep deterrence alive), but also in order 
to kill off the already evolving intra-Western debate over a SNF modernization 
program, which would surely get going fully as soon as there were no SRINF 
left on NATO’s side.111 Using the argument that the USSR would presumably 
demand a zero option for French and British nuclear forces as soon as the P IA was 
removed,112 the CDU and CSU tried again to get backing from both key European 
Allies. But London and Paris were already harassing the FRG with regard to 
SNF modernization—just as Washington did. Even within the CDU, figures like 
Deputy Party Chairman and Minister President of Baden-Württemberg, Lothar 
Späth, publicly announced that the Pershing IA issue was only a bargaining 
chip to get the Warsaw Pact to disarmament talks over SNF.113 Such statements 
indirectly indicated a readiness to renounce P IA.
As Ambassador Günter van Well reported from Washington, the Reagan 
Administration was having increasing doubts about the firmness of Bonn’s 
commitment to keeping the Pershing IAs, in face of the mounting pressure from 
Moscow. Van Well did not rule out the possibility of Secretary Shultz disregarding 
German (and British) objections and ruthlessly sacrificing the German Pershing 
IAs, all contradicting promises notwithstanding. The American wanted to get 
an INF agreement and prove his disarmament approach was right.114 After talks 
with the U. S. delegation in Geneva, German diplomats came to the conclusion: 
“blatantly obvious, the wish was expressed that we solve this [Pershing IA] prob-
lem for the U. S.”115 Apprehension grew that Washington might lay all the blame 
on Bonn if an INF Treaty should fall apart because of the Pershing IA issue.116
110 Genscher–Shevardnadze delegation talks in Moscow, July 7, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 204.
111 Am Kleiderständer, in: Der Spiegel No. 24, June 8, 1987, p. 26. 
112 Conversation of Kohl with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Assemblée Natio-
nale, June 3, 1987, in: PA / AA, B 150/668. Exactly for that reason, Thatcher, too, objected to 
an abandoning of the P IA, Thatcher, Downing Street, p. 771.
113 Interview with Späth, in: Der Spiegel Nr. 24, June 8, 1987, p. 24. 
114 Telegram No. 3049 of van Well, July 16, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 214.
115 Memo of AA’s Deputy head of the Disarmament Division, Ambassador Hartmann, to 
Genscher, July 21, 1987, in: PA / AA B 150/671.
116 Handwritten comment of State Secretary Sudhoff on a memo by AA’s Head of the Disarma-
ment Division, Holik, on August 17, 1987, which analyzed another letter of Secretary Shultz 
to Genscher confirming that the U. S. would steadily refuse to include the German Pershing 
IA in an INF agreement, PA / AA, B 150/673.
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On August 18, Soviet ambassador Yuli A. Kvitsinsky urgently called on Gen-
scher, who was on holiday in the south of France, relaying the alarming message 
that, due to the Pershing IA question, the INF Treaty really was at risk. Because 
of this Shevardnadze was confidentially suggesting that Bonn should take the 
appropriate initiative itself.117 
It is worth noting that exactly this pattern would be repeated three years later 
in the process of German unification, this time concerning the controversial 
issue of the size of the Bundeswehr. In 1990, Shevardnadze again confidentially 
indicated that Germany should submit a proposal as its own initiative that would 
enable Soviet agreement.118 Kohl acted accordingly during his famous Caucasus 
meeting with Gorbachev.119 On a multilateral level, the result was confirmed by a 
declaration of Genscher at the Vienna CFE forum, which was finally incorporated 
in the Two plus Four Treaty.120 
In 1987, back home, Genscher held a for-your-eyes-only conversation with 
Chancellor Kohl. He had thoroughly prepared it by previously winning over the 
more compromise-orientated, left-wing CDU leaders like Employment Minister 
Norbert Blüm, Späth, and Geißler.121 He succeeded in convincing the Chancellor. 
Without any prior consultations with the NATO Allies or even with the CSU itself, 
Kohl then made a complete U-turn. On August 26, he declared that, in order to 
help the American quest for an INF Treaty, his government would autonomously 
agree to a unilateral dismantling of all German Pershing IA missiles if the INF 
Treaty were to become effective.122 Just as in the fall of 1989, when he presented 
his famous Ten-Point Plan, Kohl’s unilateral move took Washington completely 
by surprise.123 On both occasions, however, the American Presidents backed their 
proven and trusted German ally. In 1987, Kohl’s declaration was accepted all the 
more readily, because it substantially facilitated the finalization of the INF Treaty.
117 Conversation of Genscher with Kvitsinsky in Théoule-sur-Mer, in: PA / AA, B 150/673; 
Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 572–573.
118 Conversation of Genscher with Shevardnadze in Copenhagen, June 7, 1990, in: Andreas 
Hilger (ed.), Diplomatie für die deutsche Einheit, Munich 2011, Doc. 32, p. 167; Genscher, 
Erinnerungen, pp. 817 f.; Tim Geiger and Heike Amos, Das Auswärtige Amt und die 
Wiedervereinigung 1989/90, in: Michael Gehler and Maximilian Graf (eds.), Europa und 
die deutsche Einheit. Beobachtungen, Entscheidungen und Folgen, Göttingen 2017, p. 85.
119 Conversation of Kohl with Gorbachev in Archyz, July 16, 1990, in: Deutsche Einheit. 
Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90, ed. by Hanns Jürgen Küsters 
and Daniel Hofmann, Munich, 1998, Doc. 353, p. 1365.
120 For Genscher’s declaration of August 30, 1990, Bulletin der Bundesregierung 1990, 
pp. 1129–1131, and Die Einheit. Das Auswärtige Amt, das DDR-Außenministerium und 
der Zwei-plus-Vier-Prozess, ed. by Heike Amos and Tim Geiger, Göttingen 2016, doc. 147; 
for the 2+4-Treaty of September 12, 1990 (esp. Article 3), ibid., Doc. 152.
121 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 573; Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, pp. 550 f.
122 For Kohl’s declaration Bulletin 1987, p. 682.
123 Telegram No. 3618 of Gesandten Paschke, Washington, August 26, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, 
Doc. 235.
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Within his government, Kohl’s action did not go down so well. His declaration 
was widely seen as yet another capitulation a weak Chancellor was making to 
his strong deputy, Foreign Minister Genscher, and it caused a real crisis with the 
third coalition partner, the CSU. Strauß, who had never ceased from attacking his 
rival Kohl as a naïve “clunk,” was caught off guard during a visit to Bulgaria. His 
outrage ended in a very aggressive declaration from the CSU executive committee, 
delivered on August 31, which charged the Chancellor with a breach of promise 
and accused him of destroying the basis for cooperation.124 For some weeks, the 
Bavarian sister party even withdrew its Ministers from the cabinet, but in the end, 
they fell in line. It must be conceded that Strauß’s criticism had a point: the INF 
Treaty did indeed eliminate only 3 per cent of the global nuclear arsenal125—an 
aspect that was often glossed over by the Treaty’s advocates (and that has been 
largely forgotten since). Nevertheless, at the end of 1987, Strauß flew to Moscow 
himself. After conversations with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze,126 he underwent 
a “Damascus” conversion. From that moment, even Strauß acknowledged that 
serious changes were taking place in the USSR.
Similarly, relations between Bonn and Moscow improved steadily following 
the Federal Government’s “voluntary” renunciation of the Pershing IA. At his 
annual meeting with Genscher during the UN General Assembly in New York, 
Shevardnadze praised the important contribution the Federal Government had 
made in the final round of negotiations for an INF Treaty: Gorbachev himself had 
referred to Kohl’s declaration and Genscher’s contribution to it. If an INF Treaty 
were to come about, the Soviet Foreign Minister declared, it would not only be due 
to the negotiating skills of the Americans and Soviets, but also to the responsible 
political leaders in Bonn.127 Gorbachev repeated this praise personally in a letter 
to Kohl.128 The “Ice Age” of German–Soviet relations had definitively come to an 
end. In October 1988, Chancellor Kohl paid an official visit to the USSR.129 Some 
124 10-point-statement of CSU-Parteivorstand, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 
32 (1987), pp. 1373–1375; Weisheit am Werk, in: Der Spiegel Nr. 37, September 7, 1987, p. 23. 
125 Telegram No. 2448 of Ambassador Hellbeck, Bejing, on conversation between Strauß and 
Chinese Premier Minister Zhao Ziyang, October 15, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 288. On 
the Soviet side, the percentage of eliminated nuclear weapons from the global stockpile was 
estimated at 4 per cent, Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, London 
1991, p. 92; Aleksandr G. Savel’ev and Nikolaj N. Detinov, The Big Five. Arms Control and 
Decision Making in the Soviet Union, Westport / Connecticut 1995, p. 137.
126 Conversation of Strauß with Shevardnadze, December 28, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 381; 
Memcon with Gorbachev, December 29, 1987, in: Gorbatschow und die deutsche Frage, 
Doc. 19; Wilfried Scharnagl (ed.), Strauß in Moskau … und im südlichen Afrika. Bericht, 
Bilanz, Bewertung, Munich 1988, pp. 21–55.
127 Telegram No. 25 von Richthofen and Holik, New York, September 22, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, 
Doc. 268.
128 AAPD 1987, Doc. 280, Fn. 4.
129 For Kohl and Genscher’s visit of October 24–27, 1988 AAPD 1988, ed. by Michael Ploetz, 
Matthias Peter and Jens Jost Hofmann, Docs. 300, 301, 303, 304, 309; Kohl, Erinnerungen 
1982–1990, pp. 755–772.
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months later, in June 1989, Gorbachev was accorded a euphoric reception in West 
Germany, which led some observers to talk of “Gorbymania.”130 
In retrospect, it is obvious that 1987 was a turning point in Soviet–West Ger-
man relations. This was especially true with respect to the personal and political 
relationship of the two leaders of both countries, who learned the hard way how 
they could trust each other. Without the success of the INF Treaty, Gorbachev 
would hardly have had any chance of being accepted in the West as a partner 
whose Perestroika and Glasnost really brought a profound change in East–West 
relations. On the other side, the acceptance of the double zero solution and the 
unilateral abandoning of the Pershing IAs proved to the Soviet leadership that 
the Kohl–Genscher government could be a reliable and a serious partner whom 
Moscow could trust. This was an indispensable basis that helped to open the 
door for a development that only three years later would wind its way to German 
unification and the real end of the Cold War.
4. Outlook and Summary
As stipulated in the INF agreement, all Treaty-limited equipment had to be dis-
mantled within three years of the date when the Treaty entered into force: June 1, 
1988. Destruction of the Western launchers (but not the nuclear warheads!) took 
place in the United States; so all the 108 Pershing IIs and the 64 GLCMs that had 
been deployed in the FRG since 1983 were withdrawn in the following months. 
On September 26, 1990—exactly a fortnight after the signing of the Two Plus 
Four Treaty in Moscow, which handed back sovereignty to a Germany that was 
to be formally reunited on October 3, 1990—the last eight American GLCMs left 
the Federal Republic.131 Simultaneously and independently, the West German P 
IA missiles were also transferred over the Atlantic to be destroyed. This started 
in April 1990 and was finished by the fall of 1991.132 
During that time the Federal Republic (like the other four European deploy-
ment countries) had to host numerous on-site inspection teams from the USSR 
and to meet the strict requirements of the detailed inspection regulations.133 
130 For Gorbachev’s visit to Germany, Deutsche Einheit, Docs. 2–4; Gorbatschow und die 
deutsche Frage, Docs. 33–44; Wirsching, Abschied, p. 562; Hermann Wentker, Gorbatschow 
in Bonn: Ein historischer Staatsbesuch aus westdeutscher und ostdeutscher Sicht, in: 
Andreas Kötzing, Francesca Weil, Mike Schmeitzner, and Jan Erik Schulte (eds.), Vergleich 
als Herausforderung. Festschrift für Günther Heydemann zum 65. Geburtstag, Göttingen 
2015, pp. 277–299.
131 Deutsche Außenpolitik 1990/91. Auf dem Weg zu einer Europäischen Friedensordnung. 
Eine Dokumentation, ed. by Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn 1991, p. 39.
132 Bundeswehr beginnt mit dem Abbau der Pershing-Raketen; Deutsche Pershing- und SS-23- 
Raketen zerstört, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 5, 1990 and November 15, 1991.
133 As Shultz announced in NAC on November 25, 1987 within the first three years (the 
destruction period)  there would be 20 on-site inspections per annum, 15 in the next 5 
Controversies Over the Double Zero Option 151
Initially, these obligations could clash with some left-overs of the Allied powers’ 
reservation rights over Germany. The Three Western Powers—France, Britain 
and the U. S.—were still in charge of controlling German air space, and therefore 
had to “permit” every Soviet military aircraft that brought the inspection teams 
to the Frankfurt air base serving as their “entry point.” Not surprisingly, this 
procedure caused trouble when the time between each Soviet announcement of 
an inspection and the arrival of its inspection team at the nuclear deployment 
site was so tight. Not very sensitively, the British representative tried to shrug 
that question off by bluntly (but accurately) saying to his German Ally: “You are 
not sovereign.”134 
However, this was just a minor concern in comparison with the trouble that 
Britain and other NATO Allies like the U. S. caused for the Bundesregierung 
during the next two years as they continually pressed for an immediate modern-
ization of short-range nukes. The Germans did not want this: rather, they wanted 
further disarmament of SNF. Throughout 1988/89 there was fierce argument over 
the issue in NATO. For the FRG the nuclear controversy was far from over—even 
after the INF Treaty was signed.135 This time, however, Germany’s national 
interest (“the shorter the nukes’ range, the deadlier for the Germans!”) won over 
Anglo-American pressure and even over the sanctified axiom of Alliance solidar-
ity, which Bonn had hitherto prioritized. Kohl and Genscher jointly pointed 
to their government’s historic record—their imperturbable implementation of 
the Dual-Track Decision against all opposition, their final agreement to double 
zero, most recently, their abdication of the P IA. In return, they now demanded 
understanding for their objections to any new SNF armament. At the NATO 
summit in May 1989, the controversy was by no means solved. Decisions were 
postponed to 1992. By then, the revolutions of 1989 and the rush to German 
unification (within NATO) had changed the international scene completely. On 
May 3, 1990, President Bush announced that the United States would not pursue 
the modernization of ground-launched SNF; and NATO endorsed this at the 
next NPG ministerial meeting.136 From the German perspective, it was only this 
decision that ended the controversy over nuclear missiles.
For the Christian-Liberal coalition, the wrangling surrounding the INF Treaty 
that raged in 1987 was a watershed. Genscher’s clever, but populist solo actions 
and U-turns, along with the public image they created, that the tiny FDP was the 
years and 10 in the following 5 years, AAPD 1987, Doc. 340, p. 1737. For more details on 
verification measures, Telegram No.  5132 of Gesandter Paschke, December 1, 1987, in: 
ibid., Doc. 349 as well as the Multilateral Basing Country Agreement (MBCA) between the 
U. S. A., Belgium, Britain, FRG, the Netherlands, and the UK of December 11, 1987, ibid., 
Fn. 6. See also the essay by Wolfgang Richter in this volume.
134 Memo of AA’s legal advisor Hillenberg, December 4, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc.  354, 
p. 1802.
135 For the SNF controversy Wirsching, Abschied, pp. 570 f.; Fröhlich, Kanzler, pp. 176–186; 
Josef Holik, Die Rüstungskontrolle. Rückblick auf eine kurze Ära, Berlin 2008, pp. 61–66.
136 Die Einheit, Doc. 95, Fn. 19 and Doc. 93, Fn. 4.
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tail that wagged the dog, left deep scars within the CDU and the CSU. Personally, 
Chancellor Kohl came out wounded too. The old personal friendship he had 
had with Genscher was badly harmed, and these two alpha males never again 
completely trusted one another. The enmity left its marks in significant trifles: 
from now on, neither politician would inform the other of conversations they had 
with foreign leaders. It was a sign of poor cooperation and surely not the best way 
to handle a stringent German foreign policy. 
For many political observers, the events of 1987 confirmed the popular verdict 
that Kohl was a mediocre Chancellor who lacked real leadership skills. That soon 
proved wrong. However, it is hardly a coincidence that, only two years later, all 
those in the CDU who had early on favored Genscher’s political line and who (like 
Geißler, Späth, and Blüm) had helped swing the Party round on the double zero 
and P IA issues, joined in spearheading the internal fronde that tried—unsuc-
cessfully—to dethrone Kohl at the Bremen Party Convention in summer 1989.
From an American perspective, it was a mixed blessing that, due to the INF 
controversy in Bonn, the political impact of Foreign Minister Genscher grew and 
grew. Though Washington appreciated the effect of Genscher’s crusade for double 
zero (and his influence on giving up the P IA), officials there continued to distrust 
his wheeler-dealing and the offers he made to Gorbachev—his “Genscherism.” 
In Moscow, however, it was precisely this that unmistakably made Genscher an 
influential persona gratissima. 
The Reagan Administration was well aware that its INF policy caused real 
problems for its staunch ally, Chancellor Kohl. However, coming to terms with 
the other superpower over nuclear disarmament was more important; and in 
the end, Washington could not help Kohl with his political dilemma. Neverthe-
less, the U. S. Administration could rely on the fact that this dyed-in-the-wool 
Atlanticist and realist would never seriously embark on Gaullist daydreams of 
a dubious European fronde against the superpowers, as did Strauß and Dregger. 
Washington tried to show Kohl appreciation. In mid-December 1987, Secretary 
Shultz praised the Chancellor publicly as an important leader who had had 
a decisive share in implementing NATO’s Dual-Track Decision, thus laying a 
foundation for the developments bringing about the successful INF Treaty.137 
The Administration also pushed within the Alliance to secure German Defense 
Minister Wörner’s appointment as next Secretary General of NATO, when Kohl 
announced Wörner’s candidacy at the same press conference in which he said 
that the Pershing IA would be scrapped.138 Last but not least, Washington showed 
its gratitude in 1989/90 by strongly supporting Kohl’s rush to achieve German 
unification. The Bush Administration backed this historic move against all 
objections from the Allies and the Eastern powers, and vigorously helped Kohl’s 
government through the process on the international stage. 
137 Shultz bestätigt westliche Berlin-Initiative, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 
16,1987, p. 1, also conversation of Kohl with Shultz, December 15, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 371.
138 Letter Genscher to Shultz, November 2, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 304 and Doc. 371, Fn. 35.
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The Soviet leadership, too, would hardly have agreed to German unification 
if trust in West Germany had not grown further between 1987 and 1990. The 
initial rather hesitant and grudging reaction of the Federal Government to the 
double zero solution was soon forgotten. What counted in the end was Bonn’s 
far-reaching concession when it “voluntarily” gave up its Pershing IA missiles. 
Thus, this move not only helped the INF Treaty come into being—a major 
breakthrough in the cause of disarmament—but brought ample rewards to the 
German people, who for decades had been living in a divided country in the 
shadow of the Cold War.

Christian Wenkel
Resuming European Détente and  
European Integration
France and the INF Treaty
In 1987, the two superpowers signed the INF Treaty, thus officially ending the 
Euromissile crisis. Though neither the French President nor any other French rep-
resentative sat at the negotiation table, France itself was present—for throughout 
the Euromissile crisis, French diplomacy had played a decisive role. Pursuing his 
own Ostpolitik, in which he always took a tough line with Moscow, President Fran-
çois Mitterrand had actively encouraged Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev 
to resume the U. S.–Soviet dialogue on détente and disarmament, which had 
come to a standstill at the beginning of the 1980s. Mitterrand had held extensive 
conversations with both Reagan and Gorbachev in 1984/85 and had offered both 
of them advice on how to get back into meaningful negotiations.1
This was important to Mitterrand’s own policy aims. The return to confronta-
tion between the superpowers at the end of the 1970s considerably reduced 
France’s room for maneuver in the field of East–West cooperation. It also hin-
dered progress towards European integration. So, from the French perspective, 
any improvement in the area of détente and disarmament between the two 
superpowers and any steps forward towards ending the Euromissile crises would 
make better conditions for cooperation within Europe—both between the East-
1 For French policies during the last years of the Cold War see Frédéric Bozo, Mitterrand, the 
End of the Cold War, and German Unification, New York 2009; from the same author with 
a particular focus on the Euromissile Crisis, France, the Euromissiles, and the End of the 
Cold War, in: Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), The 
Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War, Stanford 2015, pp. 196–212; an excellent 
PhD thesis on this issue, completed in 2017 at Sorbonne Paris Cité University (USPC) under 
Frédéric Bozo’s supervision, is Ilaria Parisi, La France et la crise des euromissiles, 1977–1987, 
627 pages; see also Parisi’s article: L’indépendance européenne en question. La France et 
la crise des euromissiles (1977–1987), in: Relations Internationales 178 (2019), pp. 57–71. 
Another approach to the topic can be found in Georges-Henri Soutou, Mitläufer der Allianz? 
Frankreich und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss, in: Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann 
Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in 
deutsch–deutscher und internationaler Perspektive, Munich 2011, pp. 363–376; so far as the 
French archives are concerned, a large part is already accessible, in particular the holdings of 
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; a part of the holdings of the Mitterrand archives can be 
consulted via special permits (e.g. talks with heads of government from the U. S., the Federal 
Republic of Germany, or the Soviet Union), but important papers on the INF endgame are 
still being kept closed for another twenty years.
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ern and the Western parts of the continent and between the member-states of the 
European Economic Community (EEC).
The process of European integration had been linked to Cold War dynamics 
ever since the early 1950s.2 French foreign policies were much involved with both 
of these crucial issues, in particular with regard to the German question.3 Thus, 
it seems quite productive to focus on France during the INF endgame. In fact, the 
French attitude towards the INF Treaty of 1987 helps us understand the impact 
the last major crises of the Cold War—including the Euromissile issue—had on 
the European integration process right up to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1992, and even beyond.4
The link between the profound crisis in East–West relations during the 1980s 
and the various steps towards European integration, such as the beginnings 
of Franco-German Defense cooperation, enlargements in the Mediterranean 
area,5 and the European Single Act of 1986, is of a quite different nature from 
what had been seen in earlier decades. Nevertheless, as in the 1950s, it is easy to 
assume a stimulating role played by the darkening on the horizon of international 
relations, which is what was experienced in the early 1980s. A very first result 
was closer policy coordination inside the EEC, especially between Paris, Bonn, 
and (to a lesser extent) London, concerning relations with Eastern Europe.6 In 
2 For the interdependencies between the Cold War and European Integration see, above all, 
the works of Piers Ludlow, European Integration and the Cold War, in: Melvyn P. Leffler and 
Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. II: Crises and Détente, 
Cambridge 2010, pp. 179–194, and The new Cold War and the Expansion of the European 
Community—a Nexus?, in: Johnny Laursen (ed.), The Institutions and Dynamics of the Euro-
pean Community 1973–1983, Baden-Baden 2014, pp. 131–149; see also Kiran Klaus Patel and 
Kenneth Weisbrode (eds.), European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s, 
Cambridge 2013; Angela Romano, Re-Designing Military Security in Europe. Cooperation 
and Competition between the European Community and NATO During the Early 1980s, in: 
European Review of History / Revue européenne d’histoire 24 (2018), pp. 445–471; for the 
1950s see, for example, Klaus Schwabe, The Cold War and European Integration 1947–1963, 
in: Diplomacy and Statecraft 12/4, (2011), pp. 18–34.
3 Frédéric Bozo and Christian Wenkel (eds.), France and the German Question, New York 2019.
4 The issue of this linkage between the last major Cold War crisis and the Maastricht process 
is the main focus of my current research on the relations between the United States and 
the European Community; for earlier treatments of this complex issue, see Silvio Pons and 
Frederico Romero, Europe between the Superpowers, 1968–1981, in: Antonio Varsori and 
Guia Migani (eds.), Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s. Entering a Different 
World, Brussels 2006, pp. 85–97; Philipp Gassert, Did Transatlantic Drift Help European 
Integration? The Euromissiles Crisis, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the Quest for 
Political Cooperation, in: Kiran Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode (eds.), European Integration 
and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s, New York 2013, pp. 154–176.
5 As shown, for example, in Eirini Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC and the Cold War 1974–1979, 
Basingstoke 2014.
6 Some reflections on this issue can be found in Christian Wenkel, Overcoming the Crisis of 
Détente 1979–83. Coordinating Eastern Policies between Paris, Bonn, and London, in: Oliver 
Bange and Poul Villaume (eds.), The Long Détente. Changing Concepts of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 1950s–1980s, Budapest 2016, pp. 235–251; on the American impact 
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order to foster genuine European détente,7 Paris was now much more willing 
to make concessions on European integration issues, as can be seen in its attitude 
towards the Genscher–Colombo initiative. Above all, it urged a deepening of 
Franco–German cooperation. The crisis clearly helped the relaunch of the Euro-
pean integration process during the Fontainebleau EEC Summit in June 1984 and 
thus the signing of the European Single Act two years later. 
The signing of the INF Treaty in 1987 confirmed François Mitterrand’s con-
ception of European détente and European integration and provided a base from 
which he could resume both his Ostpolitik and his European policy as soon as he 
was re-elected in May 1988 and able to end his former cohabitation with Jacques 
Chirac. Against this background, the present essay will address the question of 
how the end of the Euromissile crisis and the signing of the INF Treaty can be 
linked to the various European policies of the French government. In a more 
general way, the discussion may also help us answer the broader question of 
what interdependencies there were between the Cold War crisis and European 
integration during the 1980s. To address these questions, the first section of the 
essay explores the beginnings of French policies with regard to the Euromissile 
crisis from the late 1970s on, and highlights the particular role Mitterrand 
played as a bridge-builder between East and West. A second section deals more 
specifically with varying French attitudes towards the INF Treaty in 1987 and 
towards Gorbachev, focusing on public opinion, on French diplomats and on the 
President himself. The last section discusses the consequences of the Treaty for 
French foreign policy concerned with East–West relations and integration within 
Europe.
1. France, the Euromissile Crisis, and the Disarmament Issue
From the beginnings of the Fifth Republic, and in particular after the 1966 
decision to withdraw from NATO’s military integration, France was known for its 
opposition to superpower disarmament deals. Despite a gradual reinterpretation 
of Gaullist doctrines under de Gaulle’s successors, this was still the case during 
the 1980s. Charles de Gaulle had indeed been opposed to any arms control 
deal between Moscow and Washington, which he regarded as the symbol of a 
superpower condominium.8 The French position evolved considerably in 1978 
under President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who believed that disarmament was 
on French policies, see also Laurent Césari, Les effets des politiques américaines sur la France 
1984–1988 (forthcoming article).
7 Angela Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West shaped the 
Helsinki CSCE, Brussels 2009.
8 Pascal Boniface, Repenser la dissuasion nucléaire, La Tour d’Aigues 1997; Pascal Boniface, 
La dissuasion nucléaire dans la relation franco-allemande, in: Relations internationales et 
stratégiques 10 (Summer 1993), pp. 19–25; Bertrand Goldschmidt, La France et la non-
prolifération, in: Relations internationales 69 (Spring 1992), pp. 41–50.
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a matter for all members of the international community—not just the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Giscard therefore asked for a commission on dis-
armament within the institutional framework of the United Nations. Following 
this change of course, French diplomats took part in the Geneva Conference 
on disarmament and also supported the SALT negotiations. However, France 
fiercely resisted any Soviet attempts to include French (or British) strategic 
nuclear weapons in the Geneva disarmament talks. Then, in the context of the 
Euromissile crisis, François Mitterrand redefined the conditions that would allow 
France to participate in the disarmament process at the United Nations’ tribune 
in 1983.9 For Mitterrand, it was not the weapons themselves that guaranteed 
effective protection but the political will to use them at the decisive moment. For 
him, the French Force de frappe was first and foremost a political weapon and he 
did not anticipate actually using it. The most crucial political issue for the various 
French governments was to maintain their independence in defense by keeping 
the French nuclear arsenal out of any disarmament negotiations. However, they 
were continually confronted by Soviet demands to include the nuclear forces of 
third countries in the arms control negotiations. Persistently, Paris insisted on 
rejecting this.
In a conversation with the new Soviet Ambassador to Paris, Yuli Vorontsov, 
Mitterrand explained the point of the French nuclear force: “Our Force de frappe 
plays a strategic role, not a tactical one. […] So why should France use its nuclear 
weapons if this would lead to a devastating disaster? We are not crazy! This force 
is our ultimate means of honor and defence.”10 Considering the Soviet demands 
unfriendly, he complained bitterly about the unwillingness of the Soviets to 
understand the French position: “I have not understood anything in Russian 
analyses of French politics for quite a while. It is as if I spoke Assyrian. But I 
speak French!”11
The usual Soviet demand for the inclusion of French and British nuclear 
weapons was repeated by Gorbachev immediately after he took office in April 
1985; with the same regularity it was rejected as foolish by François Mitterrand.12 
However, the Force de frappe was now coming under additional pressure from 
the other side—from Ronald Reagan and his idea of a Strategic Defense Initia-
tive: “The real risk in terms of space is not that the United States may become 
9 François Mitterrand, La France et sa défense. Paroles publiques d’un président 1981–1995, 
Paris 2015, pp. 103–114; see also the dossier prepared for this purpose in the Mitterrand 
Papers, in: Archives nationales de France (AnF), series 5AG4, vol. CD264/3.
10 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Yuli Vorontsov, June 24, 1983, in: 
AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD76/2.
11 Ibid.
12 Telegram from the French embassy in Moscow, April 24, 1985, in: Archives of the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter AMAE), series Europe after 1944, vol. 5642; see also 
François Mitterrand, Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France. Introduction à 
25 discours, 1981–1985, Paris 1986, pp. 32–33.
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invulnerable but that the USSR may become so in turn. This would render the 
French deterrent force obsolete and would have incalculable consequences for 
our country.”13 In preparation for a meeting he was to have with Ronald Reagan 
in 1985, Mitterrand’s advisors urged him to clarify the French position: “As long 
as there is no other credible security system, our deterrent capacity must be 
maintained militarily and this has to be explained to the public.”14
One of the major differences between Mitterrand’s stance in the Euromissile 
crisis and that of his predecessor, Giscard, was the unreserved support he gave 
to the NATO Double-Track Decision from the very beginning of his Presidency. 
His diplomatic advisor, Hubert Védrine, described it as the “founding act” of his 
foreign and security policy.15 In return for this support, the French diplomats 
expected the Federal Republic of Germany to take a clear stance against the 
inclusion of French nuclear weapons in the Geneva discussions.16
In this context, a new Franco–German cooperation on security and defense 
was established, nearly thirty years after the failure of the European Defense 
Community in 1954 and nearly twenty years after the signing of the Elysée 
Treaty of 1963, which led to the failure of De Gaulle’s ideas concerning a common 
Franco–German foreign and defense policy. An expression of this close coopera-
tion between Paris and Bonn in dealings with Moscow—if not an indication of 
a new common Franco–German Ostpolitik—was Mitterrand’s speech to the 
Bundestag on January 20, 1983.17 In contrast to Giscard and his Administration, 
Mitterrand considered the Federal Republic to be not the cause of the crisis but 
rather its victim. 
During the early 1980s, the Euromissile crisis brought about a growing conver-
gence of German and French views about Soviet policies, even if French diplomats 
were far from convinced by the West German conception of the strategic (im)-
balance in Europe. As a reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and 
to Washington’s stance on East–West issues, Paris had already intensified its 
political consultations with Bonn. Henceforth, the German–Soviet relationship 
was once again considered to be a crucial element even for French détente policy, 
and the Federal Republic was now regarded as an honest broker between the East 
and the West.18
13 Memo for the President, Hubert Védrine, January 4, 1985, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD257, 
quoted in: Parisi, La France et la crise des euromissiles, p. 431.
14 Memo in preparation for the meeting with Ronald Reagan, Elisabeth Guigou, and Hubert 
Védrine, May 1, 1985, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 4863, quoted in: ibid., p. 433.
15 Hubert Védrine, Les mondes de François Mitterrand. A l’Elysée 1981–1985, Paris 1996, p. 93.
16 Report of the Franco-German Working Group on the relations with Eastern Europe to the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, pp. 14–20, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 4911.
17 For Mitterrand’s speech see Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. Stenographische 
Berichte, 9th Legislation Period, 143rd Session, pp. 8978–8992.
18 Memo of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Joëlle Timsit, 
December 8, 1981, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/1.
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In the same period a common rejection of the Soviet demand to include 
British and French nuclear weapons in the nuclear balance calculation in Europe 
also created a rare moment of unity between Margaret Thatcher and François 
Mitterrand. In accord with his British counterpart, he stated: “Our loyalty to the 
Alliance must not make us the plaything of decisions made between Washington 
and Moscow. All the more reason to strengthen the Franco–British relations that 
will be useful in this domain.”19 Together with the Franco–German relationship, 
which he had described as “the last bulwark against madness” in a conversation 
with Helmut Schmidt some days earlier, Mitterrand intended the strengthening 
of such bi- and multilateral relationships between European countries to send out 
a message to the superpowers.20 
The troubles caused by the Euromissile crisis, and in particular the deploy-
ment of the American Pershing II missiles, resulted in a deterioration in the 
Soviet–German relationship and, in consequence, lent growing importance to 
the Franco–Soviet one.21 Paris could once again assume a leading role in the field 
of East–West relations. In this context, 1984 marked a turning point which led 
to substantial changes in French relations with Moscow in particular, but also 
with Washington. This was symbolically manifested in state visits the French 
President made to both capitals. Looking back at the end of the century, Anatoly 
Chernyaev, Gorbachev’s diplomatic advisor from 1986 and a foreign policy expert 
in the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 
1984, regarded Mitterrand’s visit to Moscow as a major event.22
Throughout the years 1984 and 1985, Mitterrand traveled and acted as a 
bridge-builder between East and West, explaining to his American and Soviet 
counterparts how they could deal with each other. While playing a crucial part in 
re-establishing the East–West dialogue and encouraging a resumption of détente 
at superpower level, he was convinced that he was conferring a leading role on 
France. As he confided to Henry Kissinger: “Beyond my own person, it must be 
said that France is currently the only country in Western Europe that can have a 
meaningful dialogue with the Russians.”23
In particular, he used his meetings with President Ronald Reagan and Vice-
President George Bush to prepare them for a revival of the dialogue with Moscow. 
In February 1984, he called on Bush to resume talks with the Soviets after a 
certain period had elapsed: “What we need to do is to get the Russians used to 
19 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher, January 10, 
1981, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD75/2; see also memo of conversation between François 
Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher, October 20, 1983, in: ibid.
20 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Helmut Schmidt, January 7, 1981, 
in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD72/2.
21 Memo of the head of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
December 10, 1984, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 4907.
22 Anatoly C. Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, University Park 2000, pp. 75 f.
23 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Henry Kissinger, June 28, 1984, in: 
AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD74/1.
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dialogue again.”24 Some months later, on March 22, 1984, in a conversation with 
Reagan he explained how he saw the French role in helping the Soviets overcome 
their bad trajectory: “It is with you that they want to negotiate on the substance. 
But it’s more convenient for them to start with France.”25
According to the French version of the minutes of this conversation, Reagan 
seemed to be very curious, and appreciated being advised by the French President. 
The central piece of advice Mitterrand gave was a psychological one: “With 
regard to the USSR, it is necessary: 1) not to give up anything, 2) not to concede 
anything, 3) to place yourself in a good psychological situation for the day when 
the Soviets want to discuss.” Reagan, he said, should deal very carefully with the 
Soviets: “Dialogue must be as much about signs as it is about substance. Primar-
ily, for reasons of dignity. Signs and sensitivity are decisive.”26 In return, the 
American President praised France’s role in the INF affair just as much as Bush 
had complimented Mitterrand for his speech to the Bundestag.
In October 1985 in Paris, Mitterrand also gave advice to Mikhail Gorbachev, 
when the Soviet leader made his first visit to a Western capital, just before the 
Geneva Summit.27 For the President’s advisor Hubert Védrine, it was clear from 
the very beginning, that France should help Gorbachev carry through his reform 
agenda.28
However, in March 1986 Mitterrand lost his governmental majority. For 
more than two years he had to work with a right-wing government under 
Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. This somewhat limited the degree of initiative 
he was able to take in the domain of foreign policy. The chief foreign policy 
disagreement between the left-wing President and his right-wing Prime Minister 
centered round security issues, particularly those raised by the INF affair. It 
highlights how differently they perceived the Cold War and how this conflict 
should be brought to an end.29
24 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and George Bush, February 15, 1984, 
in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD74/1.
25 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Ronald Reagan, March 22, 1984, in: 
AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD74/1.
26 Ibid. Reagan noted in his diary how he had probed Mitterrand on the USSR: “His views were 
most informative & confirmed some thoughts I’ve been having.” See Douglas Brinkley (ed.), 
The Reagan Diaries, New York 2007, p. 227.
27 Memo of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, September 11, 
1985, in: AnF, serie 5AG4, vol. CD413/1; see also Marie-Pierre Rey, Gorbatchev et “la maison 
commune européenne”, une révolution mentale et politique?, in: Revue russe 38 (2012), 
pp. 101–110.
28 Hubert Védrine, Les mondes de Mitterrand, p. 381.
29 For Chirac’s position on INF see Jacques Chirac, Mémoires, Paris 2009, pp. 369 f.; on the 
cohabitation, Jean Lacouture, Mitterrand. Une histoire de Français, Vol.  2, Paris 1998, 
pp. 271–300; on the INF issue during the cohabitation, Parisi, La France et la crise des 
euromissiles, pp. 426–448.
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2. French Attitudes Towards Gorbachev and the INF Treaty
Compared to those in other Western countries, French intellectuals were late in 
turning away from the Soviet Union and Communism. An important turning 
point came with the events in Prague in 1968 and Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s 
testimony about Soviet Communism some years later. But it was at the beginning 
of the 1980s that the rejection of the Soviet Union reached its peak in French civil 
society. Despite Communist participation in the French government from 1981 to 
1984, French skepticism with regard to Moscow was now widespread and deeply 
rooted. This attitude was made particularly clear by none other than François 
Mitterrand in the speech he made to the German Bundestag in 1983. In 1985, 
only five per cent of the French had a positive image of the Soviet Union. This 
changed fundamentally with the appearance of Mikhail Gorbachev on the politi-
cal stage—albeit with some delay. French opinion researchers therefore compared 
Gorbachev’s impact, and especially his peace initiatives, with the perceptual 
shifts triggered by Stalin and Khrushchev in earlier decades.30
By 1989, Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader towards whom the French 
showed more trust and sympathy than they did to his American counterpart. 
Surveys confirm that it was above all the dimension of peace that shaped the 
image of both Gorbachev and the Soviet Union most strongly at this moment. 
The decisive change in the perception of Gorbachev dates back to 1987 and can 
be linked to the negotiation and signing of the INF Treaty. While in April most 
French people were still against a double-zero solution, by June they had already 
come to favor it—a turn probably due to the silencing of the Gorbachev and INF 
critics in the ranks of the Chirac government. In 1988 Gorbachev was even pro-
claimed “Man of the Year” by the right-wing conservative newspaper Le Figaro.31
In the commentaries of French journalists who specialized in foreign and 
defense policy issues, three currents can be identified when Gorbachev and his 
reform policy were assessed. Between the outright skeptics at one extreme and 
the optimists at the opposite pole, the largest group cautiously appreciated that 
change, but focused on the narrow limits set. They were particularly impressed 
by the changes being made in foreign policy, which gave them an overall positive 
picture of Gorbachev.32
As in other countries, the Washington Summit of December 1987 was well 
covered by TV stations and in the press. The French public was fascinated, and, 
according to surveys, was largely in favor of abolishing intermediate nuclear 
forces in Europe. The country’s press, however, was divided in its assessment of 
30 Olivier Noc, Le choc Gorbatchev, in: Société française d’enquêtes par sondages (ed.), L’état 
de l’opinion 1990, Paris 1990, pp. 51–69.
31 Le Figaro Magazine, January 2, 1988.
32 Stephane Verlhac, La perestroïka gorbatchévienne vue par les politologues et observateurs 
français, in: Cahiers d’histoire immédiate 10 (Autumn 1996), pp. 143–185.
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the Summit and the INF Treaty. Left-wing newspapers and journals, and also 
those from Catholic circles, were clearly in favor of the Treaty. They thought 
it a spectacular achievement, especially because of the verification measures, 
and liked the way Reagan and Gorbachev were readjusting to peace. But those 
from the right-wing camp were very critical about the Treaty as well as about 
Reagan—and especially about Mitterrand. Typical headlines during the days of 
the Washington Summit ran: “75 hours are enough to undress Europe”, “The 
illusion of the zero-option”, and “A fool’s bargain”.33 Articles under such titles 
reflected not only the official French position before the turn under Giscard in 
1978 but also the attitude of the right-wing government in office in 1987. This 
government considered the Treaty pointless, and even dangerous, for French 
security. Gorbachev was portrayed as a clever winner, able to triumph over a weak 
old man in the U. S. who had become a victim of efficient Soviet propaganda. 
The Summit also provided an occasion for French diplomats, former military 
officials and political opponents of Mitterrand to express their fears about his 
attitude towards the INF Treaty. They wanted to “wake up” the French public. 
François Fillon, right-wing President of the National Defense and Armed Forces 
Committee of the French Parliament, for instance, suspected Mitterrand of 
envisaging the scrapping of French nuclear forces and criticized the way he 
had given his support to the Germans in 1983.34 Others feared a potential 
new Yalta, in which the superpowers would decide on Europe’s future without 
Europeans themselves having any say on the issue.35 What is much more remark-
able, however, is that some of the critics suggested taking the bull by the horns 
and creating a European Defense Community and a European Political Union. 
This last argument proved quite useful to the French President in pursuing his 
European ambitions.36
The outlook of the French Foreign Ministry was colored by a traditional 
anti-Sovietism. At the time of the Reykjavik Summit of October 1986, French 
diplomats were very disappointed with Washington and Moscow and the willing-
ness to sign an INF Treaty as soon as possible that both sides seemed to show. 
A lot of memos, written during the weeks around the Summit, dealt with the risk 
of a possible denuclearization of Western Europe and the fear of the expected 
33 Robert Lacontre, Washington. 75 heures pour déshabiller l’Europe?, in: Le Figaro Magazine, 
December 12, 1987; Jean Denipere, Les illusions de l’option zéro, in: Rivarol, January 29, 
1988; Jacques Bonomo, Accord de désarmement ou marché de dupes?, in: Le Figaro, Febru-
ary 27, 1988; all the articles from the French press quoted in this chapter were found in the 
various press packs on the subject compiled by the Sciences Po Paris library.
34 François Fillon, Pas de salut sans un front commun, in: Le quotidien de Paris, December 4, 
1987.
35 Alain Peyrefitte, Un parfum de Yalta, in: Le Figaro, December 9, 1987.
36 Jean Denipere, Les illusions de l’option zéro, in: Rivarol, January 29, 1988; Noël Darbroz, Pas 
d’Europe aux sommets, in: La Croix, December 8, 1987; Michel Drancourt, L’Europe au défi, 
in: Le quotidien de Paris, December 8, 1987; Jean-François Poncet, Une grande absente, in: 
Le Figaro, December 7, 1987.
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weakness of France’s position should this happen.37 The various departments of 
the Quai d’Orsay remained skeptical or were as outright pessimistic as Jacques 
Chirac and Jean-Bernard Raimond, his Minister for Foreign Affairs: “Since 
World War Two, our security and that of our allies has been based on nuclear 
deterrence […]. Again, the Reykjavik meeting gave the impression that the 
abolition of deterrence could be a matter for a US–Soviet consensus, which is a 
cause of serious concern for France.”38 The French Minister of Defense, André 
Giraud, even described Gorbachev’s proposition for a double-zero option made 
on February 28, 1987 as a “European Munich” that would give the Soviets free 
rein to use all their other military levers to dominate Europe.39
Prime Minister Chirac stood on the side of the British and the Germans when 
he emphasized his doubts about the double-zero solution. Only the German 
decisions of 1987 to approve the double-zero solution and to give up any plan 
to modernize the Pershing IA missiles—decisions in line with Mitterrand’s 
position—brought the President’s dispute with his Prime Minister to an end, at 
least formally.40 
French diplomats believed that strategic nuclear forces were the real danger 
to their country and therefore insisted on the necessity of nuclear deterrence in 
Europe and on maintaining the existing strategic link between Western Europe 
and the United States. The question now being asked in the French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs was how the link between European and American security 
interests could be re-organized.41 Another issue much discussed at the Quai 
d’Orsay during the months and weeks before the signing of the INF Treaty 
concerned the verification measures and the question of whether these measures 
could endanger the West in subsequent disarmament negotiations.42
Nevertheless, despite all these initial criticisms and fears, and although, in 
the end, France was only indirectly affected, the majority of French diplomats 
approved of the INF Treaty, believing that it fulfilled the Western objectives 
formulated in 1979. Clearly, they would have preferred it if Washington and 
Moscow had first settled the issue of their strategic nuclear forces (START) and 
37 For example, a memo on the French position towards the INF affair of the Strategic Affairs 
Directorate, November 27, 1987, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 6621.
38 Memo of the Strategic Affairs Directorate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Novem-
ber 3, 1986, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 6652.
39 Quoted in Pierre Favier and Michel Martin-Roland, La décennie Mitterrand, vol.  2: Les 
épreuves 1984–1988, Paris 1996, p. 650; see also Bozo, France, the Euromissiles, and the End 
of the Cold War, p. 206.
40 Parisi, La France et la crise des euromissiles, p. 443. See also the essay by Tim Geiger in this 
volume.
41 Memo of the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy of the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, March 2, 1987, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 6621.
42 The question arises for the first time in a memo of the Strategic Affairs Directorate of the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 11, 1987, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, 
vol. 6621.
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the disarmament of short-range missiles. They were also a little worried—though 
not as much as their German counterparts—about the convergence of denucle-
arization ideas in Moscow and Washington. And finally, they wondered whether 
the Allies would now be able to clarify their objectives. They therefore sug-
gested that, after the signing of the INF Treaty, nuclear disarmament in Europe 
should be slowed down until a clear common position on European security 
was found.
At the time, French Socialists, too, generally distrusted Gorbachev’s disar-
mament rhetoric. Amongst them, as with others, a change in attitude can be 
observed from the year 1987 onwards. It may be explained by a variety of events, 
such as the release of Andrei Sakharov, eased emigration possibilities for Russian 
Jews, and a trip the General Secretary of the Parti Socialiste (PS), Lionel Jospin, 
made to Moscow; but the INF Treaty was also highly significant. At the end of the 
year, most French Socialists and, above all, the French President were vehement 
supporters of Perestroika.43 Previously, Mitterrand had not been completely 
convinced of the honest intentions of the Soviet leader, but his attitude towards 
Gorbachev’s reform policy evolved considerably after the Summit meeting in 
Moscow in July 1986.44
When the INF Treaty was signed in December 1987, neither Mitterrand nor 
Chirac could react in any other way than positively; but the French President’s 
reaction was especially enthusiastic. In contrast to many of his contemporaries 
(and not only in France), he believed in a possible end to the Cold War, and the 
Treaty confirmed this conviction.45 He even expressed his support for the Treaty 
on German television.46
Like his predecessor Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterrand considered the INF 
Treaty to be a historical milestone, putting a European position into practice, and 
serving as a starting point for a longer-term process of ensuring peace. At the 
same time, he agreed with his critics that a disengagement of the United States 
from Western Europe would pose a potential threat. However, he was confident 
that the Treaty would not fundamentally change the picture. What he feared 
much more than the chances of a nuclear attack was a military conflict fought 
with conventional arms along the length of the Iron Curtain.47
At the NATO Summit in March 1988, he praised the Treaty again, describing 
it as a beginning, and now calling for a fifty per cent reduction in the strategic 
arms of the U.S. and the USSR, simultaneously urging that conventional forces 
be disarmed, a plea he had already made in 1986. To West European critics of 
the INF Treaty, he recommended attending more carefully to these disarmament 
43 Marie-Pierre Rey, La gauche française face à la perestroïka gorbatchévienne 1985–1991, in: 
Communisme 76/77 (2003/2004), pp. 141–167.
44 See Bozo, France, the Euromissiles, and the End of the Cold War, p. 208.
45 Parisi, La France et la crise des euromissiles, p. 444.
46 Interview with François Mitterrand on East German television, January 6, 1988, https://www.
elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-6732-fr.pdf (accessed on May 6, 2020).
47 Interview with Yves Mourousi (TF1), in: Mitterrand, La France et sa défense, pp. 390–394.
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issues and to the asymmetry of the conventional forces on either side of the Iron 
Curtain.48
A few months later, in September 1988, he called on the United Nations 
tribune to organize a European conference on these issues within the framework 
of the CSCE.49 Indeed, Mitterrand now considered that disarmament was one 
way—perhaps the most appropriate way—to change the Yalta order in Europe, 
especially if it meant disarming along the frontiers of the Iron Curtain. For him, 
the signing of the INF Treaty came at just the right moment in terms of domestic 
politics, a few months before the French Presidential elections. In the letter he 
wrote to the French people in the spring of 1988 during his campaign, Mitterrand 
could argue, with reference to the Treaty, that security and disarmament should 
be handled together and not separately.50 His security policy stance thus gave 
him a domestic political advantage over Jacques Chirac.
3. The INF Treaty and French Policies towards  
European Integration
The Euromissile crisis was decisive in bringing about a relaunch of Franco-
German cooperation, especially in the fields of security and defense. This was 
part of a renewed French effort to solve not only the German question but also 
the European one.
During the second half of the 1970s, French policies towards the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe were characterized by vehement competition with West 
Germany’s Ostpolitik. Just before the Euromissile crisis, French President Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing and his diplomats were particularly worried about the expected 
end of the Brezhnev era and tried to make the Soviets accept the idea of a confer-
ence on disarmament in Europe. This proposal was unsuccessful, coinciding as 
it did with the dwindling of French political influence in Moscow. As Bonn now 
seemed to stand in a better position than Paris, French diplomats saw a growing 
necessity to foster a European framing of the Federal Republic, and in particular 
of its Ostpolitik.51 
The election of François Mitterrand in 1981 gave French diplomacy the oppor-
tunity to make a fundamental change in terms of détente policy. Strategy had 
already begun to shift under Mitterrand’s predecessor, but the transition at the 
48 François Mitterrand, Declaration at the opening session of the NATO Summit, March 2, 
1988, in: François Mitterrand, La France et sa défense, pp. 377–381. See also report of the 
German Ambassador to NATO, March 3, 1988, in: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1988, ed. by Michael Ploetz, Matthias Peter, and Jens Jost 
Hofmann, Munich 2019, Doc. 75.
49 Mitterrand, La France et sa défense, pp. 395–400.
50 François Mitterrand, Œuvres, Vol. IV, Paris 2018, pp. 821–891.
51 Memo for the President, December 31, 1981, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/1.
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Elysée Palace gave critics of the French détente policy a voice. The in-house think-
tank of the Quai d’Orsay now concluded that France had never been a privileged 
partner of the Soviet Union but had merely been a useful plaything in the hands of 
Brezhnev. Even worse, the French détente policy was not only deemed ineffective 
but was seen as harmful for the Western allies because it favored a sort of “moral 
disarmament.” 
France’s endorsement gave détente the seal of the legitimacy it needed. The diligence 
shown by French leaders in defending the ‘achievements of détente’, despite the incidents 
along the way, had made it possible to consolidate a concept that has been proven useful 
to Moscow in order to pursue a policy of military strengthening and of expansion in 
the Third World […]. The deepening of the dialogue with France, and its preservation 
during periods of crisis (Afghanistan), has made it possible to give external credibility 
to the idea that the USSR is a power like any other belonging without any restriction to 
the community of nations. However, the quest of normality is one of the oldest objectives 
of the Soviet state since Rapallo. […] France has favoured, if not the disarmament of its 
allies, at least some moral disarmament.52
Following this new predominant perception of its own Ostpolitik and due to 
the Euromissile crisis, France reduced its relations with Moscow and other 
Eastern European capitals on the political level, while maintaining exchange 
and interpenetration economically and culturally.53 This shift was largely of a 
symbolic nature and mainly affected the ways of communication and dealing 
with the Soviet leadership. During the 1970s a newly elected French President 
would have paid a visit to Moscow straight after coming into office. Mitterrand 
waited until the deployment of the Pershing II missiles on West German territory 
had happened. As late as 1984, he was able to revive an official French policy of 
détente that still seemed to have potential for widening the room for maneuver 
in French foreign policy.
Aiming to change the patterns of French Ostpolitik, Mitterrand traveled to 
Hungary in 1982, thereby supporting Hungarian concepts of détente and human 
rights. His visit to Budapest was regarded as a way of communicating to Moscow 
that there was a European community straddling the Iron Curtain, and also to 
show how the French were determined to overcome the order of Yalta:
Under these conditions, the visit of the President of the Republic will have a particular 
resonance: Towards the Soviet Union, it will demonstrate, at the time of the Warsaw coup, 
our persistent desire for dialogue with the Eastern European states, despite the pressure 
that Moscow is putting on them and the policy it is imposing on them. With regard to 
52 Memo of the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
May 14, 1981, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD392/4.
53 On the persistence of détente during the crisis of détente policies, see Poul Villaume and 
Oliver Bange (eds.), The Long Détente. Changing Concepts of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe 1950s–1980s, Budapest 2016.
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the countries of Eastern Europe, it will underline our desire for openness and dialogue 
with the members of the European Community, which has its roots in the oldest history 
and whose future may not necessarily have been shattered by Yalta.54 
That some countries of the Eastern part of the continent themselves claimed 
membership in Europe at this very time, believing that European integration 
should not be limited to the West, was considered as a sign of success and change: 
“This concern alone constitutes recognition of the importance of the Community 
phenomenon and is the best encouragement on the path taken since 1957.”55
The Euromissile crisis prompted France to reconsider its own attitudes and 
policies towards the East–West conflict as well as towards European integration 
and, linking both, the German question. This last appears to have been of 
particular importance to the Elysée, as Mitterrand expected a solution to it before 
the end of the twentieth century.56 The political decisions taken in 1982 and 1983 
due to these changes of perception remained valid for the following years—at 
least until the end of the Cold War.
Although Mitterrand had rejected Franco–German relations because of their 
exclusionary character during his Presidential election campaign, he came to rely 
on this bilateral relationship as a central pillar of his foreign policy only a few 
months after taking office. More than ever French diplomats saw this as a key 
guarantee of the Federal Republic’s ties to the West. This is why, at this time, they 
were prepared to make concessions to their German partner on the forthcoming 
institutional reforms of the European Community.57 Fearing that German 
Ostpolitik might drift, with a general deterioration in German–Soviet relations 
in 1982 and 1983, the Quai d’Orsay expended much time and effort proposing 
a European vision of East–West relations to the Germans. It was a vision that 
would differ from the American approach and from the one that Bonn was used 
to conducting, which French diplomats found “non-strategic”.58 
To get the Germans to change their strategic approach, French diplomats 
worked at deepening Franco–German relations in the field of security policy. 
In the re-orientation of French defense policies which they considered neces-
sary for this purpose, they even went as far as to call into question the Gaullist 
doctrine of an independent French deterrent force: they were prepared to place 
54 Memo of Bertrand Dufourcq, Head of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, March 5, 1982, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD274/4; see also a memo of the 
Working group on East–West Relations of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in: ibid.
55 Memo of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the attitude of 
the Soviet Union with regard to the European integration, September 13, 1983, in: AMAE, 
series Europe after 1944, vol. 4911.
56 Memo of conversation between François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, October 21, 1982, in: 
AnF, series 5AG4, vol. CD72/2.
57 Memo for the President, September 22, 1981, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/1.
58 See for example the memo of the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, January 12, 1982, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/2.
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it at the service of an emerging Europe. Their long-term objective was clearly the 
organization of a more European, and thus more independent, system of defense 
for Europe.59 The joint Franco–German declaration on these issues made on 
February 25, 1982 was seen in Bonn as helpful support in the debate over the 
deployment of the Pershing II missiles, and in Paris as a base for a renewed 
Ostpolitik to be implemented in the future.60
As in earlier decades, French wishes to contrive a common Ostpolitik with 
the Federal Republic were received with some reluctance in Bonn, however: 
“As I argued that a policy in the East should have as a necessary corollary a 
tenacious effort to strengthen European integration, develop common policies 
and consolidate existing ones, I was unanimously told that the differences in 
economic ideology between the partners did not allow us to be so ambitious.”61
The speech Mitterrand made to the Bundestag enabled him to clarify his own 
position, and to send a clear, strong signal that France wanted to enhance Franco–
German solidarity. Mitterrand was quite worried by the pacifist movement in the 
Federal Republic and its potential impact on German policies—indeed, this was 
one of his main motivations for delivering the speech. One of the most important 
results that came from it was the very close and strategic relationship Mitterrand 
struck up with Chancellor Helmut Kohl. It lasted at least until 1989/90 and the 
dispute over how to put German unity into practice.
Once the INF Treaty had been signed, making European détente possible once 
again, the German question came back on the agenda too. From the French point 
of view, the renewed European détente could facilitate European integration, and 
this was seen as particularly urgent as a renewed German Ostpolitik was becom-
ing increasingly active:62 “There’s only European unification. If not, Germany 
will play between East and West.”63
The decisions taken at the Franco–German Summit on November 12 and 13, 
1987 (on the eve of the Washington Summit) marked the beginning of a new 
chapter in the bilateral partnership and prepared the ground for the deepen-
ing of the European integration process. The Summit saw the creation of the 
Franco–German Defense and Security Council, and the Coordination Group 
for Economic and Monetary Policy. In January 1988, just a couple of weeks 
after the INF Treaty was signed in Washington and directly connected with 
59 Memo of the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
February 12, 1982, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/2.
60 Memo of a meeting of the political directors of the French and German Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, April 30, 1982, in: AnF, series 5AG4, vol. 160/2.
61 Telegram of Bertrand Dufourcq, head of the Europe Directorate of the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, on the meeting of the Franco–German working group on relations with 
Eastern Europe, October 1, 1982, in: AMAE, series Europe after 1944, vol. 4911.
62 Bozo, France, the Euromissiles, and the end of the Cold War, p. 207; see also Bozo and Wenkel 
(eds.), France and the German Question.
63 Council of Ministers, February 11, 1987, in private papers, quoted in: Bozo, France, the 
Euromissiles, and the End of the Cold War, p. 209.
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the issues raised by it, the French President and the West German Chancellor 
together signed an additional protocol to the Elysée Treaty on defense and 
security issues, establishing, for instance, the Franco–German brigade. However, 
the Franco–German Defense and Security Council, officially created on this 
very occasion, was not allowed any competence in the nuclear domain: France 
preferred to retain its conservative stance on the nuclear issue. This was one of 
the reasons for the rather poor results the new institutions had in developing a 
common Franco–German strategic vision for Europe in the Cold War context. 
Nevertheless, French diplomats continued their quest to open up a long-term 
perspective, pursuing this until the German question was resolved in 1990.64
Following his re-election in October 1988, Mitterrand delivered an important 
speech at the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale, calling for a new 
French spirit of engagement in defense, though not without reaffirming that a 
European alternative to NATO would not work.65 This speech of his shows how 
far France had moved on in its strategic thinking during the Euromissile crisis 
and had the approval of NATO representatives and German security specialists.66
At a range of levels French policy took advantage of the momentum set going by 
the INF Treaty. This was apparent in the disarmament conference in Vienna, in 
the revival of French Ostpolitik immediately after Mitterrand’s re-election, and in 
the European integration process leading to Maastricht. Mitterrand’s re-election 
with a Socialist majority in May 1988 seems to have shown popular approval of his 
positive evaluation of East–West relations after Mikhail Gorbachev’s arrival in of-
fice, and his optimistic acceptance of the INF Treaty as an invitation to deepen the 
European Community at both political and defense levels. He could thus resume 
an Ostpolitik that corresponded to his own conception of détente. Throughout 
the years 1988 and 1989 he made numerous trips to Eastern European countries 
establishing new relationships with them on the pattern inaugurated during his 
trip to Hungary in 1982.67
In Paris, the rapprochement of the two superpowers was seen as a precondi-
tion for a European response to the continent’s security requirements. A new 
European defense policy was envisaged—to be created from 1993 onwards. The 
basis for it was the close Franco–German cooperation on defense issues that had 
been started in 1982 and was formalized in 1988. Energized by the INF Treaty, as 
a signal announcing the crumbling of the two Cold War blocs, European actors 
64 Memo of the Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
on the Franco–German relationship, April 30, 1989, in: Maurice Vaïsse and Christian Wenkel 
(eds.), La diplomatie française face à l’unification allemande. D’après des archives inédites, 
Paris 2011, pp. 55–60.
65 Mitterrand, La France et sa défense, pp. 401–417.
66 Samuel F. Wells, France and NATO under Mitterrand 1981–1989, in: Maurice Vaïsse, Pierre 
Melandri, and Frédéric Bozo (eds.), France et l’OTAN, Brussels 2012, pp. 559–631.
67 Memo for the President, Caroline de Margerie, January 23, 1992, in: AnF, series 5AG4, 
vol. CDM33.
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could expect greater room for their own maneuvering. France played a central 
role in pushing forward the Maastricht process that was about to begin and, in 
particular, in the integration of security and defense issues into the European 
Union project. When this process started in 1988, the plan to reinforce security 
in Europe meant first and foremost strengthening European integration so that 
the European countries could themselves be actors, rather than passive objects 
of the East–West conflict.68 It can safely be assumed that in 1987/88 Mitterrand 
was already looking beyond the end of the Cold War order.
At the time, the real question was about how French defense capacities could 
be integrated into a European defense project—a tricky question, as the French 
defense doctrine did not correspond with that of NATO. However, the INF Treaty 
marked a turning point in the relations France had with this organization. In 
1988—for the first time since 1966—France adopted a NATO resolution, and thus 
created a unanimity in the West that had been unknown for more than twenty 
years. Finally, the signing of the INF Treaty paved the way for the French govern-
ment to sign its own first major disarmament treaty in Vienna in November 
1990—the Treaty on Conventional Force Reductions in Europe (CFE).
All these efforts—in the fields of Ostpolitik, of Franco–German relations, of 
European integration, and of disarmament—can be understood as expressions of 
the French will to solve the European question, to find ways to go beyond the still 
existing Yalta order in Europe and to end the East–West division of the European 
continent. In the course of the INF affair, the French changed their perception of 
Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, and it seems that this led them to an 
altered view of Europe, so that they saw the overall European question differently 
as well. This had direct consequences on the policy the French adopted in 1989/90 
to deal with that question. Largely unnoticed by American foreign policy, but still 
in its wake, the European Community had been evolving since the mid-1980s, not 
least under French political influence. From 1988 on, decisive moves were made 
towards the creation of new structures. These can be understood as a reaction to 
the experience of the Euromissile crisis, but, at the European level, they would 
last far beyond the end of the Cold War.69
68 See also Parisi, La France et la crise des euromissiles, p. 409.
69 Samuel F. Wells, From Euromissiles to Maastricht: The Policies of Reagan–Bush and Mitter-
rand, in: Helga Haftendorn, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stephen F. Szabo, and Samuel F. Wells 
(eds.), The Strategic Triangle. France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the 
New Europe, Washington 2006, pp. 287–307; Dieter Krüger, Sicherheit durch Integration? 
NATO, EU und der lange Schatten des Kalten Krieges, in: Bernd Greiner (ed.), Das Erbe des 
Kalten Krieges, Hamburg 2013, pp. 176–193.

III. Reactions of the Eastern Allies

Hermann Wentker
The German Democratic Republic, Gorbachev,  
and the INF Treaty
Erich Honecker was not a friend of nuclear weapons in Europe. If war broke out, it 
was clear that the GDR would be part of the battlefield and would suffer devastating 
consequences. At the beginning of the 1980s, with the discussion about NATO’s 
Double-Track Decision and the threatened deployment of intermediate-range 
nuclear forces (INF) in West Germany and other West European countries, 
Honecker’s anxiety grew. It came to a peak when, after the deployment decision 
of the Bundestag in November 1983, the GDR had to accept the deployment of 
Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 missiles on its own territory. In an interview with the West 
German weekly paper Die Zeit in January 1986 he clearly stated that these weapons 
would vanish from East German soil if the United States and the Soviet Union 
reached an agreement on a zero option on INF weapons.1 Several months later, 
on November 21, he became even more explicit in a speech delivered to the SED 
Central Committee: “If the INF-question is solved it will no longer be necessary to 
have tactical missiles (under the range of 1,000 km) in the GDR. Then it would be 
possible to remove this devil’s stuff (Teufelszeug) from the territory of the GDR.”2 
With this statement—which was printed in Neues Deutschland, the paper of 
the Socialist Unity Party (SED)—Honecker stated publicly that the GDR was 
adversely affected by the deployment of missiles with nuclear warheads on its own 
territory and that he wanted to see them removed. Shortly before this event, on 
October 11 and 12, U. S. President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev had almost agreed to scrap all ground-launched INF at their meeting 
in Reykjavik. 
But it was not only general concern about the effects of a nuclear war on the 
GDR and tactical support for the Soviet leader that induced Honecker to make 
1 Wir sind für den Frieden auf der Erde und im Kosmos. Interview des Chefredakteurs der 
BRD-Wochenzeitung Die Zeit, Dr. Theo Sommer, January 24, 1986, in: Erich Honecker, 
Reden und Aufsätze, Vol. 11, Berlin (East) 1987, p. 239.
2 Mit Initiative, Schöpfertum und Tatkraft verwirklichen wir die Beschlüsse unseres XI. Parteit-
ages. Aus dem Schlußwort auf der 3. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED, November 21, 
1986, in: Erich Honecker, Reden und Aufsätze, Vol. 12, Berlin (East) 1988, p. 203. According 
to Oliver Bange, Honecker had spoken repeatedly about “nuclear suicide” since 1981, and had 
used the term “devil’s stuff ” to characterize Western and (from 1983 onwards) Eastern nuclear 
weapons, but he does not substantiate this with any sources, see Oliver Bange, Sicherheit und 
Staat. Die Bündnis- und Militärpolitik der DDR im internationalen Kontext 1969 bis 1990, 
Berlin 2017, p. 224.
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this statement. For a deeper understanding of GDR politics with regard to INF 
and the INF Treaty, first it is necessary to look back briefly to 1983, when the Sovi-
ets decided to deploy SS-12 and SS-23 in East Germany. Secondly, East German 
politics with regard to the INF Treaty have to be seen in the context of Soviet–East 
German relations, on which Gorbachev’s accession to power in 1985 had a deci-
sive influence—and this means the relationship between the leaders in Moscow 
and East Berlin as well as that between Gorbachev and the East German people. 
As the GDR could not influence Soviet–U. S. negotiations directly, Honecker had 
to concentrate on supporting the Soviet position indirectly, through his contacts 
with West German politicians. Furthermore, he tried to impress Moscow with 
his power to influence West German politics. So the third part will be devoted to 
East German support of Gorbachev in the context of relations between Bonn and 
Moscow. As this essay will not restrict itself to high-level politics, the fourth and 
last part will be concerned with the important question of how the East German 
public responded to the negotiations and the INF Treaty in 1987.
1. A Brief Look Back: Soviet Reactions to the Bundestag’s Arms  
Upgrade Resolution and the GDR 
On December 12, 1979, the NATO Foreign Ministers decided, on the one hand, 
to deploy new American nuclear weapons in Western Europe, in order to restore 
the balance in nuclear deterrence after the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the 
European parts of the Soviet Union from 1976. On the other hand, they made 
an offer that both superpowers should negotiate a restriction of their INF, thus 
opening the possibility of reducing Soviet SS-20 missiles and of deploying fewer 
Pershing II missiles and ground-launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) than stated 
in the first part of the Decision.3 Although Moscow at first declined to talk 
as long as NATO stuck to its Decision, it eventually agreed to negotiations in 
Geneva, which began on November 30, 1981. As it became clear in the course of 
1983 that these talks would remain inconclusive, the probability increased that 
the Bundestag would pass a vote in favor of the deployment of Pershing II missiles 
and GLCM in West Germany. 
Already on May 12, 1983 the Politburo of the CPSU decided that, in this case, 
more than the intended number of SS-20 would be deployed and that operational-
tactical missiles would be transferred further to the west, especially to the GDR 
and the ČSSR. Without giving details, the Soviet government announced on May 
28 that if U. S. weapons were deployed, it would take effective countermeasures.4 
3 For the Dual-Track Decision, see the Communiqué of NATO’s special meeting, https://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27040.htm.
4 Cf. Gerhard Wettig, Die Sowjetunion in der Auseinandersetzung über den NATO-Doppel-
beschluss 1979–1983, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (VfZ) 57 (2009), p. 252; Julij 
A. Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm. Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten, Berlin 1993, pp. 322, 325.
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Honecker did not favor this increase of nuclear weapons in the GDR. This was 
mainly for economic and financial reasons. To a large extent, the GDR was 
dependent on the Soviet Union for the supply of cheap raw materials, especially 
crude oil. When, in the fall of 1981, Moscow let its East German ally know that 
it would cut the delivery of crude oil in the future by two million tons, from 19 
to 17 million tons per year,5 it became clear to the East German leadership that 
economic support from the Soviet Union would in future decrease. This would 
make the GDR more and more dependent on economic cooperation with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, even though its raison d’état called for delimitation 
from its West German rival. Since the normalization of relations between the 
two German states in the Basic Treaty of 1972, the GDR also profited from 
West German loans and payments, especially for the use of East German traffic 
routes. In order not to endanger favorable trading conditions and other financial 
advantages from the Federal Republic, Honecker had to maintain a policy of 
détente between both German states at almost any price.6 And last, but not least 
he dreaded the costs which would be incurred in the preparation of the deploy-
ment sites.7 Honecker also knew from a visit to Moscow made in early October 
1983 by Herbert Häber, Head of the so called “West Department” in the Central 
Committee, that the Soviet leadership did not have any idea how to react politi-
cally if there was a West German decision in favor of deployment. Afterwards 
Häber visited the Federal Republic and, after talks with numerous government 
and opposition leaders, reported: “In all discussions one notices that the term 
‘damage limitation’ was being used as a central theme.”8 Although Honecker 
learned from this report that only the West German Social Democratic Party and 
the tiny Green Party would reject the deployment of missiles and that the Parties 
of the governing Christian-Liberal coalition would support the move, he became 
5 For Soviet-East German communication on this matter between August, 27 and October, 
21 1981 see Hans-Hermann Hertle, Die Diskussion der ökonomischen Krisen in der Füh-
rungsspitze der SED, in: Theo Pirker, M. Rainer Lepsius, Rainer Weinert, and Hans-Hermann 
Hertle (eds.), Der Plan als Befehl und Fiktion. Wirtschaftsführung in der DDR. Gespräche 
und Analysen, Opladen 1995, pp. 321 f.
6 Cf. Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalen System 
1949–1989, Munich 2007, pp. 477–480, 500–506; on German–German relations during 
the controversies over the NATO Double-Track Decision see Hermann Wentker, NATO’s 
Double-Track Decision and East–West German Relations, in: Christoph Becker-Schaum, 
Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), The Nuclear 
Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s, 
New York / Oxford 2016, pp. 87–103.
7 Cf. Heiner Bröckermann, Landesverteidigung und Militarisierung. Militär- und Sicher-
heitspolitik der DDR in der Ära Honecker 1971–1989, Berlin 2011, pp. 536 f.
8 Häber’s report on his sojourn in the FRG from 9–16 October, 1983, in: Detlef Nakath 
and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan (eds.), Die Häber-Protokolle. Schlaglichter der SED-Westpolitik 
1973–1985, Berlin 1999, p. 148. 
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convinced that Bonn had an interest in maintaining détente in East-West German 
relations, just as he did.9
So, after the Bundestag’s arms upgrade decision of November 22, Honecker 
believed he could develop his own strategy with impunity. Three days later, 
he announced the counter-deployment of Soviet operational-tactical missiles 
in the GDR (SS-12 and SS-23) at the meeting of the SED’s Central Committee. 
But he added: “Of course, these measures which were indispensable to prevent 
the strategic military superiority of the U. S. are not producing cheering and 
jubilation throughout our country.” He affirmed his set intention to prevent a 
nuclear world war, to end the arms race, and to continue the policy of détente. 
With respect to East–West German relations, he added that he was anxious to 
“control the damage as much as possible.”10 Against the backdrop of what he 
had heard from Bonn, this was meant as a message to the West German leaders 
that they need not fear a deterioration in these relations. As became clear in a 
letter from the Central committee of the CPSU to the SED Politburo sent at the 
end of November, Moscow expected East Berlin to pursue a “walls up” policy 
towards Bonn.11 But Honecker did not give in. Economic dependency on the 
West German rival was increasing, as can be seen from the negotiations about 
two loan pledges of over a billion DM each, the first of which was settled on July 
1, 1983 and the second a year later on July 25, 1984.12 Honecker simply could not 
afford to antagonize Bonn. 
He was therefore very pleased when Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl applauded 
his statements to the Central Committee in a letter, and confirmed his own 
commitment to East–West German dialogue. Kohl concluded, “The two states 
in Germany find themselves, with respect to each other, in a unique association 
of responsibility towards Europe at large and the German people in particular.” 
Honecker took up the term “association of responsibility” in his subsequent 
phone conversation with Kohl and emphasized that “realism and reason” should 
9 Hermann Wentker, Zwischen Unterstützung und Ablehnung der sowjetischen Linie: Die 
DDR, der Doppelbeschluss und die Nachrüstung, in: Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Her-
mann Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppel-
beschluss in deutsch–deutscher und internationaler Perspektive, Munich 2011, pp. 147 f. 
10 In kampferfüllter Zeit setzen wir den bewährten Kurs des Parteitages für Frieden und 
Sozialismus erfolgreich fort. Aus der Diskussionsrede von Erich Honecker, Generalsekretär 
des Zentralkomitees der SED, in: Neues Deutschland, November 26/27, 1983, p. 3.
11 On November 28, 1983 three secret letters from the CC of the CPSU reached the SED Polit-
buro. The second of these contained thinly veiled instructions that the GDR should make 
clear to the FRG how much the situation had changed after the deployment of the missiles, 
in “the persistent raising of political problems—the question of borders, of citizenship etc., by 
intensified controls of West German citizens when entering the GDR and more”. Quoted after 
Michael Ploetz and Hans Peter Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung. DDR und UdSSR im 
Kampf gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss, Münster 2004, p. 179.
12 Stephan Kieninger, “Niemand will einen Rückfall in den Kalten Krieg”. Franz Josef Strauß, 
Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski und der Milliardenkredit für die DDR 1983, in: Zeitschrift 
für Geschichtswissenschaft (ZfG) 65 (2017), pp. 352–371.
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“truly gain the upper hand” in East–West relations, despite criticism of Western 
deployment of nuclear weapons.13 From the end of 1983 onwards, East-West 
German relations took an unexpected upward surge. Honecker kept his word to 
Bonn, and Moscow did not intervene. This not only secured the financial and 
economic support needed, it also provided the GDR—in contrast to the Soviet 
Union—with the profile of being a “peace-loving state.”14 
Stasi sources and indirect West German opinion polls indicate that the East 
German public to some extent appreciated Honecker’s attitude and willingness 
to maintain relations with Bonn intact. But there was also widespread criticism 
against the quick deployment of Soviet missiles in the GDR, which for many 
in the population did not fit in with the protests being made against Western 
rearmament. In early 1984, the Stasi counted over 400 “pseudo-pacifist” and 
“neutralist” petitions—including over one hundred collections of signatures 
with about 4,000 participants—criticizing the Warsaw Pact’s reaction.15 Even 
if Honecker managed to maintain the image of the GDR as a “peace power” at 
an international level, he obviously failed to boost his popularity within his own 
country. According to Jens Gieseke, even in this time, “the lack of legitimacy of 
the East German regime was always present.”16 
2. Soviet–East German Relations and Gorbachev’s Accession  
to Power
The estrangement between the Soviet Union and the GDR continued throughout 
the years 1983 and 1984. Although the Soviet leadership did not have the power 
to force the GDR to leave its course of conducting “business as usual” with 
the FRG, it was still strong enough to prevent Honecker from visiting Bonn in 
1984. On August 17, 1984 the East German leadership had had to endure severe 
criticism of its “Westpolitik” by CPSU General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko. 
Honecker, who had stressed that it was for the SED leadership to decide on his 
visit to Bonn, in the end gave in, so as to prevent an open breach between Moscow 
13 Kohl to Honecker, December 14, 1983; Telephone conversation between Honecker and Kohl, 
December 19, 1983, in: Detlef Nakath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan (eds.), Von Hubertus-
stock nach Bonn: Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch–deutschen Beziehungen auf 
höchster Ebene 1980–1987, Berlin 1995, pp. 155–159 (first quotation p. 155), pp. 159–170 
(second quotation p. 165).
14 Wentker, Zwischen Ablehnung und Unterstützung, pp. 151–153.
15 Jens Gieseke, Whom Did the East Germans Trust? Popular Opinion on Threats of War, 
Confrontation and Détente in the German Democratic Republic, 1968–1989, in: Martin 
Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian Ostermann (eds.), Trust, but Verify. The Politics 
of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969–1991, Washington, 
D. C. / Stanford, Cal. 2016, pp. 158–160.
16 Ibid., p. 159; on the East German peace movement see Rainer Eckert, The Independent Peace 
Movement in East Germany, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), Nuclear Crisis, pp. 207–221.
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and East Berlin.17 The relative weakness of the Eastern superpower with respect 
to the GDR was mainly due to imperial overstretch:18 on the one hand its costly 
worldwide engagements increased, not only in Africa but also in Afghanistan; 
and on the other hand, the Soviet economy was weakening, especially with the 
fall in prices of crude oil after 1981. Another cause for this weakness was that, 
from the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union was led by ill and aged leaders: Leonid 
Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. This changed with the 
death of Chernenko, when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary on 
March 11, 1985. 
The effects on Soviet-East German relations have to be analyzed in three fields 
of action. First, because of Gorbachev’s commitment to disarmament (which 
culminated in his resolve of January 15, 1986 to abolish all nuclear weapons until 
the year 2000),19 the GDR lost its special role as “peace power”. But, by supporting 
such initiatives,20 the GDR leadership showed it was once more in line with the 
Soviet Union. On the whole, this was a more comfortable position than what had 
prevailed before. 
Second, with regard to Honecker’s yearning for a visit to Bonn, nothing 
initially changed. In his first meeting with Kohl in Moscow on March 14, 1985, 
Gorbachev was anything but charming. He implicitly accused the Chancellor of 
“standing at attention” before the U. S. leadership.21 Gorbachev stuck to the 
Soviet line that the Federal Republic had to be punished for the deployment 
decision of 1983. Therefore, in 1985 and 1986, he pursued a strategy of cir-
cumventing the West German government in Western Europe.22 Moreover, 
he clearly demonstrated a preference for the oppositional SPD by receiving, as 
early as 1985, Party chairman Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr and Minister-President 
of North Rhine-Westphalia Johannes Rau (who was to challenge Kohl in the 
next national election). On a lower level, Moscow also courted the Green Party. 
After an invitation by the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Greens sent a 
17 Fred Oldenburg and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, Honecker kam nicht bis Bonn. Neue Quellen 
zum Konflikt zwischen Ost-Berlin und Moskau 1984, in: Deutschland Archiv 28 (1995), 
pp. 791–805.
18 Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev. 
An Analysis Based on New Archival Evidence, Memoirs, and Interviews, Baden-Baden 1998, 
especially pp. 133–190.
19 Erklärung des Generalsekretärs des ZK der KPdSU, Michail Gorbatschow, January 15, 1986, 
in: Michail Gorbatschow, Ausgewählte Reden und Aufsätze, Vol.  3, Berlin (East) 1988, 
pp. 146–159.
20 E.g. UdSSR zeigt den Völkern Europas Perspektive des Friedens, in: Neues Deutschland, 
January 17, 1986, p. 1.
21 Ambassador Kastl, Moscow, to Auswärtiges Amt, March 15, 1985, in: Akten zur Auswärtigen 
Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1985, ed. by Michael Ploetz, Mechthild 
Lindemann, and Christoph Johannes Franzen, Munich 2016, Dok. 68, pp. 378–381. 
22 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, Stuttgart 2012, p. 454. See also 
Tim Geiger’s essay in this volume.
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delegation to Moscow and Leningrad in April 1986.23 Gorbachev seems to have 
set his hopes on a victory of the West German Social Democrats in the federal 
elections on January 25, 1987. Only when these hopes were dashed by the victory 
of the CDU / CSU-FDP coalition did he change his course. On February 2, 1987 
Gorbachev instructed the Soviet foreign office to intensify contacts with the West 
German government, which should not be “left to Honecker”24—for the SED 
General Secretary was also preparing his visit to Bonn, at first independently of 
Gorbachev. Because Gorbachev now wanted to intensify his relations with Bonn 
too, a certain rivalry ensued. But after Moscow’s change of course in its politics 
towards the Federal Republic it was, once more, in line with East Berlin, so that, 
after consultations between members of the SED and CPSU Party Executives in 
July, Honecker could visit the Federal Republic from September 7 to 11, 1987, with 
Gorbachev’s (grudging) consent.25 
Third, after having initially welcomed Gorbachev as a relatively young and 
dynamic leader, the East German leadership’s perception changed in the course 
of 1986 and 1987. As long as he only seemed intent on economic reforms, the 
SED (which claimed that the Soviet Union was merely catching up with the GDR) 
could live with the new Soviet course. The SED leadership could also feel fairly 
secure that the new Soviet leader would not interfere in the internal affairs of the 
GDR, because at a Party and State Leaders’ meeting of the COMECON states on 
November 10 and 11, 1986 in Moscow, Gorbachev had committed himself to the 
autonomy of each ruling Party.26 At their meeting on October 3, 1986 Honecker 
had, for the first time, openly reproached Gorbachev for being too liberal with 
Soviet writers who had publicly denied the existence of a West and East German 
literature and had pronounced themselves in favor of German reunification.27 
23 For Gorbachev’s contacts to Brandt see e.g. Wilfried Loth, Willy Brandt, Michail Gor-
batschow und das neue Europa, in: Andreas Wilkens (ed.), Wir sind auf dem richtigen Weg. 
Willy Brandt und die europäische Einigung, Bonn 2010, pp. 413–432; Stefan Creuzberger, 
Willy Brandt und Michail Gorbatschow. Bemühungen um eine zweite “Neue Ostpolitik”, 
1985–1990, Berlin 2015; for the Soviet contacts with the Green Party see Hermann Wentker, 
Die Grünen und Gorbatschow. Metamorphosen einer komplexen Beziehung 1985 bis 1990, 
in: VfZ 62 (2014), pp. 481–514.
24 M. S. Gorbačevs orders concerning the German question, February 2, 1987, in: Aleksandr 
Galkin and Anatolij Tschernjajew (eds.), Michail Gorbatschow und die deutsche Frage. 
Sowjetische Dokumente 1986–1991, Munich 2011, pp. 26 f.
25 For the preparation of Honecker’s visit see Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, p. 515; 
Heike Amos, Die SED-Deutschlandpolitik 1961 bis 1989. Ziele, Aktivitäten und Konflikte, 
Göttingen 2015, pp. 491–500.
26 Memcon of meeting of leading representatives of the fraternal parties of the socialist coun-
tries of COMECON on November 10 and 11, 1986, in Moscow, in: Daniel Küchenmeister 
and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, Gorbatschows Entfernung von der Breshnew-Doktrin. Die Mos-
kauer Beratung der Partei- und Staatschefs des Warschauer Vertrages vom 10./11. November 
1986, in: ZfG 42 (1994), pp. 719 f.
27 Memcon of meeting between Honecker and Gorbachev, October 3, 1986, in: Daniel Küchen-
meister (ed.), Honecker-Gorbatschow Vieraugengespräche, Berlin 1993, pp. 160–165.
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But, whereas he uttered this point of criticism behind closed doors, he felt 
compelled to go public after Gorbachev’s speech to the CPSU Central Committee 
on January 28, 1987, which clearly aimed at a partial democratization of the party 
and the state. In a consultation with the SED Kreissekretäre (District Secretaries) 
on February 6, he implicitly distanced himself from Gorbachev with the words: 
“If the GDR’s socialist democracy is involved, it is irreplaceable.”28 On April 9 
the SED leadership took this distancing further with an interview given by the 
SED Secretary for Culture, Kurt Hager, in the West German magazine Der Stern. 
When asked if the GDR would follow the course of Perestroika in the Soviet Union 
he answered: “Would you, if your neighbor changes his wallpaper, feel obliged 
to change your wallpaper, too?”29 This reaction was so sharp because Honecker 
and his entourage realized that, if transferred to the GDR, Gorbachev’s reform 
policy would threaten not only their power but the very existence of the East 
German state. Though the leadership saw the risks of Gorbachev’s reforms, this 
did not apply to the East German population. Indirect opinion polls from the 
West German polling agency Infratest and from Stasi reports show that most East 
Germans not only supported Gorbachev’s disarmament policy, but also would 
welcome the transfer of Soviet reforms to the GDR. According to the Infratest 
report, Gorbachev stood “among the GDR population primarily for the hope of 
internal reforms.”30 
GDR politics with regard to the INF negotiations have to be seen in the 
triple context of relations with the Soviet Union, of domestic policy and of the 
implementation of East German policy towards West Germany. East Berlin had 
to perform a difficult balancing act between supporting Soviet foreign policy 
while disapproving of its domestic politics. Because of his rejection of Soviet 
reforms, it became even more important for Honecker to support Gorbachev’s 
peace moves. This was for domestic reasons, because he knew that the peace 
moves were popular among East Germans. His support could best be shown in 
the field of East–West German relations. Here Honecker continued talks with 
leading West German politicians, aiming to secure their support for the Soviet 
position. In this way, he hoped, first, to persuade Gorbachev of the value of his East 
German ally; second, to demonstrate to the public his intent to secure peace and 
get rid of the “devil’s stuff” in the GDR; and, third, to maintain continuous good 
relations with the FRG on which the East German state depended economically.
28 Schlußwort auf dem Plenum des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU, January 28, 1985, in: Gor-
batschow, Ausgewählte Reden, Vol. 4, pp. 394–401; Erich Honecker vor 1. Kreissekretären 
(Auszüge), in: Deutschland Archiv 20 (1987), p. 442.
29 Kurt Hager beantwortet Fragen der Illustrierten Stern in: Deutschland Archiv 20 (1987), 
p. 656. 
30 Infratest, Deutschlandpolitik und innerdeutsche Situation. Einstellungen und Verhaltens-
weisen von DDR-Besuchern und DDR-Bewohnern (I. und II. Welle), Zusammenfassender 
Berichtsband 1987, Vol. 4, p. 49, Infratest-Archive, Berlin.
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3. East German Support of Soviet policy in the Context  
of Relations with Bonn and Moscow
On February 28, 1987, Gorbachev announced on Soviet television that the Soviet 
Union was no longer making the realization of the zero option on INF dependent 
on the abolition of SDI.31 By untying the package discussed at Reykjavik, he 
hoped to bring the chance of progress back to the stagnant INF negotiations. 
 Honecker had been informed shortly before the announcement and had prom-
ised his support. Indeed, he was so quick in making a supporting declaration in 
Neues Deutschland32 that, on March 3, the SED Politburo was able to acknowledge 
Gorbachev’s “great gratitude for the quick and prudent reaction of comrade 
E. Honecker and the GDR in support of the Soviet proposals.”33 In accordance 
with the Politburo’s decision he went ahead and communicated with Helmut 
Kohl, writing a personal letter as well as informing him via the West German 
representative in East Berlin, Hans Otto Bräutigam, and via the East German 
representative in Bonn, Ewald Moldt. He told Kohl that the GDR would follow an 
INF Treaty with an agreement that the Soviet Union should withdraw its missiles 
from the GDR, and Bonn should also engage with its Allies to make the proposals 
happen. Honecker suggested that representatives of both states should meet to 
discuss how to support the Soviet initiative.34
Kohl reacted positively with a verbal message on March 12, and promised to 
send Minister Wolfgang Schäuble to East Berlin.35 Before this visit took place, 
the Warsaw Pact Committee of Foreign Ministers met in Moscow on March, 24 
31 Erklärung des Generalsekretärs des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU, Michail Gorbatschow, 
March 1, 1987, in: Gorbatschow, Ausgewählte Reden, vol. 4, pp. 492–494. This date is that 
of the publication in Pravda of Gorbachev’s earlier announcement. For the background to 
this decision, see Elizabeth C. Charles, Gorbachev and the Decision to Decouple the Arms 
Control Package: How the Breakdown of the Reykjavik Summit Led to the Elimination of the 
Euromissiles, in: Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), 
The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War, Washington, D. C. / Stanford, Cal. 2015, 
pp. 66–84.
32 Gemeinsame Stellungnahme des Politbüros des ZK der SED, des Staatsrates und des Minis-
terrates der DDR, March 1, 1987, in: Neues Deutschland, March 2, 1987, p. 1; see also Diese 
große Chance muß genutzt werden, ibid., p. 1.
33 Minutes of the Politburo meeting, March 3, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2/2208, TOP 
2. The draft minutes (“Arbeitsprotokoll”) of the Politburo session contains a submission 
by Honecker, dated February 28, 1987, in which the measures to support Gorbachev’s 
announcement are listed: SAPMO, DY 30 J IV, 2/2A/2985, fol. 15 f. 
34 Honecker’s letter to Kohl, March 1, 1987, in: Nakath and Stephan (eds.), Von Hubertusstock, 
pp. 293 f.; Non-paper, in: Draft minutes of Politburo meeting, March 3, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30 
J IV, 2/2A/2985, fol. 17 f. 
35 This can be gathered from the report about the sojourn of the Federal Minister for Special 
Tasks and Head of the Federal Chancellery, Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, in Berlin, March 26 and 
27, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2A/2995, fol. 78. 
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and 25, 1987, and agreed that their most important common task was to achieve 
a Treaty for the elimination of INF in Europe.36 East German Foreign Minister 
Oskar Fischer was keen to present Honecker’s policy towards Bonn as successful. 
So after praising Gorbachev for having shaken “the image of supposedly aggres-
sive socialism, of the so-called evil Russian,” he went on to commend Honecker’s 
initiatives towards Kohl which had “compelled the FRG government to move” and 
to adopt the zero-option as well.37 His aim was to underline the GDR’s role as a 
prominent and successful supporter of Gorbachev’s peace policy, especially vis à 
vis his Soviet colleague Shevardnadze. 
Immediately after this meeting, the Minister from the Federal Chancellery, 
Schäuble, came as promised to East Berlin, where he met with Fischer on 26 
and with Honecker on 27 March.38 Fischer asked Schäuble to support the zero 
option “without fuss or quibble” (“ohne Wenn und Aber”). As the GDR leadership 
knew that the West German government had reservations with regard to the 
zero option, this addendum became a standard formula in all conversations 
with the West Germans on this topic. Fischer declared that, in accordance with 
Gorbachev’s declaration, if the zero option were adopted, the missiles deployed in 
the GDR in 1983 would immediately be withdrawn.39 He also handed a non-paper 
over to Schäuble containing thoughts about parallel steps both states could take 
in Europe. Among them was the suggestion that they should discuss “the idea 
of a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe.”40 This was a theme on which the 
SED had negotiated and come to an agreement with the West German Social 
Democrats on October 21, 1986, when Egon Bahr (SPD) and Hermann Axen 
36 Report on the 14th meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization’s member states on March 24 and 25, 1987, in Moscow, SAPMO, DY 30, J 
IV, 2/2/2212, fol. 14–18. See also Vojtech Mastny and Malcolme Byrne (eds.), A Cardboard 
Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991, Budapest / New York 2005, 
Doc. 121, pp. 554–556.
37 Speech by Comrade Minister Oskar Fischer during the meeting of the Committee of Foreign 
Ministers in Moscow, March 24 and 25, 1987, in: SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2A/2995, fol. 62–64.
38 The meetings are well documented: Conversations between Federal Minister Schäuble, 
Federal Chancellery, and Foreign Minister of the GDR, Fischer, and the General Secretary of 
the CC of the SED, Honecker, in East Berlin, March 26 and 27, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Dok. 
86, pp. 416–422; Conversation Schäuble-Honecker, March 27, 1987, in: Heinrich Potthoff 
(ed.), Die “Koalition der Vernunft”. Deutschlandpolitik in den 80er Jahren, Munich 1995, 
pp. 515–525; Report on the Sojourn of Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Head of the 
Federal Chancellery in Berlin on March 26 and 27, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2A/2995, 
fol. 78–83; Note about the conversation between Foreign Minister of the GDR, Oskar Fischer, 
and Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Head of the Federal Chancellery, Dr. Wolfgang 
Schäuble, on March 26, 1987 in Berlin, in: ibid., fol. 98–105.
39 These words can be found in the East German note, but not in the West German record of 
conversation.
40 Non-Paper: Überlegungen für gemeinsame oder parallele Schritte der DDR und der BRD, 
um dazu beizutragen, die Chancen zu einem gesonderten Abkommen zur Beseitigung der 
Mittelstreckenraketen in Europa zu nutzen, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2A/2995, fol. 115–117.
The German Democratic Republic, Gorbachev, and the INF Treaty 185
(SED) had presented their “Principles for a nuclear-free corridor” in Bonn.41 As 
this idea was rejected by the governing parties in Bonn, Schäuble did not mention 
the subject in his replies to Fischer and Honecker. He stated that, with respect 
to disarmament, both states should concentrate on feasible steps, including a 
treaty on the zero-option for INF. After that, negotiations should immediately 
shift to short-range nuclear forces (SNF), where the Federal Republic assumed 
there was a huge imbalance to the disadvantage of the West. Here, like the GDR, 
the Federal Republic was prepared to aim at a zero option too, but only if the 
imbalance of conventional weapons was redressed at the same time. Moreover, 
both sides should stand up for those aims in their respective alliances—a point 
on which they concurred. Schäuble thus avoided succumbing to demands which 
he knew were anathema to his government; but, with his consent to pursue the 
zero option with regard to INF, the East German leadership had achieved its 
main goal.
On March 10, in support of the Soviet initiative, the SED Politburo had decided 
to carry on politically and diplomatically with the struggle for Europe’s liberation 
from INF. This resolve played a major role in a planning paper drawn up by the 
East German Foreign Ministry for GDR–FRG relations on April 7 in preparation 
for Honecker’s visit to Bonn. This paper declared it a central aim to achieve a zero 
option for INF “without fuss or quibble.” Furthermore, the GDR stated its inten-
tion of counteracting any inclusion of the FRG in the confrontational situation 
the United States was provoking, appealing to the population’s desire for peace.42 
In subsequent conversations between East and West German politicians at the 
top level, every GDR official tried to secure the consent of his dialogue partner 
to the zero-option, and always “without fuss or quibble.” When a West German 
politician used these magic words himself, as happened at the end of March, in 
Bonn, in a conversation between Genscher and Otto Reinhold, Director of the 
Academy of Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the SED, this could be 
touted as evidence of East German success.43 Such could not be claimed in the 
case of Günter Mittag’s conversation with Helmut Kohl on April 1, however. 
The SED Secretary for Economics not only stressed how important it would be 
for the GDR and the FRG to remove the INF missiles from Europe without fuss 
or quibble, but also repeated much of what had been said to Schäuble some two 
weeks before. The Chancellor did not take up the words, but only spoke in general 
41 Negotiations had taken place in an SPD–SED working group between December 1985 and 
September 1986. See Frank Fischer, “Im deutschen Interesse”. Die Ostpolitik der SPD von 
1969 bis 1989, Husum 2001, pp. 190–193.
42 Minutes of Politburo meeting on March 10, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2/2209, TOP 3; 
Planning paper by the Foreign Ministry on GDR–FRG relations, April 7, 1987, in: Nakath 
and Stephan (eds.), Von Hubertusstock, pp. 307–310.
43 Information by Otto Reinhold to Erich Honecker about a meeting with Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, end of March 1987, in: ibid., pp. 294–296.
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terms about the favorable situation in world politics and the Federal government’s 
“key position” in exerting influence in NATO.44 
The situation changed somewhat when, in a speech delivered in Prague on 
April 10, Gorbachev proposed beginning negotiations on the reduction of short-
range INF—i. e. missiles with a range between 500 and 1,000 km.45 This led to a 
split in the Federal government in Bonn, where Genscher was prepared to accept 
Gorbachev’s offer but Defense Minister Manfred Wörner was not.46 Honecker 
was well informed about the Soviet move, as became clear in his conversation 
with Parliamentary Group Chairman Wolfgang Mischnick (FDP) on the day of 
Gorbachev’s speech in Prague. He not only stated once more “that it was a decisive 
question that the GDR and FRG should be in favor of eliminating INF in Europe 
without fuss or quibble,” but, full of praise, he also referred to the proposal on 
short-range INF which Gorbachev was going to make in Prague the same day. 
Mischnick, who belonged to the same Party as Genscher, expressed West German 
interest in reaching an agreement on INF—the aim being a zero option—and 
suggested starting negotiations about the other missiles within six months, and 
discussing conventional weapons as well.47 
A few days later, on April 14, Gorbachev went even further with his proposals 
in a conversation with U. S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow. Not 
wanting to give Washington a pretext for increasing American SRINF, he had 
suggested a zero option for these weapons too.48 When Deputy Foreign Minister 
Alexander Bessmertnykh informed Honecker about Shultz’s visit, six days later, 
he stated that the U. S. Foreign Secretary had not reacted to this new suggestion, 
but he had clearly said to Shevardnadze: “We absolutely want such a treaty.” 
According to information available to the Soviets, Shultz had informed the NATO 
Allies accordingly. All this had led to a dispute between some West European 
states and the U. S. on how far the NATO doctrine of “flexible response” had to be 
changed under such new conditions. In his reply, Honecker supported the Soviet 
position and drew attention to the conversations he had had with West German 
politicians about the earlier Soviet initiatives—especially his conversation with 
Wolfgang Mischnick of the FDP. Honecker stressed the fact that Mischnick 
concurred with Genscher in his support of the zero option and, according to the 
44 Memcon of conversation between Günter Mittag and Helmut Kohl, April 4, 1987, in: ibid., 
pp. 297–303.
45 Rede auf der Kundgebung der tschechoslowakisch-sowjetischen Freundschaft, April 10, 
1987, in: Gorbatschow, Ausgewählte Reden, Vol. 4, pp. 523–542.
46 Cf. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen, Munich 1997, p. 564. See also the essays by 
Philipp Gassert and Tim Geiger in this volume.
47 Conversation Mischnick–Honecker, April 1, 1987, in: Potthoff (ed.), Koalition der Vernunft, 
pp. 526–533, the quotations pp. 527 f.
48 Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition. American–Soviet Relations and the End of the 
Cold War, Washington, D. C. 1994, p. 312; George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph. My Years 
as Secretary of State, New York 1993, pp. 889–891.
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information available to him, Genscher had then “played a constructive role at the 
Foreign Ministers’ conference in Brussels.” This was important for Honecker, who 
also referred to positions taken up in the CDU / CSU, especially that of Defense 
Minister Manfred Wörner, who rejected the double zero option. Honecker not 
only displayed detailed knowledge of West German politics, but also stressed the 
fact that the GDR had “taken an active influence on the FRG’s attitude, especially 
to the elimination of INF without fuss or quibble.” This, he believed, would not 
remain without influence on the other Western governments.49
Although Honecker was exaggerating enormously when he ascribed Gen-
scher’s and others’ support for the double zero option to the influence of the 
GDR, he was right in his analysis of the political scene in Bonn. While Genscher 
supported a double zero option, Wörner wanted the zero option to be restricted 
to missiles with a range between 1,000 and 5,000 km.50 As Genscher later wrote 
in his memoirs, there were concerns in the CDU / CSU that, after a second zero 
option for SRINF, a third one would follow for short-range nuclear weapons 
(those with ranges under 500 km). This could leave Western Europe denuclear-
ized and open to threat by the Warsaw Pact’s overwhelming conventional forces. 
Genscher stood out for the double zero option, however, and felt certain that 
Reagan and Shultz were determined to enforce this solution on the Western 
Alliance. He believed this because Shultz had reported back on his conversations 
in Moscow at a NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting on April 16.51 The coalition in 
Bonn was heading for disagreement, which became visible in a Bundestag session 
on May 7, when the Greens, the SPD and the FDP declared themselves in favor of 
the double zero option, leaving the CDU / CSU isolated.52 
On May 15, Honecker congratulated the SPD Parliamentary Group Chairman, 
Hans-Jochen Vogel, for his speech in the Bundestag, and supported his remark 
that the CDU / CSU was beginning to take up an anti-American position. Clearly, 
Honecker wanted to exploit the split in the Federal government between the 
CDU / CSU and the FDP, and he encouraged Vogel to persevere in full-hearted 
support of the double zero option.53 Against the backdrop of 80 to 83 per cent 
of West Germans favoring concrete disarmament steps, he was perhaps hoping 
for a change of government, which would enable the GDR to realize agreements 
that had been reached by the SED-SPD disarmament group. But on the whole 
49 Memcon about a conversation between Erich Honecker and Alexander Bessmertnykh in 
Berlin, April 20, 1987, SAPMO, DY 30/2384, fol. 62–80, the quotations fols. 68, 77.
50 Federal Minister Wörner to Federal Chancellor Kohl, April 19, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, 
Dok. 116, pp. 581–584. 
51 Genscher Erinnerungen, pp. 565 f.; on the NATO Council of Ministers’ meeting see Ambas-
sador Hansen, Brussels (NATO), to Auswärtiges Amt, April 16, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, 
Dok. 115, pp. 575–581.
52 Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht 11. Wahlperiode, 10. Sitzung, May 7, 1987, 
pp.524–565. 
53 Conversation H.-J. Vogel-Honecker, May 15, 1987, in: Potthoff (ed.), Koalition der Vernunft, 
pp. 535, 537 f., 549 f. 
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Honecker stuck with the government Parties; the opposition was only second 
in importance, and this flirtation was just an interlude. In the mid-1980s, the 
Green Party was also a partner of the SED leadership against the ruling coalition 
in Bonn, but that relationship was greatly reduced after 1986, and in April 1987 
the SED Politburo decided that a precondition for a GDR visit by members of the 
Green Party was the recognition of GDR laws. The Greens no longer accepted 
these, as quite a number in their Party criticized the human rights situation in 
the GDR and had close ties with East German oppositional groups.54 
On June, 1, 1987 Genscher prevailed and the Federal Government decided 
to support the double zero option. The following day, Genscher told an SED 
official, Otto Reinhold, that this decision was a great success, paving the way for 
the West European countries’ consenting to this solution in NATO. But, as the 
CDU and CSU were still in confusion, he declined to meet Honecker and Fischer 
during a forthcoming private visit to his birthplace, Halle in the south of the 
GDR.55 And now a new problem was looming: Gorbachev was also demanding 
that the Federal Republic should get rid of 72 (older) Pershing IA missiles. As 
these were not U. S. missiles but were at the disposal of the Bundeswehr, they were 
not part of the INF deal. The demand provoked a new split within the Federal 
Government along the established lines: Genscher was prepared to abolish these 
missiles, but the CDU and CSU were not. Promptly, on June 24, Moscow accused 
Washington of wanting to exclude the Pershing IA missiles from the negotiations 
and the Treaty. During President Richard von Weizsäcker’s state visit to the Soviet 
Union, Shevardnadze called these weapons “the obstacle No. 1” on the road to 
an INF Treaty.56 
The GDR again saw a chance to demonstrate its importance to the Soviet 
leadership. An opportunity arose when Klaus Wedemeier (SPD), the Mayor of 
Bremen, visited Honecker on July 1. After reiterating the fact that both German 
states had reached agreement on the elimination of INF in Europe “without 
fuss or quibble,” Honecker pointed out that there was now a danger a Treaty 
could not be sealed because of the Pershing IA: “It would be bad,” he said, “if 
the Federal Republic of Germany played a negative role in this context.” His 
wording was very similar to Shevardnadze’s, when he had described the refusal 
to include these missiles in the negotiations as the main obstacle to concluding a 
Treaty. Wedemeier agreed, following the well known position of his Party, thus 
provoking a protest from Hans Otto Bräutigam, who was accompanying him: 
54 Regina Wick, Die Mauer muss weg—Die DDR soll bleiben. Die Deutschlandpolitik der 
Grünen von 1979 bis 1990, Stuttgart 2012, pp. 231 f.; Minutes of Politburo meeting, April 7, 
1987, SAPMO, DY 30 J IV, 2/2/2213, TOP 4.
55 Information by Otto Reinhold to Erich Honecker about a meeting with Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher on June 2, 1987, in: Nakath and Stephan (eds.), Von Hubertusstock, pp. 312 f.
56 Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 567–570; the quotation in: Ministerialdirektor Freiherr von 
Richthofen, currently Moscow, to Secretaries of State Ruhfus and Sudhoff, July 9, 1987, in: 
AAPD 1987, Dok. 204, p. 1021.
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Bräutigam defended the Federal government’s point of view.57 Although this 
conversation had no effect on the West German government’s position, Hermann 
Axen, the Secretary of International Affairs of the SED’s Central Committee, 
who visited Moscow on July 27, relayed it to Alexander Dobrynin and Vadim 
Medvedev, who were Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, the former of 
its International Department, the latter of its Department for Relations with the 
Socialist Countries. The aim of Axen’s journey was to obtain Moscow’s consent 
for Honecker to visit the Federal Republic in September. Although he referred 
to West Germany’s insistence on keeping the 72 Pershing IA missiles, thereby 
postponing the INF Treaty, Axen also stressed the fact that there was a shift of 
power in the Federal Republic because of East German efforts and pressure. In the 
Bundestag, the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP formed a majority, and the CDU and 
CSU had no alternative but to take this into account. Axen’s self-congratulatory 
words culminated in the sentence: “Our pressure has forced the ruling circles 
in the FRG to accept the documents of Reykjavik and the unequivocal positive 
statement proposed by comrade Erich Honecker concerning the conclusion of a 
treaty about the elimination of the INF without fuss or quibble.”58 Once more 
the East German leadership was seeking to convince its Soviet counterparts of 
the GDR’s value for achieving the INF Treaty. This seemed even more important 
at a time when Honecker was preparing his visit to Bonn, which Gorbachev had 
not regarded favorably. 
Before this event could take place, the last stumbling block on the path to the 
Treaty was removed—but not because of any moves by the GDR. The main reason 
why Kohl had once more to line up with Genscher was that he knew he had no 
chance of going on if he pursued a policy that was neither in line with public 
opinion nor with the NATO Allies. The final initiative in this matter came from 
the Soviet side. Instructed by Shevardnadze, Yuliy Kvitsinky, the Soviet Ambas-
sador to Bonn, called on Genscher (who was on holiday in France) telling him 
that a treaty on the basis of the double zero option could be signed immediately if 
only Bonn would give up the Pershing IA. Returning to Bonn, Genscher managed 
to persuade Kohl, so that the Chancellor publicly declared the FRG’s waiver of 
the 72 Pershing IA missiles on August 26.59 The GDR’s influence on this decision 
was non-existent. Nonetheless, the SED Politburo proudly declared that Kohl 
had been compelled to make his declaration on the Pershing IA even before 
Genscher’s visit and continued: “The unanimity in supporting the global double 
57 Permanent Representation to Auswärtiges Amt, July 1, 1987, PA AA, B2 (Ref. 014), 
Vol. 512962 (I thank Tim Geiger for providing me with this document.) The East German 
record of this meeting in: Potthoff, Koalition der Vernunft, pp. 559–563, is much less detailed 
on this point.
58 Memorandum of consultation between Hermann Axen and the Secretaries of the CC of the 
CPSU, Alexander Dobrynin and Vadim Medvedev on June 27, 1987 in Moscow, (extracts), 
in: Nakath and Stephan (eds.), Von Hubertusstock, pp. 315–319, the quotation p. 317.
59 Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 571–576.
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zero option by both German states which has thus become possible is a decisive 
result of comrade Erich Honecker’s visit to the FRG.”60
Although the GDR leadership publicly supported the Soviet position in the INF 
negotiations, there are indications that its military leaders were not so convinced. 
At the Warsaw Pact’s meeting of the Defense Ministers’ committee in Bucharest 
from November 24 to 26, Minister of Defense Heinz Keßler praised the agreement 
reached in the negotiations as “a great success of the peace policy of socialism over 
the most aggressive circles of NATO;” the Soviet Union’s “persistent struggle for 
the conclusion of this Treaty” once more underlined “the defensive character of 
socialist military power.” But nuclear disarmament, he went on, was only one side 
of the coin. So, looking at the military situation “soberly and without illusions,” 
he pointed out “how intensely NATO is increasing and training the capability 
for aggression of its armed forces in big maneuvers.”61 Here he was specifically 
referring to the autumn exercises of NATO, during which U. S. forces had carried 
out the biggest transport of troops to Europe since 1944, and to an exercise that 
had demonstrated the increasing military reintegration of French forces into 
NATO. Keßler’s comment shows the anxiety the Eastern military felt on account 
of the conventional and nuclear “revolution in military affairs” in which NATO 
was ahead of the Warsaw Pact because of Western technological superiority. In 
this context the double zero option—among other factors—also contained new 
potential dangers.62 
Honecker was of a different opinion. On December 9, 1987, he hailed the INF 
Treaty as “a historical milestone on the road to a world without nuclear weapons,” 
and he referred to his statement of November 1983 when he had said: “We have 
never made a secret of the fact that the deployment of additional nuclear weapons 
in East and West has for us never been a cause for rejoicing.”63 Moreover, on 
November 26, well before setting off for Washington, Gorbachev had made a 
phone call to Honecker suggesting a meeting of the General Secretaries of the rul-
ing Communist Parties, after the Summit. It would be in East Berlin. Honecker 
was delighted with this proposal, and promised to arrange the meeting which 
was to take place on Gorbachev’s journey back from Washington to Moscow.64 
60 Report about Honecker’s visit to the Federal Republic, September 7 to 11, 1987, in: Potthoff 
(ed.), Koalition der Vernunft, pp. 564–575, the quotation p. 572.
61 Statement by the Minister of National Defense on the 20th meeting of the Committee of 
Ministers of Defense on the 1st item of the agenda, in: http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.
ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/21971/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/a622de25-
3972-4d18-b6b4-c587f226abfd/de/871124_2_east_g_statement.pdf, fol. 70.
62 Cf. Bange, Sicherheit und Staat, especially p. 434. For the revolution in military affairs also see 
Oliver Bange, SS-20 and Pershing II: Weapon Systems and the Dynamization of East–West 
Relations, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), Nuclear Crisis, pp. 70–86.
63 Erklärung Honeckers: Historischer Meilenstein auf dem Wege zu einer kernwaffenfreien 
Welt, in: Neues Deutschland, December 9, 1987, p. 1. 
64 Honecker to all members and candidates of the Politburo, November 26, 1987, SAPMO, DY 
30/2385, fols. 122 f.
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This was a great chance for Honecker to present himself once more as a—if not 
the—most important supporter of Gorbachev’s peace politics in the Eastern bloc. 
The meeting of the Party leaders took place on December 11, 1987. The Foreign 
and Defense Ministers were also invited. Gorbachev gave a lengthy report of the 
Summit talks. Although he bestowed enough praise on himself, when speaking 
about grasping the initiative and following up on it, he also talked of changes he 
had perceived in Ronald Reagan: Reagan had come to the conclusion “that this 
Soviet government does not aim at world domination.” Honecker welcomed the 
INF Treaty as “the introduction to disarmament.”65 After the meeting, a treaty 
was publicy signed between the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia 
about inspections to be made according to the INF Treaty’s terms. This treaty 
was needed because the withdrawal of Soviet missiles deployed in the GDR and 
ČSSR since 1983 also had to be monitored.66 The meeting made an impression 
on the Swiss Ambassador to East Berlin, Franz Birrer. At the end of his report he 
wrote that “for the GDR and especially for Honecker [the conference had been] 
a very successful and prestigious matter.”67 The meeting, the signing of the 
treaty, and surrounding events received extensive press coverage, especially by 
Neues Deutschland. The East German public was urged to realize that not only 
Gorbachev, but Honecker too, had had a significant share in the outcome of the 
negotiations. 
The treaty between the Soviet Union, the GDR and the ČSSR reminded onlook-
ers of the fact that SS-12 and SS-23 missiles were still deployed on six bases in the 
GDR—an appendix to the INF Treaty detailed a total 97 launchers.68 In February 
and March 1988, well before the ratification of the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union 
withdrew these weapons. In its information to the rank and file of the Party, the 
65 For the preparation of the meeting, see Minutes of Politburo meeting, December 1, 1987, 
SAPMO, DY 30, J IV, 2/2/2250, TOP 2; for a report of the meeting SAPMO, DY 30, J IV 
2/2/2252, fols.  10–13; for protocol of internal meeting see Stenographic minutes of the 
meeting of leading representatives of states of the Warsaw Treaty on Friday, December 11, 
1987, in Berlin, SAPMO, DY 30/2355, fols. 8–63, quotations fols. 14, 61.
66 Abkommen zwischen der DDR, der UdSSR und der ČSSR über Inspektionen im Zusam-
menhang mit dem Vertrag zwischen der UdSSR und den USA über die Beseitigung ihrer 
Raketen mittlerer und kürzerer Reichweite, December 11, 1987, in: Gipfeldiplomatie. Aus-
gewählte Dokumente und Chronik zu den sowjetisch-amerikanischen Verhandlungen und 
Gipfeltreffen Januar 1985-Juni 1988, Teil II: Dezember 1987-Juni 1988, Berlin (East) 1989, 
pp. 284–287.
67 Franz Birrer to Head of the Political Secretariat, December 17, 1987: Ostblock-Gipfel nach 
Washingtoner Gipfel, in: Bernd Haunfelder (ed.), Die DDR aus Sicht schweizerischer Diplo-
maten 1982–1990. Politische Berichte aus Ost-Berlin, Münster 2017, Dok. 51, pp. 204–206, 
the quotation p. 206. 
68 Memorandum Of Understanding Regarding The Establishment Of The Data Base For 
The Treaty Between The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics And The United States Of 
America On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles, in: 
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#mou. Swiss ambassador Birrer in his report 
of December 17, 1987 spoke about 50 launchers and 171 missiles (including missiles for 
exercises): see Haunfelder (ed.), DDR aus Sicht, p. 205.
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SED Central Committee once more emphasized the success of Honecker’s flank-
ing support for the Soviet Union during the negotiations.69 However, this did 
not mean that now there were no missiles of this type on East German territory. 
As late as March 1990 a spokesman of the GDR Defense Ministry admitted to 
Neues Deutschland that the National People’s Army still had 24 of its own SS-23 
missiles, and four launchers at its disposal; however, these did not have nuclear 
warheads.70 Being at the disposal of the East German army, these missiles were 
similar to the 72 Pershing IA weapons, about which the Soviet Union had made 
such a fuss in the summer of 1987.
4. The East German Public and the INF Treaty
In 1987 there was no longer any institution for conducting opinion polls in the 
GDR, but the Stasi collected information on people’s opinions on a number of 
different topics. The so-called Central Analysis and Information Group in the 
Ministry for State Security (MfS) often aggregated single reports into one central 
report, which was sent to selected political leaders, Honecker and Stasi Minis-
ter Erich Mielke always among them.71 One of these reports surveys popular 
opinion on the INF Treaty. When looking at the central reports, we have to bear 
in mind that they were written for the political leadership; but as the following 
is based not only on the central report72 but also on a large number of single 
reports,73 it seems possible to draw a fairly accurate picture of public opinion, 
even if this is based only on Stasi documents.
The main message contained in the broad Stasi coverage of how the East 
German population responded to the Washington Summit and the INF Treaty 
was that their consent and approval was unanimous. Besides this observation, the 
documents contain the following five key elements.
First, according to almost all the reports, people stated that it was Soviet 
peace policy that had made the Summit and the Treaty possible. The historical 
significance of the Treaty was acknowledged: a whole system of weapons would 
be destroyed, and this was the first time such a thing had happened. In the single 
69 Bröckermann, Landesverteidigung und Militarisierung, pp. 708 f.
70 Sprecher des Verteidigungsministeriums: Kein Geheimnis um Raketen der NVA, in: Neues 
Deutschland, March 3, 1990. I thank Tim Geiger for this information.
71 Cf. Daniela Münkel, Die DDR im Blick der Stasi. Die geheimen Berichte an die SED-Führung 
1953 bis 1989. Vorwort, in: Die DDR im Blick der Stasi 1988. Die geheimen Berichte an die 
SED-Führung, redacted by Frank Joestel, Göttingen 2010, pp. 7–11. 
72 Information about the general public’s first reactions to course and results of the Summit 
meeting between the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, Comrade Gorbachev, and the 
President of the U. S. A., Reagan, from December 7 to 10, 1987, in Washington, BStU, MfS, 
ZAIG Nr. 4234 fols. 2–7.
73 All reports can be found in the archives of the BStU. If in the following a sentence or passage 
is quoted directly, a footnote will indicate the document out of which it is taken. 
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reports—but, interestingly, not in the general report—Gorbachev was personally 
credited for the meeting and its results: in one report he was called “man of the 
century” (Jahrhundertmann).74 For the most part, Reagan came off badly: often 
he was called an actor who was simply putting on a show. But some reports quoted 
people saying that he wasn’t such a bad guy after all, and that you couldn’t just 
dismiss him as an actor. One single voice—that of an East German wanting 
to leave the GDR—even said that it was important for the East Germans that the 
U. S. President had addressed human rights in the Eastern bloc.75
Second, there was widespread skepticism towards the U. S. Some people were 
uncertain whether Congress would ratify the INF Treaty, or whether the U. S. 
would adhere to its conditions, as Reagan had not given up on SDI. Despite the 
renewed détente in East–West relations, most people’s assessment of the character 
of the U. S. and of the “imperialist” states had not changed. Only one person was 
reported to be suspicious of the Soviet Union itself, thinking that it might not 
destroy its INF but hide them in some place within its vast territory.76
Third, in spite of this continued skepticism towards the U. S., hopes were high 
that the INF Treaty would be just a first step and that further disarmament trea-
ties on nuclear and conventional weapons would follow. The Christian churches 
even saw in the meeting of Gorbachev and Reagan a “hopeful beginning for a 
world characterized by Christian charity.”77 
Fourth, the East Germans projected many more wishes onto the results of the 
Summit. Some hoped that, with disarmament, enormous funds would become 
available to improve the social and economic situation—especially of people in 
the GDR. In the National People’s Army, conscripts hoped that the Summit would 
affect structure and length of service, and they hoped that fewer reservists would 
be called for military exercises. And, last but not least, others hoped that, with this 
improvement in the superpowers’ relations, the dialogue between the FRG and 
the GDR would improve as well. This would result in better traveling possibilities 
and enhanced economic and cultural relations with the Federal Republic.
Fifth, praise for Gorbachev as a champion of disarmament went hand in hand 
with praise for him as a reformer. The Stasi reported that discussions often began 
with the Washington Summit and the changes in Soviet foreign policy, but from 
there they went on to changes within the Soviet Union, and they ended with 
74 Information about the atmospheric picture and opinions [in the National People’s Army and 
the border troops], December 11, 1987, BStU, MfS, HA I, Nr. 15162, fol. 341.
75 Report on mood and reaction of the general public, December 15, 1987, BStU, MfS, BV 
Berlin, Abt. XIX, Nr. 11219, fol. 221. 
76 Information about reactions and expressions of opinion by employees of central departments 
of the transport and communications sector to the results of the Soviet–American summit 
and other political questions of the day, December 18, 1987, BStU, MfS, HA XIX, Nr. 4816, 
fol. 190. 
77 Reactions by the general public of the district [Potsdam] to the meeting of the General 
Secretary of the CC of the CPSU Comrade Gorbachev and U. S. President Reagan, December 
8, 1987, BStU, MfS, BV Potsdam, AKG Nr. 914, fol. 66.
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demands for a more open and critical approach to problems in the GDR. Other 
discussions dwelt on the statement Gorbachev made in East Berlin on December 
11, asserting that changes in the international arena were connected with an 
improvement in cooperation among socialist countries and with “the perfection 
and the renewal of socialism.”78 The obvious inference people drew was that 
more democratization, openness and honesty were needed in the GDR too. 
All in all, the Stasi reports yield ambivalent results. On the one hand, we can 
see how popular Gorbachev was in the GDR as a harbinger of peace. The fact that 
the INF Treaty was primarily seen as a result of Gorbachev’s policy, and not as 
that of Reagan, and the widespread skepticism of the U. S. were not necessarily the 
result of GDR propaganda alone, or due to the fact that these reports were written 
for the SED leaders. These opinions may also be traced back to the influence of 
West German media. On the other hand, it is clear that Gorbachev functioned 
as a screen for the projection of the many wishes and hopes of large parts of East 
German society. People especially craved for inner reforms, and for improved 
East–West German relations and chances to travel. These latter concerns seem 
to have been at least as important to them as their esteem for Gorbachev’s peace 
politics.
5. Conclusion
1. Honecker supported Gorbachev’s disarmament politics with regard to INF 
because he himself wanted to remove Soviet missiles from the territory of the 
GDR, and also because he wanted to demonstrate to the world and to the East 
Germans that he concurred with Gorbachev in this field, even if he rejected 
Gorbachev’s politics of internal reform.
2. The only way in which he could effectively be of help in this process was by 
using his contacts with West German politicians. Here he tried to kill two birds 
with one stone. His first aim was to promote his politics of détente towards the 
Federal Republic so that he could visit Bonn and maintain good relations with 
the FRG for economic and financial reasons. His second aim was to convince 
Gorbachev that East German influence was needed to make the Federal Govern-
ment support the double zero option “without fuss or quibble.”.
3. In assessing Honecker’s success, we have to differentiate what he achieved 
with respect to West Germany, Gorbachev, and the East Germans. Honecker was 
at last able to visit the Federal Republic and there receive the maximum recogni-
tion for the GDR that it had enjoyed in the whole forty years of its existence. 
Whether he convinced Gorbachev of his indispensable qualities in making the 
78 Information about reactions and expressions of opinion by employees of central departments 
of the transport and communications sector to the results of the Soviet–American summit 
and other political questions of the day, December 18, 1987, BStU, MfS, HA XIX, Nr. 4816, 
fols. 191 f.
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Federal Government accept the double zero option and waive the 72 Pershing IA 
missiles we do not know. But at least Gorbachev let Honecker put himself in the 
limelight by calling the meeting of the General Secretaries in East Berlin, after 
the Summit. Although Honecker concurred with the majority of East Germans 
in his wish to eliminate INF missiles in East and West, his popularity seems not 
to have benefited from this identity of views. Popular opinion was definitely on 
Gorbachev’s side. Praise was heaped on the new Soviet leader, not only for having 
achieved the INF Treaty but also for his politics of internal reform. Gorbachev 
was the person on whom the hopes of GDR citizens were pinned. In the end, this 
contributed greatly to the downfall of the East German state.

Wanda Jarząbek
The Polish People’s Republic and the INF Talks
The question of armaments limitation and reduction attracted great interest in 
Polish society and within the government in Warsaw. This interest was rooted in 
Polish experiences, and especially memories of World War II. In the eyes of many 
Poles the war had left them not only with enormous material damage, but with 
hecatombs of dead Polish citizens, the annihilation of the intelligentsia, and the 
destruction of a huge amount of cultural heritage. It also brought the loss of Polish 
independence—even though from a formal point of view Poland had been restored 
as a sovereign country. A natural reaction to these experiences was a particularly 
strong fear of war. Not only this. The armaments race had an effect on education 
and propaganda activities, which used the war and social memory as a tool to 
lend legitimization to the leadership and as means of creating “enemy” images. A 
will to start up a new war was attributed to the West (i. e. NATO) while the East 
(i. e. the Warsaw Pact) was seen as striving for peace. 
Awareness of the constant menace connected with the possibility of war 
was present in the East as well as in the West.1 The main object of this chapter 
is to show the official Polish reaction to the disarmament talks that took place 
in the 1980s, especially to the talks on the reduction of Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces (INF). This is examined in the context of the Polish domestic situation, 
Poland’s place in international relations and the tradition of Communist Poland’s 
diplomacy. 
1. Poland in the 1980s
How much did Poland have room for maneuver? This question is crucial for 
an evaluation of the country’s reaction to developments in East–West relations 
during the 1980s. The Communist Polish authorities certainly tried to realize 
their aims in their relations with the Soviet Union, with Soviet bloc countries, and 
with countries outside the bloc. In general, Soviet bloc countries had very limited 
space to themselves in the field of foreign policy. This was especially so with 
regard to superpower relations; and nuclear armament was a question reserved 
to the superpowers. During the 1980s, Polish room for maneuver was limited 
even further after martial law was introduced by the First Secretary of the Polish 
United Workers Party (PUWP), General Wojciech Jaruzelski, on 13 December, 
1 See Sven S. Holtsmark, Vojtech Mastny, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), War Plans and alliances 
in the Cold War. Threat perceptions in the East and West, New York 2006, passim.
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1981. Poland was politically isolated; the level of political interaction between 
Poland and the West was lowered even more; and in the case of the United States, 
even ambassadors were withdrawn on both sides. Polish leaders were not, there-
fore, invited to other countries, and for several years after 1981 no high ranking 
foreign leader visited Poland.2 As, very slowly, the domestic situation started to 
become more stable, Polish activities focused on rebuilding political relations as 
a necessary precondition for the economic talks that were needed. First talks with 
the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Italy took place in late 1984. In December 
1985 General Wojciech Jaruzelski met French President Franҫois Mitterrand in 
Paris, but he was made to enter the Elysée Palace by a side door and not through 
the main entrance.
One of the Western preconditions for a return to more regular political 
contacts was the release of political prisoners. The amnesty announced by the 
Polish authorities in September 1986 opened up possibilities for more interaction 
with Western governments. The main priority in Poland’s activity, however, 
was the question of the country’s debt and its restructuring. The poor economic 
situation overshadowed all the activities of the government at that time. Its 
incapacity to manage the economy and to improve the standard of living was the 
main reason for the lack of legitimacy it had in the eyes of the people. Further 
reasons for popular mistrust were the leadership’s dependence on Moscow and 
the crackdown on Solidarność it had made in 1981. Moreover, relations with 
the Soviet Union and with the Soviet bloc countries were proving difficult. The 
Polish crisis was perceived as one of the dilemmas the whole bloc was having to 
contend with, worsening the perception of it in the West and “demoralizing” the 
societies within it.
In the mid-1980s, the PUWP still constituted the core of the political system 
in Poland, although two other official political parties were allowed, at least 
formally. Nevertheless, the center of power shifted to other institutions such 
as the army and the special services controlled by the Ministry of Interior. The 
Party’s First Secretary, Wojciech Jaruzelski, was successful in removing his 
strongest opponents from political life.3 Predominant political factors at that 
time were the need for a rearrangement of the Communist system, undermined 
by strikes and rejected by the majority of society, and also for economic reforms. 
This is why a restructuring of the Communist system started earlier in Poland 
than in other Eastern bloc countries. 
The nature of the changes in Poland differed from those in the Soviet Union. 
First of all, the government was aware of its lack of legitimacy and was interested 
2 Andrzej Skrzypek, Dyplomatyczne dzieje PRL w latach 1956–1989, Warsaw 2010, pp. 377 ff. 
See also Andrzej Paczkowski, Dyplomacja czasów kryzysu (1980–1989), in: Wojciech Mater-
ski and Waldemar Michowicz (eds.), Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej, vol.  6, Warsaw 2010, 
pp. 853 ff.
3 Andrzej Paczkowski, Dowódca czy przywódca? Wojciech Jaruzelski w latach 1981–1989, in: 
Konrad Rokicki and Robert Spałek (eds.), Władza w PRL. Ludzie i mechanizmy, Warsaw 2011, 
pp. 259–289.
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in broadening the “social basis” it could rely on. From 1982 on, many consultative 
bodies were set up, often with the participation of established journalists and 
professors.4 The old Front of National Unity (Front Jedności Narodu), which 
had been active since 1957, was replaced in 1985 by the Patriotic Movement of 
National Revival (Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego). Several changes 
were introduced into the Polish constitution, including the establishment of 
the Tribunal of State (which was to become the Tribunal for high-ranking 
state officials) and the Constitutional Tribunal. This does not mean that those 
institutions had real power, especially in matters of vital importance for the Party 
and the government—but they were meant to show the “democratization” of the 
Communist system, especially to foreign observers.
The need to reform the economy and to provide people with everyday neces-
sities was predominant.5 Economic matters were especially important for the 
younger generation who knew more about the West and, because of this, the 
authority of both the Party and the government was at a very low level among the 
youthful.6 After the termination of martial law in Poland on July 22, 1983 many 
attempts were made to attract people of non-Communist views, among them 
intellectuals and some of those affiliated with the Catholic church. It was hoped 
to draw them into the Party. But it was especially young people the leadership 
tried to woo. Communist youth organizations (and student organizations too) 
tried to entice young people with free (or nearly-free)  holidays, opportunities 
to earn extra money, chances to participate in student exchanges with Western 
countries, and courses where they could learn languages. Some foreign founda-
tions (including the West German Friedrich Ebert Foundation) let the Polish 
authorities choose who should receive scholarships, while others, especially in 
the United States, denied them this right. The young people who were given such 
opportunities to boost their careers in exchange for loyalty to the PUWP were 
nicknamed “Jaruzelski’s janissaries” by people hostile to the government. Many 
of them continued their political careers successfully after 1989 and the transition 
that occurred in Poland.
The change of leadership in the Soviet Union in 1985 opened a new chapter 
in the history of the Eastern bloc.7 When the new Soviet leaders informed 
4 For instance: Rada Społeczno Gospodarcza przy Sejmie (the Social-Economic Council to 
Parliament), Konsultacyjna Rada Gospodarcza przy Prezesie Rady Ministrów (the Consulta-
tive Economic Council by the Prime Minister), Rada Konsultacyjna (a Consultative Council 
to W. Jaruzelski as the head of the Council of State).
5 Wojciech Morawski, Pełzająca katastrofa. Gospodarka polska w latach osiemdziesiątych, in: 
W przededniu wielkiej zmiany. Polska 1988 roku, Gdańsk 2009, pp. 27–43.
6 Leszek Biernacki, Nie można zdezerterować—młodzieżowy bunt w 1988 roku, in: W przed-
edniu, pp. 79–97. For public opinion polls see Barbara Badora, Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, and 
Krzysztof Kosela (eds.), Społeczeństwo i władza lat osiemdziesiątych w badaniach CBOS, 
Warsaw 1994, pp. 267–268.
7 See for instance Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, Oxford 1996; Vladislav M. Zubok, A 
Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, Chapel Hill 2007. 
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Warsaw Pact Party leaders about their aims, the Polish Communists adopted a 
“wait-and-see” approach. Then, as the new General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev 
strengthened his position and it became clear that change in the Soviet Union 
would continue, his policy of reform gained support in the PUWP. His interna-
tional activities and his attempts to stop the arms race were especially welcomed. 
All efforts to lower the danger of war were strongly welcomed and received the 
people’s sympathy and support. In the Polish official press, Gorbachev’s policies 
were presented as ones aimed at relaxing East–West tensions rather than ones that 
might bring significant domestic reforms.8
2. Polish “Peace and Disarmament Initiatives”
Although the policies of the Soviet bloc countries were subject to what was called 
“coordination,” every country tried to promote its own goals. In the Polish case, 
the most obvious of these independent efforts were made in response to the 
“German question.” Bilateral Polish–West German issues included establishing 
diplomatic relations, recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a permanent border, 
and international matters such as possible German reunification and West Ger-
man access to modern arms, especially nuclear weapons.9 After the changes 
following the Polish October of 1956, the new leadership’s attempts to conduct 
a more independent foreign policy were most visible in policy towards Moscow 
and Bonn.10 
In 1957 Poland started to promote its first disarmament plan, which was 
named after Adam Rapacki, at that time the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He 
proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone, initially comprising four countries: 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, the FRG, and the GDR. It has been much debated 
whether this was a Polish or a Soviet plan.11 The origins are somewhat obscure, 
8 Wojciech Multan, Nowe radzieckie inicjatywy rozbrojeniowe, in: Nowe Drogi, 1/452 (1987), 
pp. 10–16. Nowe Drogi (New Ways) were, according to information given in them, “a theo-
retical and political organ of the Central Committee of the PUWP”.
9 Wanda Jarząbek, Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa wobec polityki wschodniej Republiki Fed-
eralnej Niemiec w latach 1966–1976. Wymiar dwustronny i międzynarodowy, Warsaw 2011, 
pp. 16 ff. 
10 Wanda Jarząbek, W sprawach niemieckich nasz głos musi mieć swą wagę. Problem niemiecki 
w polskiej polityce zagranicznej od października 1956 r. do rozpoczęcia tzw. drugiego 
kryzysu berlińskiego w listopadzie 1958 r., in: Dzieje Najnowsze, 33/2 (2001), p. 104. Andrzej 
Korzon, Kłopotliwy Satelita. Stosunki polsko-sowieckie 1947–1957, in: Andrzej Korzon 
(ed.), Rola i miejsce Polski w Europie 1914–1957, Warsaw 1994, p. 161.
11 The Rapacki Plan has been studied by many historians. See e.g. Teresa Łoś–Nowak (ed.), 
Plan Rapackiego a bezpieczeństwo europejskie, Wrocław 1991, passim. As a Polish initiative, 
the plan has been discussed by Piotr Stefan Wandycz, Adam Rapacki, and the search for 
European Security; Gordon A.  Craig and Francis L.  Lowenheim (eds.), The Diplomats 
1939–1979, Princeton 1994, pp. 298–312. The Americans and British, as well as the FRG, 
were strongly critical of this idea e.g. in James R.  Ozinga, The Rapacki Plan. The 1957 
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but Rapacki’s plan was certainly compatible with trends in international politics, 
with some of the Soviet announcements that were being made, and with Polish 
political goals. It was a kind of “two-in-one” proposal—linking nicely both with 
the Polish government’s German policy and with the disarmament initiatives 
presented by Western politicians and the Soviets during the first détente in the 
Cold War that followed Stalin’s death and subsequent changes within the Soviet 
Union. It is also possible that, by making this proposal, the Polish leadership 
hoped to avoid the detection of nuclear weapons on Polish territory, which was 
starting to be a real problem. Poland was in danger of possible attacks that would 
aim to destroy the places where nuclear weapons were based. The Poles fretted 
over the political aspects; the military details were discussed in depth with the 
Soviets. 
During the 1960s, a new version of the old Rapacki Plan was unveiled—now 
renamed after the first Secretary of the Communist Party, Władysław Gomułka. 
In the second half of the decade, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked on 
plans for a pan-European conference, which eventually became the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In the original Polish plans, 
the security questions to be raised included disarmament measures; but due to 
superpower priorities at that time these were excluded from the CSCE agenda.12 
Later, armament and disarmament questions were indeed discussed in the CSCE 
process. In the late 1970s, Poland started to be involved in talks to realize the idea 
of the disarmament conference, and in Madrid in 1981, it proposed a mandate for 
a Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures. During the Vienna 
CSCE follow-up conference on December 8, 1986, Poland proposed broadening 
the Vienna mandate to include CBMs and disarmament talks.13 During the 
Vienna meeting disarmament talks also took place between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact, and this was followed with much interest in Poland.14
Proposal to Denuclearize Central Europe and an Analysis of Its Rejection, London 1989. 
See also David Tal, From the Open Skies Proposal of 1955 to the Norstad Plan of 1960. A 
Plan Too Far, in: Journal of Cold War Studies, 10/4 (2008), pp. 80 f. Even in the Soviet block 
it was not fully supported, see Ernst Laboor, Der Rapacki-Plan und die DDR. Die Entspan-
nungsvision des polnischen Außenministers und die deutschlandpolitischen Ambitionen 
der SED-Führung in den fünfziger und sechziger Jahren, Berlin 2003. See also Milan 
Hronicek, Reakcja Czechosłowacji na Plan Rapackiego w latach 1957–1958, in: Petr Blažek, 
Paweł Jaworski, and Łukasz Kamiński (eds.), Między przymusową przyjaźnią a solidarnością. 
Czesi-Polacy-Słowacy 1938/39–1945–1989, Vol. 2, Warsaw 2009, pp.185 f. 
12 Wanda Jarząbek, Hope and Reality. Poland and the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, 1964–1989, in: Cold War International History Project Working Paper, 
Vol. 56, Washington 2008, pp. 16–27. See also Wanda Jarząbek, Polska wobec Konferencji 
Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie. Plany i rzeczywistość, 1966–1975, Warsaw 2008, 
pp. 43–75. 
13 Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
further AMSZ), Notatka o polskich propozycjach zgłoszonych na spotkaniu wiedeńskim 
KBWE, March 13, 1987, DSiP 26/93, w. 11.
14 AMSZ, Notatka informacyjna, April 4, 1987, DSiP 26/93, w. 11.
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For internal propaganda purposes, the country’s leadership also tried to orga-
nize events showing how involved they were in the disarmament talks. They 
wanted to project a picture of Polish leaders being active in the crucial processes 
of changing international relations. In 1986, a “Congress of Intellectuals for the 
Defense of the Peaceful Future of the World” was organized in Warsaw. This 
Congress was announced as an event inaugurating the UN International Year of 
Peace. Although many scholars and peace activists refused to come to Warsaw, 
and although it could not be compared with the 1948 Congress in Poland in terms 
of famous personalities attending, it was regarded as a success.15
Probably because of the common interest in disarmament and the will to be 
more active in international talks, Polish Communists began working on a new 
peace initiative, this time named the Jaruzelski Plan. It was announced in Poland 
on May 8, 1987 (the eve of “Victory Day” in the Communist bloc). The idea was 
also presented to the other Warsaw Pact members then working on their own 
disarmament concepts. Jaruzelski discussed his plan during the meeting of the 
Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee (PCC) in Berlin on May, 28–29, 
1987.16 After the formal announcement of the Jaruzelski Plan Polish and Soviet 
experts met to discuss details of the memorandum the Polish Foreign Office 
wanted to send to other countries.17 The Jaruzelski plan dealt with conventional 
and nuclear arms (launched from aircrafts, missiles, nuclear artillery and nuclear 
mines). It also discussed the question of confidence-building measures and 
reviewed the steps needed for inspections to control the disarmament steps. The 
Soviets supported Poland’s intention to introduce elements of the plan into the 
Vienna 23 talks—the preparatory talks of the sixteen NATO and seven Warsaw 
Pact countries which would propose a mandate for negotiations on Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE). The plan was also officially presented during the CSCE 
follow-up conference in Vienna on July 17, 1987.
15 Archiwum Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej (Archive of the Institute for National Rememberce, 
further AIPN), Ocena przebiegu Kongresu Intelektualistów w Obronie Pokojowej Przyszłości 
Świata, January 16–19, 1986, BU 1589/1303. The World Congress of Intellectuals for the 
Defense of Peace took place from August, 25 to 28, 1948 in Wrocław. The propaganda aim of 
the Congress was to convince public opinion that Communist countries were supporters of 
peace, and the West, especially the U. S. as the only owners of atomic weapons at that time, 
a menace to peace. Numerous Western intellectuals, such as Pablo Picasso, Julian Huxley, 
Paul Éluard, Bertolt Brecht, and Graham Greene, took part in the Congress. The Organizing 
Committee included Irène and Frédéric Joliot-Curie and Le Corbusier. The organizers 
(mainly Poles and French) referred to the tradition of the International Congress of Writers 
in Defense of Culture, which took place in 1935 in Paris. Professor A. J. P. Taylor, a historian 
from Oxford, supported only by a few other intellectuals, protested against the accusations 
of fascism made against the U. S. and the West.
16 AIPN, Wystąpienie I Sekretarza KC PZPR, przewodniczącego Rady Państwa PRL, tow. 
W.  Jaruzelskiego na naradzie Doradczego Komitetu Politycznego UW, May 28, 1987, BU 
02958/563.
17 AMSZ, Notatka informacyjna o polsko-radzieckich konsultacjach nt. planu zmniejszenia 
zbrojeń i zwiększania zaufania w Europie, June 23, 1987, DIE 52/90, w.1.
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In the second half of the 1980s, many publications were issued describing post-
war Poland’s activity in the field of disarmament, its search for denuclearization 
and its engagement in devising security-building measures.18 This was probably 
seen as one element of Polish policy that could gain support from Polish society 
and at the same time enable the leadership to keep up with ongoing change in 
East-West relations. Some initiatives—beginning with the Rapacki Plan—were 
always treated as a kind of Polish ‘brand’. For Poland, it is also important to 
take the economic benefit of ending the armament race into consideration. 
Armaments were expensive, and due to the sharing of obligations of Soviet bloc 
members, every state had to participate in purchasing equipment from the Soviet 
Union and manufacturing whatever Warsaw Pact plans demanded. The export 
of products from the national military industry was not free. Warsaw had to ask 
Moscow what and to whom these items could be sold. 
3. Polish Reactions to the INF Talks 
In October 1980 the Preliminary Talks on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
began in Geneva. The formal talks between the U. S. and the Soviet Union started 
on November 30, 1981. The INF talks were observed by Polish diplomats, who 
often took their information from press releases. That Poles had this role does not 
mean that the Polish authorities were much involved. It should be stressed that 
disarmament talks about nuclear weapons were in the exclusive domain of the 
superpowers. As the Soviet Union was the undisputed leader of the Soviet bloc, 
it was obvious that other Warsaw Pact countries could never participate in the 
decision-making process. However, the countries were informed about the talks 
through multilateral and bilateral exchanges within the alliance. Information 
was often given at the last moment, shortly before the Soviet leaders gave a public 
statement. As bilateral contacts were also used to transmit information, the scope 
of information divulged differed among the Soviet satellite states. 
When the talks started, the Polish Communists were confronted with domes-
tic problems: the strikes of summer 1980. These ended with the legalization 
of Solidarność, the first independent, non-Communist trade union movement 
within the Warsaw Pact. Recognition of this force prevented more rapid develop-
ments, but it did not calm the situation. The conflict between the Party (in other 
words, the government) and Solidarność was sharpening. The introduction of 
martial law in December 1981 resulted in massive criticism of the Communist 
18 See e.g. Teresa Łoś-Nowak, Problem rozbrojenia w polskiej polityce zagranicznej, Warsaw 
1985. See also Wojciech Multan, Porozumienia rozbrojeniowe po II wojnie światowej, 
Warsaw 1985; Wojciech Multan, Rozbrojenie w Polskiej polityce zagranicznej, Warsaw 1987; 
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, New Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). A Polish 
view, Warsaw 1987; Adam Daniel Rotfeld, The CSCE and the European Security System, 
Warsaw 1988. Many articles were published in “Spawy Międzynarodowe”, a magazine issued 
by the Polish Institute for International Affairs (PISM).
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government and contributed to its political isolation. However, many Western 
leaders were appeased by the fact that the Soviets did not intervene in Poland 
directly. During the first phase of the INF talks up to 1983, therefore, the attention 
of the Polish leadership was consumed by the domestic crisis. 
When negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union restarted 
in March 1985, Poland was informed about the talks mostly through the familiar 
channels existing within the Warsaw Pact. I do not know of any cases in which 
the Soviets provided any deep or detailed information about the INF talks. It 
could be that minutes of conversation do not exist, given the habitual reluctance 
of Soviet Foreign Policy-makers to pass on information. Shortly after the talks 
were renewed, during the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers that 
took place on March 19–20,1986 in Warsaw, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze informed the Warsaw Pact member-states of the difference in 
interests between the USSR and the U. S. in the agenda of the Geneva disarma-
ment talks. He stated that the United States and the Western countries were not 
willing to engage in talks about the whole nuclear arsenal (all types of nuclear 
weapons), but wanted to limit negotiation to intermediate-range missiles. They 
refused to discuss other topics, especially the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).19 
According to Shevardnadze, Moscow was being very flexible in the Geneva talks, 
and any contrary opinions stated in the media should be regarded as Western 
propaganda. The final conclusion of Shevardnadze’s statement was that a further 
U. S.–Soviet summit would only be possible if the U. S. changed its stance on to 
the agenda. 
This information was a mix of true facts and false. It typified how situations 
were standardly presented during Warsaw Pact meetings. Usually the Soviet 
announcements were merely noted, and provoked no deep discussion or even 
opposition from the other leaders. During this particular meeting it was only 
Romania’s Foreign Minister Ilie Văduva who advanced any ideas. In his view, the 
INF talks should not be limited to Europe and arms reductions and should also 
cover conventional weapons.20 
A few months later, during the Political Consultative Committee meeting in 
Budapest (June 10–11, 1986) Gorbachev informed Warsaw Pact leaders that the 
U. S. was planning to revoke the implementation of the (never ratified) SALT II 
Treaty and that the Soviet Union was considering limiting talks to the types of 
weapons included in SALT II. He also disclosed that the USSR was interested 
19 AMSZ, Notatka informacyjna o warszawskim posiedzeniu Komitetu Ministrów Spraw 
Zagranicznych państw-stron Układu Warszawskiego, March 23, 1986, D.ZSRR 33/89, w.1. 
For records of the meeting see also Anna Locher (ed.), Records of the Warsaw Pact Commit-
tee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 1976–1990, Parallel History Project on Cooperative 
Security (PHP), http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/colltopicf105.html?ln
g=en&id=16543&navinfo=15699.
20 For Văduva’s speech (in Czech) see http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/
colltopicee6e.html?lng=en&id=20506&navinfo=15699.
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in establishing an international system of collaboration on atomic energy and 
space research. Referring to the SDI project, he asked his Eastern bloc allies to 
strengthen their activity against the “militarization of space.”21 In East Berlin 
a group was established to study the possibilities of freezing (and in the longer 
run reducing) the military spending of the Warsaw Pact members. In future this 
group was to work on the reduction of the Warsaw Pact’s forces.
At the end of 1986, the Polish government assessed the Geneva disarmament 
talks as an unsuccessful effort. In a summary of Polish foreign policy prepared 
for discussion at the PUWP Politburo meeting on January 6, 1987, the first point 
presented was an analysis of US–Soviet relations. The lack of progress in this area 
was presented as a consequence of American policy. Washington was accused of 
breaking the Reykjavik agreements. The White House’s refusal to talk about all 
types of nuclear weapons and the continued deployment of intermediate-range 
missiles in Europe were criticized especially.22 
At the end of January 1987, a conference of the Secretaries for International 
Affairs and Ideology of the Communist parties took place in Warsaw. Disarma-
ment became part of the discussion.23 During a meeting with the delegates, Jaru-
zelski discussed both conventional armaments and the allegedly non-existent 
balance of power between East and West. Referring to his talks in Japan and 
Italy, he emphasized that Western governments presented a false picture of the 
situation and insisted that they gave false data on the quantities and military 
effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact’s armed resources. He instanced tanks, where 
the Warsaw Pact countries had numerical dominance; yet, Jaruzelski argued, on 
this example, that NATO tanks were more advanced from a technological point 
of view.24 
During the INF talks, rumors began to circulate about a possible change in 
the Soviet stance.25 They turned out to be true. Moscow’s position with regard to 
SDI changed in February 1987.26 Since the diplomatic talks proved that the Amer-
21 For records of the Budapest PCC meeting see Vojtech Mastny, Christian Nuenlist, Anna 
Locher, and Douglas Selvage (eds.), Records of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative 
Committee, 1955–1990, http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic1fe4.
html?lng=en&id=17111&navinfo=14465. 
22 Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of Modern Documents, henceforth AAN), Bilans polityki 
zagranicznej PRL w 1986 r., December 1986, WZ 973/682.
23 AAN, KC PZPR, Notatka dot. przebiegu narady sekretarzy KC bratnich partii krajów 
socjalistycznych ds. międzynarodowych i ideologicznych, Warsaw January 22–23, 1987, WZ 
973/416.
24 AAN, KC PZPR, Informacja o spotkaniu I sekretarza KC PZPR W. Jaruzelskiego z sekre-
tarzami KC uczestniczącymi w naradzie w Warszawie w dniach January 23–24, 1987. WZ 
973/416.
25 AAN, KC PZPR, Notatka dot. przebiegu narady sekretarzy KC bratnich partii krajów 
socjalistycznych ds. międzynarodowych i ideologicznych, Warsaw January 22–23, 1987, WZ 
973/416.
26 See also the essay by Tom Blanton and Svetlana Savranskaya in this volume.
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ican side was not prepared to sign a treaty covering a broader range of nuclear 
weapons, Moscow withdrew from the hard line it had taken during the three 
Geneva disarmament talks. About two weeks after Gorbachev’s announcement 
on February 27, 1987 and shortly after the U. S. had placed a new proposal on the 
table (March 4), the ambassadors of the Warsaw Pact countries were invited to the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry. There they met with Yuli Vorontsov and Vadim Loginov, 
the former Deputy Foreign Minister and head of the Soviet START delegation 
in Geneva.27 They were updated on the state of the talks and informed about 
a phone conversation between Vorontsov and his American counterpart Max 
Kampelman. According to the information passed on by the Soviets, Kampelman 
had asked the Soviets what their attitude was to the “zero option” in Europe and 
Asia, and the Soviet answer had remained negative. Vorontsov had indicated that 
some aspects of the American proposal were not acceptable to the Soviet side, for 
instance an idea it included of allowing the mechanical / technical downgrading 
of the INF missiles to change their range. The Soviets had also said that the reduc-
tion of short-range missiles, which the Americans now wanted to include in the 
INF talks, should be discussed separately. Vorontsov had admitted that it would 
be difficult to include factories in the control mechanism, a point the Soviet side 
had studied. He and Kampelman had also discussed the lack of any Soviet draft 
for a treaty on the table, which meant that the American draft would have to 
be taken as the starting point for further negotiations in Geneva. According to 
Vorontsov this was because Moscow wanted to finish the talks quickly—in about 
four months. Vorontsov had also explained that U. S. Foreign Secretary Shultz 
was scheduling a visit to Moscow in April. The results of that visit would be 
passed on to Polish and other allied diplomats there, details concerning possible 
numbers of missiles to be liquidated.28
The Polish side observed the reactions of Western countries to this new phase 
of the INF talks closely. They noticed that Gorbachev’s proposal (especially the 
way it renounced coupling of INF and SDI) was regularly treated as a proof of his 
weakness as a Soviet leader and evidence of there being a difficult situation in 
the USSR.29 According to Polish diplomats, in Great Britain opinions prevailed 
that INF, SNF and chemical weapon talks should be carried on simultaneously; 
this lay behind London’s reservations regarding the U. S.–USSR negotiations.30 
The FRG attitude to armament and disarmament also attracted much interest in 
Warsaw. According to the reports from Polish diplomats, the SPD and the Greens 
were especially keen on the disarmament talks, and the Poles noticed how they 
criticized the Kohl government. In the German governmental coalition, the FDP 
was perceived as more interested in active FRG participation in disarmament 
27 AMSZ, depesza z Moskwy, March 3, 1987, DIE 52/90, w. 1.
28 AMSZ, depesza z Moskwy, April 16, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.
29 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, March 12, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.
30 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, March 14, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.; see the contribution by Oliver 
Barton to this volume. 
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talks than were the CDU and CSU.31 Governmental policy was assessed as simple 
reaction to world trends rather than any systematic line arising from convictions 
or inner deliberations. When, on August 26, 1987, Chancellor Kohl announced a 
possible waiver of Pershing IA missiles, Polish observers therefore evaluated it as a 
purely tactical move. The announcement came just before elections in some West 
German federal states and was seen as a kind of “maneuver to avoid accusations 
of slackening US–USSR INF talks.”32
As previously mentioned, members of the Polish authorities had hardly any 
opportunity to lead high-level talks. But they did talk over questions of dis-
armament with foreign governments. The INF negotiations became a subject 
of discussion when Jaruzelski held talks with the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Jean-Bernard Raimond, when he visited Poland in April 1987. Answer-
ing Jaruzelski’s accusations that Paris was not interested in quick results and 
was slowing the INF talks down, Raimond stressed that France supported the 
idea of balanced, well-adjusted disarmament and stated that the liquidation of 
the intermediate-range missiles and the denuclearization of Europe should be 
accompanied by reductions in conventional arms and chemical weapons as well.33
Topics connected with the international situation and disarmament talks were 
also discussed during Wojciech Jaruzelski’s visit to Moscow in April 1987. How-
ever, the agenda of these bilateral meetings was dominated by Polish domestic 
issues, such as the complicated economic situation, the activities of the opposition 
in Poland, and the role there of the Catholic church.34 Neverthess, Jaruzelski did 
offer an update on the the development of his plan. This plan proposed a gradual 
reduction of nuclear weapons and was to finish with establishing a nuclear-free 
zone. It also included a gradual reduction of conventional weapons, so as to leave 
only defense weapons in Central Europe and effect a change in military doctrine, 
while putting security measures in place aimed at avoiding sudden attacks.35 
Gorbachev answered that the Soviet Union supported the Polish initiatives, and 
that details were to be worked out in bilateral talks between experts.
The INF talks took more time than Moscow anticipated. In May 1987, during 
the PCC meeting in East Berlin, Gorbachev reported that the U. S. and Soviet 
Union were close to an agreement, but that there were obstacles on the side of 
31 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, information obtained from the Polish Embassy in Cologne, June 
5, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16. For the West German response to an INF Treaty see the essays by 
Philipp Gassert and Tim Geiger in this volume.
32 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, August 29, 1987, DD 38/89. w. 16.
33 AIPN, Notatka informacyjna z wizyty ministra SZ Francji J. B. Raimond’a w Polsce, April 
10–11, 1987, BU 0449/1, t.2. For the French position see also the essay by Christian Wenkel 
in this volume.
34 AAN, KC PZPR, Tezy do rozmów W.  Jaruzelskiego z M. Gorbaczowem, April 1987, WZ 
973/447.
35 Zapis rozmowy sekretarza generalnego KC KPZR M. Gorbaczowa z I sekretarzem KC PZPR 
gen. W.  Jaruzelskim, April 21, 1987, in: Antoni Dudek (ed.), Zmierzch dyktatury, Vol.  1, 
Warsaw 2009, p. 122.
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France, the FRG, and Great Britain.36 This difficulty also came up in Polish 
conversations with Western diplomats, especially French and British ones.37 
Poland was also deeply interested in the reduction of conventional armaments, 
which started to be a topic in new international talks within the CSCE framework 
that followed the successful Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) held in Stockholm from 1984 
to 1986.38 According to Polish observers, all the difficulties in speeding up 
preparatory talks on conventional armaments and the reluctant stance of some 
smaller NATO countries to these talks arose through fear of Soviet conventional 
supremacy. Western Europe was correctly perceived as fearing INF reductions 
because its countries would thereby lose the U. S. nuclear umbrella.39 The Poles 
thought that Western countries found reductions of SRINF and SNF missiles more 
difficult to accept because they were afraid of the possibility of being powerless 
in case of local European conflicts.40 Polish diplomats also took note of voices 
against limiting INF talks to Europe.41 They tried to gather information about 
Western public opinion and analyzed reactions in newspaper articles, media 
coverage, and scientific conferences.42 Poland was also interested in restarting 
the work of the United Nations Disarmament Committee.43
Polish interest in a change in the military doctrine espoused by the Warsaw 
Pact military doctrine in addition to disarmament can also be attributed to a 
concern to limit military expenses. Among Warsaw Pact members, the Polish 
army was the second largest after the Soviet Union’s. The cost of maintaining 
its manpower and equipment was a considerable burden on the Polish budget. 
According to the bloc’s “share of duties,” Poland was to develop tank production 
plus accompanying units and equipment suitable for amphibious landing opera-
tions. A change of the military doctrine to a defensive one would help to lighten 
this burden.
As the INF talks were coming to an end, the Polish side intensified its work on 
the details of the Jaruzelski plan, and tried to obtain support for its ideas from 
Moscow—and also from the West. In November 1987, Soviet Deputy Foreign 
Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh informed the Poles that some points from the 
Jaruzelski plan could be attached to the European disarmament talks.44 This 
36 For the PCC meeting in East Berlin on May 28/29 see Mastny et al. (eds.), Warsaw Pact 
Political Consultative Committee, http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/coll 
topic01ce.html?lng=en&id=17112&navinfo=14465. 
37 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, June 20, 1987, July 1, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.
38 AMSZ, depesza z Moskwy, June 19, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.
39 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, July 8, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.
40 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, March 14, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.
41 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, May 26, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.
42 AMSZ, dispatches from different countries, DIE 2/90, w. 1.
43 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, September 22, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.
44 AMSZ, depesza z Moskwy, November 17, 1987, DIE 2/90, w. 1.
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was what the Poles wanted. But they also expected that the Polish origin of these 
ideas should be noticed.
After the signing of the INF Treaty in Washington on December 8, 1987, 
the Soviet satellite countries were told how the Soviet leadership assessed its 
results. This happened on December 15–16, 1987 in Warsaw during a meeting of 
the Multilateral Group on Reciprocal Information—a new body created within 
the Warsaw Pact the previous year.45 The narratives of the Soviet side aimed 
at underlining a success that was “bigger than expected,” since the agreement 
included new generations of weapons and created modern control and verifica-
tion mechanisms. The Treaty was presented as the first step towards liquidating 
all nuclear arms. It was also presented as the result of a positive change in 
Soviet–American relations and as a starting point for further talks. According 
to the Soviets, INF should also have an impact on the behavior of European 
countries, especially the NATO countries, and the small European countries 
(Benelux, Denmark, Norway) would become more interested in conventional 
disarmament talks. But as to the reactions of the big European countries, the 
Soviets anticipated effects unfavorable for Moscow—the beginning of a new arms 
race in the field of marine or conventional armaments, and the speeding up of 
European integration as an answer to the Washington—Moscow dialogue.46 The 
Soviets assumed that, because Washington would try to keep close relations with 
Western Europe, it might freeze the talks on chemical weapons reductions for a 
certain period of time in the Geneva UN Conference on disarmament.
The Poles tried to assess the impact of the INF Treaty on Poland’s place in 
international relations. An evaluation of the results of the Washington Treaty was 
prepared in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is an interesting document. 
It attempted to calculate the global and regional effects of the agreement and its 
impact on Polish security. Several points were presented as positive results in 
the field of security. The first was a reduction of the danger of a nuclear attack 
on Polish territory through the liquidation of the part of NATO’s nuclear arsenal 
that could have been used for this purpose. Another positive was a significant 
limitation in the possibility of sudden and precise nuclear attack by NATO. The 
remaining nuclear arsenal would leave more time for reaction in the case of a cri-
sis. It was assessed that from a military point of view the missiles to be destroyed 
were highly accurate and demanded only a very short time to reach their targets: 
so, due to their liquidation, the stage of ultimate escalation of a conventional 
conflict in Europe into a nuclear one would be eliminated. A positive effect was 
also seen in the promise that the FRG would waiver its Pershing IA missiles— 
a move said to serve the principle of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.47 It 
45 AMSZ, Notatka informacyjna o piątym posiedzeniu grupy wzajemnej informacji bieżącej, 
December 19, 1987, D. ZSRR 17/91, w. 1.
46 Ibid. 
47 AMSZ, Notatka informacyjna o implikacjach dla Polski Układu ZSRR-USA ws. likwidacji 
ich rakiet nuklearnych średniego i krótszego zasięgu, December 12, 1987, DIE 2/90, w. 1.
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was also expected that the Treaty would contribute to improving the atmosphere 
in Europe, and that this could result in greater scope for small- and medium-sized 
countries to operate. For Poland it could mean enhanced possibilities of reaching 
a “negotiation stadium” for the Jaruzelski Plan, since this plan discussed areas 
of disarmament whose importance would grow after the INF Treaty. It was also 
noticed that NATO states were starting to discuss replacing the ground-launched 
INF missiles that would be abolished by the Treaty with weapons launched by 
other means, such as bombers or submarines.
The impact on Polish security was not perceived as unambiguously positive. 
Once intermediate-range missiles were liquidated it would be more difficult 
for both sides to attack the remoter targets in Europe. It was therefore assessed 
“that the security of the Soviet Union will grow to a greater extent than the 
security of Poland, as in the case of nuclear missiles stationed in Europe, Soviet 
territory would be difficult to reach.”48 In the case of conventional or nuclear 
war, it might even come about that Polish territory could be the main theater of 
war. It was noted that putting Polish territory in the center of an eventual war 
made Poland’s situation dependent on planned changes in NATO strategy. NATO 
might indeed compensate for its lost intermediate-range missiles by deploying 
air- or sea-launched missiles or by introducing a new self-maneuvering missile, 
and this was treated as an option. However, the high cost of production made 
this rather improbable. A modernization of NATO’s conventional weapons was 
described as more likely especially as NATO members believed that the Warsaw 
Pact countries were superior in these types of weapon. One possible consequence 
of the INF Treaty envisaged was closer military integration of Western Europe 
independently of the U. S., on whose nuclear umbrella the European countries 
had hitherto relied.49 It was also mentioned that NATO’s decisions at Montebello50 
made the development and modernization of conventional arms possible. This 
could mean that a new arms race in the field of modern conventional weapons 
would be forced on the Eastern bloc countries from outside. 
All in all, however, the INF Treaty was described as beneficial to Poland. 
Further disarmament talks were welcomed, especially talks on the reduction 
of conventional arms, which were now seen as the most dangerous for Polish 
security. As for nuclear weapons, Poland should push for the inclusion of all 
types of armaments remaining in Europe (and its close neighborhood) in further 
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group had decided at its meeting on October 27/28, 1983 to aban-
don 1,400 nuclear warheads within the next 5 or 6 years, but also to modernize the alliance’s 
aging weaponry (nuclear and conventional). For the communiqué see https://www.nato.int/
docu/comm/49-95/c831028a.htm. For the meeting in the report of West Germany’s Foreign 
Ministry see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1983, 
ed. by Tim Geiger, Matthias Peter, and Mechthild Lindemann, Munich 2014, Doc. 321, and 
AAPD 1985, ed. by Michael Ploetz, Mechthild Lindemann, and Christoph Johannes Franzen, 
Munich 2016, Doc. 126.
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disarmament talks. In the new situation, the Jaruzelski Plan should concentrate 
on conventional weapons, methods of verifying and the question of preventing 
a sudden attack. It was also recommended that more efforts be made to promote 
a NATO–Warsaw Pact dialogue on military doctrines. Thus, together with West 
Germany, Poland became one of the driving forces for the seminars on military 
doctrines that were held in Vienna in January and February 1990. For the first 
time ever, these seminars gathered together the military leadership of both 
antagonistic military alliances.51 
As one of the consequences of the INF Treaty, it was anticipated that there 
would be an increasing role for both German states in the issues. It was also 
expected that some elements of the Polish initiative would be developed by the 
German states and presented as their own, the Genscher initiative of June 1987 
advocating a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament being 
cited as an example. Intensified dialogue with both German states on disarma-
ment questions was advised. Such a dialogue did already exist, but was limited by 
the fact that the two Germanies belonged to different military alliances. During 
one of the talks, the plenipotentiary of the FRG government for disarmament 
questions, Josef Holik, had informed the Polish side, that after the signing of the 
INF Treaty, Western Europe would be careful to keep the process of reduction 
under control so as not to weaken Europe. He had also informed the Polish side 
that Genscher’s concept concerning disarmament—of both nuclear and conven-
tional weapons—was in some points similar to Jaruzelski’s ideas.52 This could 
be treated as a good starting point for further contacts on European security.
4. Conclusion
Poland was not directly involved in the INF talks. As a country and a military 
power it was integrated into the Soviet bloc, and this meant, among other things, 
that it had little room for maneuver and limited possibilities of influencing 
Moscow’s policy. Non-nuclear countries did not have much influence on nuclear 
armaments issues in the second half of the 1980s. Nuclear weapons were stationed 
in Soviet bases on Polish territory, but anything to do with them was totally 
outside Warsaw’s remit of competence. Their employment, however, could have 
a tremendous and devastating effect on the country and on Polish citizens. The 
government at that time was very much under the influence of the military and 
had to be keenly aware of what might happen to Polish territory in a case of 
nuclear or conventional war. Accordingly, as this essay has demonstrated, the 
INF talks were of particular interest to the Polish authorities. Despite this, there 
51 For the Vienna Seminar on military doctrines see the account of West German participant 
Dieter Wellershoff, First successful step in CSBM negotiations—the military doctrine semi-
nar, in: NATO Review, No. 2 (April 1990), p. 10.
52 AMSZ, depesza do Moskwy, December 17, 1987, DD 38/89, w. 16.
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is little evidence to show the exact way of thinking the government had at the 
time. The press also presented events in a routine way, without revealing different 
points of view.
In the birth of the INF Treaty itself, it would be difficult to speak of a Polish 
impact on the talks, or of any Polish input. Such discussions were kept out of the 
reach of Poland and the other Soviet satellite states. But we can say that the INF 
talks and a general common interest in disarmament resulted in governmental 
work on Polish proposals. These included the Jaruzelski Plan and propositions 
for talks on conventional arms reduction. The INF Treaty enhanced the détente 
process and diminished the direct danger of a war with the potential to destroy 
Poland—even if, proportionally, the scrapping NATO’s INF arsenal reduced the 
danger of such destruction more for the USSR than for Poland. 
The significance of the INF Treaty, however, was not limited to the 1980s. 
Even after the transition that started in 1989 it remained important from the 
Polish perspective. The Poles became increasingly concerned when the INF 
Treaty regime started to break down, with new Russian medium- and short-range 
missiles like the Iskander missiles deployed close to the Polish border, in the 
Kaliningrad region. The relaxation of tensions in East–West relations served 
Polish interests as such. and not just the interests of the Communist government, 
which tried to rebuild contacts with Western countries and gain support for eco-
nomic reforms. In periods of East-West relaxation, the level of domestic freedom 
usually improved too. The lowering level of East–West confrontation could be a 
good sign for Polish society as it looked to establish (or remove) ties to the West. 
The INF Treaty was the first step in real disarmament and can also be regarded 
as a milestone facilitating other talks about the political order in Europe—and 
indeed, the world. Changes in that order, especially the enlargement of NATO in 
1999 and of the European Union in 2004, have brought many benefits to Poland 
and Polish society.
IV. Public Opinion and Protest Movements
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Anti-Nuclearism and the Role of Sub-Regional Arms Control 
Initiatives in the Nordic Countries During the Second Cold War
1. Introduction
There is widespread agreement among Cold War historians that the mobilizing 
effect of the anti-nuclear campaigns in both Europe and the U. S. had an impact 
on the formulation and timing of decisions made by NATO in the context of the 
Euromissile crisis.1 The same can be said about the effect of the transnational 
disarmament community and the non-aligned movement on the Soviet Union’s 
turn towards disarmament activism during the Gorbachev era. This pivotal turn 
led to the signing of the INF and START treaties.2 As in the rest of Europe, 
the heyday of anti-nuclear protest in the Nordic countries was between 1980 
and 1983. A quite rapid revival of the peace movement, spearheaded by veteran 
activists, led to the establishment of non-hierarchical civil society movements 
like the “No to Nuclear Weapons” campaigns in Norway and Denmark in the 
early 1980s.3
One of the most evident examples of the effect of public opinion and the 
transnational peace movements on foreign policy during this era comes from 
Denmark, where the opposition parties, holding a majority in the Danish parlia-
ment, the Folketinget, pushed the center-right minority government to pursue its 
so-called “footnote policy” between 1982 and 1988. During this period Denmark 
added several reservations to NATO’s operations and procedures. This was in line 
1 See Angela Santese, Ronald Reagan, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the Nuclear 
Scare of the 1980s, in: The International History Review 39/3 (2017), pp. 496–520; Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, Did “Peace Through Strength” End the Cold War? Lessons from INF, in: 
International Security 16/1 (1991), pp. 179–185. Maria Eleanora Guasconi, Public Opinion 
and the Euromissile Crisis, in: Leopold Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd 
Rother (eds.), The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War, Washington, D. C. 2015, 
pp. 271–289; Lawrence S. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the Nuclear 
Disarmament Movement, Stanford / CA 2009, pp. 129–136.
2 See Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold 
War, Ithaca 2002, pp. 269–338.
3 See Michael A. Krasner and Nikolaj Petersen, Peace and Politics: The Danish Peace Move-
ment and Its Impact on National Security Policy, in: Journal of Peace Research 23/2 (1986), 
pp. 156–173.
Anti-Nuclearism 
and the Role of Sub-
Regional Arms Control 
Initiatives
Tapio Juntunen216
with the Danish government’s decision to reduce its support for the Double-Track 
Decision in 1979, followed by a partial withdrawal on the 1983 decision to deploy 
Pershing II and Tomahawk Cruise Missiles in Europe. The “footnote policy” 
started to lose its meaning only after the signing of the INF Treaty, when, in 
spring 1988, the government—led by the Conservative Party—decided to reframe 
the “footnote policy” as an issue affecting Denmark’s commitment to full NATO 
membership by calling parliamentary elections.
The change in public opinion fell on especially fertile ground in Nordic coun-
tries with a strong liberal-egalitarian identity, such as Norway and Denmark. It 
was in many ways natural for their governments to emphasize the centrality of the 
arms control component in NATO’s Double-Track Decision. Both Denmark and 
Norway had long decided not to allow the deployment or positioning of nuclear 
weapons on their territories during peacetime. This tradition of nuclear restraint 
had already made the two Nordic members of NATO react somewhat differently 
from other small NATO members like Holland and Belgium when it came to 
the reception of NATO’s Double-Track Decision in 1979. “Nuclear realists,” 
advocating the stabilizing effect of enhanced nuclear deterrence, were clearly in 
the defensive mode when it came to public opinion in Scandinavia.
Regarding the reception of the INF Treaty in Nordic countries, it is also 
important to note that its focus on land-based missile deployments in Central 
Europe left unsolved an emerging security dilemma in the northernmost part of 
the continent. The INF Treaty did not address the prospect of military buildup 
in and around the Northern sea areas, especially in the Kola Peninsula and its 
surroundings, and this omission was a major concern among the Nordic political 
elite and civil society movements even after the signing of the INF Treaty. Indeed, 
the prospect that the maintenance of deterrence through new flexible options and 
technologies would merely shift from Central European soil to the Northern sea 
areas was perceived as potentially worrisome. Thus, the perception shared by 
many in the Nordic countries was that, as important as the INF Treaty was on a 
political level, it was also a necessary but insufficient first step in a path towards 
more comprehensive arms control agreements that would take into account the 
role of sea-based nuclear deterrence in the maintenance of regional and strategic 
stability.
Built on these insights, the present essay will be based on two broad argu-
ments. Firstly, the role of the Nordic countries has often been ignored in studies 
covering the Euromissile crisis and the INF Treaty. Understandably, this branch 
of research has mainly focused on Central Europe and intra-Alliance politics.4 
4 See Nuti et al. (eds.), The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War, Washington, D. C. 
2015; Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg und 
Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler 
Perspektive, Munich 2011. There is also a flux of literature on neutrality and small state foreign 
policy, also with a historical approach, but the studies tend to focus either on comparative 
cases or on the characteristics of neutrality, neutralism and non-alignment as historically 
distinctive foreign policy postures. See Sandra Bott, Jussi M.  Hanhimäki, Janick Marina 
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I argue that, in order to portray a more precise picture of how the Euromissile 
crisis and the INF process unfolded, we need to complement the existing litera-
ture with studies that grasp the geopolitical and societal consequences of nuclear 
weapons politics and arms control processes in the Northern “flank” of Europe. 
Indeed, these dynamics should be studied from the perspective of the Nordic 
societies themselves by taking into account their egalitarian and peace-oriented 
state identities as well as the close ties at societal level within the sub-region, 
which consists of both militarily-allied and neutral states.5
Secondly, in order to understand the socio-political dynamics and the strong 
anti-nuclear sentiment in the Nordic region, the positive arms control agenda 
within the sub-region needs to be taken into account. In particular, it is important 
to recognize how the initiative to establish a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone 
(NNFZ), originally suggested by the Finnish president Urho Kekkonen in 1963 
and repeated in a more elaborate form in 1978,6 matured into a shared practical 
connection between the anti-nuclear movement and certain parts of the Nordic 
political elite during the 1980s. The NNFZ initiative can be seen as an attrac-
tive and connective issue among the Nordic states and societies during an era 
otherwise characterized by intra-Alliance tensions and the negative prospects of 
nuclear buildup.
Based on original research made in four archives in Finland, the latter part 
of this essay examines the impact the NNFZ initiative had on the Nordic debate 
over the Euromissile crisis and INF Treaty. I argue that the diplomatic process 
around the NNFZ initiative formed a counter-doxastic practice; it made visible 
the indirect negative consequences of the doxastic arms control practices that 
characterized the maintenance of the superpower-led bipolar order, especially its 
focus on Central Europe during the Euromissile crisis and the INF negotiations.
Schaufelbuehl, and Marco Wyss (eds.), Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: 
Between or Within the Blocs?, New York 2015; Heinz Gärtner (ed.), Engaged Neutrality. 
An Evolved Approach to the Cold War, Lanham 2017; Andrew Cottey (ed.), The European 
Neutrals and NATO: Non-Alignment, Partnership, Membership?, London 2018; Johanna 
Rainio-Niemi, The Ideological Cold War. The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland, 
New York 2014.
5 The Nordic sub-region has been described as a model security community by several scholars. 
See Håkan Wiberg, The Nordic Security Community: Past, Present, Future, in: Danish 
Foreign Policy Yearbook (2000), pp. 133–135; Ole Waever, Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity 
in the West European Non-War Community, in: Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), 
Security Communities, Cambridge 1998, p. 72.
6 Urho Kekkonen, Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikka. Tasavallan presidentti Urho Kekkosen tur-
vallisuuspoliittisia puheita vuosilta 1943–1979, Helsinki 1982, pp. 89–92 and pp. 95–102. See 
also Osmo Apunen, Three ’Waves’ of the Kekkonen Plan and Nordic Security in the 1980s, 
in: Bulletin of Peace Proposals 11/1 (1980), pp. 16–32.
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2. The “Nordic Syndrome” and the “Flanks Problem”
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Nordic NATO members—Denmark, 
Norway and Iceland—from the outset of their joining the Alliance in the pre-
carious post-war security environment of the late 1940s, is their ambiguity in 
attitude stemming from a firm alignment with western democratic values but, 
on the other hand, their rather reserved attitude towards great power politics. 
This was evident in concerns they held that the Western Alliance and its small 
liberal member-states would become mere objects of the heavily militarized 
bipolar Cold War security logic. Alyson Bailes has aptly described this as the 
“Nordic syndrome”—the fundamental sentiment stemming from a combination 
of egalitarian liberal values and a tendency to perceive international politics 
through a rather cynical prism of small state realism.7
Bailes picks out two key examples that illustrate how the “Nordic syndrome” 
worked in practice during the Cold War. The first one, Denmark’s “footnote 
policy” in the 1980s, is probably the best known of these examples. The second, 
“Norwegian dallying with the nuclear-free zone idea” was something that char-
acterized basically all Nordic countries during the 1980s, especially Finland, as 
I will elaborate in detail later on in this essay. Of these two examples Denmark’s 
policy of nuclear restraint (which Norway partially shared) has received consider-
ably more attention in the canon of Cold War historiography than the Nordic 
nuclear-weapon-free zone initiative.
The Nordic syndrome was also based on geostrategic considerations. Key 
arms control agreements of the early 1970s reinforced a sense of strategic balance 
between the two superpowers. But a lack of attention to managing regional level 
security in Europe, together with the rise of ideological fundamentalism in 
superpower relations and intra-Alliance anxiety over the level of U. S. commit-
ment to Europe, started off a vicious circle of misperceptions that eventually led 
to the emergence of what is now known as the Euromissile crisis.8 The spiral of 
mistrust made both sides assume the worst about the intentions of the other. The 
security dilemma was reinforced by the ambigous symbolism of new weapons 
technologies, such as the Soviet intermediate SS-20 missiles, U. S. plans to deploy 
neutron bombs in Europe, and second-generation Cruise Missiles, together with 
certain developments in nuclear strategic thinking (such as the “countervailing” 
7 Alyson Bailes, The Nordic Countries from War to Cold War—and Today, in: Scandinavian 
Journal of History 37/2 (2012), p. 158.
8 See Nuti et al. (eds.), The Euromissile Crisis; James G.  Blight and Janet M.  Lang, When 
Empathy Failed: Using Critical Oral History to Reassess the Collapse of U. S.–Soviet Détente 
in the Carter-Brezhnev Years, in: Journal of Cold War Studies 12/2 (2010), pp. 29–74; Ken 
Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World 
Politics, Houndmills 2008, pp. 120 f.
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strategy that seemingly put an emphasis on one side’s ability to dominate escala-
tion at theater level).9
The prospect of the “Europeanization” of the threat of nuclear war had deep 
ramifications in Western European societies, the Nordic countries being no 
exception.10 From the Nordic perspective, then, the geopolitical predicament 
posed by the Euromissile crisis (and partly too by the solution brought by the 
INF Treaty) looked very different from how it did from the perspective of Central 
Europe. The maintenance of a bipolar security order through arms control 
agreements that focused on land-based weapon systems was always in danger 
of omitting the potential repercussions of the growing importance sea-based 
nuclear deterrence was taking on in the European “flanks.” As Olav Riste points 
out, during the latter part of the Cold War, the strategic analyses within NATO 
“remained fixed on a scenario in which the massive strength of Warsaw Pact 
armies would break [through] the Fulda Gap and invest [sic!] most of the European 
continent. Any action on the flanks would be ancillary to the main battlefield.”11
3. Denmark and the Period of “Footnote Policy”
During the Euromissile crisis Denmark’s foreign policy was characterized by 
a reserved attitude towards NATO’s nuclear planning. Between 1982 and 1988 
Denmark added several critical footnotes to NATO’s official communiqués. The 
immediate cause of this “footnote policy” can be traced back to domestic political 
contingencies. The so-called “four-leaf clover” minority cabinet, formed in 1982 
and led by the Conservative People’s Party,12 prioritized domestic political and 
economic reforms. This helped the Social Democrats call the tune in Denmark’s 
foreign policy. As the biggest party in the opposition with a qualified majority 
in the Folketinget, the Social Democrats were able to mobilize an alternative 
majority against the cabinet. At this point, the Social Democrats had already 
revised their foreign policy line, especially their stand on NATO’s nuclear politics, 
including the Double-Track Decision of 1979, and had moved towards a more 
9 See Jonathan Haslam, Moscow’s Misjudgment in Deploying SS-20 Missiles, in: Nuti et al. 
(eds.), The Euromissile Crisis, pp. 33–37; Risse-Kappen, Lessons from INF, pp.  176–178; 
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp. 118–123.
10 David Holloway, The Dynamics of the Euromissile Crisis, 1977–1983, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), 
The Euromissile Crisis, pp. 19–22.
11 Olav Riste, NATO’s Northern Frontline in the 1980s, in: Olav Njostald (ed.), The Last Decade 
of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation, Abingdon 2004, 
p. 301.
12 In addition to the Conservatives, the government also consisted of the Liberal Party 
(Venstre), Christian People’s Party and the Center Democrats (a splinter group from the 
Social Democratic Party). Formation of minority governments was already at this point 
an established political practice in Denmark. See Rasmus Brun Pedersen, ‘Footnote Policy’ 
and the Social Democratic Party’s Role in Shaping Danish EEC Positions, 1982–1986, in: 
Scandinavian Journal of History 38/5 (2013), p. 638.
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critical orientation.13 This endangered the so-called Atlantic Consensus since 
politicians, especially the Social Democrats, were allowed to call reservations 
on Denmark’s participation within NATO, so long as they did not put Alliance 
solidarity into question altogether.14
However, Denmark’s policy of nuclear restraint had deeper roots in its 
pragmatic and peace-oriented small state habitus. As aptly explained by Cindy 
Vestergaard: 
Denmark’s approach to nuclear weapons has historically tried to reconcile its status as 
a country publicly opposed to nuclear weapons […] on the one hand with its status as 
a member of a military nuclear alliance on the other […] With a strong national desire 
for declared non-nuclear status juxtaposed with the same desire for maintaining NATO 
unity, the history of the Danish Kingdom is characterized by protest, politics and external 
pressures.15
Vestergaard’s characterization indicates a tradition of diplomatic balancing 
between domestic sentiments and the demands deriving from belonging to an 
intergovernmental military alliance with a joint nuclear planning policy. The 
Danish policy of “willfull blindness”—a double nuclear policy—emerged gradu-
ally from the late 1950s onwards in relation to questions on whether to allow calls 
at ports by naval ships from nuclear weapon states and on the role of Greenland 
as a geographical and logistical area for NATO and the U. S.16 
The Danish government, as well as its opposition, followed general Scandi-
navian sentiment in supporting disarmament, arms control and global détente. 
As one contemporary observer described the reception of the INF Treaty in 
Denmark: “The symbolic message carried by the treaty and the Washington 
declarations is appreciated all across the political spectrum [in Denmark].”17 The 
underlying tension between the recognized value of the extended nuclear deter-
rence offered by the U. S. and, opposing it, a strong pro-nuclear disarmament 
sentiment in civil society was also visible in Denmark’s responses to sub-regional 
nuclear arms control initiatives such as the NNFZ.
13 Nikolaj Petersen, ‘Footnoting’ as a political instrument: Denmark’s NATO policy in the 
1980s, in: Cold War History 12/2 (2012), pp. 297–299.
14 See Fredrik Doeser, Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: The Fall of 
the Danish ’Footnote Policy’, in: Cooperation and Conflict 46/2 (2011), pp. 222–241. During 
the “footnote” period the opposition parties (with majority seats in the Folketing) forced 
the Danish minority government to a total of 23 footnotes to NATO’s communiqués on the 
Euromissile deployments, tactical nuclear weapons and Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI).
15 Cindy Vestergaard, Going non-nuclear in the nuclear alliance: the Danish experience in 
NATO, in: European Security 23/1 (2014), p. 106.
16 Ibid. Double nuclear policy had its foundations in the 1953 decision to ban the permanent 
stationing of Allied forces in Denmark’s territory and on the 1957 ban on nuclear weapon 
deployments. 
17 Ove Nathan, Danes look to détente for greater security, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
44/2 (1988), p. 32. 
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The effect of the Danish footnotes, opt-outs and annotations on NATO’s policy 
was mostly performative. According to Anders Wivel they merely “expressed 
the Danish dissatisfaction with superpower relations in general and the nuclear 
policy of NATO in particular and were marketed as an explicit response to 
hardened U. S. rhetoric towards the Soviet Union and the intensification of 
the Cold War.”18 In this sense, the period of Danish footnote diplomacy is a 
good example of how domestic politics can affect the direction and timing of 
small state foreign policy change. It was not until spring 1988 that the “footnote 
period” came to an end. This happened when the Conservative-led government 
fully confronted the opposition’s foreign policy line by calling general elections. 
The immediate cause was a Social Democrat demand for more explicit nuclear 
restrictions in the Danish port call permission policy, a policy that was based on 
the “neither confirm nor deny” principle. Leading Social Democratic politicians 
saw the port call resolution as a prerequisite for the establishment of NNFZ, which 
was at this point being negotiated at preliminary level by an inter-governmental 
working group consisting of government officials from the five Nordic countries 
(see more below).19 
After colorful events in the chambers of the Folketing,20 the parliamentary 
deputies once again voted in favor of the resolution sponsored by the Social 
Democrats. This time, though, instead of settling for footnotes, Prime Minister 
Poul Schlüter framed the issue as a threat to Denmark’s ability to continue as a 
full member in NATO. New general elections were arranged for May 1988, only 
a few months after the previous elections of 1987. Although Schlüter’s coalition 
was not able to reach a majority position in the Folketing, a change of sides by 
the Danish Social Liberal Party (who had modified their stance towards NATO’s 
nuclear policy as a reaction to changes in public opinion over the issue) along with 
continuing support from the Center Democrats and Christian People’s Party, this 
time from an opposition position, guaranteed them a de facto majority. This, 
subsequently, effectively ended the footnote period.21
4. Norway and the Model of Sub-Regional Balancing
Although Norway witnessed minority cabinets during this era, too, the domestic 
political setting and parliamentary set-up was not as propitious to splinter party 
“foot-dragging” as was the case in Denmark.22 Like Denmark’s, Norway’s state 
identity and foreign policy culture was based on “a strong liberal / meliorist belief 
18 Anders Wivel, Still Living in the Shadow of 1864? Danish Foreign Policy Doctrines and 
the Origins of Denmark’s Pragmatic Activism, in: Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook (2014), 
p. 127; see also Pedaliu, “Footnotes”.
19 See Doeser, Fall of Danish ’Footnote Policy’, pp. 229 f. 
20 See Petersen, ‘Footnoting’ as a political instrument, pp. 307–310.
21 See Doeser, Fall of Danish ’Footnote Policy’, p. 234.
22 See David Arter, Scandinavian Politics Today, second edition, Manchester 2008, p. 317.
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that the world can become a better place” and a sense of active agency in achiev-
ing this.23 Norway’s “peace exceptionalism” and tendency towards strategic 
isolationism from great power conflicts after the experiences of World War II 
left their mark on its NATO policy. According to Riste, “the two main features 
that set Norway apart from the mainstream of alliance policy were self-imposed 
restraints on allied military presence and activities on Norwegian soil, and its 
anti-nuclear stance in its various permutations.”24 
For the European North, despite its peace-oriented foreign policy posture, 
the final phase of the Cold War amounted to a major geostrategic challenge. The 
combination of NATO’s focus on Central Europe and major efforts by the Soviet 
Union to reinforce its submarine-based strategic nuclear deterrence (beginning 
in the early 1970s) made Norway’s long coastal areas more and more vulnera-
ble.25 The increasing operational activity of Soviet submarines in the Baltic Sea 
was met with speculation that the USSR might be preparing to isolate Norway and 
the Nordic region in a pincer movement from its bases in the Kola peninusla and 
in the Baltic, should a regional crisis erupt. These concerns became even more 
alarmist after several incursions of Soviet nuclear submarines into the territorial 
waters of both Norway and Sweden in the early 1980s.26
Although the Norwegian Labor Government accepted NATO’s Double-Track 
Decision in 1979, the strong anti-nuclear sentiment displayed by the Norwegian 
public, shared by several left-wing members of the Labor Party, along with the 
positive sub-regional arms control agenda provided by the new impetus given to 
the NNFZ proposal, pushed the Norwegian government towards emphasizing the 
arms control track of NATO’s Double-Track Decision. Eventually, as Riste points 
out, “the wear and tear caused by the ‘dual-track decision’ and the parallel debate 
on a Nordic nuclear-free zone contributed to Labour’s fall from power in the 
autumn of 1981.”27 The Labor-led government was succeeded by Kåre Willoch’s 
Conservative government, which, in the eyes of the newly elected U. S. President 
Ronald Reagan, restored Norway’s position as a reliable Ally.
To counter the strategic challenge posed by the USSR, Norway decided to 
increase its defense cooperation with the U. S. From as early as 1976 it had begun 
negotiations with the U. S. (and, to a lesser extent, with Britain and Canada) on 
23 Halvard Leira, ‘Our Entire People are Natural Born Friends of Peace’: The Norwegian Foreign 
Policy of Peace, in: Swiss Political Science Review 19/3 (2013), p. 338.
24 See Riste, NATO’s Northern Frontline, p. 306.
25 See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd edition, Houndmills 2003, 
pp. 239–330.
26 Of these the most famous is perhaps the 1981 “whisky on the rocks” incident when a nuclear-
capable Soviet Whisky-class submarine shipwrecked near a major Swedish naval base in 
Karlskrona, causing a serious diplomatic crisis between the two countries and almost leading 
to a confrontation between Swedish coastal forces and approaching Soviet surface ships. See 
Milton Leitenberg, The Stranded USSR Submarine in Sweden and the Question of a Nordic 
Nuclear-Free Zone, in: Cooperation and Conflict 17/1 (1982), pp. 17–28.
27 See Riste, NATO’s Northern Frontline, p. 305.
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pre-positioning heavy equipment and supplies for ground forces in Norwegian 
bases. These were intended to be a preventive means of enhancing NATO’s 
deterrence in the region and of avoiding the unnecessary escalation that such 
maneuvers could cause during potential conflict. Measures were introduced 
to increase interoperability and logistical support so that the U. S. Air Force 
could operate more easily from Norwegian bases. Negotiations on a Prestockage 
and Reinforcement Agreement on pre-positioning a U. S. Marine Amphibious 
Brigade’s equipment in northern Norway were finalized in 1981.28 The United 
States also introduced a new, more aggressive forward-based maritime strategy 
in 1982 amid the heated vertex of the Euromissile crisis.29
From the perspective of the Nordic countries the latter development—rein-
forcing deterrence in the European Northern flank without balancing arms 
control processes—was a double-edged sword. Indeed, the focus on strategic 
parity and on the Central European theater threatened to leave the Northern 
flank of Europe exposed to increasing military buildup and tensions. According 
to Nate Jones, the U. S. shift towards a more aggressive forward-based maritime 
strategy in the early 1980s was received with extreme suspicion by the already 
paranoid and aging Soviet leadership, thus providing one more factor in the series 
of misperceptions that gradually led the Euromissile crisis towards full war scare, 
supposedly culminating during NATO’s Able Archer excercise in the fall 1983.30
During the period of Willoch’s Conservative government between 1981 and 
1986, Norway restrained itself from criticizing NATO’s approach both to the 
Euromissile crisis and to Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). It was only 
after the Labor party returned to power in 1986 that Norway briefly joined the 
chorus of “footnote countries” like Denmark, refusing to sign NATO’s com-
muniqué that supported U. S. policy on defense and space weapons. At this 
point, Norway also tightened its policy on port visits and decided to export 
submarine-related equipment to the Soviet Union, causing notable resentment 
from the hardliners in the U. S. government. As with the Danish case, this created 
a short period of discord in the bilateral relationship during the crucial period of 
negotiations between Reagan and Gorbachev over an INF treaty.31
Of course, there was also an external dimension at work in Norway’s dual 
approach of commitment and restraint. The decision made in 1960, and con-
firmed in 1961, of not accepting nuclear arms into Norwegian territory during 
28 See Simon Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe, Oxford 1989, 
p. 224.
29 The key component in the 1982 strategy, should deterrence fail, was to have the ability to 
seize the initiative, that is, to establish “sea control in key maritime areas as far forward and 
as rapidly as possible [and] wage an aggressive campaign against all Soviet submarines, 
including ballistic missile submarines.”, see Linton F.  Brooks, Naval Power and National 
Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy, in: International Security 11 (1986), p. 65.
30 See Nate Jones, Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise that Almost 
Triggered Nuclear War, New York 2016, pp. 26 f.
31 Riste, NATO’s Northern Frontline, p. 305.
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peacetime was an integral part of the so-called Nordic balance model, developed 
by Norwegian foreign policy experts at the time.32 The basic idea behind the 
model was that Norway (and Denmark to a lesser extent) could use their policy of 
peacetime nuclear restraint and the absence of foreign military bases as a preven-
tive leverage or deterrent against the Soviet Union should the latter not restrain 
itself vis-à-vis Finland and not respect its status of limited but active peacetime 
neutrality (though there remained the option of abandoning this line of policy 
should a regional crisis occur).33 The declared and internationally recognized 
neutrality of Sweden and its strong defense posture acted as a metaphorical 
pointer balancing the two pans of the scale.
Finland did not endorse this kind of mechanical reading of the Nordic bal-
ance model, since it might give room for an interpretation that the Norwegian 
and Danish NATO policy could determine its standing in relation to the Soviet 
Union.34 But this did not hinder the acceptability of the broader idea that 
“strategic balance” in the Nordics was based on a certain level of commitment 
to military disengagement on behalf of both of the superpowers. Thus, instead 
of speaking about balance in a strictly mechanical sense, Finnish foreign policy 
leadership advocated a looser conception of maintaining sub-regional stability. 
This was based on the recognition that the security doctrines of the Nordic 
countries were interdependent: political decisions in regard to security made by 
one Nordic country would necessarily affect the strategic position of the whole 
region.35
Another aspect of the external dimension was the shared social identity among 
the Nordic countries, based on their tendency to advocate liberal egalitarian and 
meliorist values, which has already been mentioned.36 This was also evident 
in the extensive support for a pro-disarmament agenda among those in civil 
society, expert groups, and parts of the political elite. The role of social demo-
cratic parties was also strong during the Cold War era.37 Thus, although the 
dominant narrative of the research literature tends to emphasize the isolationist 
element—the tendency of countries such as Denmark and Norway to disengage 
themselves from the militarized logic of great power politics—we should also take 
into account the centripetal effect caused by the shared Nordic identity and the 
shared geopolitical understanding of being located in a sometimes neglected yet 
strategically important sub-region.
32 See Arne Olav Brundtland, The Nordic Balance: Past and Present, in: Cooperation and 
Conflict 2 (1965), pp. 30–63; Erik Noreen, The Nordic Balance: A Security Policy Concept 
in Theory and Practice, in: Cooperation and Conflict 18/1 (1983), pp. 43–56.
33 Finland’s limited peacetime neutrality was based on its position within the Soviet Union’s 
sphere of interest through the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed between the 
Soviet Union and Finland in 1948. 
34 See Osmo Apunen, Linjamiehet. Paasikivi-seuran historia, Helsinki 2005, pp. 132–135.
35 See Apunen, Linjamiehet, p. 325.
36 See Leira, Norwegian Foreign Policy of Peace; Wivel, Danish Foreign Policy Doctrines.
37 See Arter, Scandinavian Politics Today.
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5. Explaining the Nordic Paradox—the Paradigmatic Case  
of Denmark
Of the two Nordic NATO members’ approaches, it is probably Denmark’s foot-
note diplomacy that provides the paradigmatic example of how foreign policy 
decisions are affected by a complex set of internal and external factors, such as 
traditions of domestic politics, public opinion, intra-party debates, transnational 
diffusion of disarmament norms and ideas, and sub-regional geostrategic con-
cerns.38 In short, there are several reasons to believe that the domestic political 
situation (dominated by the effect of the economic crisis and parliamentary 
composition after general elections) cannot by itself explain Danish foreign 
policy activism during the 1980s.
Firstly, the role of public opinion needs to be taken into account. This is evident 
in the way Schlüter’s cabinet framed the 1987 port visit resolution into a general 
debate over Denmark’s NATO membership, steering the discussion into wider 
issues than nuclear weapons and arms control alone. It is important to note that 
support for NATO as such did not deteriorate in Denmark after the Double-Track 
Decision and the start of American missile deployments in neighboring Western 
European countries in 1983. Indeed, support of NATO membership was at its 
highest (69 per cent) in 1983, perhaps the most tense year of the period. It peaked 
again at 66 per cent in 1988 when the government decided to call elections on 
Denmark’s foreign policy line.39 Thus, public opinion was against the assertive 
nuclear weapons policy of NATO, not against the military alliance itself. The 
resurgence of the anti-nuclear movement during the period also corroborates 
this conclusion.40
Secondly, continuity in the Danish strategic culture needs to be taken into 
account when explaining the country’s foreign policy activism during the Euro-
missile crisis. The Danish liberal-egalitarian state identity and the buildup of 
the Nordic welfare state model during the Cold War amalgamated with a more 
pragmatist and realistic reading of world politics dominated by the great powers, 
a worldview that stemmed from historical experiences.41 This liberal-egalitarian 
state identity can be seen as a driving factor behind the strong anti-nuclear 
sentiment within the Danish foreign policy establishment and in society in 
general. Wivel points, as well, towards the traditional small state mentality of 
power balancing and cooperative behavior to explain Denmark’s dual approach 
to peace policy. It did not want to rely too heavily on protection provided by a 
38 See Brun Pedersen, ’Footnote policy’, pp. 639 f. 
39 See Doeser, Fall of Danish ’Footnote’ Policy, p. 233.
40 See Krasner and Petersen, The Danish Peace Movement, pp. 114, 119.
41 Anders Wivel, Forerunner, follower, exceptionalist or bridge builder? Mapping Nordicness 
in Danish foreign policy, in: Global Affairs 4/4–5 (2018), pp. 419–434.
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single great power, so its positioning included forthright cooperation with other 
Nordic countries (both Allied and neutral ones), and a stance “locating Denmark 
firmly within the U. S.-based Cold War foreign policy posture.”42
In a similar vein, Pedaliu traces the origins of the “footnote period” and 
Denmark’s intra-Alliance dissent to a “longer gestation period” of suspicion 
(from the 1950s onwards) over the willingness of the U. S. to protect the national 
interests of its smaller European allies. The abandonment of the doctrine of mas-
sive retaliation in the 1960s by the Kennedy administration and Washington’s 
grand strategy shift towards Asia and preoccupation with the Vietnam War were 
key formative experiences indicating the potential volatility of U. S. transatlantic 
policy.43 
Indeed, Denmark exercised a “double nuclear policy” from the late 1950s 
onwards. In 1957 Copenhagen declared an official policy of peacetime nuclear 
restraint, according to which Denmark would not allow the stationing or deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons on its soil or the flying of nuclear-armed aircraft in its 
airspace; and this included the vast area of Greenland. Nevertheless, behind the 
official policy of nuclear restraint, successive Danish governments turned a blind 
eye to U. S. nuclear weapons stationed in Greenland between 1958 and 1965 and 
to the continual overflights of nuclear-armed aircraft as part of the U. S. airborne 
alert system, right up to the time of the 1968 “broken arrow” incident in Thule 
Air Base, Greenland.44
Moreover, the era of superpower summits and the U. S. decision to proceed 
with plans for détente directly with the Soviet leadership increased suspicions as 
to whether the U. S. would take the interests of its smaller Allies in Europe into 
account. Following the Soviet Union’s military buildup in the Kola Peninsula 
from the 1960s onwards, these concerns were felt as even more daunting. 
Finally, when explaining the strong anti-nuclear sentiment during the 1980s, 
we need to take into account both the role ties at societal level had among the 
Nordic countries and the effect of transnational movements. Amidst the increas-
ing superpower tensions in 1983, peace protests and anti-nuclear demonstrations 
drew several hundreds of thousands of people into the streets of major Nordic 
cities. In Finland alone over 215,000 people—approximately 5 per cent of the 
42 Wivel, Danish Foreign Policy Doctrines, p. 125.
43 See Pedaliu, “Footnotes”, pp. 242–245.
44 See Vestergaard, The Danish experience in NATO, pp. 106–117. The Danish and U. S. 
governments lied about why an American B-52 bomber had crashed in Thule Air Base, 
Greenland, in 1968 to avoid the fact—revealed after the end of the Cold War—that U. S. 
bombers with nuclear weapons on board flew continuously over Thule as part of the airborne 
alert system. In 1995 the Danish government revealed that the U. S. had also stored nuclear 
weapons in Greenland between 1958 and 1965. The U. S. government informed the Danish 
government amidst a heated domestic debate in Denmark over the issue, immediately after 
Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen had reassured the Danish public that there 
had never been any nuclear weapons on Danish soil.
Anti-Nuclearism and the Role of Sub-Regional Arms Control Initiatives 227
total population—participated in the anti-nuclear protests of November 1983, the 
biggest demonstrations held in the Nordics for several decades.45
Although NATO’s Euromissiles were eventually deployed, it can fairly be said 
that the massive peace protests and demonstrations made some mark. Arguably, 
they had an effect on the foreign policy agenda in the Nordic countries, as seems 
evident in the dialogue and intergovernmental cooperation on NNFZ, especially 
from the early 1980s onwards. 
I will now go on to examine the life cycle of the NNFZ initiative and the way 
the diplomatic activities around it permeated into a practical connection between 
the Nordic countries amid the Euromissile crisis and became a semi-permanent 
arrangement. The idea even outlived the signing of the INF Treaty.
6. Origins of Finnish Sub-Regional Arms Control Activism During  
the Cold War
By the end of the 1970s, the initiative to establish a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free 
zone (NNFZ) had matured into a discernible element in the Finnish foreign 
policy toolbox.46 The process of maturing lasted some 15 years after President 
Urho Kekkonen first publicly presented his idea of establishing a sub-regional 
nuclear arms control arrangement in the Nordic region in May 1963. Kekkonen’s 
original proposal was based on previous nuclear arms control initiatives put 
forward by the Soviet Union, by the Polish and Swedish Foreign Ministers Adam 
Rapacki and Östen Undén, by the British Labour politician Hugh Gaitskell, and 
by Yugoslavia’s Premier, Josip Broz Tito.47 Moreover, the idea of nuclear-weapon-
45 It is important to recall at this point that there were also cases of friction within the 
Nordic peace movement, as was the case in Western Europe as a whole. Nonpartisan peace 
organizations, such as the Committee of 100, protested against both the Soviet and the 
Western nuclear weapons buildup. “Anti-imperialist” organizations, on the other hand, who 
swore allegiance to the Soviet Union, directed their protests against NATO’s Double-Track 
Decision. That said, underneath the rather politicized surface, these massive peace protests 
were motivated more by a transnational anti-nuclear and pro-peace sentiment promoted by 
the European Nuclear Disarmament movement (END) rather than specific “Great Power” 
political antagonisms. See Elli Kytömäki, Viisikymmentä vuotta toimintaa ydinaseriisunnan 
puolesta, in: Elli Kytömäki (ed.), Ei ydinaseille: suomalaisen aktivismin historia, Helsinki 
2014, pp. 40–42. See also Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, pp. 119 f.
46 This section is based on my previous archival research collected from the Archives of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Finland (UMA), Archives of the Cabinet of the President of 
Finland (PKA), from President Kekkonen’s archives (UKA) and President Mauno Koivisto’s 
archives (MKA) held in the National Archives. See Tapio Juntunen, Kaavoihin kangistumista 
vai käytännöllistä viisautta? Suomen alueellinen ydinasevalvontapolitiikka kylmän sodan 
aikana, in: Kosmopolis 46/1 (2016), pp. 27–44. See also Apunen, Three ’Waves’ of the Kek-
konen Plan; Clive Archer, Plans for Nordic Nuclear-weapon Free Zone, in: Kosmopolis 34 
(2004), pp. 201–207.
47 See Ingemar Lindahl, The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Pro-
posal, London 1988, pp. 47–57. Max Jakobson, Kekkonen’s political advisor at the time, has 
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free zones was given new impetus in the early 1960s, when discussion on nuclear 
disarmament intensified after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 (among other 
incidents). 
Kekkonen’s original proposal was that each Nordic country should reaffirm 
its de facto non-nuclear status by making a series of unilateral, reciprocal, and 
binding commitments. As founding members, Norway and Denmark had been in 
NATO since 1949. Kekkonen reasoned that, since they had committed themselves 
to non-nuclear status during peacetime, the simple process of recognizing the 
present nuclear-free status of the region would not compromise the security 
commitments and foreign policy doctrines of the concerned countries.48 How-
ever, the original NNFZ proposal was effectively a non-starter, since the actual 
substance of the initiative was of secondary importance compared to the implicit 
agenda. Kekkonen used the initiative both to appease Soviet concerns about 
Finland’s foreign policy and to signal concern about the possible unintended 
geopolitical consequences in the Nordic region of U. S. plans to establish a 
Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) in Europe. 
For some researchers, the main rationale behind the 1963 NNFZ initiative was 
to emphasize the Nordic region, in terms of security politics, as an undivided 
and somewhat interdependent whole.49 For others, the original NNFZ initiative 
also aimed to redirect international discussion over Northern Europe towards 
the idea of reinforcing the balance between the Eastern and Western blocs—one 
of the fundamental tenets of the Finnish foreign policy posture during the Cold 
War.50 In other words, Finland’s initiative aimed for system maintenance by 
recognizing the leading role of the nuclear weapon states. (The initiative did not 
lay any demands on them.)
The lukewarm reception of the 1963 NNFZ initiative in other Nordic countries 
and in the West in general hardly came as a surprise to Helsinki’s Foreign 
Policy establishment. Finland’s plan was perceived to favor the Soviet Union, 
who would use the NNFZ as a tool to achieve the neutralization of the Nordic 
region. Denmark and especially Norway had no intention of abandoning their 
option of receiving all the military aid that was possible should there be a time 
of crisis—especially if there were no significant concessions on the Soviet side.51 
During the remainder of the 1960s Finland shifted its focus on the emerging front 
of multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy, as is evident in its role as one of 
said that Kekkonen’s 1963 NNFZ initative was prepared rather hastily in just two weeks by 
him and some of his closest advisors after the Finnish Premier had discussed the topic with 
Tito during a state visit to Yugoslavia. See Max Jakobson, Veteen piirretty viiva. Havaintoja 
ja merkintöjä vuosilta 1953–1965, Helsinki 1980, pp. 317–319.
48 See Apunen, Three ’Waves’ of the Kekkonen Plan, pp. 17 f.
49 See Kari Möttölä, The Finnish Policy of Neutrality and Defence: Finnish Security Policy Since 
the Early 1970s, in: Cooperation and Conflict 17/4 (1982), pp. 287–313.
50 See Apunen, Linjamiehet, pp. 129–131.
51 See Osmo Apunen, Silmän Politiikkaa. Ulkopoliittinen instituutti 1961–2006, Helsinki 2012, 
pp. 110–112.
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the facilitators in the negotiations that led to the signing of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in the United Nations in 1968. (Together with Ireland, Finland was the 
co-sponsor and the first nation to sign the Treaty.)52 
7. The Agenda-Setting Function of the NNFZ Initiative
The NNFZ initative was restored to the Finnish foreign policy agenda in the con-
text of the discussions on Mutual and Balanced (conventional) Force Reductions 
(MBFR) in Europe under the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) and the UN disarmament regime during the first half of the 1970s.53 But 
it was during the Euromissile crisis and amid deteriorating superpower relations 
in the late 1970s that the NNFZ agenda started to resonate among the political 
elites of other Nordic countries too. A key change in this regard came in 1975 when 
Sweden added the idea of a “safety belt” to the NNFZ agenda. It suggested that any 
sub-regional arms control arrangement in the European Northern flank should 
also include restrictions and reductions to the Soviet Union’s intermediate-range 
missile deployments in its immediate vicinity.54
At the same time, a new generation of diplomats in the Finnish Foreign 
Ministry continued to modify and redevelop the NNFZ initiative in case a 
situation came up in which Finland could make another formal proposal to start 
negotiations over the arrangement.55 The time to carry through these plans 
came when the Finnish foreign and defense policy elite realized that the routes 
of the new American second-generation cruise missiles might fly over Finland’s 
airspace.56 It was feared that this could give the Soviet Union the impetus to 
demand consultations over defense cooperation from Finland. They could do this 
by appealing to the obligations stated in the Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948, to unite 
in countering any threat posed by Germany or its allies.57
52 See Max Jakobson, 38. kerros. Havaintoja ja muistiinpanoja vuosilta 1965–71, Helsinki 1983, 
pp. 129–147.
53 See Apunen, Silmän politiikkaa, p. 114.
54 See Anders Thunborg, Nuclear Weapons and the Nordic Countries Today—A Swedish 
Commentary, in: Ulkopolitiikka 1 (1975), pp. 34–38.
55 UMA, NNFZ and procedures relating to it, March 4, 1976 [date added by handwriting], 
PYV-PAJ 1975–81 kc 15.
56 UKA, Personal letter / discussion memorandum to President Kekkonen by Jaakko Kalela, Dis-
cussions with professor Bykov, February 17, 1981, TOK, PM / JK, UKA, IV: 10; UMA, Klaus 
Törnudd, Seppo Pietinen, Juhani Suomi, Arto Mansala, Jaakko Laajava, and Pauli Järvenpää 
[signed by Undersecretary Klaus Törnudd], Report on key near-term developments affecting 
Finland’s security policy, Finnish-Soviet relations and Finland’s neutrality policy, pp. 11–15, 
December 8, 1983, Highly classified documents, 82–87kc 16.
57 These fears actualized in 1978 when Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov privately 
proposed joint military exercises between Finland and the Soviet Union whilst visiting 
Finland. Although the suggestion was averted in private talks between President Kekkonen 
and Ustinov, officials in the Finnish Foreign Ministry connected it directly with the strategic 
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The independent status of Finnish defense forces was regarded as the sacred 
core of Finland’s otherwise rather compromised status as a country of limited 
peacetime neutrality. The aging president Kekkonen reasoned that the NNFZ 
non-starter could be used once more as an agenda-setting instrument—that is, 
to pave the way for negotiations through which Finland could yet again share 
its concern over the possible unintended sub-regional consequences of nuclear 
weapons politics.
Kekkonen presented his revised NNFZ initative in a speech held at the Swedish 
Institute of International Affairs in May 1978, this time in the form of a compre-
hensive arms control regime coupled with negative security assurances from the 
nuclear weapon states, verification procedures, and other confidence-building 
measures. The proposal was followed by a round of bilateral talks between 
Finland and other Nordic countries as well as talks with the two superpowers 
separately. As was perhaps to be expected, Finland’s shuttle diplomacy did not 
open new ground for the realization of the NNFZ. Norway, Denmark, and the 
U. S. remained critical, while the Soviet Union was, also predictably, pleased 
with Finland’s efforts to promote sub-regional military disengagement in a 
way that pointed to Western weapons systems as the source of the international 
problem.58 
This time Sweden wanted to add the Baltic Sea to the discussions, most 
likely because of the increasing tensions created by Soviet submarine activities 
in the area. The most critical stance in the round of bilateral negotiations was 
presented by the U. S. Ambassador to Finland, Rozanne Ridgway, who stated that 
the Finnish proposal did not accord with the strategic thinking of the United 
States. Indeed, Ridgway went on to say that it would cause serious problems 
for the cohesion of NATO and thus impair U. S. security interests in Northern 
Europe, although U. S. diplomats were also from time to time signaling that they 
understood the political predicament that pushed Finland towards these kinds of 
activities. A summary made by the Finnish Foreign Ministry on the discussions 
with Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the U. S., and the Soviet Union was very realistic 
in its conclusions: there was almost no room for any hope that NNFZ could be 
actually realized.59
tensions in the Northern maritime area. UMA, Juhani Suomi and Arto Mansala, The visit of 
USSR’s Defense Minister, Marshal D. F. Ustinov, in Finland, July 10–14, 1978; propositions 
over military cooperation, September 11, 1978, 18–0 1978–81.
58 Apunen, Silmän politiikkaa, p. 119.
59 UMA, Arto Mansala, Summary of the discussions on NNFZ, November 9, 1978, p. 5, 
PYV-PAJ 1975–81—erittäin salaiset kc 15; UMA, Arto Mansala, Summary on the discus-
sions concerning the NNFZ thus far, November 13, 1978, p. 5, PYV-PAJ 1975–81—erittäin 
salaiset kc 15. Another key takeaway from the 1978 NNFZ discussions was that other Nordic 
countries, especially Norway, and the U. S. now seemed to have a better understanding of the 
legitimate security concerns that had pushed Finland to make the initiative in the first place.
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8. Arms Control as the Connecting Factor: How the NNFZ Matured 
into a Shared Practical Agenda Between the Nordic Countries
But the tides in the Nordic countries were also changing. Great power politics and 
the practices of systems maintenance—including nuclear deterrence policies—
were increasingly being regarded more as a liability than a solution. Among the 
Nordic public, this was evident in the rapid rise in popularity of anti-nuclear civil 
society movements during the early 1980s. This did not go unnoticed by the Finn-
ish foreign policy elite. Finnish diplomats reported back to Helsinki that some 
influential figures in the Norwegian Labor Party—particularly former Minister 
Jens Evensen and, to a lesser extent, Defense Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg and 
the future Defense Minister Johan Holst—were urging a continuation of the 
NNFZ discussions in their domestic debates.60 
Even if the task of getting all the interested parties, especially the U.S, to favor 
such a resumption seemed infeasible, the NNFZ agenda itself was becoming an 
institutionalized, or at least semi-permanent practicality between the Nordic 
countries. This became evident in 1981 when the Nordic Council of Ministers 
referred to the NNFZ in a joint statement for the first time: public discussion on 
NNFZ had gathered such momentum that it was no longer possible to avoid it 
when dealing with the nuclear issue, as the Danish Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen 
reportedly admitted during the meeting.61
The discussions over NNFZ were again given fresh impetus when, during an 
interview with the Finnish newspaper Suomen Sosialidemokraatti in June 1981, 
Leonid Brezhnev proposed that the Soviet Union was ready to give negative secu-
rity assurances to the states involved in NNFZ.62 Brezhnev also hinted that the 
USSR might be ready to make reciprocal arrangements in the Soviet territory near 
the Nordic region. Brezhnev’s underpinnings were, of course, merely tactical in 
nature, as he certainly knew that American sentiments towards the NNFZ agenda 
remained highy critical. In Finland the conclusions drawn from the discussions 
following the 1978 proposal were mostly deemed disappointing: none of the 
countries involved in the discussions were ready for official negotiations over the 
substance of the comprehensive NNFZ agenda. Rather, the discussions were seen 
60 UMA, Tapani Brotherus, Norway’s NNFZ memorandum to NATO, February 3, 1981, PYV 89 
H, file I; UMA, René Nyberg, Nuclear Weapons on Norwegian (and Danish) soil, October 15, 
1981, PYV 89 H, files III–IV.
61 See UMA, Deputy Head of Department Pekka J. Korvenheimo, Nordic nuclear-weapon-free 
zone in the meeting of Nordic foreign ministers, September 2–3, 1981, p. 1; September 14, 
1981, PYV 89 H 1981 III–IV; UMA, Acting Deputy Head of Department Erkki Mäentakanen, 
Nuclear-weapon-free Nordics, September 16, 1981, p.3, PYV 89 H 1981 III–IV.
62 See Bengt Broms, Proposals to Establish a Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, in: Michigan 
Journal of International Law 10/2 (1989), p. 352.
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as a fruitful way to market the basic foreign and security political orientation of 
Finland as part of the Nordic whole.63
Creating and maintaining practical spaces for a security political dialogue 
between the Nordic countries themselves formed the basic rationale for what 
could be labeled the fourth generation of NNFZ policies, which lasted from the 
early 1980s until the end of the Cold War. From the Finnish perspective the basic 
idea was to enhance the sense of fellowship and interdependence among the 
Nordic countries. NNFZ policies were redirected towards the level of everyday 
diplomatic encounters of diplomats and officials. President Mauno Koivisto, 
Kekkonen’s successor as President of Finland in 1982, had a more reserved 
attitude towards Kekkonen’s NNFZ aspirations, especially when it came to the 
rather intrusive style that Finland had exercised with its unilaterally formulated 
public initiatives.64 Still, Koivisto, too, saw the instrumental value in the process 
of the NNFZ discussions itself, although he emphasized that there was no point 
in making proposals just for the sake of their performative effect. Koivisto also 
had a reserved stance towards new variants of the NNFZ initiative, including the 
idea of a mini-zone consisting of only Sweden and Finland, and alternatively a 
maximalist proposal with disengagement zones outside the Nordic region.65
Discussions and practical encounters around the NNFZ issue were used to 
anchor Finland’s international position more firmly to the Scandinavian bedrock. 
Despite this, there were concerns within the Finnish security political elite on 
whether the establishment of NNFZ would have positive strategic repercussions 
for sub-regional stability at all. This was evident in a secret memorandum drafted 
by the Operative Department of the General Staff Headquarters of Finnish 
Defense Forces in 1986. The memorandum reasoned that the establishment of 
NNFZ might also increase Western anxieties about Soviet influence in the region 
and, more alarmingly, create more favorable conditions for the conventional 
forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, thus potentially destabilizing 
the military balance in the Nordic sub-region. Inclusion of the Baltic Sea was 
mentioned as a particularly problematic issue, both in terms of international law 
and strategy. 
63 UMA, NNFZ; report by the Political Department. Summary on the project’s past, present and 
perspectives on Finnish actions [signed by Head of Department Seppo Pietinen], March 30, 
1984, p.17, 14–4. 
64 This attitude is evident in several of Koivisto’s draft notes ahead of private discussions with 
foreign state leaders and diplomats between 1981 and 1983. See MKA, memorandum from 
the discussions with Norwegian Prime Minister Kåre Willoch during a state visit in Norway 
in March 1983, Koivisto’s handwritten notes, March 10, 1983, Ulkopoliittiset selvitykset, 
1983 I; MKA, memorandum from the discussions with Vice President Bush, July 3, 1983, 
Ulkopoliittiset selvitykset, 1983 II.
65 MKA, handwritten notes by President Koivisto ahead of the state visit of the Chair of the 
Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union N. A.  Tihonov to Finland, December 10, 1982, 
Ulkopoliittiset selvitykset, lokakuu 1981–1982.
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From the perspective of the Finnish politics of peacetime neutrality and the 
Nordic balance / stability model, the most interesting claim in the memorandum 
was that the actualization of NNFZ would actually increase the risk of conven-
tional military intervention within the region, through the waning of the nuclear 
deterrent effect there. So it is interesting to note the Defense establishment in 
Finland repeating the U. S. criticism of the NNFZ initiative almost word for 
word and sharing in its implicit optimism regarding the functioning of nuclear 
deterrence.66 
But the primary function of the NNFZ initiative, at this point, was to maintain 
the process of dialogue itself. As has been aptly described by Finnish diplomats 
such as Keijo Korhonen and René Nyberg, who both worked on arms control 
issues in the Finnish Foreign Ministry during the 1970s and 1980s, Finland’s 
NNFZ policies were essentially an exercise in diplomatic shadowboxing. This is 
captured rather eloquently in a metaphor used by Korhonen: “So valuable a fish 
is the salmon, it makes sense to try fishing for one, even if there is no prospect of 
catching any.”67 
The instrumental value of the NNFZ process was already recognized outside 
Finland. For example, during a private discussion in Stockholm in 1985, the 
Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme encouraged Koivisto to keep on pushing the 
NNFZ agenda. Interestingly, it was Koivisto who was the more reluctant of the 
two statesmen in this regard. Palme insisted that “we just got to keep harping on 
about it [the NNFZ agenda],” and pointed out that public opinion in Denmark and 
Norway showed considerable responsiveness to the idea. Palme hinted that the 
governments of Norway and Denmark might benefit from Sweden and Finland 
maintaining the momentum on arms control initiatives that the political elites 
in Norway and Denmark could not actively support.68
66 UMA, The effects of the NNFZ from the military perspective [signed by Vice Admiral 
Jan Klenberg and Lieutenant General Rolf Wilhelm], January 2, 1986, pp. 3–4, 14-4 PYV, 
Suomen toiminta ja kannanotot 1984–86.
67 “Lohi on niin kallis kala, että sitä kannattaa pyytää vaikkei saisikaan […].” Translated by the 
author of this essay from Jukka Rislakki, Paha sektori. Atomipommi, kylmä sota ja Suomi, 
Helsinki 2010, p. 169. René Nyberg in critical oral history sessions organized by the research 
project ‘Reimagining Futures in the European North at the End of the Cold War’ (FA268669) 
in Helsinki, September 23, 2014.
68 “Meidän täytyy vain jatkaa asian jauhamista.” Translated by the author of this essay from the 
discussion memorandum written by Undersecretary Klaus Törnudd. PKA, Meeting between 
the President of the Republic and the Swedish Prime Minister in Stockholm, January 7, 1985, 
p. 9, January 18, 1985, Jad:2 1985–89.
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9. Towards Conclusions: The INF Treaty and the Security Dilemma 
in the Northern Sea Areas
When, after several preparatory meetings between the heads of each MFA’s 
Departments of Political Affairs during winter 1986/87, the Nordic countries 
eventually established a joint intra-governmental working group to deliberate 
the NNFZ agenda in 1987, the strategic focus in Europe was already shifting 
from Central Europe towards the “flanks.” President Koivisto addressed these 
concerns in one of his key foreign policy speeches in 1986.69 Koivisto’s hand-
written notes and exchange of letters with Vice President Bush indicate that the 
Finnish president had an increasingly pessimistic view of the INF negotiations 
in late 1985 and early 1986.70 Koivisto reasoned that there was an urgent need 
to move forward in the confidence- and trust-building measures (CBM) in the 
Northern sea areas, following the basic guidelines of the CSCE process. Koivisto 
also referred to the psychological aspects of the nuclear arms race and went on 
to consider the most likely reason for war or even nuclear confrontation in the 
Nordic region: they would, he thought, be based on misperceptions. The NNFZ 
agenda, he maintained, was to be seen as an “ongoing process”.71 
It is also important to remember that the heated Danish debate over its policy 
vis-à-vis NATO continued after the signing of the INF Treaty. In 1988, in an 
interview conducted by a Danish journalist, Paul Warnke, the U. S. chief SALT 
II Negotiator in 1977–78, hinted that the U. S. had routinely violated the Danish 
policy of no port visits by ships bearing nuclear arms.72 A public debate followed, 
leading to the Folketing passing the abovementioned resolution requiring the 
Danish government to remind all visiting warships of the fact that they were not 
allowed to visit Danish ports if carrying nuclear weapons. This raised worries 
among Denmark’s allies over the cohesion of NATO, and gave rise to major 
diplomatic pressure on Denmark from the U. S., French, and British governments. 
Most notably, it resulted in the resignation of the Danish right-wing minority 
government on April 19.73
When it comes to the INF negotiations and the reception of the Treaty itself, 
it is important to realize that public opinion in Scandinavia maintained a strong 
pro-nuclear disarmament sentiment throughout the 1980s, and that this was 
so even for people in the NATO countries Norway and Denmark. Moreover, 
the anti-nuclear movements in the Nordic countries continued to develop their 
69 See Mauno Koivisto, Maantiede ja historiallinen kokemus. Ulkopoliittisia kannanottoja, 
Helsinki 1992, pp. 54–58.
70 MKA, Koivisto’s letter to Bush, December 16, 1985, pp. 1–2 Ulkopoliitiikka / selvityksiä 1985; 
MKA, Koivisto’s handwritten notes ahead of a state visit to Switzerland, March 24, 1986, 
pp. 5 f., Ulkopolitiikka / selvityksiä 1986 tammikuu–kesäkuu.
71 Mauno Koivisto, Historian tekijät. Kaksi kautta II. Helsinki 1995, p. 43.
72 See Vestergaard, The Danish experience in NATO, p. 111.
73 Ibid., pp. 111 f.
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approach, incorporating issues such as SDI and demands for a comprehensive test 
ban treaty (CTBT) in their agenda.74 The US–Soviet rapprochement and the INF 
negotiations between the superpowers were therefore received as positive news 
in the region. However, due to its focus on land-based nuclear weapons, the INF 
Treaty threatened to increase the geostrategic significance of the Northern sea 
areas. It can therefore be concluded that from the Nordic perspective (if there ever 
was such a unified stance), the INF Treaty was recognized as a historically and 
symbolically significant political achievement, but at the same time considered 
to be merely the first incremental step in a process that should lead to more 
comprehensive arms control arrangements. 
Although there were major differences between the foreign policy postures of 
the Nordic countries, the last decade of the Cold War era brought their strategic 
concerns closer together. There were several reasons behind this: a sense of 
solidarity, shared identity and kinship and, to a lesser degree, a shared perception 
of the idiosyncratic nature of their sub-regional geopolitical environment in the 
Northern “flank” of the European theater. When it comes to the NNFZ initiative, 
Finland used it as a diplomatic non-starter and agenda-setting instrument to sig-
nal its security–political concerns to fellow Nordic countries, and to the U. S. and 
NATO. During the 1980s the NNFZ discussions matured into a semi-permanent 
practical connection among the Nordic countries themselves. 
Indeed, it is rarely noticed in the existing literature that, at the turn of the 
1980s, the informal negotiation process around the NNFZ and its maturation 
into a shared Nordic practice very clearly overlapped with the proceedings of 
the Euromissile crisis. The point here is not to claim that relations between the 
Nordic countries would have been without friction without it. Especially during 
the 1960s and 1970s, arms control initiatives such as the NNFZ created tensions 
between the Nordic countries, and even the two neutral Nordic countries did not 
have identical geostrategic positions. 
To sum up, the NNFZ agenda formed a practical policy process that was used to 
create conditions for a security–political dialogue between the Nordic countries 
themselves (with minimal interference from external parties). This helped to cre-
ate a sense of interdependence. Moreover, it provided a positive agenda that tied 
together the interests of the Nordic arms control community, peace researchers, 
and activists as well as the political parties at the Center and Left of the political 
spectrum. Inter-parliamentary meetings and summits around the NNFZ ques-
tion were also organized. This positive agenda had its roots in the egalitarian and 
peace-oriented state identity that was shared by all the Nordic countries, but it 
also reflected geostrategic concerns about the status of the European Northern 
flank during arms control processes that focused exclusively on land-based 
missile deployment in Central Europe. The NNFZ initiative, then, was first and 
foremost used as an instrument to highlight the need for sub-regional sensitivity 
in the broader play of the great power order and its management.
74 Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, p. 193.
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By now it is no longer particularly original to use Google NGram graphs to 
introduce a complex topic. But tracking and visualizing the vocabulary in “a lot 
of English books” (as Google says) is nonetheless a useful way to generate both 
a first impression of how popular one term or another was and to bring up some 
first questions for study.
As Figure 1 shows, the trajectories for the occurrence of “peace” and “security” 
developed in different directions. Not surprisingly, the term “peace” peaked after 
World War I and after World War II, while the term “security” had a steadier 
career, rising slowly throughout the twentieth century. This happened parallel 
to the rise of the fields and subjects in which the term became the conceptual 
centerpiece: International Relations and Political Science. It is quite remarkable 
but unsurprising that the quantitative use of both terms—“peace” and “secu-
rity”—intersected during the last third of the 1970s. 
In the period from 1977 to 1979, the nuclear weapon stockpiles of the U. S. 
and the Soviet Union reached more or less the same levels.1 But this was 
only the most visible aspect of a complex mixture of factors that made the 
international situation appear very threatening. After this period, tensions and 
anxieties accumulated in Western societies. This spurred both a broad mobiliza-
tion of anti-nuclear peace movements in almost every Western country and 
increasing political debates and diplomatic activities regarding security issues. 
As international tensions grew, the question of how to maintain, or even improve, 
the Soviet–American nuclear status quo became an urgent topic, regardless of 
whatever position groups were taking on nuclear weapons.2 
In a heated atmosphere in which political and emotional arguments were all 
too often inextricably entangled, the task of framing the language of political 
discourse and influencing public opinion to particular ends became more and 
1 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories,  1945–2013, 
in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69/5 (2013), pp. 75–81, here p. 78, https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/0096340213501363.
2 Various contemporary concepts in P.  Edward Haley, David M.  Keithly, and Jack Marritt, 
Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the Future, New York / NY 1985. An overview in Law-
rence Freedman / Jeffrey H. Michaels, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, London 2019. 
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more important. Terms like “peace” and “security” had been in use for a long 
time. Now, there was a need to endow them with new meanings and enhance 
their political efficacy. In the context of protests and grassroot debates, the peace 
concept served as an important synthesis of ideas, critique, and fear. It covered 
concerns that preoccupied a large majority of politically interested citizens.3 
Basic security issues had already been raised in connection with the numerous 
sites that posed nuclear risks and which were identified by the anti-nuclear 
movement during the 1970s. These included “power plants, missile silos, army 
bases, research laboratories, radioactive waste dumps [and] assembly facilities,”4 
and the issue caught the public’s attention in 1979 with the events surrounding 
the reactor accident in the Three Mile Island power plant.5 
Security concepts had also been part of anti-nuclear debates within the peace 
movement due to the input of experts, scientists, political renegades, and insti-
tutional brokers like church communities, who raised basic ethical, technologi-
cal, military, political, and strategic issues. This happened, for example, in the 
context of the civil defense debate when physicists and physicians fed the peace 
movements with professional data, graphs, and projections buttressing their 
3 Holger Nehring and Helge Pharo, A Peaceful Europe? Negotiating Peace in the Twentieth 
Century, in: Contemporary European History 17/3 (2008), pp. 277–299.
4 Kyle Harvey, American Anti-Nuclear Activism, 1975–1990. The Challenge of Peace, London 
2014, pp. 8 f.; Susanne Schregel, The Spaces and Places of the Peace Movement, in: Christoph 
Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp 
(eds.), The Nuclear Crisis: the Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Move-
ment of the 1980s, New York / Oxford 2016, pp. 173–188. 
5 Dario Fazzi, The Nuclear Freeze Generation: The Early 1980s’ Anti-nuclear Movement 
between “Carter’s Vietnam’” and “Euroshima”, in: Knud Andresen and Bart van der Steen 
(eds.), A European Youth Revolt. European Perspectives on Youth Protest and Social Move-
ments in the 1980s, Oxford / New York 2016, pp. 145–158, here p. 149. On the changes caused 
by the anti-nuclear protests in Europe in the late 1970s see Andrew S. Tompkins, Better Active 
than Radioactive! Anti-Nuclear Protest in 1970s France and West Germany, Oxford 2016.
Fig. 1: Occurrence of the words “peace” (dark gray) and “security” (light gray).
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political argument against nuclear civil defense plans.6 While “peace” remained 
the overriding political issue in such debates, the peace movement referred to 
security concepts, just as the inventors and proponents of civil defense plans did, 
but they drew different conclusions. 
In spite of these different levels of argumentation, public and political percep-
tions often reduced the peace movement’s political agenda to the pursuit of 
“peace”. However, this perspective only concealed the fact that the movement 
was heterogeneous and was trying to develop a minimal consensus in order to 
perform a common protest strategy; and this least common denominator was 
inevitably moderate.7 To reduce the peace movement to a rather naïve demand 
for peace would be superficial. Interpretations of this kind only serve to downplay 
its contributions to the rising questions of how a modern state could deal with 
existing nuclear weapons in the safest way, of how to avoid a nuclear war, 
and finally how to mobilize substantial opposition to the U. S. Presidential 
Administration of the period. The following essay does not focus on whether 
the peace movement succeeded or failed, however. Rather, it takes a closer look 
at different aspects of the U. S. peace movement and in particular at FREEZE, the 
most prominent campaign within it.8 The aim of this approach is to refute over-
simplistic assessments of the peace movement and to show the extent to which 
it was a driving force—among others—which strengthened the anti-nuclear 
consensus in the country. This, in turn, helped lay an important basis for the 
success of the INF Treaty.9
6 See e.g. the series of articles “Programs for Surviving Nuclear War: A Critique” by Jennifer 
Leaning, Matthew Leighton, John Lamperti and Herbert A. Abrams in: Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 39/6 (1983), pp. 1–16. Another example: Howard Kornfeld, Nuclear Weapons and 
Civil Defense. The Influence of the Medical Profession in 1955 and 1983, in: The Western 
Journal of Medicine 138/2 (Feb 1983), pp. 207–212. See also Claudia Kemper, Medizin 
gegen den Kalten Krieg. Ärzte in der anti-atomaren Friedensbewegung der 1980er Jahre, 
Göttingen 2016; Claudia Kemper, “The Nuclear Arms Race is Psychological at its Roots.” 
Physicians and their Therapies for the Cold War, in: Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann 
(eds.), Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945–90, 
Manchester 2016, pp. 213–237.
7 Harvey, American Anti-Nuclear Activism, p. 9.
8 The capitalized term FREEZE refers here to the nuclear freeze campaign or movement that 
included the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign as well as other groups but was not an 
acronym used at the time. It is used to differentiate the movement from the strategic concept 
of “freezing” the nuclear arms race.
9 This thesis is based on Müller’s considerations, according to which anti-nuclear activism 
worked on many levels, especially in cultural and media contexts, and had a far-reaching effect 
on political culture. See William M. Knoblauch, Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War. The Reagan 
Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race. Culture and Politics in the 
Cold War and Beyond, Amherst 2017, p. 8.
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1. Becoming FREEZE
Figure 2, another Google NGram graph, shows the frequency of occurrence of the 
terms “freeze,” “disarmament,” and “arms control” during the twentieth century.
Despite its long tradition as an instrument for demilitarization, the term “arms 
control” only became popular after it had come into use in professional (political) 
contexts as an element of Cold War thinking.10 Even in times of détente, the 
prospects for negotiating any fundamental disarmament did not appear very 
promising, but arms control at least seemed to offer a diplomatic opportunity to 
stay in conversation with one another.11 In their representation in Figure 2, we do 
not know the contexts in which the terms were used. But it is likely that “freeze” 
was increasingly used because, after years of growing tensions, the idea of simply 
freezing the nuclear arms race had become particularly popular. Previous ideas 
on arms control or segmented disarmament, which had been discussed at the 
diplomatic level for years, seemed less and less convincing as reliable and fail-
safe security systems.12 In the face of a growing loss of confidence in the state’s 
ability to cope with nuclear weapons the idea of freezing the arms race through 
a moratorium on nuclear warheads had been circulating widely since the second 
half of the 1970s.13 The popularity of the idea was strengthened by the fact that 
the Western alliance set contradictory priorities in its defense strategy, and 
international relations drifted into a series of crises.14 As early as 1978, two peace 
groups had appealed to stop uranium mining bilaterally, and in 1979 there was 
even a proposal from the Republican side to add a clause to the SALT II treaty 
corresponding to a FREEZE.15
Within this atmosphere various scientific and civil society groups developed 
concepts to solve the precarious situation from both a security and a peace policy 
perspective. On the one hand, when things took a turn for the worse between 
the superpowers, academic associations like the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) stepped forward with fresh ideas to keep arms 
10 Peter N. Stearns, Introduction, in: Peter N. Stearns (ed.), Demilitarization in the Contem-
porary World, Urbana, IL 2013, pp. 1–16, here p. 11.
11 Leopoldo Nuti (ed.), The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 
 1975–1985, London 2009; Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou (eds.), The Making of 
Détente. Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–75, London 2008. 
12 See e.g. the chapter title The Nuclear Freeze Movement: The Reagan Administration’s 
Greatest Threat, in: Christian Peterson, Ronald Reagan and Antinuclear Movements in the 
United States and Western Europe, 1981–1987, Lewiston, NY 2003, p. 87.
13 Dario Fazzi, The Nuclear Freeze. Transnational Pursuit of Positive Peace, in: The Routledge 
History of World Peace since 1750, ed. by Christian Petersen, William M. Knoblauch, and 
Michael Lodenthal, New York 2018, pp. 229–237, 229.
14 Leopoldo Nuti, The Origins of the 1979 Dual Track Decision—A Survey, in: Nuti (ed.), The 
Crisis of Détente, pp. 57–71.
15 Fazzi, Nuclear Freeze, p. 229.
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control going; while others, like the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and 
the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security and 
Arms Control (CISAC), even sought personal contacts with Soviet scientists in 
order to restart the negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT).16 Test-ban activists recognized that new safeguards—such as guaranteed 
access to test sites—were needed to convince the U. S. government that mutual 
control was possible, at least on a technical level.17 On the other hand not only 
experts but also more and more groups and initiatives were incorporating general 
concerns about nuclear armament into their political demands in order to influ-
ence the government’s rhetoric, or even its strategy. This constellation is often 
portrayed as the actions of two different groups—here the advocates (or experts), 
and there the activists18—even though the activities and personnel of both groups 
overlapped in many ways. Within this heterogeneous landscape of anti-nuke 
experts and laypeople, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC), founded 
in 1980, quickly emerged as both an important focal point for mobilization and 
the “political manifestation of [nuclear] fear.”19 
16 Kai-Henrik Barth, Catalysts of Change. Scientists as Transnational Arms Control Advocates 
in the 1980s, in: John Krige and Kai-Henrik Barth (eds.), Global Power Knowledge. Science 
and Technology in International Affairs, Chicago 2006, pp. 182–206, here pp. 186–188.
17 See for a history of Verification Diplomacy Nancy W. Gallagher, The Politics of Verification, 
Baltimore / MD 1999. A general approach to the concept of Trust in International Politics 
is offered by Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian F.  Ostermann (eds.), Trust, 
but Verify. The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 
1969–1991, Washington, D. C. 2016.
18 Rebecca Johnson, Advocates and Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation and 
the Test Ban Treaty, in: Ann M. Florini (ed.), The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil 
Society, Tokyo / Washington 2000, pp. 49–82.
19 Paul Boyer, Fallout. A Historian Reflects on America’s Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear 
Weapons, Columbus, OH 1998, p. xv.
Fig. 2: Occurrence of the terms “freeze” (black), “disarmament” (light gray), and “arms 
control” (dark gray).
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Taking a last look at the second NGram graph, Figure 2, we can see that 
“freeze,” as a political and strategic concept, peaked in 1983, as the campaign 
gained momentum. The campaign was initially able to form numerous coalitions 
at local and state level and to pass resolutions there. The campaign’s collaboration 
with the Democrats was not the result of targeted cooperation. Rather it was due 
to there being some political and strategic overlap between the Democrats and 
FREEZE. The former wanted above all to oust the President from power, while the 
campaign called for an arms freeze, no matter who had the power. The campaign 
began to be successful at the time when Democrats in Congress were trying to 
obstruct the President’s policies. The campaign, in turn, needed party-political 
access to Congress in order to be able to bring about concrete decisions. In the 
Republican-led Senate, a FREEZE resolution failed in 1983, but in the same year 
the Democrats were successful with their resolution in Congress, where, after 
various attempts, a resolution tabled by Edward Kennedy based on the demands 
of FREEZE was approved. Among other things, this resolution called on the 
government to agree and implement an immediate halt to the arms race with the 
Soviet Union.
Although the INF Treaty, signed a few years later, represented an extraordi-
nary diplomatic breakthrough, its emergence cannot be explained by diplomatic 
history alone. The process that led to making the reduction of medium-range 
weapons conceivable and negotiable included oppositional politics, the efforts 
of arms control talks, and the FREEZE campaign. So it makes little sense to 
attribute victory to either the peace movement or to diplomacy, and it is especially 
crass to assume that Reagan made the crucial shift from a nuclear hardliner to 
a disarmament-supporting diplomat overnight.20 Rather, it can be assumed that 
many of the political changes that occurred during the 1980s also depended on 
the perceptions and interpretations of the political opposition. Such a perspective 
can help us understand the heterogeneous dynamics that made the INF Treaty 
possible. 
The role of non-state actors like the peace movement in general and FREEZE 
in particular should be seen as an important part of these dynamics.21 In turn, 
the success of the campaign must not conceal the fact that the U. S. peace move-
ment was quite diverse even before 1987 and certainly after the ratification of 
the INF Treaty. Indeed, the U. S. peace movement was both heterogeneous and 
focused on the freeze concept as an overarching idea. This was because a call to 
halt the nuclear arms race was both easily comprehensible and a way to connect 
the heterogeneous strands of national protest in the U. S., also linking them to 
global sentiment and protest. This is all the more interesting because the breadth 
20 Cortright laments a bit too schematically the lack of a significant “role of the peace move-
ment”: David Cortright, Protest and Politics: How Peace Movements Shape History, in: Mary 
Kaldor and Iavor Rangelov (eds.), The Handbook of Global Security Policy, Chichester 2014, 
pp. 482–504, here p. 493 f.
21 Angela Santese, Ronald Reagan, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the Nuclear Scare 
of the 1980s, in: The International History Review 39/3 (2017), pp. 496–520, here p. 497.
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of the term “freeze” made it possible for activists, supporters, and the public to 
read further implications into it, notably criticism of the political establishment 
in Washington.22 
In order to grasp these interrelationships, it is important to understand the 
concept of “framing,” a term readers will almost certainly know, but which has to 
be explained in its relation to protest movements. Every local or national political 
initiative or NGO needs global frames to ensure that the specific issues they focus 
on remain relevant for a longer time period and for more people than just the 
local or national peer group. A frame, as originally outlined by Erving Goffman, 
is a set of concepts and theoretical perspectives that organizes experiences and 
guides the actions of individuals, groups, or societies.23 Such frames can explain 
how protest movements are able to connect the different issues that concern their 
individual members with global politics. Or, as David A. Snow explains: 
Applied to all varieties of social phenomena, including civil disturbances, social move-
ments, and politics in general, the idea of framing problematizes the meanings associated 
with relevant events, activities, places, and actors, suggesting that those meanings 
are typically contestable and negotiable, and thus open to debate and differential 
interpretation.24 
Such frames were created, for example, when protests referred to “nuclear fear” 
as a common factor for all people involved, regardless of their specific political 
preferences. In this usage the frame “fear” worked like a bracket making it possible 
to share an interpretation of reality.25 The same applied to the word “freeze”— 
a simple term that denoted a distinct first step towards solving all the nuclear 
issues. And in a way it worked: “The genius (and limitation) of the nuclear weapons 
freeze was that it reduced a complex issue to a simple idea that was linked to a 
deliberate strategy for mobilization.”26 But, as so often in the history of protest 
22 See Wilfried Mausbach, Vereint marschieren, getrennt schlagen? Die amerikanische Frie-
densbewegung und der Widerstand gegen den NATO-Doppelbeschluss, in: Philipp Gassert, 
Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. 
Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive, Munich 
2011, pp. 283–304.
23 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience, New York 
1974.
24 David A. Snow, Frames and Framing Processes, in: Kathrin Fahlenbrach, Martin Klimke, 
and Joachim Scharloth (eds.), Protest Cultures: A Companion, New York 2016, pp. 124–129, 
here p. 125; see also Dieter Rucht, Studying Social Movements: Some Conceptual Challenges, 
in: Stefan Berger and Holger Nehring (eds.), The History of Social Movements in Global 
Perspective. A Survey, London 2017, pp. 39–62. 
25 David A. Snow, Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields, in: David A. Snow, Sarah 
Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, 
Oxford 2004, pp. 380–405.
26 Sam Marullo, Ron Pagnucco, and Jackie Smith, Frame Changes and Social Movement 
Contraction: US Peace Movement Framing after the Cold War, in: Sociological Inquiry 66/1 
(February 1996), pp. 1–28, here p. 4.
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movements, the story was more complex, because although the terminology and 
idea united very different factions of arms critics, the cooperation was neither 
unambiguous nor conflict-free.
Utilizing the framing concept to explain the peace movement’s strategies for 
mobilization is only one side of the coin. The other side concerns heterogeneous 
concepts and groups that facilitate our understanding of INF as an important 
milestone and a point of rupture for the peace movement. Yet, they also reveal 
how support for an INF Treaty was just a minor part of another overarching 
theme in terms of global peace and security. In other words, perceiving the peace 
movement only within the INF frame is far too narrow. It leaves out both the 
political dynamics and strategic debates of the early 1980s and the long-term 
peace discourses about societal and technological developments which, in addi-
tion to armaments, are perceived as threats to peace. 
2. FREEZE
The core idea of the FREEZE campaign was to persuade the U. S. and the Soviet 
Union simultaneously to adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, 
and deployment of any nuclear weapons and missiles as well as on new air-
craft primarily designed to deliver nuclear weapons—in the American case, the 
MX and Pershing II missiles in particular.27 The key figure in the FREEZE 
movement, Randall Forsberg, initiated the idea of a “mutual, verifiable” freeze. In 
1979, in a first bid at introducing it, she addressed over 600 activists from already 
existing peace organizations at a convention, calling on them to collaborate on 
the nuclear FREEZE proposal. In the same year, she popularized her nuclear 
freeze idea in an influential pamphlet which she co-authored under the title 
“The Price of Defense.”28 As a strategic analyst,29 she had recognized the window 
of opportunity for mass mobilization. The necessary political resources were 
27 M-X was short for LGM-118A Peacekeeper, this was a missile capable of carrying multiple 
warheads that could be deployed at short notice to multiple targets. The missile was thus 
considered a fast defensive weapon. Compared to MX, Pershing II was the modernized form 
of a classic medium-range ballistic missile.
28 Boston Study Group, The Price of Defense, New York 1979. See also Fazzi, Nuclear Freeze, 
p. 230. 
29 Randall Forsberg (1943–2007) studied at Barnard College, worked as a teacher in Pennsyl-
vania, and moved with her Swedish husband to Stockholm where she got a job as a typist at 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). After her divorce she moved to 
Boston in 1974 and enrolled in a MIT PhD program studying defense policy and arms con-
trol. Utilizing her many contacts, she began disseminating the “Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms 
Race” in 1979. In the same year she founded her own Institute for Defense and Disarmament 
Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts and in the following years she became an important 
disarmament advisor. See Mitchell K. Hall (ed.), Opposition to War. An Encyclopedia of 
US Peace and Antiwar Movements, Santa Barbara / CA 2018, p. 266.
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already available, but a vehicle for mobilizing and uniting the existing networks 
of groups and activists was lacking. Later she described the circumstances at that 
time and her motivation: 
[…] Then in December [1979], the Soviet Union went into Afghanistan and in January 
of 1980, Carter withdrew the [SALT II] treaty and it never did come up before the Senate. 
Well, it was in that environment that the FREEZE movement was born. The way I saw it, 
and other people who were concerned with arms control and disarmament—the SALT 
II Treaty was not that strong. It was a relatively weak treaty which essentially codified 
the next generation of nuclear weapons on both sides.30
Forsberg had wondered how such a “weak treaty” could arouse political debate 
and saw the opportunity of attracting the public’s attention: 
And it started as a movement to create popular pressure to support those people in Wash-
ington and the Senate and the Congress who wanted to see good arms control agreements 
with the Soviet Union, support them over the opposition of the vested interests.
The recent experience of a perilous nuclear accident at the Three Mile Island 
reactor,31 together with growing tensions in international relations, no doubt 
contributed to promoting the foundation of FREEZE as well. In an interview, 
Forsberg suggested a further factor, referring to a general mood after the Vietnam 
War and in the years that followed: 
So, in my view, between 1974 and 1979–80, we had the pendulum swing back completely 
in the other direction from what it had been during the Vietnam era. And I think 
that it was during that period when we had the SALT II Treaty—we had arms control 
negotiations, but we had this kind of against-criticism-of-the-military public sentiment. 
So, there wasn’t much support for the arms control process. [But at the end of the 70s] 
the period where no criticism of the military was acceptable in the national mood was 
ending.32
Forsberg not only proposed a call for a nuclear FREEZE but also offered argu-
ments for how it should be presented and its perspective. She suggested that the 
movement should: 
couple public education about the danger of nuclear war and the arms race with a 
concrete proposal to take an initial first step that leads in a good direction; this would 
have the opposite effect of empowering people, giving them hope, giving them something 
30 War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Missile Experimental; Interview with Randall Forsberg, 
November 11, 1987 on Open Vault from WGBH Media Library and Archives, http://open 
vault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_F6CC542AF94B434FBC7E1DBE45F07024; (31 August 2018).
31 Natasha Zaretsky, Radiation Nation. Three Mile Island and the Political Transformation of 
the 1970s, New York 2018.
32 War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Missile Experimental; Interview with Randall Forsberg, 
November 11, 1987.
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to work for. And it was that coupling of both, the sense of the negative, the terrible danger 
and fear, and also the sense of the positive step of something to work for that I thought 
would really turn the trick in creating a national movement.33
From the start FREEZE offered a comprehensive outline of a secure peace process 
but, above all, it disseminated a “Call to Halt the Arms Race”34 in moderate 
and clear language, a text that “was easily accessible and salable to the general 
public.”35 In this way, FREEZE propagated an arms control concept in which the 
option of disarmament was only the second step. This aspect was decisive for 
gaining broader support within the United States, but at the same time made its 
demands different from those of the European peace movements, which, as a rule, 
called for bilateral disarmament.36 
The Call was printed jointly and initially disseminated by Forsberg’s Institute 
for Defense and Disarmament Studies, the American Friends Service Committee 
(AFSC), Clergy and Laity Concerned, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation. It is 
noteworthy that religious denominations, especially Quakers and the Catholic 
Church, formed a strong backbone to the peace movement. (The AFSC, founded 
as an aid organization after the First World War, and the American Episcopal 
Conference have been involved in many anti-nuclear protests since 1979.)37 
Consequently, these groups supported the FREEZE Call, which was designed 
to address both peace activists and the American public.38 Forsberg and other 
supporters of the campaign calculated that, to convince politicians, they needed 
not only factual arguments but, above all, strong public support. Accordingly, the 
first objective of FREEZE was to build coalitions and to raise public awareness and 
support.39 The organizers developed a strategy for popularizing their claims and 
encouraged the public to contact their senators and representatives in Congress. 
It is difficult to say to what extent FREEZE influenced public opinion in 
this way but, strikingly, the campaign resonated with existing anxiety over the 
nuclear threat in general. Although, with the “zero option,” Reagan offered his 
own proposal to break the impasse, peace activists were swayed more by his 
33 Ibid. 
34 The Call was published in various journals and pamphlets, see e.g. Jane O. Sharp, Call to 
Halt the Nuclear Arms Race: Proposal for a Mutual US-Soviet Nuclear-Weapon Freeze, in: 
Bulletin of Peace Proposals 12/4 (1981), pp. 417–421.
35 David S. Meyer, A Winter of Discontent. The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics, New 
York 1990, p. 157.
36 Kyle Harvey, The Promise of Internationalism. US Anti-Nuclear Activism and the European 
Challenge, in: Jan Hansen, Christian Helm, and Frank Reichherzer (eds.), Making Sense of 
the Americas. How Protest Related to America in the 1980s and Beyond, Frankfurt a. M. 
2015, pp. 225–243.
37 Mausbach, Vereint marschieren, p. 288; Lawrence Stephen Wittner, Toward Nuclear Aboli-
tion: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present. The 
Struggle against the Bomb, Vol. 3, Stanford 2003, pp. 172–177.
38 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 498.
39 Ibid., p. 499.
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threatening rhetoric, which did not alleviate any of the prevalent fears of “the 
enemy” and its nuclear potential.40
Although FREEZE spread very quickly and gained in popularity, neither the 
media nor the Reagan Administration took the campaign as seriously as they 
did the European peace movements. Moreover, activists had to acknowledge 
considerable “criticism from European anti-nuclear campaigns [which] alleged 
that the FREEZE did not consider opposition to Euromissiles deployment as 
a particularly high priority.”41 The campaign moved beyond this defensive 
position in the course of 1982, as it experienced growing success at the local and 
state level. A petition campaign in California to put the FREEZE proposal on 
the ballot at an upcoming state election was overwhelmingly successful because 
“local organizers collected more than 700,000 valid signatures in just a few 
months, twice the number needed to qualify for the ballot.”42 Politicians from 
the Democratic Party like House members Edward Markey and Mark Hatfield, 
along with Senator Edward Kennedy, noted the growing public awareness and 
introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives and the Senate.43 From 
that point on, the campaign’s agenda had to be recognized as a serious political 
demand and its organizers “still saw the potential for the FREEZE campaign to 
move beyond its domestic work [on a transatlantic and international level] if the 
freeze proposal were ratified by Congress.”44
The first reactions of the Reagan Administration had been cautious and defen-
sive, rejecting FREEZE as a crude mixed bag of unprofessional suggestions.45 
The Administration’s alternative, the “zero option,” was proposed not only as 
a diplomatic coup (as peace activists liked to describe it), but also as “a way of 
co-opting peace movement demands.”46 It was not until another resolution 
was introduced to the Senate at the end of March 1982 that Reagan showed the 
first signs of adopting a different position. In a public speech, he expressed his 
“concern for the effects of nuclear war,” though he made no explicit mention of 
the campaign.47 Nevertheless, the campaigners were able to use this statement 
to their advantage. Forsberg and the NWFC had correctly assessed their window 
of opportunity, and in view of the upcoming mid-term Congressional elections, 
politicians in almost every federal state had to recognize and respond to an 
increasingly nuclear-sensitive public opinion.
40 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 500. See also the contributions by Beth Fischer and Ronald 
Granieri in this volume.
41 Harvey, Promise of Internationalism, p. 235.
42 David Cortright, Protest and Politics: How Peace Movements Shape History, in: Mary Kaldor 
and Iavor Rangelov (eds.), The Handbook of Global Security Policy, Chichester, UK 2014, 
pp. 482–504, here p. 491.
43 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 502.
44 Harvey, Promise of Internationalism, p. 235.
45 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 504.
46 Cortright, Protest and Politics, p. 493.
47 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 503.
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3. Further Issues
The public adopted the FREEZE concept and its rhetoric not so much as an 
expression of an unequivocal anti-nuclear stance but because of its oppositional 
and connectable political language. Since FREEZE and its appeal to the political 
establishment were mostly discussed and protested at the local level, it provided 
an opportunity to express general dissatisfaction with public policy and with 
the political decision-makers in Washington D. C.48 As the FREEZE resolution 
presented itself as a manifesto of “We the people,” it was fueled by “the people’s” 
dissatisfaction and feelings of uncertainty towards U. S. government politics 
that clashed with majority attitudes and moral perspectives.49 So, although 
this rhetoric no doubt boosted broader mobilization of support, the extended 
interpretation was also a handicap for the campaign. FREEZE ran the risk of 
abandoning its core mission, which was its focus on strategic doctrines and arms 
policy. Increasingly it became an instrument of domestic opposition. 
This effect can be seen, for example, in the significance of opinion polls. 
As mentioned above, there were noteworthy changes in public opinion that 
ran parallel to the campaign’s success. In 1980, polls showed that support for a 
ratification of SALT II decreased dramatically, while at the same time more and 
more Americans supported higher military spending.50 This indicated that 
there “was significant public support for a more hawkish posture and greater 
fears of war” occurring at the same time.51 The majority feared a nuclear war 
and simultaneously supported defense concepts, no matter how they were to be 
implemented. However, in order to assess the success of FREEZE correctly—or 
indeed the policies of the U. S. government of the period—it must be noted that, 
48 Fazzi argues in a generational perspective that young protesters in both the European and 
U. S. movements “aimed to challenge capitalism, support different models of economic devel-
opment, promote anti-militarism and non-violence or redefine urban and social spaces.” 
Dario Fazzi, The Nuclear Freeze Generation. The Early 1980s Anti-nuclear Movement 
between “Carter’s Vietnam” and “Euroshima”, in: Knud Andresen and Bart van der Steen 
(eds.), A European Youth Revolt. European Perspectives on Youth Protest and Social Move-
ments in the 1980s, New York / Oxford 2016, pp. 145–158, here p. 149.
49 “All forms of communication involve creating audiences and making certain assumptions. 
The ‘people’ are constituted in the process, and their existence is confirmed through the 
artifice of public opinion polls and market research […]. Individual answers to pollsters’ 
questions are aggregated into ‘public opinion’ […] The creation of these phenomena allows 
them to become tools for legitimizing partisan opinion or media agendas.” John Street, Mass 
Media, Politics, and Democracy, Basingstoke 2011, p. 71. Snowball provides a study of the 
communication and rhetoric of the Christian and conservative organization “The Moral 
Majority” and its success during the early 1980s. His perspective on structures and strategies 
of influencing public opinion is remarkable for many public related movements. David 
Snowball, Continuity and Change in the Rhetoric of the Moral Majority, New York 1991.
50 Meyer, A Winter of Discontent, p. 85.
51 Ibid.
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even though opinions on the nuclear issue had become more ambivalent between 
1980 and 1984, in general “Americans’ opinions on nuclear weapons and war” 
scarcely changed between World War II and the end of the 1980s.52 
In a nutshell: most Americans vacillated between long-term uneasiness about 
nuclear weapons, “a fear of nuclear war […], and a distrust of the Soviet Union.”53 
This led to quite uneven and, from today’s vantage point, seemingly inconsistent 
opinions. Over 80 per cent of the U. S. population believed both “that the Soviet 
Union was hostile and couldn’t be trusted (85 % in 1984) and that nuclear 
weapons were dangerous.”54 Over 80 per cent wanted “the superpowers to agree 
to stop making nuclear weapons,” while another 82 % per cent opposed unilateral 
U. S. disarmament. 
Obviously, any peace initiative had to engage with this highly ambivalent set 
of opinions, which remained much the same throughout the 1980s. These strong 
popular opinions about war and weapons and about the Soviet Union help to 
explain why FREEZE “achieved massive popular support” so quickly, as David 
S. Meyer highlights in his study A Winter of Discontent.55 The FREEZE campaign 
did not grow out of a general change in attitudes toward nuclear weapons; instead, 
it was successful because it was able to crystallize diverse fears by focusing on 
common ground and transforming them into a single political demand. However, 
a detailed look at the opinion polls reveals significant limitations to the support 
for FREEZE: 
First, the public supported only a bilateral freeze or a freeze among all nuclear nations. 
[…] Second, very high levels of support for the freeze depended in considerable measure 
on confidence that such an agreement could be verified. […] Finally, public support 
for the freeze was conditional upon belief in the equivalency of the two superpowers’ 
arsenals.56 
Such restrained and heterogeneous opinions revealed that support for FREEZE 
was not only an expression of an all-embracing anti-nuclear conviction but was 
also motivated by a desire to voice a general and pressing dissatisfaction with U. S. 
security policy and its efficacy, and to express active concern about it. 
Political rhetoric indicates too that the campaign was used for further con-
cerns in its criticism of the political establishment. As mentioned above, FREEZE 
was spearheaded by an extremely visible contingent of academic experts and 
scientists who played “a critical role in focusing public attention on the dangerous 
capabilities of nuclear weapons.”57 The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) 
52 J. Michael Hogan and Ted J. Smith III, Polling on the Issues: Public Opinion and the Nuclear 
Freeze, in: The Public Opinion Quarterly 55/4 (Winter 1991), pp. 534–569, here p. 537.
53 Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 86.
54 Ibid., p. 87. Meyer refers to The Public Agenda Foundation, Voter Options on Nuclear Policy 
Providence, RI, May 1984.
55 Ibid.
56 Hogan and Smith III, Polling on the Issues, p. 541 f.
57 Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 97.
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and the FAS, in particular, provided knowledge and infrastructure for the peace 
movement. With this backdrop, FREEZE united a number of nuclear scientists 
and strategic experts like Robert Alridge, Daniel Ellsberg, George Kistiakosky, 
Jerome Wiesner, Hans Bethe, Harrison Brown, Karl Menninger, George Wald, 
Bernard Feld, Carl Sagan, and Jonas Salk, who were all highly visible in the 
media as they attacked the Reagan administration’s nuclear policies.58 But, since 
Forsberg and the early activists intended to gain support from the mass media 
and spark a mass movement, they needed support from more than just scientists. 
Politicians like Edward Kennedy were a key factor in providing this; but 
so were celebrities like the actress Patti Davis (Ronald and Nancy Reagan’s 
daughter), Paul Newman, and associations of clergymen.59 Another substantial 
but less visible group of players in the FREEZE context were business people who 
had not wholeheartedly supported Reagan’s candidacy, some of them because of 
his military or ideological policies, others because of their dependence on trade 
with the Soviet Union, or because of the growing federal deficit. Many of these 
business people were supporters of the Democratic Party, and were interested 
in arms control for economic reasons. They supported foundations conduct-
ing research on arms control (institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the 
MacArthur Foundation).60 
This type of support for FREEZE could have considerable impact, as the case 
of California highlights. The Californian FREEZE campaign was initiated in 1981 
and was soon joined by Harold Willens, “a millionaire who had long been an arms 
control advocate within the Democratic Party establishment. [His] participation 
in the freeze campaign was welcomed as it meant an infusion of money, media 
attention, and mainstream legitimacy.”61 But there was also unrest within the 
campaign because of Willens’s intervention into its grassroots style and, on top of 
this, his attempts to influence the resolution. He aimed especially to reduce any 
links to other issues or overarching questions, such as demands to transfer the 
funds used in the arms race to the civil sector in order to strengthen development 
policies, which was one of Forsberg’s long-term goals. 
In the course of the California political campaign, the resolution was watered 
down to the point where it became an inoffensive request and ultimately a 
tame appeal for a nuclear armament freeze lacking broader societal perspectives 
on accompanying issues such as the technological arms race, nuclear weapon 
production, and extended deterrence. To be sure, the campaign had become 
highly visible and successful by the end of 1982, when “12 state legislatures, 
58 Ibid., p. 98 f.
59 On the context of social mobilization, popular music, musicians, and campaign shows like 
“Artists United against Apartheid” and others see Christian Lahusen, The Rhetoric of Moral 
Protest: Public Campaigns, Celebrity Endorsement and Political Engagement, Berlin 1996. 
60 Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 109 f.
61 Ibid., p. 111.
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275 city governments, and 446 New England town meetings had passed freeze 
resolutions, and voters had approved freeze referenda in eight states, the District 
of Columbia, and over two dozen cities.”62 But in 1981 California had already 
shown that popular victories were ambivalent, all the more so when FREEZE 
was becoming a synonym for general opposition to the government and for 
anti-establishment rhetoric.
Typically, the FREEZE rhetoric heard at rallies or in statements by local 
politicians was marked by a combination of classic anti-elitism and the speakers’ 
desire to set themselves apart from a supposed elitist political establishment and 
demonstrate empathy with the common people.63 As Senator Tom Harkin (an 
early Congressional supporter) stressed: “US citizens would no longer ‘allow their 
lives to be held in constant peril by the decisions of an elite group of generals, poli-
ticians and scientists’” and another Democratic representative asserted that “The 
issue of nuclear war and nuclear arms control belongs to the people.”64 On the 
one hand, backing for the nuclear FREEZE was more a response to the perceived 
excesses of the Reagan Administration than primarily support for an anti-nuclear 
security concept. On the other hand, these features, plus the essential moderate-
ness of its key idea created the image of the campaign as a massive grassroots 
movement that had to be recognized and taken seriously in Washington D. C. 
The FREEZE campaign itself was essentially robbed of its international political 
context. “The alliance between freeze organizers and national politicians put the 
freeze on the front page and on the floor of Congress, but in a stripped-down 
version without the meaning the early supporters intended.”65 However, for a 
brief moment FREEZE attracted huge interest and a high level of media coverage.
On first sight, FREEZE succeeded when Edward Kennedy and Jonathan Bing-
ham announced their introduction of the nuclear freeze resolution into Congress 
in March 1982. But Kennedy used vague language, merely calling upon the 
President to “decide when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze.” This 
watered down the resolution to a mere request for a schedule and nothing more. 
Forsberg and other FREEZE leaders were disappointed, because the original 
resolution had called for an “immediate freeze.” It took another year and another 
vote in Congress for the movement to make a real breakthrough.66 After a delay-
ing tactic by the government, Resolution 13 came up for a vote on the floor of the 
House of Representatives in March 1983. The debate took more than 40 hours 
and involved several amendments. When 278 Representatives finally approved 
62 Hogan and Smith III, Polling on the Issues, p. 535.
63 As a communication and language scientist, Dan F. Hahn calls these mechanisms simpli-
fications, generalizations, and “the art of saying nothing.” See Political Communication. 
Rhetoric, Government, and Citizens, State College, PA 1998, pp. 96–109.
64 Quoted after Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 161 (unfortunately without dates). 
65 Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 113.
66 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 511.
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the FREEZE resolution, it was the first time that any bill asked the President “to 
propose to Moscow a mutual and bilateral nuclear weapons freeze.”67 
Yet, the limitations of this success were evident in the small print, or rather 
in the amendments that were added, weakening the text and downgrading the 
resolution from the mandatory to the advisory level.68 The inconsistent politics 
of the House of Representatives probably led to even more disappointment among 
activists: only two months later, in May 1983, a majority approved “the release 
of $625 million for the testing and deploying of 100 MXs,”69 The resolution had 
previously failed in the Senate, where the decisive foreign policy decisions could 
have been made. Obviously, a majority of the representatives were pursuing a dual 
strategy, on the one hand taking into account domestic politics and the mood 
of their voters to support the FREEZE resolution, and on the other, sustaining a 
nuclear-based national security policy.
Circumstances had changed by the time the Presidential election campaign 
was underway in 1984 and FREEZE again tried to build up pressure on the Reagan 
Administration. First, Reagan’s most important project, the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI), had begun to take shape, a defense system that was not covered by 
the FREEZE concept and was difficult to integrate into any populist rhetoric. And 
second, FREEZE’s position during the Presidential campaign was complicated 
by the campaign’s support for the Democratic Party candidate, Walter Mondale. 
The Democrats’ politics concerning armaments were very ambiguous, includ-
ing advocating a freeze at the same time as backing the construction of new 
intercontinental ballistic missiles like Midgetman, and the sea-launched Trident 
II as well as supporting the deployment of Euromissiles.70 
When, on November 6, 1984, Reagan won his second term in office, FREEZE 
could only emphasize that the movement’s demands had been a major issue in 
the election campaign and claim that the President’s now moderate tone and talk 
of arms control was partly a result of FREEZE. This change was no doubt real, 
so that a rapprochement between the Administration and the campaign seemed 
visible. But this was hardly a relevant response to the original FREEZE demands 
and FREEZE’s previous impact as a pressure group was weakening. Moreover, 
Reagan and his Administration were able to present their shift in strategy as a 
move deriving from their own policy-making insights. 
67 Ibid., p. 512.
68 Ibid. In a meeting of NATO’s Nuclear Planning group, U. S. Minister of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger therefore denied any importance for this non-binding resolution. (See AAPD 
1983, Doc. 77, p. 397).
69 Ibid.
70 Meyer, Winter of Discontent, p. 250. The special characteristic of these missile types was 
their high mobility: Midgetman was a mobile intercontinental nuclear missile which could 
be moved rapidly from one firing location to another. Trident missiles were launched from 
submarines.
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4. Diversification as a Feature of the U. S. Peace Movement 
By the end of 1984 FREEZE had literally exhausted all its resources, money, 
and volunteers in mobilizing support during the election campaign, and after 
Reagan’s re-election it proved very difficult to regain political momentum.71 Cer-
tainly, activists and “political organizations continued their work, now including 
virtually all the types of political action that characterized the movement in 
earlier years: civil disobedience and direct action, symbolic demonstration and 
educational events.”72 But the numerous activities now lacked a unifying cam-
paign and a slogan that everyone could work with. The FREEZE campaign lost 
much of the public’s attention, creating the impression that the peace movement 
as a whole had collapsed after Reagan’s election victory. In fact, the process of 
diversification continued. To understand this process in the second half of the 
1980s, it is worth taking a look at basic ideas that were relevant in the whole U. S. 
peace movement.
In 1986, after peak public attention for the peace movement as a whole had 
long since subsided, some 500 “significant” U. S. peace organizations (meaning 
those with a budget in excess of $30,000) were active, between them covering a 
broad spectrum of issues.73 As a rough breakdown: one portion of the movement 
concentrated on lobbying for FREEZE and arms control; another important 
set of groups dealt with anti-interventionism, an issue made relevant by U. S. 
policy towards Central America during the 1980s; and a third portion can be 
categorized as the nonviolent current within the movement. Differences between 
these strands of peace activism were not based solely on political distinctions or 
preferences in strategy; rather, all three portions of the movement can be traced 
back to strong peace traditions and ideas, stemming from the nineteenth century, 
that were connected with certain concepts of world order.74 
What the FREEZErs, the anti-interventionists, and the nonviolence groups 
had in common was their concern over the question of how to end wars, or 
how to avoid them altogether. The point where they diverged, however, was in 
their analysis of the causes of war. Like other schools of political analysis, the 
underlying assumptions of their peace concepts can be distinguished according 
to whether they were inclined to interpret the mechanisms of the international 
system as a result of interaction between the great powers, or as an essentially 
anarchical world order, or as the outcome of human relationships on a large 
scale.75 First, the great power analysis “attributes the causes of war and peace 
71 Ibid., p. 253.
72 Ibid., p. 254.
73 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith (eds.), Frame Changes, p.11.
74 About the many different peace groups that supported FREEZE see Lawrence Stephen 
Wittner, Confronting the Bomb. A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Move-
ment, Stanford 2009, pp. 152–158.
75 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith (eds.), Frame Changes, p. 6.
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to the policies and behaviors of a small number of great nations.”76 This is the 
basis of most bilateral security concepts, like the one that was favored by FREEZE. 
Secondly, the world order analysis “views the cause of war as the result of the 
anarchy of the international system,”77 and this raises the issue of promoting 
multilateral institutions and more coordinated policy-making processes. This 
conception of international conflicts was favored by anti-interventionist groups 
who interpreted U. S. foreign policy as part of the problem of global inequality 
and human rights violations. Finally, the nonviolence analysis “sees the cultural 
acceptance and use of violence in the range of human relationships as the core 
obstacle to peace.”78 If international relations are interpreted from this third 
perspective, then conversely, appropriate frames for peace must be developed that 
offer plausible strategies for preventing the system from pursuing acts of violence, 
armament, or war.79 
All of these three peace frameworks have had a presence throughout the 
history of peace movements in the U. S., alternatively favoring the establishment 
of international organizations or a preference for bilateral agreements. A focus on 
the advancement of civilized human behavior in order to establish a non-violent 
culture80 partially underlies many educational programs and is an explicit aim 
of peace education.81 While in the first half of the twentieth century many 
peace organizations followed world order analysis and supported the League of 
Nations and other international institutions, from the 1970s on, more and more 
organizations and activists focused on “more great power-oriented unilateralist 
and bilateralist approaches,” especially when they were critical of the U. S. nuclear 
strategy.82
Against this backdrop, we should keep in mind that “peace” and “security” are 
always interconnected, but which one of the two terms is preferred at any time 
depends on the political context and its framing. This “rule” applied to the peace 
movement of the 1980s. The U. S. case illustrates perfectly how peace movements 
can raise public awareness (and how they need the public’s attention), but it 
also shows the costs. The complex meaning of the activists’ topic (security and 




79 These three concepts are quite static and should only outline the horizon of peace ideas 
at this point. But it is important to note that these interpretations are based on the same 
fundamental assumptions as those of international relations theorists. See e.g. Kenneth 
Waltz, Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis, New York 1959.
80 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith (eds.), Frame Changes, p. 7.
81 Till Kössler and Alexander Schwitanski (eds.), Frieden lernen. Friedenserziehung und 
Gesellschaftsreform im 20. Jahrhundert, Essen 2013.
82 Charles Chatfield with Robert Kleidman, The American Peace Movement. Ideals and 
Activism, New York 1992; Lawrence Stephen Wittner, One World Or None: a History of the 
World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953, Stanford 1993.
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was partly due to the close interdependence of protest and the media—the media 
being necessary because the latter “create public attention for their [protesters’] 
concerns and help them gain influence on the thematic agenda of the political 
system.”83 Since the logic they follow is based on newsworthiness, the mass 
media create content based on a simple distinction between information or 
non-information, which immediately affects the medial perception and repre-
sentation of any event or phenomenon.84 This mechanism fostered a reduction 
of the demands spelled out in the “Call to Halt the Arms Race” to the simple 
“FREEZE” formula. Eventually, the idiosyncratic public sphere, which is closely 
linked to the logic of the media system and its modes of communication, adopted 
and interpreted the FREEZE concept and campaign. But the closer the diplomatic 
success of a treaty between the U. S. and the Soviet Union became, the less news 
value FREEZE could offer and the less attention the campaign received. 
After the re-election of Ronald Reagan not only FREEZE but members of 
the whole peace movement questioned their strategies and goals. The reactions 
ranged from downright romantic gestures to strategies of professionalization. 
For example, a part of the movement relied on completely new forms of protest to 
attract public attention and to satisfy the need for concrete action. This included 
the Great Peace March for Global Nuclear Disarmament, which David Mixner, a 
prominent gay rights activist and political campaign strategist, was instrumental 
in bringing to life. In 1986 it brought some hundreds of peace activists from Los 
Angeles to Washington D. C.85 In turn a large number of FREEZE supporters 
were in favor of organizational consolidation, which is why the campaign merged 
with another huge organization, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear 
Policy (SANE), which had been going since 1957. The advantages of a merger 
were obvious, as SANE was a well known organization originally founded by 
prominent Americans “to stimulate debate on the hazards of nuclear testing”,86 
and had been involved in nuclear risk education for many years. Moreover, the 
campaigns that had previously focused on diverse issues decided to consolidate 
their resources and, in 1993, created Peace Action. In their own eyes, they had 
succeeded in implementing the anti-nuclear consensus of those opposing the 
83 Benjamin Ziemann, Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA since 1945: 
Introduction, in: Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen 32 (2004), pp. 5–19, 
17.
84 A general approach in Bart Cammaerts, Alice Mattoni, and Patrick McCurdy (eds.), Media-
tion and Protest Movements, Bristol 2013. See for the German case Kathrin Fahlenbrach and 
Laura Stapane, Visual and Media Strategies of the Peace Movement, in: Christoph Becker-
Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp (eds.), 
The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of 
the 1980s, Oxford / New York 2016, pp. 222–241.
85 Harvey, American Anti-Nuclear Activism, pp. 143–167.
86 The Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute National Committee for a Sane 
Nuclear Policy, https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/national-committee-sane-
nuclear-policy-sane (last accessed on March 17, 2020).
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Reagan Administration, nudging the latter finally to move away from the zero 
option and aspire to achieving the INF Treaty. In reality, their influence may have 
been more indirect. Their successes at the beginning of the 1980s reflected the 
mood of large parts of the population, which the government had to acknowledge.
5. INF and FREEZE in the Long Run
The question of who could claim the implementation of the INF Treaty as their 
political success remains to be discussed on different levels.87 This question—of 
who succeeded—fails to address other decisive issues, such as the possibilities and 
strategies opposition politics had in the 1980s; and they were by no means limited 
to the Democratic Party. Furthermore, a look at the peace movement shows that 
the processing of international goals such as the INF Treaty was strongly linked 
to domestic political and social debates. 
For the peace movement, the political debate of the 1980s became a lesson in 
the pitfalls of mass mobilization and cooperation with political elites, paradig-
matically highlighted in the relation between the movement and the President. 
On the one hand, in the perception of the peace activists, Reagan’s rhetoric and 
statements on limited nuclear war underwent significant changes within a year 
of his 1981 inauguration. This was strongly demonstrated in his radio address of 
May 1982, when he stressed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never 
be fought.”88 Whatever motives had influenced the President and had led to 
this statement—inner conviction, a desire to contain the popularity of FREEZE, 
or concerns about public opinion—he eventually abandoned his earlier, strictly 
hawkish stance and stressed opportunities for diplomatic solutions to the arms 
race. On the other hand, the President continued to be suspicious of the move-
ment, and he openly insinuated that it was influenced and manipulated by the 
Soviet Union.89 
All in all, we can assume that FREEZE, together with many other smaller 
initiatives, was an important factor that shaped the oppositional climate, and 
thus also the reactions of the government. But international opposition exercised 
a lot of influence too, when the Reagan Administration found it had to take heed 
of the European peace movements and when public opposition to the NATO 
Double-Track Decision reached new heights. The campaign, however, interpreted 
the policy change as a consequence of its own educational work in influencing 
87 Lawrence Wittner gives the peace movement “the bulk of the credit” for the breakthrough 
toward the INF Treaty, see Lawrence Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 403.
88 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 506 quoting Radio Address to the Nation on the Federal 
Budget and the Western Alliance, May 29, 1982, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/
speeches/52982a. On Reagan’s stance on nuclear weapons see the contributions by Beth 
Fischer and Ronald Granieri in this volume. 
89 Santese, Ronald Reagan, p. 510.
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public knowledge and the public’s mood; they saw 1983 as “a turning point in 
shaping the premises for a change in Reagan’s foreign policy.”90 
In the long run, U. S. peace activists have learned their lessons and have taken 
into account the interdependence of external and internal conditions for their 
protest and the need to develop multi-layered concepts of peace and security. As 
an arms control lobbyist and member of the Union of Concerned Scientists said 
in 1994:
Trying to use the old strategies of the 1980s to cut military spending down does not 
work as well. It’s just not as relevant. […] We are [now] getting into nonproliferation, 
peacekeeping, and cleaning up the weapons complex. But we are not just lobbying against 
things, but lobbying for things that we want to see us doing: multilateral responses to 
regional conflicts, developing new mechanisms and full funding for peacekeeping, full 
U. S. participation in the UN, repair the damage of the Cold War, economic conversion, 
and deciding what our security priorities should be after the Cold War. It is a whole 
cultural change for us.91 
Indeed, since the mid-1980s, peace movement mobilization has seen a general 
decline and a substantial loss of public support, especially among arms control 
and FREEZE groups. But, at the same time, surviving peace groups and organiza-
tions have reasserted their demands and agenda and have shifted towards a more 
structural or radical critique of the system of international relations.92 The 2017 
Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear 
Weapons (ICAN)—an extremely professional network and coalition of different 
NGOs supporting the implementation of the UN nuclear weapons ban treaty—is 
the best evidence of this shift.93 Anyone who asks where the peace movement 
stands today must be aware that peace activism has changed. For example, it no 
longer employs concepts that tend to have a catch-all character, in the hope that 
this will advance its primary objective of gaining substantial influence. FREEZE 
was an extraordinarily popular campaign in the 1980s, but it is far from being 
the only manifestation of protest and campaigning among U. S. or international 
peace activists.
90 Ibid., p. 514.
91 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith, Frame Changes, p. 19. They are referring to Jenny Week from 
UCS.
92 Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith, Frame Changes, pp. 20–23.




West German Politics, the INF Treaty,  
and the Popular Dynamics of Peace
The revolutionary turn in international affairs leading up to the INF Treaty, had 
a tremendous impact on West German foreign politics. On August 26, 1987, 
Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl publicly abandoned long-standing and deeply 
held principles with regard to the role of nuclear weapons in keeping the peace in 
Europe.1 In a sensational press briefing, he publicly agreed to the dismantling of 
West Germany’s very own, but rather aged Pershing IA missiles. These weapons 
systems had been deployed way back during the 1960s. In the mid-1980s, they were 
rapidly losing their readiness and military utility. Yet they continued to be of politi-
cal and symbolic value, by making the military of non-nuclear West Germany an 
integral part of NATO’s nuclear deterrent.2 Moreover, the Pershing IA, as well as 
other intermediate nuclear weapons such as the Pershing II and ground-launched 
Cruise Missiles that had been stationed in the wake of NATO’s 1979 Double-Track 
Decision, had long been seen as a means to ensure that nuclear war (or warfare in 
general) would not be limited to the territory of the two German states. 
The promise of an INF Treaty, which proposed to disband all intermediate-
range nuclear missiles in Europe, thus once again raised a specter that had 
haunted West German politicians for more than two decades: at all costs they 
must avoid a scenario in which West Germany could be “decoupled” from the 
American security guarantee by potentially limiting a nuclear war (or war in 
general) to central Europe. As conservative critics of Kohl’s move were pointing 
out, a situation might once again emerge, in which the two German states would 
be devastated by a military conflict that was geographically limited to Europe, 
while the two superpowers would shield their own territories from the ravages of 
war. After all, that fear of a “singularization” of West Germany had driven Kohl’s 
1 That always precarious “consensus” is best described by the strategy of “flexible response,” 
which, since the late 1960s, linked conventional military upgrades with an American willing-
ness to threaten the use of substrategic nuclear weapons. It was established in response to the 
NATO crisis of the late 1960s, see Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A 
Crisis of Credibility 1966–67, Oxford 1996, pp. 389–402; Kori N. Schake, NATO Strategy and 
the German-American Relationship, in: Detlef Junker, Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach, 
and David B.  Morris (eds.), The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 
1945–1990. A Handbook, Vol. 1, 1945–1968, Cambridge 2004, pp. 233–239. 
2 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Null-Lösung. Entscheidungsprozesse zu den Mittelstreckenwaffen 
1970–1987, Frankfurt a. M. 1988, p. 19. 
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predecessor Helmut Schmidt toward what would become the NATO Double-
Track Decision. From both Schmidt’s point of view and Kohl’s, this had become 
necessary, because Soviet medium-range missiles (such as the SS-20) had been 
left out of the U. S.–Soviet SALT negotiations, which only covered systems with a 
range above 5,000 kilometers.3
While it looked as though the Federal Republic was succumbing to interna-
tional pressures when Kohl grudgingly accepted the retirement of the Pershing 
IA, the Chancellor was in fact bowing to domestic public opinion as well as to 
pressure from within his own government, as I will argue in this essay. At home, 
Kohl faced a potential parliamentary majority that favored radical steps toward 
disarmament and which was quite in harmony with the majoritarian attitudes 
of the West German population. The rise of Gorbachev had contributed to 
an evaporation of the strong anti-Communist sentiments and mostly negative 
perceptions of the Soviet Union that had long been a hallmark of West German 
politics.4 Only a few years earlier, distrust of Moscow had prevailed among a 
majority of West Germans. In 1982/83 the country had heatedly discussed the 
question of whether the NATO Double-Track Decision should be implemented or 
not. Despite considerable opposition from the Left, the argument put forward by 
Kohl and the conservative side had carried the day: they claimed that, by intro-
ducing the SS-20, the Soviets had clandestinely acquired military predominance 
in Europe and put West Germany in a difficult strategic spot. As the proponents 
of Nachrüstung had relentlessly argued, the Soviets were out to weaken the trust 
between Germany and her Western Allies by undermining NATO’s doctrine of 
“flexible response.”5 While the huge peace movement of the early 1980s had 
3 See Tim Geiger, The NATO Double-Track Decision: Genesis and Implementation, in: Chris-
toph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne 
Zapp (eds.), The Nuclear Crisis: The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace 
Movement of the 1980s, New York 2016, pp. 52–69, here p. 56; and Oliver Bange, SS-20 
and Pershing II: Weapon Systems and the Dynamization of East–West Relations, in: ibid., 
pp. 70–86, here p. 71. 
4 See Hermann Wentker, Die Deutschen und Gorbatschow 1987 bis 1989. West- und ost-
deutsche Perzeptionen zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel, in: Hanns Jürgen Küsters (ed.), 
Der Zerfall des Sowjetimperiums und Deutschlands Wiedervereinigung, Köln / Weimar / Wien 
2016, pp. 119–149; Tim Matthias Weber, Zwischen Nachrüstung und Abrüstung. Die Nuk-
learwaffenpolitik der Christlich–Demokratischen Union Deutschlands zwischen 1977 und 
1989, Baden-Baden 1994, pp. 271–275. 
5 Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Mari-
anne Zepp, Introduction: The Nuclear Crisis, NATO’s Double-Track Decision, and the Peace 
Movement of the 1980s, in: Becker-Schaum et al. (eds.), Nuclear Crisis, pp. 1–36, here p. 3; 
the German wording is important in this context. While Nachrüstung refers to technical 
“retrofitting”, the defenders of the NATO Double-Track Decision used this term to highlight 
the fact that Western “rearmament” had only come “after” (nach) the Soviets had started to 
deploy the SS-20; the peace movement disputed this temporal order and preferred the term 
“Aufrüstung” (armament). 
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clearly lost the battle over “Euromissiles”, it had been successful in turning the 
German public further toward “peace.”6 
In addition, a dramatic normalization of East–West German–German rela-
tions contributed to those rather unprecedented political steps. In 1987, the Cold 
War between the two German states was finally laid to rest. In the summer of 
1987, the impending first visit of the East German State and Party Chief, Erich 
Honecker, to the West German capital city of Bonn was looming large in German 
politics.7 To complete this highly popular course of German–German détente, 
Kohl needed to make concessions with regard to disarmament, even though the 
INF Treaty seemingly violated the very strategic and intellectual base that had 
formed the core of the West German and transatlantic “security consensus” 
since the 1960s. Its resurrection had been central to Kohl’s argument during 
the 1979–1983 Nachrüstungsdebatte (“Euromissiles debate”). But as the West 
German government knew full well, the Soviet Union would not have consented 
to Honecker’s trip to West Germany if Kohl had held out on the Pershing IA.8 
Thus Kohl’s dramatic reversal over nuclear weapons on August 26, 1987 not only 
removed an important obstacle with regard to the conclusion of the INF negotia-
tions in Geneva, but opened the path toward a Honecker visit to Bonn as well.9 
That visit was popular in West Germany, even though Honecker himself was not. 
During his discussions with Honecker, Kohl drew attention to the sacrifice of the 
Pershing IA missiles as an important gesture of West German good will. As Kohl 
and Honecker agreed, the two German states needed to work together to secure 
peace in Europe.10
Even though his more “dovish” stance on nuclear weapons would bring Kohl 
into conflict with the conservative “steel helmet” faction within his own political 
camp and the few remaining Cold War “hawks” in West Germany, it endeared 
him to the liberal wing of his government. Faced with a possible parliamentary 
majority in favor of a “double zero” option that included the Pershing IA, Kohl 
sided with the “doves.” Ultimately, however, the “Kohl reversal” was made pos-
sible by a “peacenik” public that was more in harmony with the positions of the 
early 1980s peace movement than with the old Cold War consensus that had still 
6 Philipp Gassert, Arbeit am Konsens im Streit um den Frieden: Die Nuklearkrise der 1980er 
Jahre als Medium gesellschaftlicher Selbstverständigung, in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 52 
(2012), pp. 491–516.
7 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, Munich 2012, pp. 468 f.; as 
Schwarz argues, even though Kohl himself remained skeptical with regard to the ultimate 
outcomes of German–German détente, the strong liberal wing of the CDU was very much 
in favor of a Honecker visit and a continued rapprochement between the two German states. 
8 See the contribution by Hermann Wentker in this volume. 
9 See the conversation between Genscher and GDR Foreign Minister Fischer, September 8, 
1987, in: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1987, ed. 
by Tim Szatkowski, Tim Geiger, and Jens Hofmann, Berlin 2018, Doc. 247, pp. 1244–1251, 
here p. 1245. 
10 Conversations between Kohl and Honecker, September 7, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 244 
and 245, pp. 1223–1243, here p. 1224. 
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prevailed five years earlier during the heated debates on the NATO Double-Track 
Decision. In the end, Kohl’s departure from Cold War orthodoxy made sense not 
only with regard to West Germany’s relations to its Allies and to the Soviet bloc 
but, most importantly, made sense from a domestic political point of view. Like 
attitudes in most of Western Europe, West German public opinion had seen a 
decisive turn toward peace since 1985.11 Whether that was due to the “Gorbachev 
factor,” as some scholars like Jeffrey Herf have argued,12 or was the outcome of 
a belated “victory” of the peace movement, as for example Lawrence Wittner has 
proposed, will remain a topic for many future discussions.13 
1. The Kohl Reversal: The Chancellor’s About-Face on Nuclear 
Weapons in the Summer of 1987 
German Chancellors are normally quite reluctant publicly to invoke their consti-
tutional right to set binding policy guidelines on members of their own cabinet 
(Richtlinienkompetenz).14 On August 26, 1987, Kohl, who only in January of that 
same year had been re-elected for a second time, and who seemed quite securely 
enthroned in the Chancellor’s office, felt that he needed to do exactly that. 
Among members of his center-right Christian Union / Liberal Democratic coali-
tion government, the discussion had been spiraling out of control as to whether, 
under an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, West Germany would 
be allowed to keep its remaining 72 Pershing IA ballistic missiles. The Federal 
Republic had acquired these weapons during the 1960s. Should there be a war, 
they could potentially deliver U. S. nuclear warheads to areas controlled by the 
Warsaw Pact Organization. While the Federal Republic had solemnly renounced 
the right to own nuclear weapons and had signed the 1968 Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty (NPT), the Pershing IA missiles were an integral and highly 
symbolic part of NATO’s nuclear escalation continuum. They were meant to 
forestall a “singularization” of non-nuclear Germany within NATO and vis-à-vis 
11 Maria Eleonora Guasconi, Public Opinion and the Euromissile Crisis, in: Leopoldo Nuti, 
Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), The Euromissile Crisis and the 
End of the Cold War, Stanford 2015, pp. 271–289, here p. 286. 
12 Jeffrey Herf, War By Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of 
the Euromissiles, New York 1991, pp. 224–233.
13 Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarma-
ment Movement 1971 to the Present, Stanford 2003, pp. 403–404. 
14 Everhard Holtmann, Die Richtlinienkompetenz des Bundeskanzlers—kein Phantom?, in: 
Erhard Hoffmann and Werner J.  Patzelt (eds.), Führen Regierungen tatsächlich? Zur 
Praxis gouvernementalen Handelns, Wiesbaden 2008, pp. 73–84; from a historical point 
of view Philipp Gassert, Bildung und Management von Koalitionen. Die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland in historischer Perspektive, in: Philipp Gassert and Hans Jörg Hennecke (eds.), 
Koalitionen in der Bundesrepublik. Bildung, Management und Krisen von Adenauer bis 
Merkel, Paderborn 2017, pp. 11–28, here p. 23. 
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the Soviet Union, as well as prevent a “decoupling” of Germany from the U. S. 
nuclear guarantee.15 
In his August 26 press conference, the Chancellor announced, in a somewhat 
circumventive and technical way, that West Germany would take its Pershing 
IA down, if a deal by the Soviet Union and the United States would meet certain 
criteria. First, the two superpowers had to agree on, and ratify, an INF Treaty that 
abolished all medium-range nuclear missiles worldwide. Second, they needed to 
agree on a “satisfactory” verification regime. Thirdly, they needed to stay within 
their agreed timetable.16 Kohl’s strong conditional wording displayed a lingering 
distrust of the superpowers in general and the Soviet Union in particular. That 
was why he was linking his offer to the ratification and successful implementa-
tion of an INF Treaty—a line which he could not hold either. Yet in essence, he 
had very publicly “turned” on nuclear deterrence. As Kohl’s Christian Socialist 
Union (CSU) coalition partner and arch-rival within the Christian-Conservative 
camp, the baroque Bavarian Premier and CSU Party Chief, Franz Josef Strauß, 
later railed in his memoirs, the Chancellor’s step was “totally irresponsible” and 
“totally unjustified.”17 
Strauß was right that Kohl’s public statement amounted to a 180-degree turn-
around. It had been only three months since Kohl, speaking for the same West 
German government, had very confidently announced in the Bundestag that 
the Federal Government was in accord with its Western Allies that the German 
Pershing IA missiles had “never been part” of the Geneva INF negotiations and 
that they could therefore not be included in a Soviet–American “zero solution.”18 
Moreover, as Defense Minister Manfred Wörner had argued in early June, the 
Pershing IA would remain the only land-based NATO nuclear system that would 
not strike on German soil alone and could be used as a “negotiating chip” for 
15 On the fear of “decoupling” as the perennial nightmare of West German politicians, which 
had also motivated Helmut Schmidt, when he called for a NATO reaction to the SS-20, see 
William Burr, A Question of Confidence: Theater Nuclear Forces, US Policy toward Ger-
many, and the Origins of the Euromissile Crisis, 1975–1976, in: Nuti et al. (eds.), Euromissile 
Crisis, pp. 123–138.
16 Chancen für die Menschen in Deutschland und für Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle, 
Erklärungen des Bundeskanzlers, Bulletin der Bundesregierung 80/1987, https://www.
bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/1980-1989/1987/80-87_Kohl_2.html.
17 Franz Josef Strauß, Die Erinnerungen, Berlin 1989, p. 552; for further detail see Tim Geiger’s 
contribution to this volume. 
18 See Kohl’s speech in the Bundestag on June 4, 1987 in: Verhandlungen des Deutschen 
Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, 11th Legislative Period, 16th Session, p. 926. See also 
his second inaugural speech March 18, 1987, after the new government had been formed. 
Here, Kohl affirmed that there was “no alternative to the strategy of flexible response”, 
ibid., 4. Sitzung, p. 67; for a detailed, step-by-step treatment of Kohl’s reversal see Risse-
Kappen, Null-Lösung, pp. 150–170; Karl-Rudolf Korte, Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls 
Kanzler schaft. Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989, Stuttgart 1998, p. 328, and the 
contribution by Tim Geiger in this volume. 
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future negotiations on short-range missiles striking below 500 kilometers.19 That 
expectation had soon turned out to be quite erroneous. In early August 1987, 
Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze very pointedly asked how it could 
be that the Federal Republic was interloping in Soviet–American negotiations, 
thereby threatening the successful conclusion of a historic disarmament treaty. 
If the superpowers agreed to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons—those 
striking within the 500 to 5,000  km range—the Pershing IA, with a range of 
720 km, would have to go to as well.20 
Thus, on the surface, it looked as though Kohl was mostly giving in to 
international pressures, along with the more dovish members within his own 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as well as the Free Democrat (FDP) “Liber-
als,” led by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The Pershing IA missiles 
were increasingly outdated and needed modernization.21 While military experts 
were quite clear on that point, officials in Kohl’s government, including several 
high-ranking members of his Party, were prevaricating. Many were not as much 
concerned about international resistance to Germany’s modernization plans as 
about German public opinion. Indeed, during the summer of 1987, the Reagan 
Administration had even pressured West Germany to go ahead with moderniza-
tion, as had been decided on by NATO way back in 1983.22 Even France, which 
was not usually too keen on a nuclear Germany, shared some of the concerns 
of the West German government that the INF Treaty would leave the Federal 
Republic in a vulnerable position.23 
Yet, though internationally there seems initially to have been some room for 
maneuver, Kohl had West German public opinion against his position; and that 
was more important. While ostensibly he was bowing “to international pressures,” 
he was in fact giving in to the prevailing sentiment of the German population as 
well as of a majority of deputies in the Federal Parliament. In early May 1987, 
Kohl’s Liberal coalition partner had been very publicly sliding in the direction of 
the Social Democrats and the Green Party by opposing plans to modernize the 
Pershing IA. Ever since Helmut Schmidt had “discovered” the “missile gap” in 
1977, the debate had been complicated by the confusing way in which the various 
categories of nuclear weapons were defined. This structured not only the Geneva 
negotiations between the superpowers, but also the nuclear weapons debate in 
19 Herausforderungen der Zukunft: Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung auf der 
Kommandeurstagung der Bundeswehr in Oldenburg, Bulletin der Bundesregierung No. 55 
(June 6, 1987), https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/1980-1989/ 1987/55-
87_Woerner.html. 
20 Die Sowjets unter Risiko halten, Der Spiegel, No. 33 (August 10, 1987), pp. 19–21, here p. 20. 
21 Memo by Adamek, May 20, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 145, pp. 726–728. 
22 Telegram by Ambassador van Well, Washington, July 16, 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 214, 
p. 1071–1077.
23 Consultations of the German and French Foreign and Defense Secretaries, May 21, 1987, in: 
AAPD 1987, Doc. 146, pp. 728–735, here p. 734; see the contribution by Christian Wenkel to 
this volume. 
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Germany. While experts talked about “long-range intermediate nuclear forces” 
(LRINF) with a 1,000 to 5,000-kilometer range and “short-range intermediate 
nuclear forces” (SRINF) with a 150 to 1,000-kilometer range, the “double zero” 
and the Geneva negotiations addressed those above 500 kilometers, which would 
include the Pershing IA. 
Therefore, Kohl’s about-face on the Pershing IA was the domestically expedi-
ent thing to do. Always the pragmatic centrist politician, Kohl knew that he was 
in a comfortable position to override the conservative “Cold Warrior” wing of 
his Party and his government. These included Strauß and the CSU, as well as 
Defense Minister and future NATO General Secretary Manfred Wörner and the 
so-called “steel helmet” group within the CDU, led by the powerful chief whip 
of the Christian Democratic Bundestag group, Alfred Dregger. Of course, the 
Pershing IA had been stationed way back in the 1960s and thus long predated 
the 1979 NATO Double-Track Decision, to which Kohl had once tied his political 
future and which would now be voided by the 1987 INF Treaty. Yet Kohl realized 
that West Germany could not win a fight over a nuclear delivery system whose 
warheads it did not even own, and whose limited range made it even less popular 
among West Germans. After all, these outdated weapons would hit only targets 
either within Germany or in its immediate neighborhood. 
2. A Dovish Domestic Context, West German Public Opinion  
and the “Gorbachev Factor”
While at first glance Kohl’s willingness to give up the Pershing IA looks surpris-
ing, it made a lot of sense from a domestic point of view. In 1982/83 he had first 
formed a new government (replacing the “father” of the NATO Double-Track 
Decision, Helmut Schmidt, as Chancellor) and then, in early 1983, he had secured 
an electoral victory by promising not to give in to the “pressures of the street” but 
loyally to implement the NATO Double-Track Decision.24 Even though the world 
had moved toward détente since Reagan’s much-discussed 1984 “reversal”25 
and Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985, the military fundamentals with regard 
to the Soviet side were still the same as four years earlier. As has been explained 
above, by now accepting that the Pershing IA would be covered by the “double 
zero solution” of the INF Treaty, Kohl was violating one of the basic premises of 
West German security policy, held since the 1960s: that a situation must at all 
costs be avoided in which Germany could potentially be isolated and singularized 
behind a “nuclear firewall.” Even though Gorbachev sounded very different in 
comparison to his successors, in 1987 no one could safely predict that East–West 
tensions would not return. After all, it had twice happened during earlier phases 
24 Geiger, NATO Double-Track Decision, p. 65.
25 See the contributions by Beth Fischer and Ronald Granieri in this volume. 
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of the Cold War and no one in his or her right mind imagined the collapse of the 
Soviet Empire within four years.26
Members of the conservative faction within Kohl’s government were time and 
again pointing this out. Within the logic of deterrence, West Germany and her 
Western European Allies would still face a conventionally superior Soviet Union 
if they accepted an INF Treaty with no further guarantees and a successful con-
clusion of the Vienna negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe (MBFR). 
The latter had been dragging on without success since 1973, and no one in 1987 
expected them to lead to any meaningful result.27 At least on paper, the Soviets 
still held a huge conventional (and chemical) military advantage in Europe. 
NATO could not deter it adequately, at least not within the prevailing doctrine of 
“flexible response” that had been invented in 1967 to steer NATO strategy away 
from immediate all-out nuclear war. After an INF Treaty, West Germany would 
be much more dependent on a U. S. nuclear guarantee that rested on strategic 
weapons stationed at sea or in the United States and not on weapons stationed in 
Western Europe. Thus, within the logic of a gradual response to a military threat 
from the East, West Germany would face a return to the uncertain times of the 
1970s before the NATO Double-Track Decision. 
A compounding problem for the conservative “hawks” was that the strategic 
debate had all the trappings of an “expert discourse” that went against common 
sense. The intricacies of NATO nuclear strategy were lost on most parts of the 
general public, who either did not appreciate or did not understand the reasoning 
behind “flexible response.” The 1967 core NATO idea of “flexible response” had 
always been a hard sell, and not just because it had introduced a European level 
of nuclear escalation instead of intercontinental nuclear exchanges. Even though 
it was supposed to strengthen NATO’s deterrence capabilities, ultimately, as the 
Potsdam military historian Oliver Bange has argued, it replaced “a strategy for 
preventing war […] by one for waging it.”28 Of course, that change of strategy, 
which had come with the 1967 Harmel Report, was supposed to make NATO’s 
willingness to deter an enemy more credible by giving the American President 
more options. While “flexible response” may have made deterrence more credible 
as the Soviet Union saw it, from the peace movement’s point of view that strategic 
reasoning was a load of nonsense. According to those in the peace movement, 
war would become more likely, because the threshold for using nuclear weapons 
would be lowered. This last perspective was now carrying the day in West 
Germany. 
26 After the 1955 “Cold War Respite,” East–West tensions had returned with a vengeance during 
the Berlin and Cuban Crises of the late 1950s and early 1960s. During the 1970s, détente had 
turned out to be short-lived, as was very vividly present in the minds of the decision-makers 
of 1987. 
27 In 1989 they were replaced by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, which 
would then lead to huge cuts in conventional armaments, see the contribution by Tim Geiger 
in this volume. 
28 Bange, SS-20 and Pershing II, p. 71.
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Spurred on by popular culture, people had always imagined what would 
happen “if deterrence fail[ed].”29 Most did not conceive of nuclear weapons 
as political weapons that had kept the peace in Europe since the late 1940s. 
But they did understand, and full well, that any systems that were meant to 
strike within 1,000 kilometers, would devastate Central Europe including all of 
Germany—East and West. The popular saying “Je kürzer die Raketen, desto toter 
die Deutschen (literally, “the shorter the missiles, the deader the Germans”) made 
it difficult to overcome resistance to any idea of nuclear modernization within 
a context in which the superpowers were moving toward détente. Only four 
years earlier, people had overwhelmingly accepted the stationing of new nuclear 
systems in the wake of the NATO Double-Track Decision. That decision, however, 
had been pushed through against the backdrop of renewed East–West tension and 
because the perception had taken hold among a majority of West Germans that 
the Soviets had been using foul play in accelerating their armaments programs 
in the 1970s. By 1987, those fears were gone. Since the first 1985 Geneva meeting 
between Gorbachev and Reagan and the astounding 1986 Reykjavik Summit, 
superpower relations had taken a revolutionary turn for the better. Thus, world 
politics seemed to be on a new trajectory toward peace.30 
That new spirit of détente swiftly caught on with the West German public.31 
It undercut any efforts Kohl and the conservative “Cold Warriors” tried to make 
to hang on to the Pershing IA as a nuclear insurance of last resort. Even before a 
single nuclear warhead had been removed, Gorbachev’s disarmament proposals 
and “charming” initiatives had had a marked impact on West German public 
opinion. Many Germans, not just those on the Left, were enchanted by the new 
CPSU General Secretary, who held out a carrot for overcoming Cold War enmity 
once and for all.32 In his 1987 book, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country 
and the World, Gorbachev explained not only how he saw the future of Russia, 
but how he thought that the “new thinking” was appropriate for Europe and the 
world, too. His line that “Europe is our common home” was well received in 
Germany. It evoked images of a common European heritage in a continent that 
has had its “fair share of wars and tears.”33 Despite the brutal German invasion 
29 See for example Jerome F. Shapiro, Atomic Bomb Cinema. The Apocalyptic Imagination on 
Film, London 2002; Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller, and Dierk Walter (eds.), Angst im 
Kalten Krieg, Hamburg 2009; Philipp Gassert, Popularität der Apokalypse. Überlegungen zu 
einer Kulturgeschichte der Nuklearangst seit 1945, in: Johannes Piepenbrink (ed.), Das Ende 
des Atomzeitalters, Bonn 2012, pp. 126–141.
30 For a classic contemporary treatment, see the still superb volume by Raymond L. Garthoff, 
The Great Transition. American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War, Washington, 
D. C. 1994, pp. 300–325. 
31 See Herf, War by other Means, pp. 218 f. 
32 Wentker, Die Deutschen und Gorbatschow, pp. 120–124. 
33 “Der Kontinent hat an Kriegen und Tränen mehr als genug gehabt.” I am quoting from the 
second German edition, Michail Gorbatschow, Perestroika. Die zweite russische Revolution. 
Eine neue Politik für Europa und die Welt, Munich 1989, p. 253. 
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of the Soviet Union during World War II, Gorbachev seemed to stretch out a hand 
to Germans as well as others. Moreover, he implicitly admitted Soviet guilt for the 
past, when he pointedly explained his concept in a speech in Prague.34 
Even though Gorbachev did not mention the United States and Canada as 
partners in that new “European home” and thus, in the conservatives’ view, 
was employing the old Soviet trick of dividing the West, the left-liberal German 
press urged Germany’s politicians to take Gorbachev at his word.35 The Social 
Democrats welcomed Gorbachev’s initiatives very warmly. In 1988, the main 
intellectual architect of the Social Democratic Ostpolitik of the 1970s, Willy 
Brandt’s erstwhile foreign policy advisor Egon Bahr, called for a “common 
security” in Europe, even if that left the Americans out in the cold. Shortly after 
the signing of the INF Treaty, he envisioned a new European order, in which 
Soviet and American forces would be withdrawn from Central Europe.36 What 
is interesting, though, especially in the light of more recent developments, is 
that some conservative circles outside the traditional Christian Democrat “Cold 
Warrior” orbit wistfully hoped for a day in which Russia would “move back 
into a European home” too. As the conservative CDU member of the European 
Parliament, Otmar Franz put it in 1987: the “European Home” included Russia, 
to which, six years later, he added the thought that, after the end of the Cold 
War, a Europe that included Russia would be competing in a triadic economic 
world order, in which North America and East Asia would form the antagonists 
of Europe.37 
Those skeptical of Gorbachev’s political initiatives were increasingly on the 
defense in West Germany. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was one 
of the early converts. The Liberals had gained votes in the January 1987 Federal 
elections, whereas the Christian Democratic Parties had suffered considerable 
losses. While the two partners were still negotiating the outlines of a new coali-
tion government, the Foreign Minister gave a speech at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos on February 1, 1987, in which he laid out his program for the 
coming years. He urged Germany’s European Allies, and by implication his 
future coalition partners as well, to take Gorbachev seriously: “If there is a chance 
today that, after forty years of confrontation, relations between East and West 
might have reached a turning point, it would be a mistake of historic proportions 
if the West were to pass on this chance, merely because it could not get over a 
mindset that always assumed the worst with regard to the Soviet Union.” And 
Genscher added: “We are prepared to take the promise of the common European 
home up and build this home together with the Soviet Union.” He concluded 
34 Ibid.
35 Wentker, Die Deutschen und Gorbatschow, p. 123. 
36 Egon Bahr, Zum Europäischen Frieden: Eine Antwort an Gorbatschow, Berlin 1988, p. 91; 
see Andreas Vogtmeier, Egon Bahr und die deutsche Frage. Zur Entwicklung der sozialde-
mokratischen Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik vom Kriegsende bis zur Vereinigung, Bonn 1996. 
37 Ottmar Franz, Europa und Russland—Das europäische Haus, in: Ottmar Franz (ed.), Europa 
und Russland. Das europäische Haus? Göttingen 1993, pp. 1–8, here p. 7. 
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quite emphatically: “Our motto can only be: Let’s take Gorbachev seriously, let’s 
take him at his word.”38 
Within the government, the dividing line was thus not between the Liberals 
and the two Christian Union Parties, but rather between members of the conser-
vative wing of the CDU with its Bavarian sister Party the CSU on the one side, and 
the more moderate Christian Democrats and Liberals on the other. As Genscher 
gleefully pointed out in his memoirs, his speech received mixed responses among 
Christian Democrats. At the same time, however, his call “to take Gorbachev at 
his word” led to positive responses from the German public and from leading 
left-center journalists like the influential editor of the Hamburg newsweekly Der 
Spiegel, Rudolf Augstein.39 As moderate members of the CDU / CSU group, such 
as the foreign expert Volker Rühe, pointed out time and again, the Christian 
Democrats had lost votes to the Liberals, because Strauß’s Cold Warmongering 
had sown doubts among the population as to whether the Bonn government 
was really on a trajectory toward disarmament and détente in Europe. That 
Genscher was seen as the one major politician who was constantly “talking about 
peace, while the Union parties are portrayed as warmongers” was not a winning 
strategy—as Kohl’s foreign policy advisor Horst Teltschik highlighted.40 
In retrospect, it is hard to understand why the Union parties were so divided 
about this point. Giving away the outdated 72 Pershing IA missiles, which anyway 
would have needed urgent modernization or replacement to stay fit for service 
beyond 1992, looked like a rather small price to pay. But the conservatives were 
not yet willing to pay this price, even though the German public was smitten 
by the very idea that Cold War enmity could be overcome in Europe. “German 
Angst” was gone; Gorbymania reigned supreme. This was shown in opinion 
surveys. Whereas in September 1983, 53 per cent of those polled expressed fear 
and felt anxious because of “threats from the East,” in September 1987, 63 per cent 
of the respondents did not think that Germany was facing such a threat at all. In 
May 1987, only 18 per cent of those polled thought that nuclear weapons were 
still necessary to deter the Soviets, while 57 per cent thought that conventional 
weapons could easily do the trick and have the same effect of keeping the Soviets 
and their allies at bay.41 
While Strauß continued to play the Cold Warrior, most German politicians 
seemed happy to go with the flow of public opinion and enjoy the new mood. In 
the run-up to the Federal elections of January 1987, many, including Chancellor 
Kohl, had campaigned on promises to take more initiatives toward disarma-
ment, with 60 per cent of the population now being in favor of totally abolishing 
38 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Nehmen wir Gorbatschow ernst, nehmen wir ihn beim Wort, in: 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Unterwegs zur Einheit. Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit, 
Berlin 1991, pp. 137–150, here p. 146 f., 150. 
39 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen, Berlin 1995, pp. 527–530. 
40 Ganz Wunderbar, in: Der Spiegel 7/1987, February 9, 1987, pp. 23 f. 
41 See the various public opinion surveys quoted in Weber, Nachrüstung und Abrüstung, 
p. 272–274.
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intermediate-range nuclear weapons—a very dramatic shift from how opinion 
stood in the fall of 1983. Even among supporters of the CDU / CSU, 47 per cent 
were in favor of a “zero option.”42 Yet while the Christian Democrats were in 
favor of a “zero option”, holding out against a “double zero solution” that would 
cover all SRINF including the Pershing IA carried increasingly higher political 
costs. The issue became one of the major points in the following state elections 
in Kohl’s home state of Rhineland-Palatinate, as well as in Hamburg, where the 
Christian Democrats were once again suffering major losses.43 With electoral 
results coming out in April and May, Kohl was finally convinced that he needed 
to move on the armament question.44 
Given the prevailing sentiments of the German population and a growing 
enthusiasm for disarmament and détente in Europe, those who were critical 
of a “double zero option” were at a loss to get their point across. Since the two 
superpowers were moving in the direction of abolishing all intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles with a scope beyond 500 kilometers, the argument that was put 
forward by Strauß, Wörner, Dregger and the other remaining Cold War hawks, 
that a removal of a whole class of nuclear weapons would leave Germany in a 
dangerous strategic spot, sounded less and less convincing. Strauß had lost the 
battle for the office of Foreign Minister in Kohl’s new government. Now, he 
saw himself increasingly sidelined and out of sync with public opinion. In his 
memoirs, he reflects upon the public mood in Germany, which he thought was 
inimical to a “sober and realistic weapons and disarmament discussion.” Strauß 
was enraged by the fact that, among many intellectuals as well as large chunks of 
the public, the “superstition” could not be overcome that “disarmament alone can 
secure the peace.” As was common practice at the time, he invoked the negative 
example of pre-World War II “appeasement,” pointing out that British and French 
efforts to contain Hitler by accepting some of his demands had opened a path not 
“toward the heaven of peace, but toward the hell of war.”45
How quickly the West German discourse on nuclear weapons had shifted 
toward the “peace camp,” became abundantly clear during a Budestag debate 
in early May 1987. Now the “dovish” side counted a majority of the Bundestag 
deputies and even included several representatives from the Christian Democrat 
camp.46 While Kohl reiterated the position that NATO did not consider the Per-
shing IA to be part of the Geneva negotiations, the Chief of the Free Democratic 
group, Wolfgang Mischnik, welcomed a “double zero solution” for his Party. He 
indicated that such a step might also include the Pershing IA, if the Western Alli-
ance clarified its position and if the Americans made it clear that NATO’s defense 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., p. 275. See also the contribution of Tim Geiger in this volume.
45 Strauß, Erinnerungen, p. 514. 
46 See Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, 11th Legislative 
Period, 10th Session, May 7, 1987, p. 558, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11010.pdf.
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strategy would not be undermined by such a move.47 There may have been a 
lot of “ifs,” but the direction in which the Liberals were heading was obvious. 
As the Green Party deputy, “peace researcher” and retired Lieutenant Colonel 
of the Federal Army, Alfred Mechtersheimer, pointedly noted during that same 
Bundestag debate, the conservative “hawks” were now facing a majority of Social 
Democrats, Greens and Liberals in favor of a “double zero solution”, without 
any “Pershing IA reservation.” At no other time than in 1983 would a nuclear 
modernization platform have gained a parliamentary majority.48
The straw that finally broke the camel’s back was the increasing unwillingness 
of the Western Allies to accept what they thought was an inconsequential position 
being held by the Federal Government, along with the subsequent question of 
modernizing the Pershing IA.49 That modernization was impending, if the 
Germans were holding on to the missiles. In the beginning, France and Britain 
had supported the German position on the Pershing IA, because they did not 
want their own independent nuclear deterrents to be part of a deal between the 
superpowers. But in the summer of 1987, perspectives within NATO were shift-
ing, since it had emerged that a deal with the Soviets could come to nothing if 
NATO held on to Germany’s Pershing IA. As the nuclear warheads of the Pershing 
IA were in the sole control of the United States, it was inconceivable, in the eyes 
of the public, that they should be left out from a Soviet–American deal—whereas 
British and French nuclear weapons were not owned or controlled by the U. S., 
even though the British also depended on U. S. launch systems. The West Ger-
man government had no choice other than to accept that it would not press for 
a modernization of the Pershing IA missiles if an INF Treaty could be signed. It 
also accepted that they would be removed.50 Even though the U. S. government 
had long supported the West German position on the Pershing IA, the American 
side was relieved to learn that Kohl had given up this “artificial impediment.” 
The renunciation would force the Soviets to move beyond rhetoric and “bring 
substance” to an INF Treaty.51
3. A Late Triumph for the Dying Peace Movement?
One of the ironies of the second half of the 1980s is the slow death of the peace 
movement. This came during a period in which the political spectrum in Germany 
was itself moving toward “peace.” Years of talk about “peace,” “disarmament,” 
and “making peace with ever fewer weapons,” a slogan that had been pioneered 
by the CDU, had moved the emphasis of West German political culture in the 
47 Ibid., p. 545 f. 
48 Ibid., p. 558. 
49 See Risse-Kappen, Nullösung, pp. 162 f.; Wirsching, Abschied vom Provisorium, pp. 568 f. 
50 Kohl’s press conference of August 26, 1987; see Tim Geiger’s contribution in this volume. 
51 Gesandter Paschke, Washington, to Foreign Office, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 235, pp. 1191 f. 
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direction of the peace movement’s core positions. The geopolitical shifts coming 
with Gorbachev’s ascent to power and Reagan’s “zero option” stances, as well as 
the “political springs” in most of Eastern Europe, rapidly narrowed the discursive 
space for hawkish positions. The conservative “Cold War” camp was therefore 
rapidly losing its erstwhile hegemony in the nuclear weapons debate. They could 
not rely on anti-Communist fears as they had successfully done during the early 
1980s, even though the peace movement itself was now going through a period of 
prolonged weakness. An indicator of the peace movement’s falling attraction was 
the dwindling number of people attending the annual Easter marches. In 1987, 
the march drew far fewer participants than marches four or five years earlier.52 
In the summer of 1987, it briefly looked as if the peace movement could stage a 
comeback. As members of the two Christian Union parties were heatedly debat-
ing whether they should resist the tendency toward a “double zero” option that 
included the Pershing IA, movement activists once again felt invigorated. Plans 
were being discussed for the fall of 1987 to organize marches and large block-
ades of the Pershing IA depots in Geilenkirchen (North Rhine-Westphalia) and 
Landsberg am Lech (Bavaria).53 If Kohl, Strauß, and the “Cold Warriors” dug in 
their heels, preventing a successful conclusion to the Geneva INF talks, activists 
expected to draw huge crowds for large-scale protest demonstrations once again. 
As a circular letter among peace movement members put it in early August 
1987: “It would be totally intolerable, if the historic chance of a first step toward 
disarmament were to be jeopardized by the German government. The failure of 
the Geneva negotiations would be a fiasco.”54 
The clash did not come. Kohl did not do the peace movement the favor they 
were expecting. When he abandoned his resistance to a “double zero” solution 
that included the Pershing IA, he pulled the rug from underneath the peace 
movement activists. While it is impossible to attribute dramatic policy shifts to a 
single cause, and even more difficult to measure the impact of protest movements 
on decision-making, the very idea that West Germany would go through another 
“hot autumn” made Kohl and many members of his political party think twice. 
Moreover, Kohl did not want to risk damaging the relationship with Genscher 
and the Free Democrats. As Kohl summarized in his memoirs: “By moving over 
to Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s foreign policy line, I possibly avoided a serious row 
within the coalition. In turn, I accepted a grave quarrel within the Union parties.” 
Kohl could pay that price, because he knew full well that public opinion was on 
52 Rüdiger Schmitt, Was bewegt die Friedensbewegung? Zum sicherheitspolitischen Protest der 
achtziger Jahre, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 18/1 (1987), pp. 110–136.
53 Cf. Wolfgang Hölscher and Paul Kraatz (eds.), Die Grünen im Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 
und Anlagen 1987–1990, Vol. 1, Düsseldorf 2015, Doc. 21, p. 113, and Doc. 22, p. 118.
54 Circular letter: Für einen sofortigen, ersatzlosen und endgültigen Abzug aller Pershing-
Raketen. Aufruf zur täglichen gewaltfreien Blockade der Stationierungsorte der Pershing 
IA- Atomraketen, S. 2, in: Archiv Aktiv, Bestand GMA KZU 10, quoted in the dissertation 
by Richard Rohrmoser, Sicherheitspolitik von unten. Gewaltfreie Proteste gegen nukleare 
Mittelstreckenraketen in Mutlangen 1983–1987, Mannheim 2019. 
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his and Genscher’s side and that he would be rewarded by a Honecker visit. He 
also thought that his willingness to move on the Pershing IA had impressed 
Gorbachev, who up until that point had tended to show Kohl the cold shoulder.55 
It is not too far-fetched, then, to argue that the early 1980s peace movement 
had had a marked impact on the political culture of West Germany. While it had 
failed to prevent the German government from going ahead with the Double-
Track Decision in 1983, with Kohl relentlessly campaigning for the stationing 
of Pershing II and nuclear-armed Cruise Missiles, the population seems to have 
opened up to the peace movement’s original goals and ideas as East–West tensions 
began to abate during the second half of the 1980s. This created a larger discursive 
space for the “peace camp.” If public opinion surveys are any guide at all, most 
people in West Germany still thought that the Green Party was too radical.56 
Yet most had moved beyond the old Cold War (“Harmel”) consensus. The old 
nightmare of West German foreign policy elites, that the Federal Republic could 
be “singularized” and decoupled from an American nuclear guarantee (which 
had provided the core argument for the NATO Double-Track Treaty), no longer 
found much resonance among the West German population.57 
4. Conclusion 
Although the peace movement had lost the “1983 war over the Euromissiles,” it 
had now won the “peace” by pushing Kohl toward a “double zero” solution that 
included Germany’s outdated Pershing IA. Though many activists had been 
disappointed by the turn of events in 1983 and large-scale peace demonstrations 
were a thing of the past, some members of the peace movement had turned their 
disappointment into a political resource of democratic resilience.58 Despite his 
qualified 1987 re-election success, Kohl was faced with an informal coalition of 
parliamentary deputies who had decisively moved in the direction of the peace 
camp. 
Many now favored getting rid of the Pershing IA because perceptions of 
Europe’s overall political situation had changed dramatically within a rela-
tively short period. By the second half of the 1980s, Cold War fears and anti-
Communism were largely gone; Germans were open to bigger disarmament 
steps. It seems that, after some initial hesitation, even the Chancellor was happy 
55 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, Munich 2005, pp. 550 f.; on the initial difficulties 
between Kohl and Gorbachev see Schwarz, Kohl, pp. 451–461. 
56 Silke Mende, Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn. Eine Geschichte der Gründungsgrünen, 
Munich 2011, pp. 483–485. 
57 See Risse-Kappen, Null-Lösung, p. 164; it is quite remarkable that the participants in the 
debates in the Bundestag in early May 1987, frequently invoked public opinion polls, when 
making the point that times had changed. This included Genscher and the FDP. 
58 Bernhard Gotto, Enttäuschung als Politikressource. Zur Kohäsion der westdeutschen Frie-
densbewegung in den 1980er Jahren, in: VfZ 62 (2014), pp. 1–33. 
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to play along. By aligning himself with Genscher and the Liberals as well as the 
more moderate members of the CDU, Kohl could keep his Bavarian archrival, 
Franz Josef Strauß, at bay. At the same time, he could undercut potential internal 
opposition from the more dovish members of his own Party, who were rallying 
against the Cold War hard-liners too.59 
While it created difficulties and fractures within Kohl’s Christian Democrat-
led coalition government, the INF Treaty was very much in sync with the feelings 
of a majority of West Germans—or rather those people who responded to public 
opinion surveys. It concluded the “move toward peace” and the acceptance of 
the status quo in Europe that had begun in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This 
is obvious from the fact, that in the summer of 1987, Kohl was getting ready 
for an unprecedented visit by the East German Chief of State and Party, Erich 
Honecker. Though Kohl repeatedly stressed that West Germany had not given 
up on its ultimate goal of reunifying the two German states, the very fact that 
Honecker had been invited to visit amounted to a ratification of the status quo 
in Europe and Germany. It was just another step in mentally accepting that “the 
other German state” existed. 
The same logic applies to the INF Treaty. While in hindsight, this Treaty may 
look like an opening gambit in the overcoming of the East–West division of 
Europe, blazing the way for the fall of the Wall, such a “post-Cold War” perspec-
tive was not held at all widely among contemporaries—at least, not in Germany. 
When, on June 12, 1987, U. S. President Reagan challenged Gorbachev to “tear 
down this wall,” it looked like a public relations stunt which willfully ignored the 
political basics in Europe. Many West Germans saw Reagan’s speech as oratory 
mostly aimed at domestic U. S. consumption and as an almost comic return to a 
Cold War rhetoric that now belonged to the past.60 It did not easily square with 
the same President’s revolutionary work toward disarmament in Geneva. The INF 
Treaty thus seemed like one more piece of ratification, ultimately consolidating 
the same old European order that had been established by the victorious powers 
with the 1945 Potsdam Treaty.
59 The Southwestern CDU, under the leadership of the Baden-Württemberg State Premier 
Lothar Späth, who tried to replace Kohl in 1988/89, had called for a “double zero” solution 
on May 24, 1987, see Risse-Kappen, Null-Lösung, p. 166. 
60 Jens Schöne, Ronald Reagan in Berlin: Der Präsident, die Staatssicherheit und die geteilte 
Stadt, Berlin 2017, pp. 44–45. 




The Elimination and Verification Process
1. The Objectives of the INF Treaty and the Role of Basing 
Countries
The Treaty of December 8, 1987 between the United States of America and the 
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)1 came into force on June 1, 1988. 
This Treaty aimed at solving the “missile crisis” in Europe and its set objective 
was to eliminate a whole class of ground-based, nuclear-capable intermediate-, 
medium- and shorter-range missiles, launchers and support structures. Three 
years later, on June 1, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union had destroyed 
all such assets in accordance with the Treaty provisions. 
The elimination process focused on deployed nuclear capable intermediate-
range and medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM / MRBM) and Cruise Missiles 
(IRCM) with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500  km. NATO assessed that Soviet 
MRBM such as the SS-4 (RSD-10) and SS-5 (R-12) with ranges well beyond 
1,500  km, and in particular the mobile SS-20 (RD-14) IRBM with a range of 
approximately 5,000  km, were a serious threat to Western Europe. The SS-20 
carried three independently targetable re-entry vehicles with nuclear warheads 
that could reach targets throughout Europe, including the United Kingdom and 
Spain, and could do so to a high accuracy of an estimated 300 meters. Although 
these were deployed mainly in Soviet western military districts, the USSR had 
also based approximately one-third of the more than 1,800 INF systems that it 
had in service with rocket forces east of the Urals, including 162 SS-20, to threaten 
China.2 
1 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 1987. 
Selected Documents No. 25, Department of State Publication 9555, published by the U. S. DoS, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication Editorial Division, Washington, 
D. C., December 1987 (in the following footnotes referred to as “INF Treaty”).
2 Steven Pifer, Avis T. Bohlen, William T. Burns, and John Woodworth, The Treaty on Interme-
diate-Range Nuclear Forces: History and Lessons Learned. Brookings, Arms Control Series 
Paper 9, December 2012, p. 12; Daryl Kimball and Kingston Reif, The Intermediate-Range 





On the Western side, the U. S. had begun to station ground-launched medium-
range ballistic missiles (GLBM) and Cruise Missiles (GLCM) on Allied territories 
in Western Europe following NATO’s Dual-Track Decision of 1979. This deploy-
ment included 108 Pershing II GLBM in West Germany and 464 medium range 
BGM-109G Tomahawk GLCM systems in West Germany, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Italy, and the United Kingdom. With ranges from 1,800 to 2,500 km, such 
mobile systems could reach vital Soviet targets within short flight times. More 
such systems were held on U. S. territory in a non-deployed state. Despite this, 
NATO’s Dual-Track Decision also kept the door open for dialogue and laid the 
ground for arms control negotiations aiming at the total elimination of ground-
based INF systems.3
In Europe, the large quantity of forward-deployed mobile shorter-range 
ballistic missiles (SRBM) with ranges between 500 and 1,000  km posed a sig-
nificant threat to the frontline countries of both alliances. The Pershing IA in 
West-Germany and the SS-12 (OTR-22) and SS-23 (OTR-23) in the GDR, ČSSR, 
Hungary, and Bulgaria were prime examples. The latter also posed a risk to 
NATO’s forward-deployed medium-range Cruise and ballistic missiles and, from 
a Western perspective, had to be included in the INF Treaty. As well as the SRBM 
held by the Soviet forces stationed in the GDR and ČSSR, Soviet allies like the 
GDR, ČSSR, Hungary and Bulgaria operated the same types of SRBM. As the 
West German Pershing IA SRBM, with a range of approximately 780 km, was 
capable of reaching the Polish–Soviet border area, the Soviet Union wanted a 
multilateral treaty that would oblige West Germany as well as themselves to scrap 
such missiles. However, the U. S. insisted on a bilateral agreement in order to keep 
issues of strategic relevance exclusively under national control. 
One argument in favor of a bilateral solution was the fact that, in peacetime, 
nuclear warheads were held exclusively under the custody of U. S. or Soviet forces 
and could be released for use through allied delivery only after the President of 
the United States or the President of the Soviet Union had given authorization. 
In fact, the INF Treaty did not contain any provisions on counting, verifying or 
dismantling nuclear warheads other than by separating them from their means 
of delivery before their destruction. 
Eventually, only U. S. and Soviet ground-based intermediate- and shorter-
range missiles with ranges from 500 km upwards were covered by the Treaty, 
together with their launchers and supporting structures. However, this agree-
ment became possible only after Chancellor Helmut Kohl had declared that West 
3 Overview in: U. S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action. Bureau of Arms Control, 
Verification, and Compliance. Treaty Between The United States of America And The Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-
Range Missiles (INF Treaty), Signed December 8, 1987, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/
trty/102360.htm#narrative; see also Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, 
INF Treaty At a Glance. Fact Sheet. December 8, 2017; Pifer et al., The Treaty on Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces, pp. 6–13. 
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Germany would destroy its Pershing IA missiles unilaterally.4 National SRBM 
held by West Germany, the GDR, ČSSR, Hungary, and Bulgaria were destroyed 
between 1991 and 2002 following unilateral government decisions. The elimina-
tion processes of the non-superpowers were not verified under the umbrella of 
the INF verification regime, or with its methods. 
In consequence of the bilateral construction of the INF Treaty, the legal 
responsibilities for its implementation lay exclusively with the United States 
and the Soviet Union as the sole state parties to its terms. Nevertheless, as large 
portions of the INF missiles, launchers and supporting infrastructure were sta-
tioned in third countries, the consent of other countries was required for Treaty 
implementation, in particular for on-site inspections. Therefore, additional 
multilateral agreements had to be concluded by the United States and the Soviet 
Union with stationing countries. To that end, the United States concluded “The 
INF Basing Countries Agreement” in December 1987 with Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.5 
2. The INF Elimination and Verification Concept and Practice
To achieve the objective of eliminating all intermediate-, medium- and shorter-
range U.S, and Soviet Union missiles globally, it was necessary to make unprec-
edented and detailed rules for defining, counting and verifying all relevant 
armaments and equipment. A phased elimination process had to be agreed upon 
and organized—one that was balanced, transparent and verifiable. Given the 
numerical superiority of Soviet missiles, what the state parties agreed to was 
reciprocity of results rather than reciprocity of each and every reduction step. 
This method ensured that the military balance was maintained at every stage, 
under intrusive mutual control and observation. 
Verification played a crucial role in assuring compliance with a Treaty that 
had a pivotal impact on security in Europe. The INF concept of verification 
introduced ground-breaking and unprecedented rules of transparency, includ-
ing requirements for comprehensive data exchange and on-site inspection. The 
verification regime had to be construed in line with the scheduled process of 
the complete elimination of a high number of missiles, launchers, bases, and 
4 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, New York 1989, pp. 421–462; Strobe Talbot, The 
Road to Zero, in: Time, December 14, 1987, pp. 18–30. See also the essays by Tim Geiger and 
Philipp Gassert in this volume.
5 Agreement among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections relating to the Treaty 
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 1987 
(reprint July 1990), United States Information Service, Brussels, Belgium (henceforth “Basing 
Countries Agreement”).
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facilities that the Treaty had banned. These were in various locations throughout 
Europe and scattered through entire territories of the Soviet Union and the 
United States. The task required an initial establishment of a reliable database 
from which to proceed with the withdrawal, separation, and elimination of 
armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty. On the basis of this, an intrusive 
and reliable verification regime was designed, capable not only of certifying the 
completion of the elimination process but also of assuring that every step of the 
elimination process was done in accordance with the Treaty provisions, and was 
duly monitored and documented. To that end, the main body of the Treaty’s text 
established the principle provisions while details were specified in additional 
memoranda and protocols. 
The Treaty’s main text defined the assets that were to be eliminated, established 
time lines and basic provisions for the reduction processes, and set forth the 
verification concept. Details of types of missiles, launchers, and their supporting 
structures and equipment were contained in a Memorandum of Understanding 
Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty (MoU).6 A Protocol 
on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems Subject to the 
Treaty specified procedures for the elimination processes.7 Basic provisions 
for verification were enshrined in the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating 
to the Treaty,8 which was further complemented in December 1989 by the 
Memorandum of Agreement9 on verification.
2.1 Definitions and Counting Rules
According to Article I of the INF Treaty, both states party to it committed 
to “eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such 
systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.” 
The state parties also had to eliminate all launchers of such missiles along with all 
6 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the 
Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on 
the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (in the following 
footnotes referred to as “MoU”). 
7 Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems Subject to the 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (in the following 
footnotes referred to as “PoE”).
8 Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 
and Shorter-Range Missiles (in the following footnotes referred to as “PoI”).
9 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions 
of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Geneva, 
December 21, 1989 (print July 1990), United States Information Service, Brussels, Belgium.
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support structures and equipment.10 Once the Treaty came into force, the state 
parties were not allowed to produce, flight-test or launch any intermediate-range 
missiles (IRM) or shorter-range missiles (SRM) or produce any stages or launchers 
for such missiles.11
The weaponry subject to the Treaty was confined to ground-launched missiles, 
with their support structures and equipment, that had range capabilities between 
500 and 5,500 km. Those covered included all surface-to-surface missiles but 
excluded air- and missile defence (surface-to-air) missiles as well as air- and 
sea-launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM / SLCM).12 The term “missile” included 
“ground-launched ballistic missiles” (GLBM) and “ground-launched Cruise Mis-
siles” (GLCM) as weapon-delivery vehicles. “Intermediate-range missiles” (IRM) 
meant GLBM and GLCM with range capabilities above 1,000 km, reaching up 
to 5,500 km, while “shorter-range missiles” (SRM) referred to GLBM / GLCM 
with range capabilities between 500 and 1,000  km. “GLBM / GLCM launch-
ers” were defined as fixed or mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher 
mechanisms.13
The Treaty differentiated between deployed and non-deployed missiles and 
launchers according to their operational readiness and the stationing locations. 
Deployed IRM and IRM-launchers were located within deployment areas which 
contained one or more missile operating base (MOB) with a complex of support 
facilities. Deployed SRM and SRM-launchers were located at missile operating 
bases containing complexes of facilities and support equipment for the operation 
of SRM.14
The Treaty defined non-deployed missiles and launchers as those that were 
located outside deployment areas and MOBs. Such missiles and launchers were 
not held in a high readiness status for launch and were located in missile support 
facilities such as those specializing in production, repair, training, storage and 
elimination, or testing ranges. They could also be in transit—being moved 
between missile support facilities and deployment areas / MOBs after the transit 
had been duly notified following the notification provisions.15
According to article III of the INF Treaty, the following types of missile were 
subject to its terms: for the U. S.—the BGM-109G GLCM, Pershing II IRBM, and 
Pershing IA SRBM; for the USSR—the RSD-10 (SS-20), R-12 (SS-4), also the R-14 
(SS-5) IRBM and OTR-22 (SS-12) and OTR-23 (SS-23) SRBM. In addition, tested 
but non-deployed missiles and launchers were subject to the Treaty: for the U. S.—
the Pershing I B SR-GLBM; for the Soviet Union—the RK-55 (SSC-X-4) GLCM.16
10 INF Treaty, Art. IV, V, VI 1.
11 INF Treaty, Art. VI 1.
12 INF Treaty, Art. VII 3, 11.
13 INF Treaty, Art. II 1–6, Art. VII 4. 
14 INF Treaty, Art. II 7, 8, 11, 13.
15 INF Treaty, Art. II 9, 10, 12, 14.
16 INF Treaty, Art. X 6.
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2.2 Data Exchange and Update Notifications
Details were specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. This contained the 
data exchanged by both state parties as of November 1, 1987, prior to the signing 
of the Treaty, a document which established the first baseline data for elimination 
and verification. These details were updated 30 days after the Treaty came into 
force. The MoU included 2,619 deployed and non-deployed SRBM, IRBM and 
IRCM, their launchers, support equipment such as unique missile transporter 
vehicles, missile erectors, launch stands, propellant tanks as well as the deploy-
ment areas, MOBs, and missile support facilities such as production, repair, 
training, storage, test, and elimination facilities. It also covered missile stages, 
full-scale inert training missiles, training launch canisters, training launchers, 
unique fixed support structures for deployed IRBM / IRCM and their launchers as 
well as research and development launch sites. After data updates, a total of 2,692 
INF missiles—1,846 Soviet and 846 U. S. systems—had been destroyed at the end 
of the elimination process in May 1991, together with their support equipment 
and structures.17 
The baseline data specified that the U. S. possessed 689 IRM (429 deployed, 260 
non-deployed) and 170 non-deployed SRBM; while the Soviet Union possessed 
826 IRBM (470 deployed, 356 non-deployed) and 926 SRBM (387 deployed, 539 
non-deployed). The aggregate numbers of second stages of U. S. IRBM were 236, 
and of Soviet IRBM, 650. The aggregate numbers of second stages of U. S. SRBM 
amounted to 182, while the corresponding number for Soviet SRBM was 726. 
With the addition of the tested but not deployed 84 Soviet GLCM SSC-X-4, the 
aggregate number of Soviet missiles subject to the Treaty amounted to 1,836; the 
aggregate number of U. S. INF missiles was 859. 
Furthermore, the MoU specified 292 launchers for U. S. IRM (224 deployed, 
68 non-deployed)  and one non-deployed launcher for U. S. SRBM. The USSR 
possessed 608 launchers for IRBM (484 deployed, 124 non-deployed)  and 237 
launchers for SRBM (197 deployed, 40 non-deployed). It also counted 6 launchers 
for the tested but not fielded SSC-X-4 GLCM.18
Soviet missiles, launchers and support structures were dispersed at 133 sites in 
three states, as shown in Table 1.
U. S. missiles, launchers and support structures were dispersed at 34 sites in 
six states. All 9 MOBs and three of the 24 supporting facilities were located in 
Europe, 21 in the United States. This is shown in Table 2.19
17 FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) https://fas.org/
nuke/control/inf/.
18 All data referred to here are contained in MoU, Section II—V. 
19 Regarding the figure cited for Pershing IIs: most authors refer to 108 P II only, planned to 
be held in operational readiness on 108 launchers in Germany. The higher number of such 
missiles indicated in the chart includes those that were kept in reserve in MOBs (12) or as 
maintenance spares and in a non-deployed status, partially in deployment areas (12), and to 
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Table 2: Dispersal of U.S Missiles, Launchers, and Support Structures.
FRG UK Italy Belg. Neths. U. S. A. Total
Deployed Pershing II 120 – – – – – 120
3 MOB 3 MOB
Deployed BGM-109G 62 119 108 20 0 – 309
1 MOB 2 MOB 1 MOB 1 MOB 1 MOB 6 MOB
Non-depl. Pershing II 12 – – – – 115 127
2 facil 11 facil 13 facil
Non-depl. BGM-109G – – – 16 – 117 133
1 facil 6 facil 7 facil
Non-depl, Pershing 1A – – – – – 170 170
4 facil
Belg. = Belgium  Neths. = Netherlands
Non-depl. = non-deployed  facil = facilities  MOB = missile operating base
a larger extent in the United States (115). In 1987, the American figure (exceeding the official 
108) caused some concern amongst members of the West German Government, see Akten 
zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1987, Munich 1988, 
Doc. 319, pp. 1610 f.
Table 1: Dispersal of Soviet Missiles, Launchers, and Support Structures.
Soviet Union GDR ČSSR Total
Deployed SS-4/20 470 – – 470
61 MOB – –
Deployed SS-12/23 241 107 39 387
11 MOB 6 MOB 1 MOB 18 MOB
Non-depl. SS-4/5/20 356 – – 356
30 facilities – – 30 facilities
Non-depl. SS-12/23 539 – – 539
and SSC-X-4 24 facilities – – 24 facilities
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In addition, the MoU specified 11 U. S. and two Soviet Research and Development 
(R&D) Launch Sites with 30 U. S. and 5 Soviet R&D Booster Systems.20
The data contained in the MoU reflected the situation on November 1, 1987. 
Details were updated on July 1, 1988, to account for changes that had occurred 
before the beginning of the scheduled elimination process. After the end of each 
six-month interval following the moment when the Treaty came into force, each 
party had to provide a comprehensive new update through its Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Center (NRRC) to inform about changes in progress or completed 
removal and elimination processes made during the last half-year.21
The scheduled date of elimination of a specific deployment area, MOB or 
missile support facility, as well as changes to the numbers of items subject to 
the Treaty at such facilities, had to be notified not later than 30 days in advance. 
Notifications no later than 30 days in advance were also required for announcing 
the dates scheduled for the initiation of the elimination of IRM and SRBM, along 
with stages, launchers and support equipment and structures. The notifications 
had to include, inter alia, the location from which IRM, launchers and sup-
port equipment were being moved. For scheduled elimination of launchers of 
unarmed IRBMs or of research and development boosters a notification no later 
than 10 days in advance was required.22
The elimination process progressively changed the numbers of missiles, 
launchers and support structures, and equipment held by each side, and these 
changed numbers had to be communicated no later than 48 hours after elimina-
tion had occurred. Transits of INF missiles and launchers, including training 
missiles and training launchers, had to be notified no later than 48 hours after 
their completion.23 Further notifications were delivered, as required by the 
elimination process and its verification, through on-site inspections or coopera-
tive measures by use of National Technical Means (NTM). 
2.3 Reduction Phases and Methods of Elimination
The Treaty required each party to have destroyed all deployed and non-deployed 
IRM and SRBM, launchers, support structures and equipment no later than three 
years after its entry into force.24 Reductions had to be carried out in defined 
phases which distinguished between IRM and SRBM. Rather than specify equal 
numbers of missiles and launchers to be destroyed, the Treaty opted for these 
phases to ensure a strategic balance of warhead delivery capabilities during the 
20 MoU, Section VII.
21 INF Treaty, Art. IX 1–4.
22 INF Treaty, Art. IX 5 (a)–(d), 6.
23 INF Treaty, Art. IX 5 (e)–(f).
24 Parties agreed that all missiles shall be eliminated 15 days prior to the end of the overall 
elimination period. During the last 15 days, re-entry vehicles shall be withdrawn to national 
territories and be destroyed, PoE II. 9.
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entire process. Changes in the ratio between deployed and non-deployed IRMs 
and the ratio between the existing types of GLBM reflected in the MoU valid as 
of November 1, 1987 had to be avoided too.25
2.3.1 IRM, Launchers, Support Structures and Equipment
By the end of the first phase, which ended 29 months after the Treaty came into 
force, no party was allowed to exceed the following numbers of intermediate-
range missiles and launchers:
– an aggregate capability of deployed IRM launchers carrying or containing, at 
one launch, missiles deemed to carry 171 warheads; 
– numbers of deployed IRM deemed to carry 180 warheads; 
– aggregate numbers of deployed and non-deployed launchers capable of carry-
ing or containing, at one launch, missiles deemed to carry 200 warheads;
– aggregate numbers of deployed and non-deployed IRM deemed to carry 
200 warheads.26
By the end of the second phase—i. e. no later than three years after the Treaty’s 
coming into force—all IRM, launchers, support structures and equipment had to 
be eliminated. 
2.3.2 SRBM, Launchers and Support Equipment
All deployed SRBMs and deployed and non-deployed SRBM-launchers had to 
be removed to elimination facilities by a date not later than 90 days after the 
Treaty’s coming into force. They were to be retained there until the time of their 
destruction. The same applied to all non-deployed SRBMs, but within a time 
limit of 12 months. The elimination of all these, together with elimination of 
their launchers and support equipment, had to be completed not later than 18 
months after the Treaty became operative. It was not permitted for SRBMs and 
their launchers to be gathered in the same elimination facility: they had to be 
separated by a distance of at least 1,000 km.27
25 INF Treaty, Art. IV 2 (a), (v).
26 INF Treaty, Art. IV 2 (a), (i), (ii), (iii), (iv).
27 INF Treaty, Art. V 1–3.
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2.3.3 Elimination Process and Methods of Destruction
The numerous items subject to the Treaty were scattered in approximately 
160 sites across the northern hemisphere, but the elimination process required 
them to be concentrated at just a few elimination facilities. Thus, a significant 
number of movements (or “transits”) between MOB, supporting facilities and 
elimination sites had to be regularly notified and monitored, together with the 
respective changes in numbers of missiles, launchers and support equipment. 
Each transit had to be completed within 25 days.28 Prior to the arrival of missiles 
at elimination facilities their nuclear warheads and guidance elements were 
removed, while re-entry vehicles were subject to elimination.29 
To keep the withdrawal process orderly and verifiable, it was obligatory for 
the state parties to withdraw complete organizational units, such as Pershing II 
batteries, BGM-109G flights, and SS-20 regiments with two or three battalions, 
from the deployment areas and MOBs to the elimination facilities.30 However, 
during the first six months of the Treaty’s coming into force, both sides were 
allowed to eliminate up to 100 unarmed IRBM by means of launching.31 Within 
the same time frame, missiles, launchers and support equipment that had been 
tested prior to the Treaty becoming operative but which had never been deployed 
had to be eliminated too. This provision related to the U. S. Pershing IB GLBM 
and the Soviet RK-55 (SSC-X-4) GLCM.32
At the elimination facilities, missiles and launchers had to be destroyed by 
crushing, flattening, burning, or exploding stages, by severing airframes, wings, 
and tail sections into two pieces of equal size, or by cutting other components 
in half, in accordance with the technical provisions specified in the Protocol 
on Elimination. These destruction processes were observed and registered by 
inspectors from the opposite side.33
Fixed support structures had to be eliminated in situ, their superstructures 
dismantled or demolished and removed from their base. The foundations of 
fixed structures or shelters had to be destroyed by excavation or explosion. Such 
methods were registered and verified through on-site inspections or observation 
by photo-camera satellites. So that this could be done, destroyed bases had to 
remain visible to National Technical Means (NTM) of verification for six months, 
or until completion of an on-site inspection.34 
28 INF Treaty, Art. VIII 4.
29 PoE, II. 3, 9.
30 INF Treaty, Art. X 3.
31 INF Treaty, Art. X 4, 5; PoE, III. 2.: “No such missile shall be used as a target vehicle for a 
ballistic missile interceptor.”
32 INF Treaty, Art. X 6.
33 PoE, II. 7, 8, 10, with specifications for all missiles and launchers subject to the Treaty.
34 PoE, IV. 1. On NTM see section 2. f. (2) of this chapter.
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Training missiles, launchers and launch canisters were generally eliminated 
in situ, subject to on-site inspections. The Treaty also permitted elimination 
by static display of armaments and equipment after they had been rendered 
unusable. For each state party, this option was limited to a total of 15 missiles, 
15 launch canisters, and 15 launchers.35
Deployment areas, MOBs and missile support facilities had to be eliminated by 
removal of all missiles, launchers and support equipment from the sites, destruc-
tion or conversion of support structures and termination of all INF-related 
activities such as production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage, or deploy-
ment of missiles and launchers. Elimination was counted as being accomplished 
once all this was certified by an inspection, or when 60 days had elapsed since the 
notified scheduled elimination.36 In addition, conversion of any MOBs listed in 
the MoU for use as a base for GLBM / GLCM not subject to the Treaty was allowed, 
but this had to be notified no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled 
conversion.37 
2.4 On-site Inspections (OSI)
2.4.1 Phases and Quotas for OSI
Each state party had the right to conduct on-site inspections (OSI). The Treaty 
provided for a variety of mutual OSI to be made, either triggered by elimination 
action or based on annual quotas for short-notice verification. OSI could be 
carried out both within the territories of state parties and within the territories 
of basing countries.38
During the first 30 to 90 days after the Treaty came into force—i. e. between 
July 1 and August 29, 1988—the state parties had the right to conduct OSI 
of all MOBs, support facilities (other than missile production facilities), and 
elimination facilities. The purpose of such “baseline inspections” was to confirm 
the numbers and locations of missiles, launchers, support equipment and struc-
tures specified in the MoU, and thus build confidence in the reliability of the 
basic data.39
From 90 days after the Treaty’s coming into force, each state party had the right 
to conduct inspections of the elimination of MOBs and missile support facilities 
(other than missile production facilities). Any such inspection had to be carried 
35 PoE, IV. 3, V. 2.
36 INF Treaty, Art. X 8. Before the Treaty came into force, elimination of sites included in the 
MoU was possible without prior notification and on-site inspection. These sites were then 
subject to close-out inspections.
37 INF Treaty, Art. X 9.
38 INF Treaty, Art. XI 1–5, 7, 8.
39 INF Treaty, Art. XI 3.
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out within 60 days of the scheduled date of the elimination of that MOB or facility, 
which had to be notified 30 days in advance.40
Also from this 90-day mark, each state party had the right to conduct short-
notice inspections at MOBs and support facilities (other than production and 
elimination facilities) to ascertain either the number of missiles, launchers and 
support equipment located there at the time of inspection, or to confirm the 
elimination of former MOBs and support facilities. This arrangement was set 
to last 13 years. During the first three of these years, each state party could 
conduct 20 short-notice inspections per calendar year; during the following five 
years 15 such inspections; and for the remaining five years, 10.41
2.4.2 General Procedures for OSI 
In preparation for OSI, the state parties established and exchanged lists of certi-
fied aircrew members and inspectors. The lists were limited to a maximum of 
200 individuals and notifiction of their names had to be made one day after 
the Treaty came into force. It was possible to amend the lists if one side refused 
to accept certain individuals, so long as this was done within the next 20 days. 
Within 30 days, individual visas had to be issued, granting the right of the listed 
inspectors and aircrew members to enter the territory to be inspected and remain 
there for the “in-country time” of the inspection. During this time, inspectors 
and aircrew members enjoyed special privileges and immunities.42
Notification of intent to conduct an inspection had to be made through the 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) no less than 16 hours in advance of the 
estimated arrival time at the point of entry (POE). The inspected country had to 
acknowledge the receipt of such a request within one hour of its transmission. 
In cases of inspections of the completion of elimination of missiles, launchers 
and support equipment at elimination facilities, or of the accidental loss or static 
display of such items, notifications had to be issued no less than 72 hours in 
advance of the expected arrival time at the POE.43 The NRRC of the country 
to be inspected would then provide a flight plan enabling entry into its national 
airspace. This had to be done no less than six hours before the scheduled depar-
ture time of the inspection team from the last airfield outside the territory from 
which they were departing. The inspection team had to specify the inspection 
40 INF Treaty, Art. XI 4; PoE II. 2.
41 INF Treaty, Art. XI 5.
42 PoI, III. 2–7, Annex.
43 PoI, IV. 1. The Point of Entry (POE) is the airport specified in PoI I. 7. where inspection 
teams would arrive before conducting an inspection. There were two POEs each for the USSR 
(Moscow, Ulan Ude) and the U. S. (Washington, D. C., San Francisco, Calif.) and one each for 
the seven basing countries.
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site they had chosen to visit no less than four hours and no more than 24 hours 
after arrival at the POE.44
At the POE, an escort team from the inspected country would meet the 
inspection team and aircrew, the latter consisting of no more than ten individu-
als. The equipment of the inspectors would be examined to ensure that it could 
not perform functions beyond those required for the inspection. Throughout 
the in-country period, the inspected country was obliged to provide logistics, 
transportation, security protection, and medical care for the inspection team and 
the aircrew, bearing all costs associated with these services.45
The escort teams accompanied the inspection teams and aircrew throughout 
the in-country period and organized their in-country movements. Inspectors 
had to keep confidentiality on the information received during their inspec-
tions. They were not allowed to hamper operations at the inspected facilities 
unnecessarily and had to observe safety regulations. They did, however, have the 
right to stay in communication with their own embassy in the inspected country 
throughout the inspection period using telephone communications the host 
country provided.46 
Inspection teams were allowed to carry the documents that were needed for 
inspection purposes as well as cameras, linear measurers, portable weighing 
and radiation detection devices, and other equipment agreed on by the parties. 
Escort teams had the right to observe their use. Cameras were to be used only by 
the inspected party. At the request of the inspectors, the in-country escort team 
could take photographs of the inspected facilities using the camera systems of 
the inspection team. These systems were capable of producing duplicate, instant-
development photographic prints, and each party had the right to receive a copy 
of every photograph.47
Except in the case of missile production facilities, when the inspection team 
arrived at the inspection site, the pre-inspection briefings and safety-related 
procedures had to be completed within the first hour. Immediately afterwards, 
the inspection had to begin. It was not to go on longer than 24 hours (except for 
elimination and close-out inspections).48 Inspection teams had the right to split 
into sub-groups, each having at least two inspectors. Within the team as a whole, 
at least two inspectors were required to speak the language of the inspected 
country.49
44 PoI, IV. 2–4.
45 PoI, V. 1, 4–6.
46 PoI, VI. 2, 3, 5–7, 13.
47 PoI, VI. 9, 10.
48 INF Treaty, Art. XI 7, 8. Inspections could be extended by up to eight hours if the escort 
agreed. POI, VI. 14.
49 PoI, VI. 15.
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2.4.2.1 “Base-line,” “close-out,” and “short-notice” inspections
The INF Treaty distinguished between types of inspection and laid down special 
provisions. Art. XI 3. covered the initial “base-line” inspections made to verify 
the validity of information exchanges. Art. XI 4. covered the “close-out” inspec-
tions which verified that elimination of MOBs and missile support facilities 
(except for missile production facilities) had taken place. And Art. XI 5. covered 
the short-notice inspections that had to be conducted in accordance with speci-
fied annual quotas. 
In cases of “short-notice” inspections of MOBs and support facilities (other 
than elimination sites and missile production facilities) and cases of eliminated 
former MOBs and support facilities, no more than one inspection was permitted 
at any one time. With “base-line inspections,” no more than ten inspections could 
be conducted at any one time. The inspection teams were to have no more than 
ten inspectors each.50 
Within one hour of the inspection site being specified, the inspected country 
had to implement pre-inspection movement restrictions there and ensure that no 
missiles, launchers, and support equipment would be removed from it before the 
arrival of the inspection team. The inspection team had to arrive at the site within 
nine hours. During their inspection, they had the right to inspect any vehicle 
capable of carrying banned items and, by stationing inspectors at the exits, ensure 
that no such vehicle could leave without being inspected.51
Members of the escort team had duties too. When the inspectors arrived, they 
had to deliver a briefing on the number of missiles, stages, launchers, support 
structures, and equipment at the site and provide a site diagram indicating their 
locations. The inspectors had the right to inspect the entire inspection site within 
the boundaries declared by the MoU, including the interiors of structures, con-
tainers or vehicles, as well as covered objects that had dimensions equal or greater 
than the dimensions of the armaments and support equipment specified in the 
MoU. As for missiles, or launch containers that could contain them, only external 
visual observation and measuring of dimensions was allowed. In the case of large 
containers, visual observation of the interior and weighing were both permitted, 
to ascertain that they did not carry a missile or a missile stage. In the case of 
launch canisters for missiles not subject to the Treaty, the inspection team had 
the right to make external visual observations, take linear measurements, and use 
radiation detection devices.52 If covered or shrouded objects and spaces within 
structures were large enough to contain banned armaments and equipment, the 
inspected party had to demonstrate that they did not contain such items: they had 
to allow visual inspection inside an enclosed space from its entrance.53 
50 PoI, VI. 15, VII. 4.
51 PoI, VII. 1, 2, 11–13.
52 PoI, VII. 7–9, 11, 14.
53 PoI, VII. 10.
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2.4.2.2 “Elimination” inspections 
The Treaty covered elimination inspections in Art. XI 7. and Art. XI 8. The provi-
sions in the first of these texts covered how, at elimination facilities, inspectors 
should verify the process of eliminating missiles (including the launching of 
IRM as a disposal method), and also the destruction of launchers and support 
equipment. The second covered inspections made to confirm the completion of 
elimination phases of missiles, launchers, support equipment, or training missiles 
and launchers. 
The inspection teams were to have no more than 20 inspectors each. When 
they arrived to verify the elimination processes, they had to be provided with 
a schedule of elimination activities which they could compare with the data 
notified in advance. The inspectors then observed the specific procedures for 
the elimination, making sure they followed what was required by the Protocol 
on Elimination. If they found any deviations, they had the right to remind the 
in-country escort of the need for strict compliance. Completion of the elimina-
tion of each item had to be confirmed and registered in the inspection report.54 
When missiles were eliminated by means of launching, the inspectors had 
the right to ascertain the type of missile prepared for launch in a visual inspec-
tion, and could then observe the launch from a safe position. They might have 
to observe several launches from various locations.55 When confirming that 
eliminations had taken place, the inspectors had the right to inspect the results, 
and ascertain that all processes had been carried out in compliance with the 
technical procedures set out in the Protocol on Elimination.56
2.4.2.3  Ambiguities, post-inspection activities, inspection reports,  
and follow-up inspections
If ambiguities arose during an inspection, inspectors had the right to request 
clarifications. The in-country escort team then had to take action to remove the 
ambiguity during the inspection. If questions relating to an object located within 
the inspection site could not be resolved, the inspected party had to take a photo-
graph in order to clarify its nature and function. If it was not possible to remove 
the ambiguity, the question, relevant clarifications, and a copy of any photograph 
taken had to be included in the inspection report. All measurements recorded 
during the inspections needed to be certified by both teams and included in the 
inspection record.57 
54 PoI, VI. 15, VIII. 1.
55 Ibid.
56 PoI, VIII. 2.
57 PoI, VI. 11, 12.
Wolfgang Richter292
Upon completion of the inspection, post-inspection procedures including 
finalizing the inspection report had to be concluded at the inspection site within 
four hours. Within two hours after the end of the inspection the inspection team 
had to provide the in-country escort with a written report in English and Russian 
language. It contained the type of inspection carried out, the inspection site, the 
number of missiles, stages, launchers and support equipment observed and any 
recorded measurements, photographs and diagrams.58 
Inspection reports had to be factual. Inspection teams had the right to note 
ambiguities while inspected parties could include written comments. Both were 
required to resolve ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the 
report and include relevant clarifications.59 But neither the inspection nor the 
escort teams were entitled to evaluate compliance with Treaty provisions. Such 
assessment was reserved for governments.
In case of short-notice inspections, inspection teams had to return to the POE 
promptly upon completion of the post-inspection procedures and then leave the 
inspected country within 24 hours. Except for CPM inspections, inspection teams 
were entitled to conduct another inspection provided that the intent to carry out a 
follow-up inspection was duly notified, either after completion of post-inspection 
procedures or after the return of the inspection team to the POE.60
2.5 On-site Inspections (OSI) in Basing Countries
The state parties to the INF Treaty had to conduct OSI in the basing countries 
as well as on each other’s home territories. So agreement had to be made with 
these basing countries allowing inspections to be made on their territories in 
accordance with the Protocol of Inspection.61 
On December 11, 1987, the United States concluded the INF Basing Countries 
Agreement with Belgium, the FRG, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK which 
sealed this agreement and assured that the basing countries would facilitate such 
inspections without assuming any obligations or rights deriving from the INF 
Treaty. The U. S. agreed to bear the full responsibility for Treaty implementation 
while respecting the basing countries’ sovereign rights.62 Although the basing 
countries did not bear primary responsibility for the Treaty’s implementation 
they became significantly involved and had to carry considerable burdens. The 
agreed obligations led to the establishment of additional organizational units in 
their armed forces and their Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.
58 PoI, VI. 14, XI. 1.
59 PoI, XI. 1, 3, 4.
60 PoI, VI. 16.
61 INF Treaty, Art. XI 2; PoI II. 2.
62 Basing Countries Agreement, Art. I 1–5, VI 7. 
Implementing the INF-Treaty 293
Basing countries were obliged to establish communication channels and 
points of contact capable of receiving and acknowledging notification on a 
24-hour continuous basis. They had to keep personnel available on short notice 
for in-country escorts, because both the aircrew of the inspected country and the 
escort team would need to include representatives of the basing country.63 The 
inspected country had to notify the basing country when an inspecting country 
intended to conduct an inspection as soon as the request was received. The 
notification had to include the estimated date and time when the inspection team 
would arrive at the POE, the names of the aircrew and inspectors, and the flight 
plan. Basing countries retained control over their own airspace when guiding the 
aircraft of the inspecting country. Within 90 minutes of receipt of a flight plan, 
the basing country was required to provide its approval for the inspectors’ plane 
to proceed to the POE.64
Along with the escort team of the inspected country, basing countries had 
the right to escort the aircrew and inspection team of the inspecting country 
throughout their in-country presence. At POEs, they granted privileges and 
immunities to the inspectors and aircrew in accordance with the Protocol on 
Inspection, waived customs duties, expedited customs processing requirements 
as to their equipment, and provided lodging and food.65 The POEs them-
selves were determined by the basing countries and included in the Protocol on 
Inspections.66 Basing countries also had the right to receive the list of aircrew 
members and inspectors provided by the inspecting party and, under certain cir-
cumstances, could even reject named individuals. In all other cases, they agreed 
to provide the necessary visas within 25 days of receipt of the initial lists.67
No less than one hour before departure of the inspection team from the POE 
to an inspection site or from there to another inspection site, the inspected party 
had to inform the basing country. The authorities in the basing country would 
then take all the necessary steps, such as traffic control and safety and security 
measures, to enable the inspection and escort team to proceed expeditiously to 
the inspection site and arrive there within nine hours after its designation. While 
the routing of such travels remained the exclusive responsibility of the basing 
country, the mode of transportation was determined in consultation with the 
escort team. The basing country also had to assist in providing logistical support 
for the inspection team and two-way voice communication systems between the 
inspection site and the inspecting party’s embassy.68
63 PoI, VII. 3; Basing Countries Agreement, Art. II 12, III 1.
64 Basing Countries Agreement, Art. III 1, 2, IV 3, V 1.
65 Ibid, Art. IV 4–7, V 2. “Diplomatic aircrew escorts” were assigned to embassies of the 
inspected country in the basing countries for escorting aircrews of the inspecting country, 
Art. II 7.
66 PoI, I. 7., see also right to change POEs in Basing Countries Agreement, Art. VI 5.
67 Basing Countries Agreement, Art. IV 1, 2, 4.
68 Ibid, Art. III 3, V 3–5.
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After completion of the inspection, the inspected country had to brief the 
basing country, should the latter so request. Coordination meetings between both 
sides were required to discuss implementation schedules and upcoming issues. 
The first of these had to take place five days after the Treaty came into force; 
others were expected five days after either side put in a request. For immediate 
handling of questions there were standing communication lines between the 
inspected country and the basing countries.69 
The INF Basing Countries Agreement was subject to national ratification 
procedures, which came into force at the same time as the INF Treaty and, like it, 
continued for a period of thirteen years—until 31 May 2001.70
2.6 Continuous Portal Monitoring (CPM) and National  
Technical Means (NTM)
In addition to on-site inspections, each state party had the right to monitor the 
portals of certain missile support facilities continuously with technical sensors 
and observe their elimination processes through National Technical Means 
(NTM), such as photo-reconnaissance satellites.71 This was another way of verify-
ing compliance with the Treaty provisions.
2.6.1 Resident On-site Inspections with Continuous Portal  
Monitoring (CPM)
From 30 days after the Treaty came into force, each state party had the right to 
monitor the other side’s missile production facilities continuously to ensure that 
no new GLBM were being manufactured. This provision was to last for 13 years. 
Within six months of the Treaty coming into force, resident on-site inspection 
teams were posted at facilities where the final assembly of GLBM stages was 
carried out. They operated devices for continuous portal monitoring (CPM), and 
these included technical sensors. These were set up to detect stages that were 
outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM but were, in fact, not 
prohibited by the Treaty, for instance the Soviet SS-25 ICBM.
The provision covered facilities that had stopped production of existing types 
of GLBM before the Treaty came into force, and facilities that were still producing 
these stages that appeared so similar to the banned GLBM. However, if a party 
refrained from the final assembly of these look-alike stages for 12 consecutive 
months after the end of the second year of the Treaty’s coming into operation, this 
provision ceased—unless a party restarted this kind of assembly at a later date. 
69 Ibid, Art. VI 1–3, 6.
70 Ibid, Art. VII.
71 INF Treaty, Art. XI 6, XII 1.
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Early on, the U. S. Hercules Plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah, and the Soviet Votkinsk 
Machine Building Plant, Udmurt ASSR in the Russian SFSR were earmarked for 
CPM inspections.72
For CPM inspections, the inspected country had to maintain an agreed perim-
eter around the periphery of the inspection site and designate a portal with no more 
than a single rail line and one road running in parallel, not more than 50 meters 
apart. All vehicles capable of containing an IRBM or the longest stage of this type 
of missile had to exit through this portal alone. Only two other exits from the 
inspection site were permitted, and these were monitored by technical sensors.73
An inspection team of no more than 30 inspectors had the right to install CPM 
systems at the portal and additional exits, and carry out the necessary engineering 
surveys, construction, repair and replacement of monitoring systems for all this 
to work. The systems could include weight sensors, vehicle sensors, surveillance 
systems such as photo and infrared cameras, dimensional measuring equipment 
to examine vehicle and missile stages, and non-damaging X-ray image-producing 
sensors for imaging the contents of launch canisters or shipping containers. 
Inspectors could use their own two-way radio communication systems and patrol 
the whole perimeter of the site.74 
At the expense of the inspecting party, the inspected party had to provide all 
the utilities needed for the construction and operation of the CPM system, includ-
ing a center for data collection, at least two telephone lines, and high frequency 
radio equipment to enable the inspecting team to communicate with its embassy 
in the inspected country. The inspection team had the right to build up to three 
buildings outside the perimeter of the inspection site for their data center and 
team headquarters, plus an additional building for the storage of supplies and 
equipment.75
Any shipment exiting through the portals of the site capable of containing 
an IRBM or the longest stage of one of these missiles had to be declared by the 
inspected party in advance, and that declaration had to be accompanied by a 
statement that the shipment contained no banned items. The inspection team had 
the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of suspect vehicles and railcars. 
When vehicles with the capability of carrying banned items exited the portals, 
the inspection team was entitled to inspect its interior or ensure by outside visual 
observation that no containers or shrouded objects contained an IRBM or its 
longest stage. Otherwise, the inspected party had to demonstrate fully that no 
such banned items were being carried.76
If a vehicle exiting the portals was declared to contain missiles or stages as 
heavy, or heavier, than IRBM—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) for 
72 INF Treaty, Art. XI 6.
73 PoI, IX. 1.
74 PoI, VI. 15, IX. 3, 4, 6 (b)–(d), 9.
75 PoI, IX. 6 (a), X. 5.
76 PoI, IX. 11, 13.
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instance—the inspection team had to place measuring equipment outside the 
launch canister or shipping container and have this certified by the in-country 
escort. Inspection teams were allowed to view, weigh, and take measurements of 
the dimensions of suspect missiles and stages in launch canisters or shipping con-
tainers up to eight times per calendar year, in the presence of the escort team.77 
Within three days of the end of each month, the team leaders of CPM inspec-
tions had to provide their in-country escort with a written inspection report in 
English and in Russian. This had to be factual and had to include the number of 
vehicles leaving the inspection site declared to have contained a missile or stage as 
large, or larger than, and as heavy, or heavier than, an intermediate-range GLBM 
or the longest stage of such a missile. The report had also to include details of any 
measurements taken of launch canisters or containers carried by the recorded 
vehicles, and the length and diameter of missile stages inspected through visual 
observation.78
2.6.2 National Technical Means (NTM)
In addition to on-site inspections, reductions were certified through National 
Technical Means (NTM), in other words, by satellite observation. In this case, 
support structures eliminated in situ had to remain visible to NTM for six months 
after the notified date of completion or until an on-site inspection was done.79 To 
ensure unhindered operation of NTM for verification purposes, the Treaty pro-
hibited any interference with the use of photo-reconnaissance satellites and the 
impediment of such observation by concealment of missiles, launchers and sup-
port equipment. As such verification methods only applied to the INF elimination 
process, normal concealment practices within deployment areas associated with 
training, maintenance and operations, or the use of environmental shelters to 
protect missiles and launchers continued to be allowed.80 
So that they could distinguish between IRBM and strategic ballistic missiles 
with an intercontinental range (ICBM), parties could request the implementation 
of cooperative measures at specified deployment bases for road-mobile GLBM 
with a range capability in excess of 5,500 km, even when these bases were not 
former MOBs and were not subject to the INF Treaty elimination provisions. 
No later than six hours after such a request, the parties to whom a request was 
made had to open the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers at one specified 
deployment base and display the missiles or launchers kept there in the open, 
without resorting to concealment measures. The roofs had to be left open for 
12 hours following the receipt of the request. Such cooperative measures could 
77 PoI, IX. 14.
78 PoI, XI. 2.
79 PoE, IV. 1. 
80 INF Treaty, Art. XII 1, 2.
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be requested a maximum of six times per calendar year until a treaty on the 
limitation of strategic arms (START) came into force, but otherwise for no more 
than three years after the INF Treaty became operative.81
2.7 Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) and Special Verification  
Commission (SVC)
The state parties to the INF Treaty agreed to use their Nuclear Risk Reduction 
Centers (NRRC) as continuous communication channels to exchange data and 
provide and receive the notifications and information required by the Treaty.82 
Such centers, operating 24 hours every day, were established on September 15, 
1987, on the basis of a bilateral agreement to keep permanent satellite communi-
cation links relating to impending ballistic missile launches, nuclear accidents, 
or naval incidents at sea.83 
To promote the objectives and implemention of the provisions of the Treaty, 
the parties established a Special Verification Commission (SVC). The SVC con-
vened at the request of either of the parties and met regularly for several weeks 
per session in Geneva, Switzerland. It was tasked with resolving questions of 
compliance and agreeing on measures to improve the viability and effectiveness 
of the Treaty.84 Even before the Treaty came into force, senior representatives of 
both verification agencies had held three bilateral technical talks in Washington, 
Moscow, and Vienna to discuss details relating to aircraft and crews, notification 
formats, inspection procedures, and CPM activities. These talks took place in the 
period from March to May 1988, and had reached an understanding about the 
interpretation of nine Treaty issues by mid-May. Once this had been achieved, 
formal diplomatic notes were exchanged, and these “diplomatic minutes” became 
part of the Treaty’s documents.85 On December 20, 1988, a Memorandum of 
Understanding on procedures for SVC operations was signed.86
81 INF Treaty, Art. XII 3.
82 INF Treaty, Art. XIII 2.
83 FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Chronology, 
https://fas.org/nuk/control/inf/inf-chron.htm.
84 INF Treaty, Art. XIII 1.
85 U. S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and 
Compliance. Treaty Between The United States of America And The Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles 
(INF Treaty), Signed December 8, 1987, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm 
#diplomaticnotes; Joseph P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty. A History of 
the On-Site Inspection Agency and INF Treaty Implementation, 1988–1991. Treaty History 
Series. Published by On-Site Inspection Agency, Washington, D. C. 1993, Chapter 2, https://
fas.org/nuke/control/inf/infbook/ch1a.html.
86 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Procedures for the 
Operation of the Special Verification Commission, December 20, 1988.
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On December 21, 1989, after gaining considerable experience with the opera-
tion of the Treaty and making steady improvement on a “provisional basis,” 
senior representatives of the SVC from the United States and the Soviet Union 
signed a Memorandum of Agreement, in Geneva, to enhance the implementation 
of the verification provisions of the Treaty. The Memorandum contained detailed 
clarifications concerning inspection notifications, refined or alternative methods 
of destruction, permitted radiation measuring devices, and CPM operations. Lists 
of clearance numbers, navigation equipment, air routes, and types of inspection 
aircraft appeared in annexes to the Memorandum, as did details of agreed 
inspection equipment, measurement devices, cameras, sensors, and detectors.87 
3. The Elimination and Verification Process of the INF Treaty 
1988–2001
The elimination of thousands of missiles, stages, launchers and supporting struc-
tures and equipment within the three-year timespan stipulated by the INF Treaty, 
together with the proper verification of the process, posed a significant challenge 
in terms of resources, expertise and preparatory training. On-site inspections and 
escort activities covered five types of inspection in 130 Soviet inspection sites in 
the USSR, the GDR and ČSSR, and 31 U. S. inspection sites in the United States, 
West Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
The verification agencies were faced with the largest verification operations 
ever conducted up to that point in peacetime history. Their task required the 
exchange of thousands of notifications and information details, as they carried 
out hundreds of OSI at MOBs, support facilities, test sites, former production or 
assembly facilities, and elimination sites. The armories and equipment in these 
places contained thousands of items to be checked. After the INF Treaty came 
into effect, the exchanges of messages through the NRRCs multiplied dramati-
cally as enormous quantities of INF-related notifications and information came 
to be communicated on a daily basis. In the first full year of the Treaty’s enforce-
ment, the United States and the Soviet Union had the right to carry out more than 
340 on-site inspections. More than 200 inspections had already been conducted 
by December 20, 1988.88 The inspectors had to monitor and certify that elimina-
tion obligations had been fulfilled according to the timelines established.
87 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions 
of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Geneva, 
December 21, 1989 (print July 1990), United States Information Service, Brussels, Belgium.
88 Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty, Chapter 1, 3. 
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3.1 Organizational Aspects
On January, 15, 1988 President Reagan instructed Secretary of Defence Frank 
Carlucci to establish the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) in Dulles Inter-
national Airport outside Washington D. C., to implement the unprecedented 
inspection and escort obligations enshrined in the Treaty.89 OSIA, with an annual 
budget of $ 120 million, created two divisions with up to 200 experts and linguists 
for the conduct of inspections in the Soviet Union, the GDR and ČSSR, and for 
escorting Soviet inspection teams in the United States and in five European bas-
ing countries. There were also up to 200 people in the aircrews that were required. 
For portal monitoring in Votkinsk, USSR, OSIA set up a specific directorate: as 
teams of 30 inspectors had to be continuously present for 365 days a year, a larger 
pool of personnel was needed allowing for replacements in several shifts. 
In addition, OSIA established field offices with escort teams at the two in-
country POEs in Washington D. C. and San Francisco, California, one field 
office at the POE Frankfurt / Main, West-Germany for the five basing countries 
in Europe, and another field office in Tokyo, Japan for inspections in the Asian 
part of the Soviet Union. The field office in Frankfurt / Main was also used as 
a “gateway” for inspections in the western part of the Soviet Union through 
the POE in Moscow while inspections in the eastern part of the Soviet Union 
via POE Ulan Ude were dispatched from the Yokota Airbase, Tokyo. The State 
Department assigned an Arms Control Implementation Unit (ACIU) to the U. S. 
embassy in Moscow, a sub-unit to the POE Ulan Ude, and “diplomatic aircrew 
escort” units to embassies in the basing countries.90 The U. S. Air Force, which 
operated the GLCM BGM-109G Tomahawk, and the U. S. Army, which held the 
GLBM Pershing II and Pershing IA, remained responsible for decommissioning, 
transporting and eliminating the missiles, launchers, support equipment and 
structures of these systems.
In the Soviet Union, preparations for the INF elimination process were orga-
nized in similar ways. The Soviet NRRC, which operated in the Ministry of 
Defense in Moscow, played a crucial role in the implementation of the Treaty. It 
was not only entrusted with the permanent and immediate communication of all 
INF-related information and notifications but also assumed the task of prepar-
ing and conducting all INF inspection and escort activities. While the Soviet 
Strategic Rocket Forces that operated INF missiles were responsible for decom-
missioning, transporting and eliminating the missiles and associated equipment 
and structures, the NRRC coordinated all such Treaty-related operations, with 
the one exception of overseeing the CPM system at the missile production plant 
89 National Security Decision Directive 296 of January 15, 1988, cited in: FAS Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF).
90 Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty, Chapter 1. 
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in Votkinsk, which was managed by the Ministry of Defense Industries.91 The 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs established arms control implementation units 
in the Soviet embassy in Washington D. C. and in the consulate general in San 
Francisco.
After establishing the verification agencies in the two months preceding the 
coming into force of the Treaty, both sides conducted a series of mock inspections 
in the inspection sites they had in national territories and basing countries to 
establish the capabilities and routines needed to implement the verification 
provisions. Temporary housing quarters were built in Soviet and U. S. inspection 
sites in the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union to accommodate the 
inspection teams.
3.2 INF Baseline Inspections
INF baseline inspections in 164 sites began on July 1, 1988, and lasted for 60 days 
up to August 29, 1988. Their purpose was to check and buildup trust in the reli-
ability of the data exchange established in the MoU as of November 1, 1987 and 
the first update notification of July 1, 1988, according to which a total of 1,846 
Soviet and 846 U. S. deployed and non-deployed missiles, launchers and support 
equipment had to be verified. The figures can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3: Items Checked in Baseline Inspections, July to August 1988.
USSR U. S.A
IR-GLBM 654 SS-20 234 Pershing II
149 SS-4
6 SS-5
IR-GLCM 80 SSC-X-4 443 BGM-109G
Sum IR-INF 889 677
SRBM 718 SS-12 169 Pershing 1A
239 SS-23
Sum SR-INF 957 169
Total INF missiles 1,846 846
Total INF launchers 825 289
Total Treaty-limited items 5,439 2,332
91 Ibid, Chapter 4.
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These armaments and their items of support equipment were located, on the one 
side, at 130 dispersed Soviet inspection sites in the Soviet Union and in two of its 
basing countries, and, on the other side, in 31 more concentrated U. S. inspection 
sites in the United States and five of the U. S.’s basing countries. The update 
numbers communicated reflected corrections to the numbers contained in the 
data exchange of November 1, 1987, as the MoU had not at that time included U. S. 
elimination facilities and (using different counting criteria) had double-counted 
missile support facilities that were actually located at the same sites. The Soviet 
Union had established eight elimination sites; the United States, four.
Both state parties conducted baseline inspections at all MOBs and support 
facilities (except for production plants) between July 1 and August 29, 1988. Given 
the dispersal of all Treaty-limited armaments and equipment over approximately 
160 sites, these sixty days were the most intensive ones during the whole elimina-
tion and verification process. The inspection teams sometimes had to conduct 
several consecutive inspections per week. All the inspection teams consisted of 
ten inspectors, including a team leader, a deputy team leader and two linguists. 
OSIA had organized 20 inspection teams, which began activities via the POEs 
in Moscow and Ulan Ude on July 1, 1988, and which carried out 129 inspections 
by August 29. Sixteen of these inspections were counted as close-out inspections, 
as the inspected MOBs and facilities declared that they no longer had any missile 
systems, launchers, or associated equipment. On July 31, U. S. inspection teams 
had already conducted approximately 50 inspections in the Soviet Union, the 
GDR and Czechoslovakia, a number that rose to 108 by August 18. By that time, 
an additional four elimination inspections at elimination facilities had been 
carried out while one larger team of resident inspectors had begun the CPM 
inspection at the Votkinsk missile production plant.92
The Soviet Union also started inspections as soon as the baseline inspection 
period began, with 72 inspectors arriving at Travis AFB, California on July 1, 
1988. These 72 consisted of five inspection teams with ten inspectors each for 
baseline inspections and one 22-person inspection team tasked with setting up 
the CPM system at Hercules Plant No. 1 in Magna, Utah. On July 4, Soviet inspec-
tors started inspections in Europe with a baseline inspection of the BGM-109G 
Tomahawk MOB in Wüschheim and the Pershing II MOB in Schwäbisch Gmünd, 
both in West-Germany. By the end of July, Soviet inspection teams had inspected 
13 U. S. MOBs and facilities in the United States and Western Europe, a number 
that had increased to 26 (out of a total of 30) by August, 18.93
By the end of the baseline period on August 29, 1988, U. S. teams had inspected 
79 Soviet INF MOBs, 19 missile and launcher storage facilities, 6 training facili-
ties, 2 test ranges, 12 repair facilities, 3 production facilities, and 8 elimination 
facilities; while Soviet inspectors had conducted 31 baseline inspections of U. S. 




Soviet elimination sites and by Soviet teams in three U. S. elimination sites took 
on the task of measuring and updating the length, width, height, and weight of 
all missiles subject to the Treaty. The data harvested in this way then became 
the standard for all subsequent inspections. Altogether, in the first 60 days of 
the Treaty’s implementation, the U. S. Airforce flew 54 missions from Frankfurt 
to Moscow and 31 missions with 36 teams from Tokyo to Ulan Ude. If the in-
country escort missions are included, the Military Airlift Command flew 185 INF 
teams on 114 baseline inspection missions.94
The initial baseline inspections were crucial not only in establishing logistics, 
flight activities and numbers of personnel involved but, especially, in the opera-
tional and political impact they achieved. They could either establish trust in the 
reliability of data exchange or destroy the whole implementation process, which 
would then have severe political consequences during a critical time of détente. 
The outcome, however, was encouraging. Both sides were able and eager to put 
into practice the procedures that had been set out in the Protocol on Inspections. 
The inspection teams gained significant additional knowledge about each other’s 
forces, operations and doctrines and friendly professional relations were built 
up between the inspectors and their escorts. In general, the inspection results 
confirmed the validity of the data exchanges of November 1, 1987, and July 1, 
1988. Overall, there was a growth of trust not only in the viability of the Treaty’s 
concepts but in how each side saw the other’s intentions.
3.3 INF Continuous Portal Monitoring (CPM) Inspections
The aim of INF continuous portal monitoring (CPM) inspections was to verify 
that the parties to the Treaty stopped production of INF missiles. To that end, 
a U. S. resident on-site inspection team was stationed at the Votkinsk Machine 
Building Plant, Udmurt ASSR in the Russian SFSR, and a Soviet team at the 
Hercules Plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah. Inspections were scheduled to start 30 days 
after the Treaty came into force. Five months later, teams of up to 30 inspectors 
were entitled to buildup a CPM system with the assistance of the host state, so they 
could confirm that no new INF missiles were being produced.
Inspectors had to be stationed outside the periphery of the plant they were 
observing. Their task was to patrol the periphery, including the portals, and 
operate the required sensors at the permitted main portal and at two side portals. 
They were allowed to use approved sensors and non-damaging imaging (X-rays) 
to weigh, measure, and image rail cars and trucks large enough to contain an 
INF missile. Eight times a year, they also had the right to inspect containers or 
launch-canisters visually from inside. These had to be opened for that purpose 
by the inspected side. At no time did the inspectors have the right to enter the 
plant itself.
94 Ibid.
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This last proviso was important because, in the Votkinsk production plant, the 
Soviet Union continued building missiles that were not subject to the Treaty, but 
were “outwardly similar to a stage of solid-propellant GLBM.”95 At Votkinsk, 
the production of SS-20 IRBM and SS-12 and SS-23 SRBM had been stopped, while 
the final assembly of SS-25 ICBM continued. The second stages of both missile 
types were quite similar and their length differed by only a few centimeters. The 
Hercules Plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah, had produced Pershing II rocket motors 
from 1982 to 1987. Here too, an average of 400 to 500 vehicles entered and left 
every day.96
Both sides had prepared extensive CPM systems during technical talks and 
mutual expert visits in the spring of 1988. They started to station inspectors and 
buildup such systems on July 2, 1988. Sensors, communication assets, headquar-
ters and permanent residence equipment had to be flown in and then transported 
via rail and road. The U. S. chose to install non-damaging radiographic sensors 
(CargoScan) used together with infrared profilers to monitor road and rail 
traffic at the Votkinsk plant but relinquished weighing scales, which were also 
authorized by the Treaty. The Soviet Union did not install an imaging system at 
the Magna plant but did use road and rail weighing scales. However, it took more 
than a year for this equipment and the U. S. CargoScan sensors to be put in place, 
and initially inspections had to be carried out visually.97 During the installation 
phase, these differences caused some controversies, since all equipment had to be 
approved by the inspected party. Furthermore, the U. S. used contractors (Hughes 
Technical Services) to operate and maintain the monitoring system in Votkinsk 
under the supervision of an OSIA site commander and his staff. Eventually, the 
INF Treaty Memorandum of Agreement98 of December 21, 1989, standardized 
the sensors and equipment that could be used for CPM inspections.
Despite this agreement, a major issue arose in February 1989 when the Soviet 
side voiced concerns about the operation of the CargoScan system at Votkinsk. 
The concerns related to magnetic tape storage, joint operations procedures, and 
X-ray safety procedures. In March, the crisis reached a nadir when the Soviet side 
declared that three cargo railcars leaving the plant and containing missile stages 
should be barred from U. S. cargo scanning because it had not yet been agreed 
that the CargoScan equipment was ready for use. The U. S. team was confined to 
visual and manual inspection only. 
This incident at Votkinsk lasted from March 1 to March 9, 1989. The U. S. 
Secretary of State, James A. Baker, filed an official complaint with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze. Subsequently, the two sides sent expert del-
egations to Votkinsk to solve the issue. After five days of meetings, the delegations 
95 INF Treaty, Art. XI 6 (a).
96 Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty, Chapter 5.
97 Ibid.
98 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions 
of the INF Treaty.
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“agreed to technical and operational steps that addressed Soviet concerns without 
altering Treaty provisions, while the Soviet side agreed that the CargoScan system 
could become operational.”99 Once this issue had been resolved, CPM inspec-
tions were conducted in accordance with the agreed provisions and no further 
problems occurred throughout the period of operation, although inspection 
teams rotated several times.
Twenty-four-hour monitoring required dividing the teams into shifts and 
sub-groups to operate the CPM system, document and register data, patrol 
the perimeter and carry out headquarters tasks such as organizing daily work 
schedules, keeping up communications with embassies, and coordinating with 
escorts, using their own linguistic capabilities. All daily reports, including the 
acquired data, were compiled in monthly Portal Monitoring Inspection Reports, 
which were exchanged between both parties. Daily operations continued to be 
carried out smoothly until the regime was transformed into the Perimeter and 
Portal Control System of the START I Treaty of July 31, 1991.100 
3.4 INF Elimination Inspections 
The objectives of the INF elimination inspections were to observe and confirm 
that all eliminations were carried out completely within the Treaty timelines and 
in accordance with the destruction or conversion provisions of the elimination 
protocol. The protocol distinguished between
(1) OSI to monitor the elimination of fixed structures of MOBs and missile sup-
port facilities (excluding missile production facilities), that would be carried 
out in situ within 60 days after the scheduled date of that elimination; 
(2) OSI to monitor the elimination of IRM and SRBM, their launchers, and 
support equipment at elimination facilities, which had to be notified at least 
30 days in advance;
(3) OSI to monitor the elimination of IRM by launching within the first six 
months of the Treaty’s coming into force, which had to be notified at least 
10 days in advance of the launching. The same rule applied for launches of 
research and development boosters.
The revised data exchange of July 1, 1988 specified eight Soviet and four U. S. 
elimination sites together with the designation of types and numbers of missiles 
that would be eliminated at each site. 
The U. S. side declared that it would eliminate its 846 missiles at the following 
sites:
– 169 Pershing IA GLBM and a portion of the Pershing II GLBM stages at 
Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant in Marshall, Texas;
99 Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty, Chapter 5.
100 Pifer et al., The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, p. 21.
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– another portion of the total of 234 Pershing II GLBM and selected Pershing II 
launchers at the Pueblo Depot Activity in Pueblo, Colorado;
– the bulk of Pershing II launchers at the U. S. Army Equipment Maintenance 
Center (EMC) in Frankfurt-Hausen, West Germany;
– 443 BGM-109G GLCM and their launchers, operated by the U. S. Air Force, at 
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona. 
The 1,846 INF missiles of the Soviet Union were eliminated at the following eight 
sites:
– the deployment areas at Kansk and Chita in the eastern USSR, which were 
used for the launch of 72 unarmed SS-20 GLBM, as the Treaty permitted this 
method for up to 100 IRBM within the first six months of its coming into 
force—i. e. up to December 1, 1988;
– the test range Kapustin Yar by the Caspian Sea and the elimination facility 
at Sarny, which served for the destruction of 582 SS-20 IRBM and support 
equipment by explosive demolition;
– the Lesnaya elimination facility for the destruction of 155 SS-4/-5 missiles and 
their support equipment;
– Jelgava, in the western part of the USSR, for the elimination of 80 non-deployed 
SSC-X-4 missiles and launchers;
– Saryozek in Kazakhstan for the elimination of 957 SS-12 and SS-23 SRBMs, 
which had to be destroyed within 18 months after the Treaty came into force—
i. e. by December 1, 1989;
– the Stan’kovo elimination site in western USSR, more than 1,000 km distant 
from Saryozek, where transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles for SS-12 
and SS-23 SRBM were destroyed.
Operational parity had to be maintained in the numbers of deployed IRM 
warheads during the destruction process, and this required coordination of 
the withdrawal and elimination schedules. Within 29 months after the Treaty’s 
coming into force, both sides had to reduce their IRM launchers so that no side 
could field more than 171 deployed IRM warheads.101 Thus, by November 1, 1990, 
the Soviets were allowed to deploy no more than 57 SS-20 IRBM, each carrying 
three warheads, while the U. S. still had carte blanche to field all 120 Pershing II in 
Europe, since they carried one warhead only. In reality by that time, however, the 
U. S. had reduced the number of Pershing II IRBMs stationed in West-Germany 
down to 66 missiles.102
Disparity of SRBM numbers—957 deployed and non-deployed Soviet SS-12 
and SS-23, as opposed to 169 non-deployed U. S. Pershing IA—also implied that 
the Soviet Union had to eliminate missiles at much higher destruction rates than 
101 INF Treaty, Art. IV 2 (a).
102 See Memorandum, February 1, 1988, in: AAPD 1988, Doc. 46, p. 260. However, the memo, 
does not mention the 12 “non-deployed” Pershing IIs in Weilerbach.
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the U. S. This appeared to be so right up to December 1, 1989, the date when the 
elimination of all SRBMs had to be completed.
All eliminations were monitored and certified by inspection teams consisting 
of up to 20 persons. Inspected parties had to notify eliminations, at latest, 30 days 
before initiation; inspecting parties had to notify the arrival of inspection teams 
no later than 72 hours in advance. The inspectors had the right to stay in the 
inspection site and observe the elimination process up to the scheduled time of its 
completion and the certification of results in the inspection reports. On average, 
scheduled elimination processes in elimination facilities lasted for ten days.
The U. S. started the elimination of 169 Pershing IA SRBM on September 8, 
1988 with the destruction of the first Pershing IA at Longhorn Army Ammuni-
tion Plant in Marshall, Texas. The last Pershing IA was destroyed on July 6, 
1989. Destruction of Pershing IA launchers began in December 1988 at the 
Pueblo Depot Activity in Pueblo, Colorado, and was completed by July 1, 1989. 
Elimination of Pershing II GLBM missile stages was carried out at the Pueblo 
Depot Activity too, and the last Pershing II missile stages were destroyed there on 
May 6, 1991. In October 1988 elimination of Pershing II launchers started at EMC 
Hausen in West Germany. The last Pershing II launcher in Europe was destroyed 
there on April 16, 1991.
The elimination of the 443 BGM-109G GLCM, launch canisters and launchers 
began in October 1988 at the Davis-Monthan AFB in Tucson, Arizona, and 
proceeded at a rate of approximately 40 systems per month. The last U. S. GLCM 
was destroyed on May 1, 1991. GLCM and Pershing II deployed in MOBs in 
Western Europe had to be removed in operational units—GLBM batteries and 
GLCM flights—and be withdrawn to elimination sites within 25 days. Getting 
them to these sites included withdrawal from operational status, transport via 
road and rail through Germany and then by airlift from Frankfurt, Stuttgart or 
Ramstein AFB to the U. S., and finally again by road and rail.
All 169 Pershing IA SRBM were eliminated in the first Treaty year, and the 
elimination rates shown in Table 4 were achieved for the 234 Pershing II GLBM 
and the 443 BGM-109G GLCM.103
Table 4: Elimination Rates for Pershing II GLBM and BGM-109G GLCM.
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
234 Pershing II 34 72 (106) 128 (234)
443 GLCM 130 90 (220) 223 (443)
677 IR-INF 164 162 (322) 351 (677)
Cumulative numbers in brackets
103 Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty, Chapter  6; on the chronology of 
elimination see also FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Chronology, https://fas.org/nuk/control/inf/inf-chron.htm.
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The Soviet side began eliminations at the Kapustin Yar missile test range with the 
demolition of an SS-20 IRBM by explosion. Then 72 SS-20 missiles were destroyed 
by launch from the Chita and Kansk MOBs in the fall of 1988. On August 1, 1988, 
the first SS-12 SRBM was destroyed at Saryozek, again by explosion. The last 
SS-23 was destroyed on July 25, 1989. The SS-12 and SS-23 launchers and support 
equipment were destroyed at Stan’kovo elimination site before November 1, 1989, 
ahead of schedule. The last SS-4 and SS-5 missiles were eliminated at Lesnaya 
May 22, 1990 and August 16, 1990.
The USSR started eliminations during the baseline inspection phase with 
enormous speed. This was because it had to cope with a much higher number of 
items to destroy than the U. S., in particular its large arsenal of SRBMs. Already 
by the end of the first Treaty year, it had destroyed almost one-third of its SS-20, 
all SS-4 and SSC-X-4 and 83 per cent of SS-12 SRBM. On May 12, 1991, the last 
SS-20 IRBM was destroyed in Kapustin Yar. 
In sum, the Soviet side achieved the elimination rates shown in Table 5.104
Table 5: Elimination Rates for Soviet INF.
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
654 SS-20 192 262 (454) 200 (654)
149 SS-4 149 0 (149) 0
6 SS-5 1 5 (6) 0
80 SSC-X-4 80 0 (80) 0
Total IR-INF 422 267 (689) 200 (889)
718 SS-12 600 118 (718) 0 (718)
239 SS-23 0 239 (239) 0 (239)
Total SR-INF 600 357 (957) 0 (957)
Cumulative numbers in brackets
By May 31, 1991, all eliminations required by the INF Treaty had been carried out 
in compliance with Treaty provisions and ahead of timelines. By that time, more 
than 400 on-site inspections by OSIA and 230 on-site inspections by the Soviet 
NRRC had been conducted.
104 Ibid.
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3.5 INF Close-out Inspections
INF close-out inspections in both elimination facilities and the fixed structures of 
MOBs and support facilities had to be carried out, once elimination was declared 
completed at these sites. These inspections were tasked with certifying that all 
elimination obligations had been fulfilled and that the site under observation 
was indeed closed. The inspected parties had to show that they had removed all 
INF missiles, launchers and associated equipment from that facility, had ceased 
any INF related activities there, and had dismantled, destroyed, or converted to 
other purposes all support facilities such as missile and launcher structures or 
launch pads. The sites could be accepted as closed after their on-site inspection 
had certified that this had been achieved, or after 60 days had elapsed from the 
closure declaration.
All declared inspection sites had to be closed within three years of the Treaty 
going into operation—at the latest by 31 May, 1991. If parties to the Treaty declared 
that certain sites had already fulfilled such requirements before the Treaty came 
into force, baseline inspections could be counted as close-out inspections. Both 
the U. S. and the Soviet Union had prepared a number of INF sites for elimination 
in advance. The presence of MOBs and facilities without listed missiles and 
support equipment in the MoU data update explain why close-out inspections 
had already started during the baseline inspection phase in the summer of 1988. 
Among the first close-out inspections was one at the M. I. Kalinin Machine 
Building Plant in Sverdlovsk where the Soviet SSC-X-4 GLCM had been produced, 
but where production had ceased prior to the Treaty’s coming into force. Similarly, 
the V. I. Lenin Heavy Machine Building Plant in Petropavlovsk, Kazakhstan, had 
terminated production of SS-23 missiles prior to that date. Two U. S. inspection 
teams carried out close-out inspections in both facilities as early as July 17 and 
July 21, 1988. They confirmed that missile production had indeed ceased. At 
the same time, another U. S. team traveled to the Soviet SS-12 MOB at Hranice 
in the ČSSR, where Soviet missiles had already been withdrawn in March 1988. 
The Soviet escort team included representatives of the host country, following 
bilateral agreements the Soviet Union had concluded with both the ČSSR and the 
GDR.105 Altogether OSIA carried out 16 close-out inspection during the baseline 
inspection period.
The Soviet side conducted five close-out inspections during this period. They 
began on July 3, 1988 with the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah, a former test 
range for GLCMs, and the Air Force Plant 19 in California, a former production 
plant for GLCM launchers. More inspections followed on August 4, 1988 at the 
Missile Test Range Complex 16 at Cape Canaveral, Florida, and the Martin 
105 Harahan, On-Site Inspections under the INF Treaty, Chapter 7; see also FAS Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Chronology. 
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Marietta Pershing IA Launcher Production Facility in Middle River, Maryland. 
In the summer of 1988, a Soviet team inspected the BGM-109G GLCM MOB 
in Woensdrecht in the Netherlands, where no missiles, launchers and support 
equipment had been reported in the MoU or the data update of June 1, 1988. 
After the initial baseline period, another phase of routine close-out inspections 
started up, following the process of gradual elimination of MOBs and support 
facilities in accordance with the timelines specified in the Treaty. Thus in the first 
90 days after the Treaty came into force, all deployed SRBM SS-12 and SS-23 and 
all SRBM launchers had to be withdrawn from 18 MOBs under Soviet control—11 
in the Soviet Union, six in the GDR, and one in Czechoslovakia—and be taken to 
elimination sites. Within 12 months all non-deployed SRBM from other facilities 
had to go to their elimination sites. The process of SRBM elimination had to be 
concluded within the next 18 months, i. e. by December 1, 1989. Subsequently, 
SRBM MOBs and support facilities were successively closed-out. In parallel, all 
SS-4 and a number of SS-20 MOBs were closed while the last SS-20 MOBs were 
eventually eliminated in the last six months of the total elimination period.
In Europe, the sequence of closure of U. S. MOBs followed the still unfinished 
build-up of their operational status. It started with Woensdrecht in the Nether-
lands, where no GLCMs (BGM-109G Tomahawk) were yet stationed. The U. S. Air 
Force had only just begun to deploy GLCMs in MOB Molesworth in the UK when 
the Treaty came into force, and this base was scheduled for closure in the fall of 
1988 with an official notification in December. A Soviet inspection was carried 
out there on January 19, 1989. Similarly, in MOB Florennes in Belgium, the sta-
tioning of GLCM had not been completed in the summer of 1988. Consequently, 
withdrawal of its missiles started in the fall and was accomplished by December 
13, 1988. A Soviet close-out inspection on March 10, 1989, certified the closure 
of the base.106
In contrast, all three Pershing II MOBs (initially 120 missiles) in West Ger-
many remained active throughout the first two years of the Treaty’s operations 
in order to maintain the parity in warhead delivery capabilities stipulated in 
the Treaty.107 Also still active in the second Treaty year were: the large GLCM 
(BGM-109G Tomahawk) MOBs at Greenham Common, in the UK (initially 101 
missiles, 29 launchers); at Comiso in Italy (initially 108 missiles, 31 launchers) 
and at Wüschheim, West Germany (initially 62 missiles, 31 launchers), as well 
as support facilities in Weilerbach and Frankfurt-Hausen, West Germany, and 
at Grosselies, Belgium. 
Between June and December 1990 the three sites at Grosellies, Belgium, and 
Wüschheim and Waldheide-Neckarsulm, West Germany were declared closed 
and were inspected. The remaining 21 U. S. INF sites, including the MOBs at 
106 Ibid.
107 The West German Foreign Office noted on February 1, 1989, that by December 31, 1988, 
the U. S. had withdrawn 27 Pershing II from the FRG and 64 GLCM from Belgium, Italy, 
and the UK. Cf. AAPD 1989, Doc. 12, Anm. 7, p. 54.
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Greenham Common, U. K., Neu-Ulm and Schwäbisch-Gmünd, West Germany, 
along with the support facilities in Weilerbach and Frankfurt-Hausen, West 
Germany, were closed between December 1990 and May 1991.
Though, in late April and May 1991, both sides made declarations that the 
last remaining INF MOBs and support facilities had been closed, close-out 
inspections were still conducted throughout the summer and up to August of that 
year. The closure of 31 U. S. and 133 Soviet108 former INF sites was confirmed by 
close-out inspections in the sequence shown in Table 6.







31 U.S sites 7 0 24
133 Soviet sites 50 36 47
Closure of INF bases could include conversion to either civilian or alternative 
military purposes. Thus, a number of Soviet MOBs were converted to missile 
operation bases for mobile SS-25 ICBM which later became subject to START I 
agreements. They could still be inspected regularly by short-notice inspections 
which lasted up to May 2001.
3.6 INF Short-notice Inspections
INF short-notice inspections at MOBs and missile support facilities (excluding 
missile production and elimination facilities) could be made “anytime, any-
where.” The purpose of such non-scheduled monitoring was so that the state 
parties could ascertain that each side was abiding by the Treaty obligations. The 
Treaty laid down that short-notice inspections could begin 90 days after it came 
into force—i. e. on August 30, 1988—and that this arrangement would last for 
13 years, up to May 31, 2001. Each state party had an annual inspection quota: 
20 short-notice inspections during the first three years (up to May 31, 1991); 15 
during the subsequent five years; and 10 for the five years after that.
Short-notice inspections had to be notified no less than 16 hours prior to the 
arrival of the 10-person inspection team at the POE. There, the inspection team 
had to specify the inspection site they were intending to visit within 4 to 24 hours 
of their arrival. The inspected party then had the obligation to transport the 
108 The MoU of November 1, 1987, still contained 133 Soviet INF bases and facilities some of 
which were collocated. They were subsequently reduced to 130 sites by the update of July 1, 
1988.
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inspection team to the selected site within nine hours. The inspection would last 
for 24 hours, which could be exceeded by a maximum of eight hours if both team 
chiefs agreed on it. Inspection results had to be certified in inspection reports. 
After May 31, 1991, the only purpose of short notice inspections was to confirm 
that former INF MOBs and support facilities were indeed closed and that no new 
INF-related activities had been resumed there.
Short-notice inspections began during the elimination period that started in 
September 1988, but, as some former Soviet INF SS-20 MOBs were converted to 
operating bases for SS-25 ICBMs, such sites were of particular interest to U. S. 
inspection teams after the end of the elimination period. Distinguishing SS-20 
and SS-25 missiles, which had outwardly similar stages, required special verifica-
tion techniques. As the SS-25 carried one warhead while the SS-20 had carried 
three, one particular measurement was to gauge the differences in radiation the 
two types of missile emitted. Radiation detection equipment had been agreed 
in the Memorandum of Agreement of December 1989. Random sampling by 
visual observation of the interiors of one-launch canisters was used to strengthen 
verification.
Since many short-notice inspections were made to former missile bases in 
Europe, the verification agencies of the basing countries there continued to be 
involved in escorting Russian or U. S. inspections right up to May 2001. After 
Germany’s unification on October 3, 1990, the German verification agency 
had to escort both Soviet and U. S. inspection teams, since both sides had based 
MOBs and support facilities on German territory. The German Armed Forces 
Verification Center, located in Geilenkirchen, registered a total of 74 inspections 
conducted in the 12 INF sites in Germany between 1989 and 1998.109 The bulk of 
these were carried out between the summer of 1989 and May 1991. Subsequently, 
eleven of these sites were converted to civilian uses. When the INF verification 
regime ceased to exist on May 31, 2001, an illustrated volume was distributed to 
the INF state parties documenting what former INF sites in Germany had been 
turned into.
Throughout its existence between 1988 and 2001 the short-notice on-site 
inspection regime proved to be a valuable, additional and lasting tool for monitor-
ing compliance with the INF Treaty. It complemented—and outlived—baseline, 
elimination, and close-out inspections. During the time of its implementation no 
major problems were recorded.
109 Zentrum für Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, Jahresbericht Implementierung von 
Rüstungskontrollabkommen durch die Bundeswehr im Jahre 2001, BMVg FüS III 5, Berlin, 
July 2, 2002, p. 45.
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4. Conclusions
In the three years from when the INF Treaty came into force—the years beginning 
in June 1988 and ending in May 1991—the United States and the Soviet Union 
eliminated a whole class of land-based, nuclear-capable intermediate-, medium- 
and shorter-range missiles and launchers, along with their support equipment 
and structures in accordance with the Treaty’s provisions. They destroyed a total 
of 2,692 missiles, 1,114 launchers, and 7,771 other pieces of equipment that were 
prohibited by the Treaty and eliminated 161 missile operating bases and sup-
port facilities in the United States, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK.
This process was verified by more than 630 on-site inspections of five dif-
ferent types, including the stationing of resident inspection teams tasked with 
continuous monitoring of the periphery and portals of missile production plants. 
Verification was complemented by “cooperative measures” that permitted the use 
of National Technical Means of verification, managed without interference or 
concealment. Thousands of information details and notifications were exchanged 
through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of both sides and several thousand 
inspectors, escorts, staff and aircrews were involved in the process along with the 
military and civilian personnel who operated the missile bases, and support and 
elimination facilities. Special new arms control agencies were set up, and existing 
risk reduction organizations expanded. 
The INF elimination and verification process was unprecedented in peace-
time history up to that point. The successful implementation of rather complex 
elimination and verification provisions, hitherto conceptualized only in studies 
and at the negotiation table, proved that such rules were feasible and viable in 
practice. They provided a cooperative control mechanism by which the opposing 
sides could assure each other of compliance with Treaty provisions to a very 
high degree of reliability. Thus, the implementation of the INF Treaty marked a 
turning point, shifting the superpowers’ stances from confrontation to security 
cooperation. This shift constituted a crucial milestone on the way to ending the 
Cold War. Implementation of the Treaty demonstrated the intent and political 
resolve of governments to solve security problems cooperatively, and to reduce 
offensive military capabilities on the basis of parity of remaining armaments 
rather than on parity of reductions. In this way, the INF Treaty laid the ground-
work for further arms control treaties. In particular, it was the precedent on 
which the reduction and verification provisions of the bilateral START Treaty 
(including its Periphery and Portal Control System) were built; and, then again, 
it lay behind those of the multilateral CFE Treaty. In consequence, regular 
information exchanges and notifications, on-site inspections, observation of 
large military exercises, and observation flights became a weekly routine. 
Based on the “Presidential Initiatives” of 1991/92 the United States and the 
Soviet Union / Russian Federation carried out large-scale reductions of “tactical 
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nuclear weapons” (TNW) and withdrew them from European basing countries 
without legally binding treaties. By October 17, 1991, the United States had 
reduced its TNW in Europe from a peak of 7,400 amassed during the Cold War 
to a remaining figure of 400 to 600 gravity bombs.110 All ground-launched 
short-range missiles with ranges below 500 km and nuclear artillery shells were 
withdrawn and destroyed. Similarly, the Russian Federation withdrew TNW 
from basing countries and former Soviet Republics, destroying a large portion 
and keeping the remainder in centralized storage sites. These processes were 
completed in the summer of 1992.
The European basing countries eliminated their national SRBMs too. The 
last German Pershing IA missile was decommissioned on October 4, 1990—just 
one day after Germany’s unification and only a few days after the last U. S. INF 
missile had left Europe. The last of the 24 former GDR SS-23 was destroyed on 
November 14, 1991. The remaining SS-23 of the Czech Republic were destroyed in 
1996, those of Slovakia in October 2000, and those of Bulgaria in October 2002.111
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the INF Treaty 
became a multilateral agreement to include the USSR’s successor states—the Rus-
sian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan—
as INF bases and support facilities had been stationed on their territories.112 The 
former Soviet Republics agreed to continue the INF on-site inspection regime. 
With the consent of the other parties, however, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
did not take part in the meetings of the Special Verification Commission (SVC). 
On November 31, 1994, representatives of the United States, Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed a formal agreement to continue implementing 
the INF Treaty.113 
The on-site inspection regime of the INF Treaty ended on May 31, 2001. After 
that date, parties could still convene the SVC, but they had no verification tools 
other than National Technical Means (NTM). While early official assessments 
in the United States were confident that U. S. intelligence was in a position to 
cope with that task,114 other assessments stressed that information gained by 
intelligence sources needed to be analyzed and judged in accordance with the pre-
110 FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Chronology.
111 Ibid; see also Daryl Kimball and Kingston Reif, The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty at a Glance, https://www.armscontrol.org.
112 The Baltic States were not considered to be “successor states” of the Soviet Union and, 
therefore, did not become state parties to the INF Treaty although several INF sites had been 
based on their territories.
113 Daryl Kimball, Kingston Reif. Arms Control Association. U. S.–Russian Nuclear Arms 
Control Agreements at a Glance. Fact Sheets&Briefs (updated February 2019), p. 4, https://
www.armscontrol.org.
114 United States Information Service. Press Section: Document Defense Policy. Senate Com-
mittee Finds INF Verification Feasible (Text: Boren report summary on verification), March 
23, 1988, Embassy of the United States, Stockholm (EUR-207, 03/22/88).
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vailing political climate.115 After 2014, when the United States and Russia began 
to accuse each other of Treaty violations, there was no cooperatively acquired 
database for clarification of ambiguities. The powers were unable to revive either 
a suitable verification regime or a new Memorandum of Agreement capable of 
defining criteria for new systems permitted by the Treaty while others remained 
banned. On August 2, 2019, the United States formally withdrew from the INF 
Treaty. The Russian Federation followed suit and the Treaty ceased to exist.
115 Amy F.  Woolf, Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control. Congressional Research 




The INF Treaty and Europe’s Security Architecture, 1987–2019
The life-span of the INF Treaty is remarkable: it lasted for over three decades. 
When the Treaty was signed by U. S. President Ronald Reagan and CPSU General 
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, it was under a lucky star. Or so it seemed at the 
time. President Reagan’s wife, Nancy, had her personal astrologist check on the 
date originally envisaged for the signature in late November 1987. The astrologist 
foresaw a much more promising constellation of stars several days later, so the 
Treaty was signed on December 8, 1987, at 13:45 hrs, in Washington D. C.1 
Over the following months and years the INF treaty did indeed prove to 
be a success. Both the U. S. and the USSR were quick to dismantle their INF 
systems—Cruise Missiles, Pershing II missiles, and SS-20 missiles2—according 
to the agreed timetable. The INF Treaty survived even when, first, the Warsaw 
Pact, and then the USSR dissolved in 1991. A control and inspection regime was 
installed which now also covered the successor states of the Soviet Union in addi-
tion to the Russian Federation, which remained in control of the former USSR’s 
nuclear stockpile.3 Under the INF Treaty the Special Verification Commission 
(SVC) undertook arms control and verification missions in four of the twelve 
USSR successor states—Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus—while in 
both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan only one installation under the INF Treaty 
had existed anyway. On-site inspections ended only in 2001, when the means of 
control and verification changed to satellite information.
The years between 1986 and 1994 saw the formation of a new security archi-
tecture in Europe, and the bilateral INF Treaty became an integral part of this 
1 See the memoirs of President Reagan’s White House Chief of Staff about the influence of the 
Reagans’ personal astrologer on the President’s agenda: Donald Regan, For the Record: From 
Wall Street to Washington, San Diego 1988, for example pp. 3–5, 70–74, 300 f., 344, 367–370. 
For the anecdote above, see Joan Quigley, “What Does Joan Say?” My Seven Years as White 
House Astrologer to Nancy and Ronald Reagan, New York 1990; George P. Shultz, Turmoil 
and Triumph My Years as Secretary of State, New York 1993, p. 1005; Colin Powell, Mein Weg, 
Munich 1995, p. 376.
2 For the development and deployment history of these systems, see Oliver Bange, SS-20 and 
Pershing II: Weapon Systems and the Dynamization of East–West relations, in: Christoph 
Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp 
(eds.), The Nuclear Crisis. The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Move-
ment of the 1980s, New York 2020, pp. 70–86.
3 Mariana Budjeryn and Steven E. Steiner, Forgotten Parties to the INF, https://www.wilson 
center.org/blog-post/forgotten-parties-to-the-inf (accessed May 10, 2020). 
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predominantly multilateral framework. In 1986 the Document on Confidence 
and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe triggered the 
so-called Stockholm process (so called because the agreement was signed in the 
Swedish capital).4 Its stipulations included: prior announcement of military 
maneuvers, a limitation on the number of soldiers participating in these exercises, 
an invitation for observers, to witness, a right for them to inspect military units 
of other signatories, and an obligation to exchange information on dislocation 
and doctrines. These were supported by many other instruments meant to 
create transparency, and thus confidence in the non-aggressive postures of 
either side.5 
The years 1989–1991 were full of epochal events: the implosion of Communist 
rule in most Central and East European states in 1989, Germany’s reunification 
in 1990, and then the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR in 1991. All 
these turns were accompanied by new instruments for arms control and disarma-
ment. These included the various treaties regulating the long withdrawal of the 
Soviet (later Russian) armed forces from the territory of their former allies in the 
Warsaw Pact,6 the outcomes from the Summit of Paris, including the Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe7 and the Treaty on (the reduction of) Conventional Forces 
in Europe.8 Furthermore the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty on interconti-
nental nuclear systems9 was made, along with various directives from the U. S. 
4 Oliver Bange and Karl-Heinz Lutz, Ohne Öffentlichkeit keine Vertrauensbildung. Deutsche 
Medien und deutsche Armeen im KVAE-Prozess, in: Heiner Möllers and Jörg Jacobs 
(eds.), Bundeswehr und Medien. Ereignisse—Handlungsmuster—Mechanismen in jüngster 
Ge schichte und heute, Baden-Baden 2018, pp. 219–248. Josef Holik, Die Rüstungskontrolle. 
Rückblick auf eine kurze Ära, Berlin 2008, pp. 45 f. For the term itself, see for example West 
German reports and analyses of the Stockholm negotiations such as telegram No. 274, Stock-
holm, September 22, 1986, from Ambassador Citron; and the memorandum from Hartmann, 
head of the conventional Disarmament Unit in the German Foreign Office, Berlin, September 
30, 1986. Both in: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 
1986, Munich 2017, Doc. 253 and 267.
5 For the far-reaching vision of Willy Brandt with regard to a new security structure in 
Europe, see Oliver Bange, Conceptualizing “Common Security”—Willy Brandt’s Vision 
of Trans-bloc Security and Its International Perception, 1981–1990, in: Bernd Rother and 
Klaus Larres (eds.), Willy Brandt and International Relations—Europe, the USA, and Latin 
America, 1974–1992, London 2019, pp. 143–160. For a collection of contemporary personal 
experiences in arms control measures, see Guntram König (ed.), Kontrollierte Feindschaft—
Manöverbeobachtungen und Inspektionen 1987–1990, Aachen 2011.
6 Oliver Bange, Die Sicherheitspolitik Moskaus und der Stationierungsalltag in der DDR. 
Vorgeschichte und Beginn des Abzugs von 1983 bis 1991, in: Museum Berlin-Karlshorst e. V. 
(ed.), Der Abzug. Die letzten Jahre der russischen Truppen in Deutschland. Eine fotografische 
Dokumentation von Detlev Steinberg, Berlin 2016, pp. 37–55. 
7 For the Charter of Paris, November 21, 1990, see Europa-Archiv 1990, pp. D 656–664. 
8 For the CFE Treaty of November 19, 1990, see https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/index.
html (accessed June 20, 2020).
9 For the START I Treaty of July 31, 1991, see https://fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/ (accessed 
May 10, 2020).
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President on tactical nuclear weapons, and the Treaty on Open Skies allowing for 
unarmed surveillance flights over the territories of signatory states.10 
The capstone of this dynamic was the unanimous decision made in 1994 to 
institutionalize the so-called “Helsinki process.”11 Back in 1975 in Finland’s 
capital, all the European states (with the exception of Albania) had, together with 
the U. S. and Canada, signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation (CSCE) in Europe. Its four “baskets” included instruments to 
improve economic exchange, human rights, and access to information; also 
measures for a peaceful solution to conflicts (including “peaceful change of 
frontiers,”12 which would become the reference point for Germany’s reunification 
process) along with those for improving political relations. Military détente13 
and cooperation received relatively little space in the final document, but several 
codes of behavior mentioned in the list of principles also applied to military 
policies, as did the call for Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). While back 
in 1975 these last were framed in rather general, non-obligatory language, the 
CBMs—or CSBMs (Confidence and Security Building Measures) as they were 
called later—took on a dynamic of their own within the Stockholm process. 
This process was capped in 1994 by the decision of the CSCE conference in 
Budapest to turn the rather loose set of follow-up meetings into one permanent 
organization—the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
Since then, the OSCE has formed the world’s largest security-oriented multilateral 
organization, mandated by its 57 participating and 11 partner states with arms 
control, the promotion of human rights, and monitoring the freedom of the press 
and fair elections. Almost 3,500 people work for the OSCE today at its various 
institutions and in its secretariat in Vienna. For most of the post-Cold War years 
the OSCE has formed an umbrella framework for the various aspects of Europe’s 
security architecture—sometimes inspecting and controlling the implementa-
tion of treaties, sometimes providing a useful platform for discussing wider 
issues at stake. As, for many years thereafter, security and military issues were 
widely seen as somewhat non-pressing items on the European agenda, the OSCE 
remained out of the spotlight of the public media until fairly recently. 
With the crisis in Ukraine, Russia’s occupation of the Crimea 2014, and a new 
military buildup in Europe, the OSCE once again found itself in the center of the 
security–political dynamics of the continent and the ensuing efforts at pacifica-
tion, arms control, and verification. On March 21, 2014, following a request by 
10 For the Open Skies Treaty of March 24, 1992, see the FAS Fact Sheet, https://fas.org/nuke/ 
control/os/index.html (accessed May 10, 2020).
11 Daniel C.  Thomas, The Helsinki Effect. International Norms, Human Rights, and the 
Demise of Communism, Princeton 2001.
12 Gottfried Niedhart and Oliver Bange (eds.), Helsinki and the Transformation of Europe, New 
York 2008; Gottfried Niedhart, Ostpolitik. Transformation through Communication and the 
Quest for Peaceful Change, in: Cold War History 18/3 (2016), pp. 14–59.
13 Stephan Kieninger, Dynamic Détente. The United States and Europe, 1964–1975, Lanham 
2016, pp. 103–158.
Oliver Bange318
the Ukraine government, and after agreement by the 57 participating states 
in the organization, the OSCE Council decided to send a Special Monitoring 
Mission (SMM) of unarmed civilian observers to Eastern Ukraine. At its height 
the SMM consisted of 700 unarmed civilian monitors from 40 OSCE member-
states.14 The mission was intended to be an interlocutor between all parties in 
the conflict, and a neutral source of information about incidents on the ground. 
In January 2020, after the at least atmospherically successful readoption of the 
so-called “Normandy format” in Paris the previous December (consisting of the 
Ukrainian, Russian, German, and French heads of government),15 Kiev even 
asked the OSCE to expand its Monitoring Mission in Eastern Ukraine.16
However, the crisis in Ukraine also showed up the limitations of the OSCE 
instruments, originally geared towards the prevention of military crises in the 
region. Combined with the end of the INF Treaty, and in many ways linked to it, 
this might well herald the end of the security architecture of the Helsinki system. 
It is doubtful if the Helsinki system will be replaced by a “Yalta 2” system, domi-
nated by Russia and the U. S., as has been repeatedly called for by Moscow.17
Precisely because many of the links between the INF Treaty and the Hel-
sinki / OSCE system from the years 1987–1994 are still valid today, the end of the 
INF Treaty may well serve as a catalyst to trigger a negative domino effect amongst 
the other security and arms control treaties mentioned above. It therefore seems 
appropriate to consider in some detail the aspects that linked the INF Treaty to 
the wider, predominantly multilateral security issues in Europe.
14 OSCE (ed.), OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine: The Facts, Geneva, 
December 2016, https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/116879?download=true (accessed May 
10, 2020). 
15 Ergebnisse bei Gipfel in Paris: Ukraine und Russland einigen sich auf Truppenabzug und 
Waffenstillstand, in: Der Tagesspiegel, December 10, 2020, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/
politik/ergebnisse-bei-gipfel-in-paris-ukraine-und-russland-einigen-sich-auf-truppen 
abzug-und-waffenstillstand/25316996.html (accessed May 10, 2020).
16 Kyiv Asks OSCE To Expand Ukraine Monitoring Mission, in: Radio Free Europe / Radio 
Liberty, January 20, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyiv-asks-osce-to-expand-ukraine-
monitoring-mission/30387572.html (accessed May 10, 2020). The first meeting in the “Nor-
mandy format” took place on June 6, 2016 on the occasion of the D-Day commemorations 
in Northern France. There have been nine meetings in this format since.
17 Pavel Felgenhauer, Russia Proposes a Yalta-2 Geopolitical Tradeoff to Solve the Ukrainian 
Crisis, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor 12/26 (February 26, 2015), https://jamestown.org/ program/
russia-proposes-a-yalta-2-geopolitical-tradeoff-to-solve-the-ukrainian-crisis/ (accessed 
May 10, 2020). Frida Ghitis, Putin wants Yalta 2.0 and Trump may give it to him, in: CNN, 
January 27, 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/25/opinions/putin-wants-yalta-2-0-and-
trump-may-give-it-to-him-ghitis/index.html (accessed May 10, 2020).
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1. The INF Treaty: The Implementation Issue— 
and What it Meant for the Two Germanies  
as Non-Signatory States to the Treaty
The key to the impact of the INF Treaty on the course of events during the last 
years of the systemic conflict between East and West was the way in which it was 
implemented, and the stringency of that implementation. It meant the abolition 
of 846 missiles on the U. S. side and 1846 missiles on the Soviet side to be achieved 
by the end of May 1991. The dismantling and destruction of the missiles of either 
side was to be controlled by its opposite number.18 
However, many U. S. INF-systems were stationed on West German  territory 
and a sizeable portion of the Soviet systems were on East German soil. This 
armory included all 108 Pershing II missiles and 96 ground-launched Cruise 
Missiles (GLCMs) in the Federal Republic of Germany and 54 SS-12 Scale-
board and 53 SS-23 Spider in the German Democratic Republic.19 All in all, 
this amounted to almost one-third of American intermediate-range missiles 
(with a 1,000–5,500 km range) and nearly one-quarter of Soviet short medium-
range missiles (with a 500–1,000 km range) deployed on West and East German 
soil.20 It was therefore essential that American inspectors had the right to control 
missile sites in the German Democratic Republic, while Soviet inspectors could 
do the same on West German territory.21 
A key element of the implemention procedures was the so-called “territorial 
principle.” This regulated that the state on whose territory the weapons were 
deployed had to make the provisions enabling the inspections to take place. The 
territorial principle was not a feature exclusively developed for the INF Treaty 
18 Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF], https:// 
fas.org/nuke/control/inf/ (accessed March 24, 2019). Lukas Trakimavičius, Why Europe 
needs to support the US–Russia INF Treaty, in: EurActiv, May 15, 2018, https://www.euractiv.
com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/why-europe-needs-to-support-the-us-russia-
inf- treaty/ (accessed May 10, 2020).
19 Out of the 54 SS-12 missiles, 19 were stationed in Königsbrück, 8 in Bischofswerda, 22 
in Waren, 5 in Wokuhl. Out of the 53 SS-23 missiles, 6 were stationed in Weißenfels and 47 
in Jena-Forst.
20 The numbers are taken from the original INF Treaty, signed on December 8, 1987, and 
additional material to the Treaty as published online by the U. S. Department of State (no 
date of publication provided), https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm (accessed 
May 10, 2020).
21 For the Multilateral Basing Country Agreement (MBCA) between the U. S. and the deploy-
ment countries Belgium, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK of December 11, 
1987, see Bundesgesetzblatt 1988, II, pp. 431–437. See also the essay by Wolfgang Richter in 
this volume.
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but, rather, was modeled on a similar clause in the Stockholm agreement on 
conventional forces and weapons that had been signed one year earlier.22 
Accordingly, East Germany’s Ministry for National Defense and West Ger-
many’s Federal Ministry of Defense had to provide the organizational set-up 
guaranteeing that U. S. and Soviet inspectors could fulfill their tasks within the 
guidelines and timespans defined in the INF Treaty. Arrangements included pro-
vision of landing rights, transport, communication, supporting personnel, and 
more. While the dismantling of U. S. nuclear devices in the FRG was coordinated 
with the West German authorities and was thus well known to them, this was 
not the case in the German Democratic Republic. Soviet information given to the 
Party and state leadership in East Berlin on nuclear (and also chemical) weapons 
on GDR territory remained rather meager throughout. But accompanying INF 
inspectors from the U. S. allowed East German military experts and politicians a 
rare glimpse into Soviet installations with nuclear INF equipment, and provided 
valuable technical / organizational knowledge beyond mere political consultation. 
This expertise was welcomed by the first democratic government of the GDR, 
elected in March 1990, and by the Federal German government after reunifica-
tion, and it formed a valuable backdrop to the negotiations on Soviet troop 
withdrawals and the monitoring of these withdrawals thereafter. Indeed, officials 
from West Germany and the USSR had apparently agreed that the withdrawal of 
all Soviet nuclear weapons from GDR territory should be accomplished before 
German reunification in October 1990.23 However, a sizable number of these 
weapons secretly remained in Altengrabow, probably because the limited number 
of special railway wagons24 devised for the transport of nuclear weapons was 
insufficient when they were needed for the prioritized withdrawal from Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and the break-away Baltic states.25
22 For the crucial role of the “territorial principle” for the enactment of the Stockholm agree-
ment (Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures) between 1986 and 1990, 
see Bange and Lutz, Ohne Öffentlichkeit keine Vertrauensbildung, pp. 219–248.
23 For relevant literature and eye-witness accounts, see Oliver Bange, Sicherheit und Staat. Die 
Bündnis und Militärpolitik der DDR im internationalen Kontext 1969 bis 1990, Berlin 2017, 
pp. 491–494. As the U. S. inspections under the INF Treaty had shown, the nuclear warheads 
of the short medium-range missile systems stationed in the GDR (SS-12 and SS-3) had been 
removed before German reunification in October 1990. This is also confirmed by the mem-
oirs of a West German intelligence officer of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND): Norbert 
Juretzko and Wilhelm Dietl, Bedingt dienstbereit: Im Herzen des BND—die Abrechnung 
eines Aussteigers, Berlin 2004, pp. 12–52. The commanding officer of those German military 
forces stationed after the reunification on the territory of the former GDR, Jörg Schönbohm, 
confided in several interviews with the author that he assumed in early 1991 that the Soviet 
military had concentrated its remaining nuclear artillery shells in Altengrabow until their 
final removal to the USSR was technically possible in the summer of 1991.
24 The railway wagons were concealed by a cover of lead.
25 This was confirmed to the author by László Borsits, the former Chief of Staff of the Hungar-
ian Armed Forces, in Budapest on November 15, 2016. 
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2. Remaining Nuclear Threats: ICBMs and Tactical Nuclear 
Weapons—and What This Meant for Those Most Affected
The withdrawal and scrapping of ground-launched INF systems left both Ger-
man states still exposed to a huge number of remaining nuclear weapons. This 
store included a vast quantitiy of tactical nuclear devices intended for poten-
tial battlefields in Central Europe—either to blow a (nuclear) gap into enemy 
defenses in order to facilitate a break-through, or else, ironically, to block any 
similar advance by the enemy.26 The armory included nuclear artillery, atomic 
demolition devices (ADM, or “atomic mines”), bombs, and short-range ballistic 
missiles.27 Also remaining were the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of 
the two superpowers as well as their sea- and air-launched Cruise Missiles. And 
there were the French and British nuclear arsenals as well. The vast majority of 
these nuclear systems were still aimed at Central Europe, with the two German 
states at its heart.
While the nuclear threat against German territory and the German population 
thus remained almost unchanged, the only strategic deterrent against Soviet ter-
ritory in case of a war in Central Europe had been abolished with the INF missiles. 
26 For the evolving tactical and strategic planning in the USSR and the Warsaw Pact during 
these years, see Bange, Sicherheit und Staat, pp. 301–464.
27 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) or Short-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (SRTNFs)—
with “theater” serving as chiffre for Central Europe, or more precisely Germany and its 
adjacent regions.
Fig. 1: Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 1945–2017.
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The term “strategic” here is used in the classical sense, found in Clausewitz.28 
It describes a military means, operation or policy with the power to decide a 
conflict. “Punishing” an attacker either by causing “massive destruction” to 
its cities and industries or by “decapitating” its leadership (by pinpointing its 
headquarters) were the strategic nuclear options—and were therefore of central 
importance for a viable nuclear deterrence. Following this logic, between 1983 
and 1987, any attack against NATO in West Germany would immediately have 
led to the launch of Pershing II missiles and Gryphon Cruise Missiles against key 
military and political installations sited within the member-states of the Warsaw 
Pact.29 The CPSU leadership in Moscow, in all likelihood, would have answered 
with an equally strategic counter- or pre-emptive nuclear strike, using ICBMs 
against U. S. territory. The INFs therefore linked West Germany’s security to that 
of both superpowers. From a West German perspective, following the logic of 
nuclear gamery, these weapons therefore constituted a viable deterrent. 
Hence the abolition of the ground-launched INFs was tantamount to a step 
back in time—to the years before 1983. As German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
had explained in his speech at the International Institute for Security Studies in 
London in 1977, the absence of this class of weapons meant that an aggressor could 
use (and face the usage of) nuclear weapons on the German battlefield without 
having to fear an automatic nuclear response against his own territory.30 In 
all likelihood, the first use—or at latest the follow-on use—of nuclear weapons 
on the battlefield would be followed by a telephone call between the American 
President and the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the next 
step would have meant intercontinental nuclear desaster for both the U. S. and the 
USSR. Without the INFs, the two superpowers were once again “de-coupled”31 
from a conventional tactical nuclear response in Central Europe.
28 According to the definition by Clausewitz, tactics describe “the theory of the use” (planful 
use) “of military forces in combat,” while strategy is “the theory of the use of combat for the 
object of the war.” The difference is that tactics aim at victory in a specific combat operation 
while strategy aims at ultimate victory in the war itself. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, New 
York 2004, p. 71. 
29 Bange, SS-20 and Pershing II, in: Gassert et al. (eds.), Nuclear Crisis, pp. 79 f. See also the 
essay by Tim Geiger in this volume.
30 Helmut Schmidt’s remarks were closely connected to the public debate over the deployment 
of U. S. Cruise Missiles armed with neutron-bomb warheads in Europe and especially in 
Germany. His fears reflected the public debate in West Germany and were mirrored by the 
concerns of the East German head of state, Erich Honecker. See Bange, Sicherheit und Staat, 
pp. 124–143.
31 Helmut Schmidt’s speech at the IISS in London was published eleven days later in the West 
German government journal: Vortrag des Bundeskanzlers in London am 28.10.1977, in: Bul-
letin Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, No. 112, p. 1013, Bonn, November 
8, 1977. For the impact of this speech, see Oliver Thränert, Helmut Schmidt. In der nuklearen 
Grauzone: Londoner Rede tritt Nachrüstung los, in: Die Neue Gesellschaft / Frankfurter 
Hefte, 1–2 (2001), pp. 57–60. 
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The well known German proverb,“The shorter the nukes’ range, the deadlier 
for the Germans” was true once again. However aptly the proverb described the 
geostrategic nuclear position of both West and East Germany, it seems that it was 
only coined in early 1987, a mere half year before the signing of the INF Treaty.32 
On April 18, 1987 the parliamentary leader of the ruling conservative parties, the 
CDU and CSU, demanded in public that the two superpowers should also include 
all nuclear weapons with a reach between 150 and 500 kilometers in any feasible 
nuclear deal. Like most of the INF missiles, this class of nuclear weaponry was 
aimed at German territory, both in the East and the West. Seen from a German 
perspective (from whatever side of the Iron Curtain), the abolition of the INF 
systems merely obliviated the threat of nuclear disaster. In his article in West 
Germany’s prominent conservative daily newspaper Die Welt, Alfred Dregger 
summarized the situation: “The shorter the reach, the more threatening they 
[these missiles] are for our country.”33 Only a few days later, on May 7, 1987, 
while speaking before West Germany’s parliament, Dregger compressed the 
rather complex message even further: “The shorter the reach, the more Ger-
man the destruction.”34 Although Dregger was still arguing from an exclusively 
security-political perspective in the spring of 1987 (trying to maintain West 
German security interests), his catch-phrase was soon claimed by other, rather 
different actors. West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher seized 
on it in support of his own line, of “voluntarily” abolishing the FRG’s Pershing 
IA missiles (a Soviet prerequisite for signing the INF Treaty with the U. S.); and 
West Germany’s peace movement used it throughout as apparent proof of the 
irrationality of nuclear deterrence in Central Europe. 
Whoever may have been right in retrospect, in December 1987 the signing 
of the INF Treaty by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev left the Ger-
mans with the problem of hundreds of short-range nuclear systems, all directed 
more or less exclusively at their own territory. Within a few months, Dregger’s 
fears had indeed come true. While West Germany’s liberal Foreign Minister 
was willing to accept, at least temporarily, increased nuclear exposure in order 
to make the best play with the East–West détente dynamics that were unfolding 
in 1988, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was in two minds. Kohl was acutely aware 
of the INF Treaty’s consequences for the military and nuclear security of his 
state; at the same time he was desperate to avoid yet another split in the West 
German public over the issue. While discussions within the German government 
and with the German peace movement dragged on, the issue soon enough took 
32 The author is indebted to Tim Geiger for his helpful remarks concerning the historical 
genesis of this clause.
33 Alfred Dregger, Konventionelle Abrüstung ist das wichtigste Ziel, in: Die Welt, April 18, 1987, 
p. 4.
34 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, 11th Legislation 
Period, 10th Session, May 7, 1987, p. 538, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/11/11010.pdf.
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second place and was overtaken by East–West events unfolding between 1988 
and 1990.35
Furthermore, while the INF Treaty may have de-coupled the superpowers 
from nuclear war in Central Europe, they still threatened each other’s territories 
with ICBMs and SLCMs and their forces in Central Europe with SNFs, just as 
they had before. It was therefore hardly surprising when the U. S. Administration 
tried to obtain the consent of its NATO partners in Europe to modernize the 
Lance short-range nuclear missile system in the remaing months of the East–West 
conflict. It was equally unsurprising that this triggered a serious dispute within 
the coalition government in Bonn and a major crisis within NATO in early 1989. 
3. Germany’s Reunification: Security from Germany  
through Security with Germany. On the Importance  
of Conventional and Nuclear Safeguards
Though the “2+4” Treaty of September 12, 1990—involving West and East 
Germany plus France, Great Britain, the U. S., and the USSR—became the central 
document on German reunification, many other documents were signed during 
the crucial months in the fall of 1990 and in early 1991. And all of them dealt with 
security from a reunified Germany: limitation of German conventional forces, an 
assurance that German forces in former Eastern Germany would not come under 
NATO command until Soviet withdrawal, a guarantee of Germany’s final borders 
(especially with regard to Poland), a reconfirmation of Germany’s renunciation 
of force in international affairs and, last but not least, confirmation that the new 
Germany would honour the FRG’s signature on the Nonproliferation Treaty 
(and thus be a final confirmation of its abstention from nuclear weapons).36 
A crucial stepping stone in this overall construction related both to Ger-
many’s reunification and to Europe’s future security architecture. This was the 
interconnection between the question of eventual NATO membership for the 
future Germany and the proposed limits on conventional forces in Europe. In 
1990, both issues were negotiated in parallel, but while Germany’s reunification 
was settled in the 2+4 Treaty, the conventional forces issue was codified in the 
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Considering the importance of 
security from and with Germany for Europe’s future, and thus the importance 
35 Michael Broer, Die nuklearen Kurzstreckenwaffen in Europa: Eine Analyse des deutsch-
amerikanischen Streits über die Einbeziehung der SRINF in den INF-Vertrag und die 
SNF-Kontroverse, Frankfurt am Main 1991.
36 A helpful overview is provided in Heike Amos and Tim Geiger, Die Einheit. Das Auswär-
tige Amt, das DDR-Außenministerium und der Zwei-plus-Vier-Prozess, Göttingen 2014, 
pp. 45–48; Heike Amos and Tim Geiger, Das Auswärtige Amt und die Wiedervereinigung 
1989/90, in: Michael Gehler und Maximilian Graf (eds.), Europa und die deutsche Einheit. 
Beobachtungen, Entscheidungen und Folgen, Göttingen 2017, pp. 65–90.
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of the interconnection between the two issues, it is somewhat surprising to find 
that the CFE Treaty is both under-researched and under-estimated in the bulk of 
historiographical publications that have come out on 1989/1990.37
4. Dealing with the Deterrence Gap:  
The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 
The CFE Treaty was signed on November 19, 1990 in Paris and formed a crucial 
part of the new political and security structure in Europe—or so it was thought 
at the time. It reduced conventional arms to a critical minimum, thus creating 
a “structural inability for offensive action,” while maintaining viable defense 
capabilities. As such, it served a vital function within the logic of deterrence. If 
strategic nuclear weapons were reduced and if tactical nuclear weapons were to 
be withdrawn (as was the case with Soviet withdrawal from the GDR, Poland, 
Hungary, the ČSSR, and the Baltic states) then the likelihood of an armed conflict 
fought with conventional weapons alone appeared to rise. The CFE negotiations 
started in early 1989 and were meant to stabilize a potentially asymmetric 
military situation before Germany’s unification, the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact and Soviet withdrawal could become feasible.38
Like the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Mea-
sures and Disarmament in Europe, the CFE negotiations were initiated on a 
mandate from the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna (1986–1989). The CFE 
negotiations could build on the experiences gained during the Mutual and Bal-
anced Force Reductions Talks (MBFR) held between 1973 and 1989, but several 
crucial stumbling blocks in the MBFR talks were avoided.39 Thus the CFE 
negotiations differed from the MBFR talks in significant ways: (i) the territorial 
scope of CFE was not limited to Central Europe, so that it could include military 
forces relevant for the area, but deployed in areas from the Atlantic to the Urals; 
37 For the partial or complete absence of the CFE Treaty in the historiography on Germany’s 
reunification see the above-mentioned publications which at least recognize the CFE’s 
importance, but offer no “parallel historiography” on the unification and the CFE processes. 
For examples see Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of 
East Germany, Princeton 1997; the various contributions in two recently published edited 
volumes: Frédéric Bozo, Andreas Rödder, and Mary Elise Sarotte (eds.), German Reunifica-
tion: A Multinational History, London 2016; Bernhard Blumenau, Jussi M.  Hanhimäki, 
and Barbara Zanchetta (eds.), New Perspectives on the End of the Cold War: Unexpected 
Transformations?, London 2018. However, clear hints at the importance of this interrelation 
between German unifiation and the CFE Treaty had already been provided a few years after 
the events by two protagonists: Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and 
Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, Harvard 1995.
38 Federation of American Scientists (FAS), A Chronology: CFE Treaty Negotiations and 
Implementation, 1972–1996, no date, https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/cfebook/chrono.html 
(accessed May 10, 2020).
39 Author’s conversations with Philip Zelikow in 2007 and 2008.
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(ii) participation in the CFE negotiations was limited to NATO and Warsaw 
Pact member-states (excluding all so-called neutral and non-aligned countries); 
(iii) the negotiations were designed to result in a legally binding treaty (and not 
a mere political agreement). But a fourth difference was the most important one.
This fourth difference was that the CFE negotiations, at least initially, worked 
on weapons systems (and military units to serve them) and not on overall 
numbers of military personnel. In the end the CFE Treaty provided upper ceilings 
for each alliance for the entire region (20,000 tanks, 20,000 pieces of artillery, 
30,000 armored combat vehicles, 6,800 combat aircraft, 2,000 helicopters) as well 
as national and regional limits. Thus the CFE aimed at equal numbers in defined 
key areas of armament and key regions, and sought to prevent any national supe-
riority in each class of armament. No single country was meant to possess more 
than one-third of the total number of each item of armament or equipment. This 
in turn necessitated a comprehensive and rather complex verification system, 
including notifications about the holdings of weapon systems and their locations, 
on-site inspections of both notified and suspected arms locations, and close 
monitoring of the arms-destruction process (weapon systems beyond the above 
mentioned limits had to be destroyed within 40 months after the enactment of 
the CFE Treaty). The Joint Consultative Group (JCG) consisted of representa-
tives from all participating states, and was envisaged as a regular forum for 
consultations,40 which would provide a lasting institutionalized process of arms 
control. This complicated balance of weapons systems kept at low levels, and 
particularly in crucial regions, was meant to hinder any possible offensive mili-
tary action—at least in the dimensions necessary for waging and winning a war.
However, once the CFE Treaty was signed in November 1990, new efforts 
started up, now with the aim of including limits on the numbers of military 
personnel (which had been the focus of the fruitless MBFR talks). This resulted 
in the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe, which was signed at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in 
July 1992.41 However, this so-called “CFE-1A” agreement did not contain limits 
for sea-based naval forces, internal security forces, or forces serving under UN 
command.
40 With regular meeting sessions twice a year, allowing for additional sessions if necessary. 
Each session was meant to last no longer than four weeks. Protocol on the Joint Consultative 
Group of the CFE, https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/prot_jointcons.htm (accessed May 
10, 2020).
41 For the various strains of thought and historical developments leading to the arms control 
decisions at the CSCE conference in Helsinki in 1992, see the contributions to Alexander 
Moens and Christopher Anstis (eds.), Disconcerted Europe. The Search for a New Security 
Architecture, New York 1994. For the contemporary optimism about this, see the following 
two articles: Victor-Yves Ghebali, Towards an Operational Institution for Comprehensive 
Security; Pertti Torstila, The Helsinki Process: A Success Story and New Challenges, both 
in: Disarmament 15/4 (1992), pp. 1–12, 26–37. For a contemporary (and equally over-
optimistic) overview: Jenonne Walker, Security and Arms Control in Post-Confrontation 
Europe, Oxford 1994.
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5. Dealing with the Remaining Nuclear Weapons:  
The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
While the ground-launched INFs were removed from Europe and the number 
of conventional forces was dramatically reduced and their offensive capabilities 
curbed, it remained up to Washington and Moscow, as the only proprietors at 
the time,42 to deal with the vast number of intercontinental nuclear systems. 
With the systemic conflict between liberalism / capitalism and socialism quickly 
evaporating at least in its power-political dimension, maintaining an overly large 
number of intercontinental systems—missiles and aircraft—appeared to be an 
increasingly obsolete posture. 
Already in their SALT I and SALT II Treaties of 1972 and 1979 the U. S. and 
the USSR under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter and CPSU General Secretary 
Brezhnev had tried to define limits for their intercontinental nuclear arsenals. 
Both sides recognized the other’s interest in a viable nuclear deterrence. As a 
result, in the ABM Treaty, anti-ballistic missile defences were limited to two sites 
each, merely protecting the two capitals; in the Interim Agreement (SALT I), 
ICBM numbers were limited to 1,054 U. S. and 1,618 Soviet missiles, of which 
only 1,000 U. S. and 1,408 Soviet missiles were allowed to be armed with multiple 
nuclear warheads (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, MIRVs). 
Similar restrictions were laid down for nuclear submarines. SALT II, which was 
not ratified by the U. S. Senate after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, also 
featured limits to long-range nuclear bombers, air-launched Cruise Missiles 
(ALCMs) and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs).43 However, as both trea-
42 It should be noted however that the first Trident II missiles started their operational life on 
British submarines in December 1994. The Trident II has a reach of about 12,000 km. Its 
predecessor system was the Polaris missile with a reach of up to 4,600 km. With Trident II 
therefore an intercontinental system replaced an intermediate-range nuclear missile system. 
The French S3 and M2 missiles, in service at the time, had a reach of 3,500 and 3,100 km 
respectively, and are intermediate-range nuclear systems. Suzanne Doyle, The United States 
Sale of Trident to Britain, 1977–1982: Deal Making in the Anglo–American Nuclear Rela-
tionship, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft 28/3 (2017), pp. 477–493; Robert S. Norris, William 
M. Arkin, Hans M. Kristensen, and Joshua Handler, French Nuclear Forces, in: Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, July 1, 2001. 
43 For SALT I and SALT II, see https://fas.org/nuke/control/salt1/text/index.html and https:// 
fas.org/nuke/control/salt2/text/index.html (accessed May 10, 2020). See also Matthew 
J. Ambrose, The Control Agenda. A History of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Ithaca / 
London 2018; David Tal, U. S. Strategic Arms Policy in the Cold War. Negotiations and Con-
frontation over SALT, 1969–1979, London / New York 2017; Arvid Schors, Doppelter Boden. 
Die SALT-Verhandlungen 1963–1979, Göttingen 2016; Stephan Kieninger, “Diverting 
the Arms Race into the Permitted Channels.” The Nixon Administration, the MIRV-Mistake, 
and the SALT Negotiations, in: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Nuclear 
Proliferation International History Project, Working Paper No.  9, Washington, D. C. 
2016; Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft. History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age, 
Ithaca / London 2012.
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ties primarily only defined numerical limits to the number of delivery systems, 
but not to the number of nuclear warheads carried by them, the actual number 
of warheads quadrupled between 1970 and 1983.44
When the societies in Central and Eastern Europe began to put an end to 
the conflict of ideologies, and the bipolarism in political and military affairs 
evaporated, it was once again time to deal with the intercontinental nuclear 
systems. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) was signed in July 1991 
and put into force in December 1994. It allowed 6,000 warheads on 1,600 ICBMs 
and bombers on each side. As a consequence, 80 per cent of all strategic nuclear 
weapons were dismantled by 2001, the treaty itself expiring at the end of 2009.45 
With START II Presidents George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin set out to go even 
further and abolish the use of MIRVs altogether, in what became known as the 
“de-MIRV-ing agreement.”46 However, START II—though ratified by the U. S. 
Senate in 1996 and the Russian parliament in 2000—never came into effect. The 
U. S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and Russia reacted by withdrawing 
from START II. 
Only three weeks before this, on May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush 
and Vladimir Putin had signed a treaty—the “Moscow Treaty”—which is widely 
held to have been the peak of post-Cold War nuclear rapprochement between the 
U. S. and Russia.47 The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), as it is 
properly named, was meant to reduce the operationally active strategic nuclear 
warheads of each of the two states to an overall number between 1,700 and 2,200 
by 2012. In order to obtain this treaty, Moscow gave up its earlier demands for 
the guaranteed destruction of warheads, while Washington maintained a free 
hand over the fate of its decommissioned warheads and strategic nuclear weapons 
systems. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 9, 
2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell gave an assurance that “the treaty will allow 
you to have as many warheads as you want.”48 The treaty’s innovative focus on 
operational nuclear warheads rather than on the destruction of delivery vehicles 
and equipment was also its biggest disadvantage: non-operational warheads 
could be placed in storage with an option of redeploying them at a later stage. 
Furthermore, the ceiling of operational warheads had only to be reached at the 
actual expiry date of the treaty: December 31, 2012. What is more, apart from 
44 Wichard Woyke (ed.), Handwörterbuch Internationale Politik, Bonn 2000, p. 349.
45 For the START I Treaty of July 31, 1991, see https://fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/ (accessed 
May 10, 2020).
46 For the START II Treaty of January 3, 1993, see https://fas.org/nuke/control/start2/ (accessed 
May 10, 2020).
47 Nuclear Threat Initiative, Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), https://www. nti.
org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/strategic-offensive-reductions-treaty-sort/ (accessed May 15, 
2020).
48 Daryl Kimball and Kingston Reif, The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) at a 
Glance, Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, Washington, September 2006, https://www.
armscontrol.org/system/files/SORT-AtAGlance.pdf (accessed May 15, 2020).
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bi-annual consultations, no verification regime was established.49 Even before 
its delivery and expiry date, SORT was superseded by NEW START on February 
5, 2011. Thus many thousands of operationally inactive warheads still remain in 
U. S. and Russian inventories. 
Under the NEW START treaty—the “Prague Treaty”—signed by Presidents 
Barack Obama and Dmitry A. Medvedev in April 2010, the limit for deployed 
missiles and bombers is 700, for deployed warheads 1,550, and for ICBM launch-
systems (including submarines and bombers) 800. Both sides acted on the treaty 
and these number requirements were met by September 2018.50 The treaty 
expires in 2021 and it was criticised by President Trump in a telephone call 
with Vladimir Putin as “one of several bad deals negotiated by the Obama 
administration.”51
6. Dealing with the Remaining Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
When the Warsaw Pact disbanded, on March 31, 1991, Soviet (and then Rus-
sian) tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the territory of the USSR’s 
former allies in Central and Eastern Europe and from the territory of the former 
49 For the SORT Treaty of May 24, 2002, see https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/10527.htm 
(accessed May 10, 2020). 
50 Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, New START Treaty Aggregate 
Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms—Fact Sheet, September 1, 2018.
51 Jonathan Landy and David Rohde, Exclusive: In Call with Putin, Trump Denounced Obama-
era Nuclear Arms Treaty—Sources, Reuters World News, February 9, 2017, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-putin/exclusive-in-call-with-putin-trump-denounced-
obama-era-nuclear-arms-treaty-sources-idUSKBN15O2A5.
Fig. 2: U. S. Nuclear Weapon Stockpile 1962–2017.
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Soviet republics, particularly from the newly independent Baltic states. With 
much smaller Russian forces around, diminishing NATO forces, a long distance 
between NATO and Russian troops (during these years before NATO’s enlarge-
ment in the East), and an apparent end to military confrontations, there seemed 
to be little reason to have tactical nuclear weapons on the European continent.52
The withdrawal of U. S. and Soviet tactical nuclear weapons from Europe 
(outside the USSR) was therefore based on unilateral decisions by the superpower 
leaders, taking account of this new situation. In his Presidential Nuclear Initia-
tive (PNI) of September 27, 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced the 
unilateral withdrawal of all ground-launched short-range nuclear forces (SNFs), 
the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons on U. S. warships (i. e. Cruise Missiles 
not covered by the INF) and the reduction of U. S. nuclear stockpiles in Europe 
(leaving a few hundred rather than thousands of nuclear warheads in Europe).53 
In 1994, this was complemented by President Clinton’s Presidential Review 
Directive 34.54 This PRD provided the framework for the U. S. Nuclear Policy 
Review finalized in the same year. According to its terms, the U. S. would retain 
450 nuclear weapons in Europe—enough to deter an attack on U. S. Allies, target 
2,500 sites in Russia in case of all-out war, and deploy more accurate missiles on 
four additional nuclear submarines (which were not covered by the INF Treaty).55
52 The continent appeared so firmly to be at peace with itself, that a well known U. S. academic 
even revived and scrutinized the Marxist idea of “the end of history”—predicted for an 
eventual victory of Socialism (which had clearly failed to achieve this objective). Francis 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York 1992. The book was based on a 
far-sighted article published in the summer of 1989: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 
in: The National Interest 16 (summer 1989), pp. 3–18.
53 Presidential Nuclear Initiative, September 27, 1991. The Text of the Presidential Nuclear 
Initiative Announcement is published in Annex A of Susan J. Koch, The Presidential Nuclear 
Initiatives of 1991–1992, Washington, D. C. 2012, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/
a577537.pdf (accessed May 10, 2020). Relevant background material can be found in the 
George Bush Presidential Library: Bush Presidential Records, Staff and Office Files, National 
Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject File PNI. On the following day, September 
28, 1991, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Colin Powell explained at a press conference that this involved three types of nuclear artillery 
warheads (W-33, W-79, and W-48 for 8 inch and 155 mm artillery pieces respectively). All in 
all, this amounted to the removal from Europe of about 1,000 artillery rounds and 700 Lance 
missile warheads, which were to be destroyed, together with another 400 nuclear artillery 
and Lance warheads in the U. S.
54 For the history of Presidential Review Directive 34, initiating the U. S. Nuclear Posture 
Review of 1994, see Tom Sauer, Nuclear Inertia. US Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold 
War, London 2005, pp. 102–114.
55 Arthur J. Laffin and Anne Montgomery (eds.), Swords into Plowshares. Nonviolent Direct 
Action for Disarmament, Peace, Social Justice, Eugene, OR 2010, p. 263. See also Janne 
E. Nolan, An Elusive Consensus. Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold 
War, Washington, D. C. 1999.
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7. The Demise of the INF Treaty, 2014–2019
The present book represents the proceedings of a conference of historians held in 
Berlin in late 2017. When this conference reflected on the INF Treaty at that time, 
the INF issue seemed to have withdrawn from major public attention since the 
jubilant earlier days. But already dark clouds were looming on the security–politi-
cal horizon and the INF Treaty was moving back into the political spotlight. Back 
then—almost two years before the U. S. withdrawal from the Treaty—it seemed 
appropriate to consider the relevance of the INF Treaty for the larger security 
architecture in Europe.
Over the preceding thirty years, both Russia and the U. S. had found ways and 
means of dealing with the gap in nuclear deterrence posed by the Treaty, and from 
2013 on, the numerous possibilities for circumvening or even breaking the Treaty 
came under increasing discussion by the interested public. 
The malaise of the INF Treaty began with the American withdrawal from 
the Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty (ABM) in June 2002. The ABM Treaty had been 
agreed upon between Washington and Moscow in the early 1970s, and it formed 
an integral part of the SALT agreement of 1972. While all the treaties on nuclear 
weapons mentioned so far dealt with the limitation, withdrawal, and destruction 
of weapons systems and nuclear warheads, the ABM treaty ruled that neither 
of the two contemporary superpowers should produce or deploy technologi-
cal systems capable of destroying attacking nuclear missiles launched by their 
opponent. The ABM Treaty precluded defensive systems of this kind in order to 
establish and maintain a balanced nuclear deterrent. The underlying principle 
assumed that if both the U. S. and the USSR possessed the capability to respond 
in kind to a nuclear attack from the other—in “mutually assured destruction” 
(MAD)—then neither side would dare to wage nuclear war. Two aspects were of 
central importance to this concept: firstly, both sides had to maintain comparable 
numbers of nuclear weapons (mirrored in the ceilings codified in the SALT, 
START, SORT and INF agreements); and, secondly, both sides had to accept their 
own national vulnerability to nuclear war.56
This second pillar of MAD (and with it the entire concept) became obsolete, 
when the U. S. stepped away from the treaty as a consequence of the terror attacks 
on September 11, 2001, arguing that it needed ABM systems in order to provide 
more protection against this new kind of threat. The Press Secretary of the White 
House stressed at the time that “Russia is not an enemy,” and Russia’s President 
56 For the ABM logic, see for example: James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defending 
America. Updated: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense, Washington, D. C. 2002. 
Alexander T. J. Lennon, Contemporary Nuclear Debates: Missile Defenses, Arms Control, 
and Arms Races in the Twenty-First Century, Boston (MIT) 2002. Coit D. Blacker and Gloria 
Duffy, International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements (Studies in International Security 
& Arms Control), Stanford 1984. 
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Vladimir Putin declared in turn that his country’s security interests would not 
be concerned.57 
However, Putin’s perception of U. S. intentions was soon to change. The reason 
was to be found in American plans to deploy the new ABM systems (SM-3 block-
IIA missiles and far-reaching X-Band radar systems in their support) not only in 
the U. S., but also in the Czech Republic and in Poland.58 Washington explained 
this as an effort to defend Europe against possible missile attacks or blackmail 
from Iran, but Russia did not see it that way. Rather, it perceived a strategic threat 
to itself at its own doorstep, a next logical step, following on from the withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty, in a bid to undercut the established nuclear balance. As 
early as 2004, Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov was therefore voicing the case 
for Russia to leave the INF Treaty.59 This idea was followed by further soundings 
over the succeeding years until, on February 10, 2007, President Putin declared 
before the Munich Security Conference that the INF Treaty no longer satisfied 
Russia’s security interests.60 Putin’s argument was that since 1987 a whole 
number of additional states—North and South Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan, and 
Israel—had obtained INF systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads; but the 
real reason for his statement was clearly that the American ABM systems were 
to be stationed in Europe. Only four days later, on February 14, the Chief of the 
Russian General Staff, Yury Baluyevsky, made it clear that “the European shield” 
of future American ABMs “would destroy the strategic balance of forces and 
threaten Russia’s national interests.”61 A few months later, Russian officials 
57 ABM Treaty Fact Sheet, Statement by the White House Press Secretary, announcing the 
U. S. decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, Washington, December 13, 2001, https://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html (accessed 
May 10, 2020). For Putin’s statement see the U. S. response, also by the White House Press 
Secretary on December 13, 2001, https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/prsrl/2001/6849.htm 
(accessed May10, 2020).
58 While the deployment of the radar system in the Czech Republic was eventually cancelled, 
an additional deployment in Romania was decided upon. At present, in 2020, the Aegis 
Ashore site in Poland is not yet completed, but SM-3 Block IB missiles for Poland are already 
on-site and the Romanian site for the same missile-type is operational. Paul McLeary, 
Stalled Polish Missile Defense Site Needs Extra $96M, 2 Years—Getting Problem-Plagued 
Ballistic Missile Defense Site Online is an Ever-Higher-Priority for the Pentagon as Iran 
and Russia Move Out on New Missiles, in: Breaking Defense, December 12, 2020, https://
breakingdefense.com/2020/02/stalled-polish-missile-defense-site-needs-extra-96-million-
two-years/ (accessed May 10, 2020).
59 Nikolai Zlobin, A Close Look at Russia’s Leaders: Meeting Putin and Ivanov, in: The 
Defense Monitor—Newsletter of the Center for Defense Information (Washington, D. C.) 
33/5 (September / October 2004), pp. 3 f., 6 f. (on the INF issue see p. 7).
60 For President Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, and 
the ensuing discussion, see the official Russian record online, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/transcripts/24034 (accessed May 10, 2020).
61 Cited in: Russia to compensate for INF losses with Iskander missile system, in: Sputnik 
International, November 14, 2007, https://sputniknews.com/russia/2007111488066432/ 
(accessed May 10, 2020).
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publicly warned that, after leaving the INF Treaty, Russia might deploy a new ver-
sion of the Iskander missile in Belarus to make up for the anticipated inbalance. 
This was a missile with a much enhanced reach.
Ten years later—at the time of the “INF Treaty” history conference in 2017, and 
still before the U. S. decision to withdraw from the Treaty—Russian missile boats 
(corvettes with Kalibr missiles) had been transferred from Russia’s Pacific coast 
to the Black Sea and to Kaliningrad. It was widely alleged that these navy units 
carried a version of the Kalibr that had a reach exceeding 1,500 kilometres. This 
posed (and still poses) an imminent threat to Denmark, its capital Copenhagen, 
the Danish Straits, and even London. However, neither this nor the modernization 
of Russia’s air-launched Cruise Missiles were in violation of the INF Treaty. Even 
though the corvettes remained almost stationary in the vicinity of Kaliningrad, 
their missiles were by definition “sea-launched” ones. However, this exemption 
does not apply to a new version of the Iskander ballistic missile (the Iskander-K or 
SSC-8 R-500), which U. S. sources have claimed have the capability to reach well 
over 500 kilometers, perhaps even more than 1,000.62
The political linkage between the INF Treaty and other multilateral treaties 
established by the U. S. Senate and House of Representatives does show clearly 
that the INF Treaty was deeply embedded in Europe’s security architecture, and 
therefore that its destruction could potentially cause considerable harm to the 
overall structure. Already in 2017, there were members of the U. S. Congress who 
called for retaliatory measures if Russia did not cease its violations of the INF 
Treaty. They called for a renunciation of the Open Skies Treaty (OST) and raised 
the possibility of refusing to continue with the NEW START Treaty beyond 2021. 
Subsequently, there were numerous public accusations that Russia was violat-
ing the OST, which had been negotiated between 1990 and 1992 and came 
into force in 2002. The OST allows all its current 34 signatories “mutual aerial 
observation” of each others’ military activities.63 But there seems to be more 
behind the strident voices in Congress than just a retaliatory measure for 
Russian breaches of the INF Treaty. In late 2018 Aaron Mehta, a well known 
defense analyst, drew attention to Russia’s new digital electro-optical sensors 
which “would give Russia an informational edge over what can be gathered by 
the equipment used by the U. S.”64 Pulling out of existing agreements means 
crossing the threshold between U. S.–Russian bilateral treaties and Europe’s 
multilateral security architecture with as yet unpredictable effects. For example, 
62 Hans M. Kristensen, Russia Declared in Violation of INF Treaty—New Cruise Missile May Be 
Deploying, July 30, 2014, http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/07/russia-inf (accessed March 
17, 2019).
63 Alexandra Bell and Anthony Wier, Open Skies Treaty—A Quiet Legacy Under Threat, 
in: Arms Control Today 49/1 (2019), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-01/features/
open-skies-treaty-quiet-legacy-under-threat (accessed March 2019). 
64 Aaron Mehta, US, Russia Remain at ‘Impasse’ Over Open Skies Treaty Flights, in: Defense 
News, September 14, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/09/14/us-russia-remain-
at-impasse-over-nuclear-treaty-flights/ (accessed March 2019).
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the Open Skies Treaty and the OSCE’s Vienna Document of 1994 on Confidence 
and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) complement each other. As another 
American analyst warned: “Tearing up the Open Skies Treaty means killing the 
confidence-building regime between Russia and NATO. With the treaty in force, 
transparency is enhanced and the risk of war and miscalculation is reduced.”65 
Without these complementary treaties, and after the domino-effect across arms 
control treaties that would ensue, Europe could become an increasingly insecure 
place.
8. The INF’s Swan Song: An Argument for Reinventing  
and Enlarging the Treaty
When U. S. President Trump announced the withdrawal of his country from the 
INF Treaty during an election campaign rally in October 201866 and proceeded 
to enact this withdrawal on February 1, 2019, there was a remarkable initial 
outcry amongst the public in Europe. One of Germany’s most influential daily 
papers, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, wrote of the “full portfolio of fears” raised by 
Trump’s decision.67 But the end of the bilateral INF Treaty between Russia and 
the U. S. has important repercussions not only for Europe but also for the states 
in East Asia—above all China, North and South Korea, and Japan. 
Trump informed the European Allies of the U. S. a few days after his initial 
announcement, during a NATO meeting held in October 2018. Politicians, secu-
rity experts, and the media in Europe (particularly in Germany) were shocked. 
A new nuclear arms race appeared to be looming, and Horst Teltschik, former 
Security Advisor to Chancellor Kohl, publicly described Trump’s planned pullout 
as “a catastrophe.”68 Europe’s political leadership and elites looked for options to 
save the Treaty. One of the most discussed options was the possibility of enlarging 
the Treaty and getting other European states to join it. Thus, at a press conference 
following a meeting with Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on January 18, 
2019, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas proposed expanding the INF Treaty 
65 Alex Gorka, US Takes New Steps to Dismantle Open Skies Treaty, in: Online Journal of the 
Strategic Culture Foundation, https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/09/30/us-takes-
new-steps-to-dismantle-open-skies-treaty/ (accessed March 2019).
66 USA kündigen INF-Vertrag: ‘Das Spiel ist ausgespielt’ (The Game is Over), in: Hannoversche 
Allgemeine, February 1, 2019. 
67 For example: Trump kündigt INF-Vertrag—Pralles Angstportfolio, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
October 24, 2018. Exemplary for reactions in the academic world: Wolfgang Richter, Der 
INF-Vertrag vor dem Aus—Ein neuer nuklearer Rüstungswettlauf könnte dennoch ver-
hindert werden, in: SWP-Aktuell 2018/A 63, November 2018.
68 Teltschik in an interview with Deutschlandfunk (DLF), October 22, 2018, https://www.
deutschlandfunk.de/reaktion-auf-fall-khashoggi-es-braucht-eine-grundsaetzliche.694.
de.html?dram:article_id=431151 (accessed May 10, 2020).
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by means of a new document which could be signed by other countries, including 
China.69
However, the Trump Administration’s decision to curb the INF Treaty might 
well be aimed beyond Russia, precisely at this rising superpower. Like all nuclear 
weapon states other than the U. S. and Russia, China is not a signatory to the 
INF Treaty. This is what has allowed the Chinese to make a substantial buildup 
of nuclear forces over the past decades. The current goal of China’s political 
leadership is the creation of a nuclear triad with a second-strike capability in all 
circumstances.70 China’s armed forces possess 200 older and 150 new missile 
systems with a reach between 1,500 and 4,000  kilometers. This puts the U. S. 
military base in Guam within the reach of ground-launched Chinese missiles. 
The overall number of Chinese nuclear warheads is still only around 5 per cent of 
the U. S. and Russian stockpiles (320 Chinese warheads as against 6,370 Russian 
and 5,800 U. S. ones).71 According to the numbers provided by the London-based 
International Institute for Security Studies and experts like Taylor Fravel,72 up 
to 80 per cent of China’s nuclear arsenal could fall into the category of ground-
launched intermediate nuclear forces as defined by the INF Treaty. However, it is 
especially the prospect of a rapid diversification of Chinese delivery vehicles for 
these warheads that matters. These delivery vehicles have become increasingly 
diversified, mobile, and resilient. The Chinese also have nuclear capabilities at sea 
and in the air. So despite the rather limited number of warheads in its possession, 
China is about to enter the exclusive club of states possessing a nuclear triad.73 
The idea of including China in an extended NEW START treaty does appears 
to be an adequate starting point. While NEW START (or a similar successor 
treaty) contains an arms control regime over a variety of classes of nuclear 
69 Maas calls for expanding INF Treaty, in: Vestnik Kavkaza, January 18, 2019, https://vestnik 
kavkaza.net/news/Maas-calls-for-expanding-INF-Treaty.html (accessed May10, 2020). See 
also: Maas’ Appell an Russland. Mit Abrüstung den INF-Vertrag retten, in: ARD Tagess-
chau (German TV news), January 18, 2019, https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/maas-
russland-109.html (accessed May 10, 2020).
70 On China’s nuclear deterrence, see Office of the Secretary of Defense (ed.), Annual Report 
to Congress—Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China 2017, Washington, D. C., May 2017, p. 61. Eric Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving 
Nuclear Deterrent. Major Drivers and Issues for the United States, Santa Monica (Rand) 
2017, p. 112.
71 Hans M.  Kristensen and Matt Korda, Status of World Nuclear Forces. Report from the 
Federation of American Scientists, Washington, D. C., April 2020, https://fas.org/issues/
nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ (accessed May 10, 2020).
72 IISS, The Military Balance 2018, London, February 2018. M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: 
China’s Military Strategy since 1949, Princeton 2019, pp. 236–269.
73 A ‘World-Class Military’: Assessing China’s Global Military Ambitions, testimony by David 
Santoro, Director and Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy at the Pacific Forum International, 
before the U. S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission of the United States 
Senate on June 20, 2019, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=826699 (accessed May 10 2020).
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weapon systems, a new multilateral and global INF Treaty and / or the deployment 
of U. S. INFs in the East Asian region (Japan, South Korea, Palau, or Guam)74 
would diminish the relative Chinese advantage in the field of intermediate-range 
nuclear forces deployed in its orbit. Many observers in Washington therefore saw 
China, and not so much Russia, as the real addressee of Trump’s announcement 
in October 2018. Official reactions in Beijing stressed that the country had no 
74 Opinions about the probabilities, likely locations, and possible reactions of U. S. Allies in 
East and South-East Asia differ widely, however. For example: Evan Karlik, Where Will 
the U. S. Base Intermediate-Range Missiles in the Pacific? Japan’s Ryukyu Islands and 
Palau Are the Most Probable Contenders for New U. S. Intermediate-Range Missiles, in: 
The Diplomat, August 30, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/where-will-the-us-base-
intermediate-range-missiles-in-the-pacific/ (accessed May 10, 2020). Steven Stashwick, US 
Intermediate-Range Missiles in East Asia: Critical Deterrent or Needless Provocation? It Isn’t 
Clear That the United States Necessarily Needs Land-Based Intermediate Missiles to Achieve 
the Missions They Are Envisioned For, in: The Diplomat, November 15, 2019, https://
thediplomat.com/2019/11/u-s-intermediate-range-missiles-in-east-asia-critical-deterrent-
or-needless-provocation/ (accessed May 10, 2020).
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part in the INF controversy as it was not a signatory state.75 Other observers in 
South-East Asia, however, claim that the Chinese authorities perceive Trump’s 
INF decision as yet another means to limit their country’s military influence in 
the region and to drive it into a destructive arms race, just as the U. S. had done 
with the USSR in the 1980s.76 
When, in the spring of 2020, President Trump proposed that China might join 
trilateral negotiations with the U. S. and Russia on a new NEW START agreement, 
Beijing smelt a rat, suspecting that Trump might use China again as a pretext 
to leave the treaty. Though the Chinese government immediately rejected the 
invitation, Chinese academics and academics with Chinese expertise began 
arguing for a different framework. Future nuclear arms negotiations with China, 
they proposed, should be international (rather than multi-national), based on 
mutual vulnerability (necessitating limits on missile defense), and come up with 
serious no-first-use-policies.77
It seems that U. S. Administrations under both Presidents Obama and Trump 
came to see the INF Treaty as basically worthless because of the numerous 
circumventions and breaks on the Russian side. This made withdrawal from the 
Treaty merely a matter of timing. However, the current threat, that there could 
be a renewal of the nuclear arms race, has sent strong signals of deterrence to 
both Russia and China. In time, this might persuade China that it would be wise 
to participate in multilateral negotiations on global INFs or collaborate on an 
extended NEW START. 
If the renunciation of the old INF Treaty is not to be followed up by a new 
multilateral INF Treaty in due time, however, then a kind of domino effect 
might well put Europe’s entire security architecture into question. On May 21, 
2020, President Trump announced that the U. S. would be leaving the Open 
75 For the consistency of this theme in Chinese press conferences und public statements 
since November 2018, see Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press 
Conference on November 5, 2018 (on the webpage of the Chinese Foreign Ministry), https://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1610459.shtml (accessed May 
10, 2020); Spokesperson of the Chinese Mission to the EU Speaks on a Question Concerning 
the INF Treaty, July 27, 2019 (on the webpage of China’s Mission to the EU), http://www.
chinamission.be/eng/fyrjh/t1683870.htm (accessed May 10, 2020). China reiterates opposi-
tion to multilateralization of INF Treaty, in: Xinhua press agency, July 30, 2019 (http://www.
xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/30/c_138270534.htm (accessed May 10, 2020).
76 Vijay Prashad, US military hellbent on trying to overpower China. While some in China are 
urging against an arms race, relentless US saber-rattling makes a global peace movement 
crucial, in: Asia Times, May 13, 2020.
77 See Tong Zhao (senior fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing), 
Opportunities for Nuclear Arms Control Engagement With China, in: Arms Control Today 
50/1 (2020), (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-01/features/opportunities-nuclear-arms- 
control-engagement-china (accessed May 10, 2020). Gregory Kulacki, China is Willing 
to Negotiate on Nuclear Arms, But Not on Trump’s Terms, in: Defense One, March 30, 
2020, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/03/china-willing-negotiate-nuclear-arms-
not- trumps-terms/164204/ (accessed May 10, 2020).
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Skies Treaty.78 According to treaty regulations, this will take place six months 
later. With this announcement, it would appear that the first European domino 
following the abandonment of the INF Treaty might indeed be about to fall. 
Trump’s announcement came only days after the renowned American and Rus-
sian diplomats Rose Gottemoeller (former Deputy Secretary General of NATO) 
and Anatoly Antonov (Russian Ambassador to the U. S.) had published their 
appeal for a prolongation of the NEW START agreement beyond 2021.79 Both 
authors called NEW START the “gold standard” of nuclear arms control, without 
which the world would slip into a phase of intransparency and unpredictability. 
The states of East Asia perceive the security system of Europe as a shining 
example in their own search for a meaningful regional security structure. The 
irony of history is that, with the entire process now unraveling, this European 
exemplar could collapse. With the INF Treaty, the “lucky star” prediction of 
Nancy Reagan’s astrologist proved true for its time, but now we see its temporal 
limitations.
78 President Trump claimed that Russia was violating OST by limiting observation over 
Kaliningrad and over the Russian–Georgian border. “Open Skies”-Flüge—Trump kün-
digt weiteres Abkommen, in: ARD Tagesschau, May 21, 2020, https://www.tagesschau.de/
ausland/openskies-trump-usa-101.html (accessed May 22, 2020).
79 Anatoly Antonov and Rose Gottemoeller, Keeping Peace in the Nuclear Age. Why Wash-
ington and Moscow Must Extend the New START Treaty, in both: Foreign Affairs, April 
29, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-29/keeping-peace-




The INF Treaty in Perspective:  
Trust and the Story of an Unlikely Success
Arms control and disarmament are above all matters of trust. This, in a nutshell, 
has been the essence of negotiating bilateral and multilateral treaties for almost a 
century. The INF Treaty of December 1987 is yet another example illustrating this 
insight. Had it not been for two leaders who, after a rough start in their mutual 
relationship, finally came to trust one another, Soviet and American intermediate-
range missiles would never have been withdrawn from Europe and recycled into 
items for everyday consumption. Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev did 
the trick—to everyone’s surprise at the time and to the lasting amazement of 
historians.1
In order to clarify disputed issues, it is helpful to debate history in reverse 
order. Turning our agenda on its head, we can and should ask a simple question: 
Why was disarmament a dead-end issue before 1987, and why did all efforts to 
substantially reduce the nuclear arsenal amount to nothing for 40 odd years? 
In other words: why was trust so disdained for all these decades? Why did 
mistrust and suspicion have such a paramount impact on national interests and 
international relations?
At first sight, it comes as little surprise that the Cold War was a hotbed for 
distrust. This is simply because distrust is either the offspring or twin (or in any 
case a close relative) of fear. For each and every decade between 1945 and 1991, we 
can make the case that, at its core, the Cold War was based on fear.2 Time and 
again, it provides stories of how fear took hold of peoples’ hearts and minds, about 
the manner in which societies coped with fear, and, last but not least, about the 
techniques used to exploit fear for political purposes, be it in domestic or global 
arenas. In dealing with the Cold War, historians are well advised to view their 
subject matter—be it diplomacy, cultural affairs or the military—through this 
lens. Political psychology not only provides additional insights; it takes us to the 
common denominator of the Cold War, namely to the political and social impact 
of insecurity, fear and mistrust.
1 Nicolas J. Wheeler, Joshua Baker, and Laura Considine, Trust or Verification? Accepting Vul-
nerability in the Making of the INF Treaty, in: Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian 
F. Ostermann (eds.), Trust, But Verify. The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of 
the Cold War Order, 1969–1991, Washington, D. C. 2016, pp. 121–139.
2 Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller, and Dierk Walter (eds.), Angst im Kalten Krieg. Studien 
zum Kalten Krieg, Hamburg 2009.
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Conventional wisdom has it that antagonistic ideologies and adverse self-
images nourished distrust, and that they did so inevitably, and sometimes behind 
the backs of political actors, whether they were ill-intentioned or well-meaning. 
There is, indeed, ample evidence to vindicate this reading. Just think of Joseph 
Stalin’s urge to speed up the development of Soviet atomic weapons, a decision 
grounded in the unwavering belief that inter-imperialist contradictions in com-
bination with an outright hatred of Socialism would unleash another world war 
in 20 or 30 years’ time.3 Or think of the widespread perception, popularized by 
Henry Kissinger in his 1957 book on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, of both 
the Soviet Union and Communist China as “illegitimate powers” who could and 
should never be trusted, no matter when and no matter why: allegedly, they were 
aiming to destabilize and upset the international order forever. “Diplomats can 
still meet,” Kissinger claimed in a dogmatic diatribe, “but they cannot persuade 
each other. Instead, diplomatic conferences become elaborate stage plays which 
seek to influence and win over public opinion in other nations; their purpose is 
less the settlement of disputes than the definition of issues for which to contend. 
They are less a forum for negotiation than a platform for propaganda.”4 Please 
note the publisher’s comment when a 1984 reprint of this book came out, three 
short years before the INF Treaty: “Dr. Kissinger’s masterful account is as relevant 
today as when it was first published for the Council on Foreign Relations in 
1957.”5 No matter how ill-informed this judgement was, it is all too obvious 
how Cold War perceptions were poisoned by ideology, prejudice and bias.
And yet I suggest we take a different perspective on the historical setting of the 
INF Treaty. Important as they were, ideological controversies are not sufficient in 
themselves to explain the dynamics of distrust and trust. Something else needs 
to be added to the factors considered—an accelerant that stirred up contested 
issues and turned divergent interests into non-negotiable assets. This is where the 
nuclear arms race comes into play. Without it, the root, scope, and momentum 
of distrust cannot be appreciated; without it, the history of Cold War foreign 
relations fades away into an opaque twilight zone. The arms race fed on distrust, 
and vice versa, both of them promoting an entangled history of self-fulfilling 
prophecies. It is therefore quite appropriate to suggest a clear-cut assumption 
that, if any single factor captures the essence of the Cold War, it is the presence of 
nuclear weapons and the fears they unleashed.
3 David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb. The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956, Yale 
1994.
4 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York 1957, p. 318.
5 Westview Encore Edition, Boulder, Co. 1984, Publisher’s Comment.
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1. Weapons Technology and Distrust
Atomic weapons technology has been identified as a source of mutual suspicion, 
bewilderment and distrust. And rightly so. Ever since the nuclear genie left 
its bottle, the rate of technological innovations moved into fast-track mode. 
Revolutionary breakthroughs came no longer in decades, but, rather, in years—
with thermonuclear H-bombs coming on the heels of atomic prototypes, with 
intercontinental ballistic missiles augmenting the fleet of long-range bombers 
and with satellites exploiting outer space as auxiliary battleground. Neither side 
could rest assured that rivals and potential enemies were not on the verge of yet 
another revolution in military weaponry. Neither side could make the case that 
its arsenal was designed and deployed for defensive purposes only. With each 
technological gain, the line of demarcation between offensive and defensive 
weapons became ever more blurred.6
Take the infamous MIRV warheads—multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicles—as a case in point. Introduced in 1969, they fueled mutual distrust 
not only because of their increased number of warheads. The broad range of new 
and unprecedented military options they made available nourished an anxiety on 
the verge of paranoia. Mainly, people feared the contingency of massive launches 
made either in retaliation or as first strikes, either in response to an attack or in 
an attempt to disarm the other side before it could attack. The number of equally 
telling samples is unfailing—from MIRV to ABM (anti-ballistic missiles), from 
ABM to SDI (the Strategic Defense Initiative), from SDI to nuclear-tipped Cruise 
Missiles. No matter which we single out, the motivation behind it all boils down 
to the same—a deep-rooted mistrust that investments in technology might signal 
aggressive designs or that, in times of crisis, any given rival might be tempted to 
overbid his cards.
Consequently, a striving for ever more sophisticated weapons, even a quest 
for outright military superiority, became the political routine and was routinely 
justified as basic for national security. Speaking for the U. S., Henry Kissinger 
did not mince his words in a 1958 essay published in Foreign Affairs: the defend-
ing side—also known as “the West”—must be equipped with more and better 
weapons to counterbalance an aggressor’s surprise move. American superiority 
in arms was not up for negotiation and should never be mistaken as a bargain-
ing chip for trust-builders.7 Ironically enough, in 1976, when Kissinger, as 
Secretary of State, wanted to eat his words and promote arms control, he was 
undercut by hard-core conservatives from within and without the “Committee 
6 Fred Kaplan, The Bomb. Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War, New 
York 2020; Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, London 1989.
7 Henry Kissinger, Missiles and the Western Alliance, in: Foreign Affairs 36/3 (1958), 
pp.  383–400.
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on the Present Danger,” whose agenda was first and foremost built on suspicion 
and fear, with revitalized superiority as the antidote.8 Once again, the vicious 
cycle of mutual distrust was confirmed. It would have sounded like a political 
pipedream to imagine that, roughly ten years later, an agreement would be signed 
scrapping a whole generation of nuclear weapons.
Disarmament seemed all the more a pastime for dreamers because the domi-
nant elite of self-proclaimed nuclear realists had subscribed to a worst-case logic. 
This notorious Cold War-style thinking was written in stone for decades, its 
basic principles promoted by think tanks, universities, and unknown numbers of 
defense intellectuals. By definition, reliability, confidence and trust were barred 
from worst-case models, no matter what their design. This was especially true 
of its most radical form popularized from the mid-1950s, and rejuvenated in the 
“war on terror” after 9/11: the so-called “One Percent Doctrine”. This was built 
on the notion that a one per cent possibility should always be perceived as a one 
hundred per cent probability. In other words, it was assumed that miniscule 
dangers could turn into existential threats at any time and place, all the more so 
when the competition was with inscrutable rivals like the USSR or Communist 
China. The likelihood of any given “threat” scenario was not the issue; the 
thinking was that literally nothing should be excluded from the imagination. 
This was the logic of a pro-active security policy: dangers should be fought off 
before they actually took shape and before they could be proven by solid evidence. 
By definition, therefore, inaction was more risky than actually taking risks. 
That it was once again Henry Kissinger who promulgated this rationale in his 
seminal study on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy tells us a story—not only 
a story about deeply enshrined academic paradigms, but above all a story about 
having the lowest possible expectations of trust in international relations, and of 
unfailing resourcefulness in arguing the case for distrust. Generations of policy 
and security strategists knew no better; and, with minor exceptions, did not want 
to know better.
At this point one might legitimately object, and argue that nuclear weapons 
generated “negative trust,” namely a shared assumption that, out of sheer self-
interest, rivals, or even enemies, would refrain from getting carried away. There 
is, indeed, ample evidence that leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain had a 
keen understanding of the limited scope they had for military action. Whichever 
power employed nuclear weapons invited its own self-destruction. In 1954, at 
the latest, after the United States had conducted a series of thermonuclear tests 
in the South Pacific, reports to the President were unequivocal in their conclu-
sion that “super bombs” could wipe out human life from Planet Earth. Dwight 
D. Eisenhower’s public comment about “race suicide” was endorsed by Winston 
8 Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism. The Biography of a Movement, Harvard 2010; Jerry W. Sand-
ers, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment, 
New York 1983.
The INF Treaty in Perspective 343
Churchill and Kremlin leaders alike.9 “Our probable adversaries feared us just 
as we feared them,” Nikita Khrushchev noted in his memoirs, and he is also on 
record as telling American officials that “nearly everyone knew that war was 
unacceptable and that coexistence was elementary.”10 In sharp contrast to pre-
nuclear times, when a combination of arms races and political crisis more often 
than not escalated into military confrontations, the post-1945 world did not see 
any great power wars. Hence, the popular proverb of the time, “First shooters are 
second to die,” was more than mere folklore: in the nuclear age, all actors could 
trust in their rivals’ mirror-imaged perspective—or in their common rationality.
There is, however, a flipside to this story and an ambiguity all too often ignored 
or papered over. Neither side believed that nuclear war was impossible; but all 
sides bent over backwards to be permanently prepared for the unimaginable. This 
observation identifies the second source of deep-rooted distrust: war-plan options 
masterminded by military elites and signed off by their political superiors.
2. Nuclear Strategies and Distrust
Since the early 1980s, ample documentary evidence on contingency war plans has 
been available on the American side.11 Compared with the density of Pentagon, 
White House, and National Security Council records, available resources from 
Soviet archives are only fragmentary. But, taken as a whole, documents from both 
sides conclusively verify a set of mirror-imaged assumptions about nuclear war 
and allegedly successful strategies to prevail and win should deterrence fail.12 
Two questions provided a common East–West denominator for war-planners: 
Was it possible to completely disarm the other side? Or could damage be inflicted 
on the enemy that was sufficient at least to curtail a counterstrike and thus avoid 
unacceptable losses for one’s own society? 
For American Strategic Air Command planners in the 1950s, “the idea of a 
single war-winning blow was an irresistible temptation,” David Alan Rosenberg 
notes in a seminal study on the origins of overkill.13 Internal discussions and 
paperwork were rife with talk about a nuclear “Blitzkrieg” and fantasies about 
preventive wars turning the Soviet Union into a radioactive ruin within hours. It 
is true that President Dwight D. Eisenhower rebuffed his most hawkish advisors 
9 David Holloway, Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962, in: 
Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, 
Vol. 1: Origins, Cambridge 2010, pp. 383–386.
10 Nikita Khrushchev, in: David Holloway, Racing toward Armageddon? Soviet Views of 
Strategic Nuclear War, 1955–1972, Unpublished Manuscript, July 2017, p. 7.
11 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, New York 1983.
12 Holloway, Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War.
13 David Alan Rosenberg, The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 
1945–1960, in: International Security 7/4 (1983), p. 36.
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and sidelined the idea of a Pearl Harbor in reverse. He did, however, confirm a 
National Security Council guideline, in effect since October 1953, stating that, in 
the event of hostilities, the United States would consider nuclear weapons to be 
as available for use as other munitions and that in peacetime the U. S. must make 
clear its determination to prevail if general war should eventuate.14 “Prevail” 
and “survive” were key terms of the 1959 Presidential guidance, which in years 
to come also informed the war-plans of the Kennedy Administration and the 
McNamara Pentagon. Until the mid-1970s, prevailing and surviving in case of 
war was predicated on one option—the delivery of a quick and devastating blow 
if intelligence should detect Soviet war preparations. This, in other words, was 
a strategy of pre-emption, or of striking first, in a grey-area of more or less solid 
information about the other side’s intentions.15
That Soviet leaders excelled as copy-cats of pre-emption most certainly con-
tributed to the war of nerves and to the inflation of mutual distrust. Whether 
they explicitly referred to the term or not is of minor importance. In essence, 
Party declarations, open-source publications, and internal debates testify to the 
fact that Soviet rocket forces were poised to strike against American missile silos 
and strategic aviation and forward-based systems. Their purpose was to disarm 
the other side and they needed to be launched pre-emptively to secure victory 
and survival. Ironically, this option seemed all the more attractive against the 
backdrop of major technical and military shortcomings. For a long time, and with 
good reason, the Soviets had been worried about the efficiency of their air defense 
system as well as their capacity to retaliate against a U. S. attack. Without any veri-
fiable reason, they also feared a Barbarossa-style attack conducted with superior 
American arms. Thus it was Soviet weakness that promoted a strategy the other 
side perceived as indicative of aggressive designs—a suspicion only increased by 
public bragging that another world war would see the Red Army victorious over 
moribund imperialism. To quote from a 1964 internal study directed by Defense 
Minister Rodion Y. Malinovsky: “The conditions of nuclear war […] present us 
with the alternative: either the offensive or defeat.” And from that perspective, 
striking first was “the chief form of nuclear war fighting.”16 For what all this was 
worth, it at least kept the illusion of containing war-damage alive.
In the 1970s, both sides refrained from pre-emptive strategies and gravitated 
to launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack postures.17 But the preponder-
14 Holloway, Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, p. 385; Bernd Greiner, 
Politik am Rande des Abgrunds? Die Außen- und Militärpolitik der USA im Kalten Krieg, 
Heilbronn 1986, pp. 55–73.
15 William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg, Nuclear Competition in an Era of Stalemate, 
1963–1975, in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
the Cold War, Vol. 2: Crises and Détente, Cambridge 2010, pp. 95, 104.
16 Quoted in: Holloway, Racing toward Armageddon?, p. 11; see ibid, pp. 12 f., p. 16; Burr and 
Rosenberg, Nuclear Competition, p. 97.
17 Holloway, Racing toward Armageddon?, pp. 19, 26; Burr and Rosenberg, Nuclear Competi-
tion, pp. 96, 105.
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ance of mistrust remained. The technological race for ever more refined nuclear 
weapons continued, and delivery systems of unprecedented target precision were 
devised. These innovations went hand in glove with drastically reduced warning 
times against an impending attack. Because of this, the specter of disarming 
first strikes was reanimated, and the notion of mutual assured destruction was 
once more called into question by fantasies of “limited damage” and “survival.” 
Strategy was continually couched in ill-defined, murky and risky terms. In the 
end this nourished completely preposterous ideas like the Soviet “Dead Hand” 
system. In the early 1980s, measuring devices sensitive to pressure, light, and 
radiation were installed all over the USSR and programed to execute a fully 
automatic counterstrike in response to a U. S.-orchestrated decapitation of the 
Soviet leadership.18 “Doomsday Machine” would have been an appropriate 
code name for it, as an exact replication of a device in Stanley Kubrick’s movie 
Dr. Strangelove.
All told, during the Cold War the nuclear powers were the hostages of suspi-
cion, insinuation and mistrust. Fully aware of the apocalyptic impact of another 
total war, political and military elites declared a nuclear taboo. And yet they 
sponsored “as if” investments, strategies, and force postures—as if the devalu-
ation of military power could be reversed, as if technological breakthroughs 
could offer a way out of the nuclear dilemma, as if, in the event of war, they could 
limit the damage, prevail, and ultimately win. Day in, day out, the “unthinkable” 
was not only reflected on, but was also seen as something possible. Hence the 
Eisenhower Administration toyed with the idea of employing nuclear weapons 
on three occasions: during the war in Korea, at the time of the siege of Dien 
Bien Phu in Vietnam, and when there was conflict over the Chinese offshore 
islands of Quemoy and Matsu;19 John F. Kennedy and his advisors, too, debated 
18 David E.  Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and 
Its Dangerous Legacy, New York 2009; The 1983 War Scare: “The Last Paroxysm” of the 
Cold War, Part I, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 426, Interviews 
with Lieutenant General Gelii V.  Batenin, ed. by Nate Jones, Document 23, p. 10; Viktor 
M. Surikov and Colonel Varfolomei V. Korobushin, ibid., Document 7, p. 135 and Docu-
ment 24, p. 107.
19 Richard K.  Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, Brookings Institution 1987, 
pp. 63–93; Fred Kaplan, The Bomb. Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear 
War, New York, 2020, pp. 9, 103–106, 201. For more details on the Korean war, see Phil 
Williams, Donald Goldstein, and Henry Andrews (eds.), Security in Korea: War, Stalemate, 
and Negotiation, Boulder, Co. 1994, pp. 153–158; Roger Dingman, Atomic Diplomacy 
During the Korean War, in: International Security 3 (1988), pp. 50–91; Carl A. Posey, How 
the Korean War Almost Went Nuclear, in: Air&Space Magazine, July 2015, pp. 15–23. For 
more details on Dien Bien Phu see Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support. The Early Years, 
1941–1960: The United States Army in Vietnam, Washington, D. C. / Center of Military 
History 1983, pp. 211–216; Frederic Logevall, “We might give them a few.” Did the US Offer 
to Drop Atom Bombs at Dien Bien Phu?, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 2, 
2016, pp. 8–12; Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive 
Diplomacy, Cambridge 2017, pp. 182–184; John Prados, Operation Vulture: America’s Dien 
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pre-emptive options during the Berlin Crisis of 1961.20 In the words of former 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk: “We can’t assume nuclear war won’t happen.” There 
was just no certainty in “this God damn poker game.”21 As in a poker game, 
you might be apprehensive, but your fear must never be perceived as anxiety. 
Intimidating the other side was always the better choice.
Henry Kissinger got to the heart of the “God damn poker game” in his 
1957 book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy: “The key problem of present-
day strategy is to devise a spectrum of capabilities with which to resist Soviet 
challenges. These capabilities should enable us to confront the opponent with 
contingencies from which he can extricate himself only by all-out war, while 
deterring him from this step by a superior retaliatory capacity.” And he added in 
even bolder words: “The side which is more willing to risk an all-out war or can 
convince its opponent of its greater readiness to run that risk is in the stronger 
position.” This strategy “will not be easy to implement. […] Above all, it requires 
strong nerves. […] Its effectiveness will depend on our willingness to face up to 
the risks of Armageddon.”22 Keep in mind that this plea for strong nerves was 
much more than a young professor’s unsolicited contribution; it reflected the 
intellectual mainstream in America’s major foreign policy think tank at the time, 
the Council on Foreign Relations.
Whether you call it “war of nerves,” “atomic blackmail,” “atomic diplomacy,” 
or simply “deterrence” is immaterial in the end. No matter what, it boiled down 
to a simple, yet sweeping message: though militarily unusable, nuclear weapons 
were tools for political and diplomatic leverage. Leaders on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain were at one with each other in the shared conviction that a nuclear threat 
posture was needed if they were to play a central role in world affairs. Nuclear 
weapons were the currency of status, prestige, and global power, the means to 
prevent others from overextending their influence and to demonstrate national 
assertiveness. They were a power booster in constant need of being recharged. 
Grinding this blunt weapon seemed to be the inevitable order of the new age. It 
was based on an ancient rationale: whoever refrains from threats of force and 
military engagements demonstrates political impotence and bids goodbye to 
vital interests; but those willing to move into the grey areas of intimidation and 
uncertainty can extend their scope of action—and all the more so if they convey 
the impression that events might actually get out of hand. Needless to point out, 
Bien Phu, New York 2014, pp. 91–98; Rebecca Grant, Dien Bien Phu, in: Air Force Magazine, 
January 8, 2004, pp. 18–21. For more details on the the Quemoy-Matsu-crisis, see Gordon 
H. Chang, To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu-Crisis, in: 
International Security 4 (1988), pp. 96–123.
20 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 
 1945–1963, Princeton 1999, p. 183; Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, 
Laos, and Vietnam, New York 2000, p. 97; Kaplan, The Bomb, pp. 51–63.
21 Burr and Rosenberg, Nuclear Competition, p. 90. Andrei Sakharov argued alike. See Hol-
loway, Racing toward Armageddon?, p. 29. 
22 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons, pp. 144, 168, 173 (emphasis ibid.).
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a policy of making outspoken nuclear threats was a risky one. But the risk was 
accepted, if not welcomed. It goes without saying that its price tag was chronic 
mistrust.23
3. “Atomic Diplomacy” and Distrust
Neither side was ever ready to provoke, much less to unleash, nuclear war. The 
mutually shared policy of deterrence, however, was a mind game, born in fear, 
which had to perpetuate fear to drive its point home. In the 1950s, U. S. Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles therefore defined Cold War statecraft as a war of 
nerves—as the art of approaching the abyss and holding your adversary in 
suspense about the borderline between a policy of reckless gambling and mere 
bluff. Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikita Khrushchev argued likewise. Molotov’s 
active advice was to keep the opposite side under permanent pressure, but always 
be conscious of personal limits. And in 1958 Khrushchev claimed that “the 
people with the strongest nerves will be the winners. That is the most important 
consideration in the power struggle of our time. The people with weak nerves will 
go to the wall.”24 On various occasions John F. Kennedy followed suit and, to cite 
a 1962 interview as a case in point, publicly toyed with the idea of a nuclear first 
strike against the Soviet Union should America’s “vital interests” be challenged.25 
Needless to say, any definition of what actually constituted “vital interests” was 
kept in limbo. Up to the early 1980s, both sides employed such strategies of 
psychological attrition time and again.
Because of this, the sheer presence of nuclear weapons and attending fantasies 
rank prominently in the history of Cold War crises. Certainly, the manifold 
confrontations of the time cannot be measured by the same yardstick: events 
in Berlin, Korea, Suez, Congo, Cuba, Vietnam, Egypt, Syria and Israel, Angola, 
Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa not only occurred in different settings, they 
followed their own patterns of logic. Yet there was a common background noise: 
a feeling of uncertainty, suspicion and mistrust. No actor could be confident that 
the other side would respect red lines; each side tended to “overload the enemy” 
without knowing how its coded language of power would eventually be deci-
phered and understood. That some protagonists lived on an overdose of rational 
actor-logic was no comfort—indeed, quite the opposite, as a conversation of 
January 1973 between Henry Kissinger and Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s Ambassador 
to Washington, illustrates. Lecturing his guest about the intertwined workings of 
23 See Jeremi Suri, Logiken der atomaren Abschreckung oder Politik mit der Bombe, in: Bernd 
Greiner, Christian Th. Müller, and Dierk Walter (eds.), Krisen im Kalten Krieg, Studien 
zum Kalten Krieg, Band 2, Hamburg 2008, p. 34; Burr and Rosenberg, Nuclear competition, 
pp. 91 f.
24 Holloway, Nuclear Weapons, pp. 382, 392.
25 Bernd Greiner, Die Kuba-Krise. Die Welt an der Schwelle zum Atomkrieg, Munich 2010, 
p. 37.
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force and diplomacy, Kissinger maintained that exceeding the limit by 30 per cent 
was better than to fall short by five per cent, and that, whenever force was either 
threatened or applied, a slightly hysterical reaction would do the trick.26 This 
was another, and arguably the most precise, shorthand for “atomic diplomacy” 
and distrust in the Cold War.
Buttressing the credibility of nuclear weapons shaped foreign policy and 
crisis-management throughout the period. Alternatively, debunking the useful-
ness of nuclear power was also an option. In both respects, the Berlin Crisis of 
1948, the Korean War, the Suez Affair, and the Cuban Missile Crisis are telling 
examples. In July 1948, weeks after the Soviets had imposed a blockade on West 
Berlin, President Harry S. Truman dispatched B-29 bombers to Europe. Beyond 
the walls of the Pentagon and the White House nobody was aware that these 
planes had not been modified to carry atomic weapons and that the American 
stockpile at the time was miniscule. However, the rest of the world was to be led 
to believe in American steadfastness and that it retained the option to go nuclear 
anytime.27 For fear of seeming weak and inviting further pressure, Stalin sought 
refuge in a forward strategy of his own: stand your ground, do not give in, offer 
no compromise. Clearly, a similar rationale was in play in early 1950. Whatever 
really motivated Stalin to give Kim Il Sung the green light to attack South Korea, 
atomic diplomacy loomed large—if only to demonstrate the sheer ineffectiveness 
of America’s nuclear superiority. 
The matchless master in this game was Nikita Khrushchev. His threats of mis-
sile attacks on London, Paris, and Tel Aviv in early November 1956, his defiance 
of the West once more over Berlin, and his deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba 
all amounted to outright bluff. But, to him, exposing the other side’s vulnerability 
and calling its credibility into question always seemed worth the effort. As is 
well known, Khrushchev was kicked out of office in 1964 on a charge of political 
adventurism—an allegation which did not stop his rivals from following in his 
footsteps. Leonid Brezhnev lost no time in pronouncing the new rulers’ reading 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis: never again would they allow the United States to 
humiliate the Soviet Union with a superior nuclear force. Another round in the 
armaments race was set off; once again a superpower took a run to sharpen its 
arsenal of blunt weapons.
To cut a long crisis-story short, we can conclude that nuclear weapons prodded 
the United States and the Soviet Union into competition for a superior power-
rating. As historian Jeremi Suri states, both raised geopolitical claims, incurred 
liabilities and took risks beyond the means of non-nuclear powers. Again, one of 
the most famous authorities to attest to this claim is Henry Kissinger. Without 
nuclear threats, he contended in a much acclaimed essay for Foreign Affairs, 
the United States would forgo any chance to rewrite the global map in its 
26 Suri, Logiken der atomaren Abschreckung, p. 40.
27 Greiner, Politik am Rande des Abgrunds?, pp. 61 ff.
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favor.28 As Special Consultant for National Security from 1969 to 1975 and Sec-
retary of State from 1973 to 1977, Kissinger followed his own advice, making use 
of nuclear weapons for political coercion. On three occasions, he and President 
Richard M. Nixon applied the so-called “Madman Theory”—a policy of feigned 
madness to bring the Soviets into line. During the Vietnam peace negotiations, 
the Jordan Crisis in 1970, and the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, American 
armed forces were put on high levels of alert despite the risk of inadvertent 
escalation. Nuclear weapons were an incentive to the superpowers to overdraw 
their political accounts and to enter into contests over power and influence in 
literally every corner of the world.29 This was the perfect recipe for perpetuating 
distrust: threatening the worst at places and times of their own choosing, merely 
for the sake of being on eye-level with the other side, undermining its credibility, 
or giving it a dose of its own medicine.
In contrast, we might refer to the policy of détente and arms control agreements 
like SALT (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) as successful moves towards a 
trust- and confidence-based security policy—or at least as attempts to defuse the 
toxic legacy of nuclear weapons. Admittedly, the 1970s saw a loosening of the 
old, deep-seated patterns of mutual distrust. Especially in Europe, an easing of 
tensions proved durable and contributed in multiple ways to the eventual demise 
of the Cold War.30 When we focus on U. S.–Soviet relations, however, the record 
looks less bright. Arrival at a lasting policy shift was compromised in many ways: 
Nixon and Kissinger saw détente as a subtle form of anti-Soviet containment; 
the Soviets in turn seized on every opportunity to gain ground in the Third 
World; and even moderate plans for arms control drew heavy fire from American 
conservatives and fear-mongers who fantasized about “windows of vulnerability” 
and Soviet first-strike capabilities. In 1979, when SALT II was locked in stalemate, 
“atomic diplomacy” had its latest comeback.31
4. Distrust Writ Large: The Early 1980s
Again in the early 1980s, we witness the interplay of all too familiar patterns. First, 
technological progress and the modernization of nuclear weapons increased. 
Second, another chapter in a policy of fear was staged by the Reagan Administra-
tion during its first term. Just recall the political rhetoric of that time. Secretary 
of State Alexander Haig is on record making the infamous claim that there are 
28 Henry Kissinger, Military Policy and Defense of the ‘Grey Areas’, in: Foreign Affairs 33/3 
(1955), pp. 416–428.
29 Suri, Logiken der atomaren Abschreckung, pp. 27, 31.
30 Matthias Peter, Die Bundesrepublik im KSZE-Prozess, 1975–1983. Die Umkehrung der 
Diplomatie, Berlin / Boston 2015.
31 Arvid Schors, Doppelter Boden. Die SALT-Verhandlungen 1963–1979, Göttingen 2016.
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more important things than living in peace.32 President Ronald Reagan put the 
disposal of Communism to the rubbish dump of history as the top item on his 
foreign policy agenda—a logical extension of his belief that Communism stood 
for a bizarre chapter in human history which had outlived itself.33 And, according 
to Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, if deterrence should fail, the U. S. 
should be able to wage and win an all-out nuclear war.34 Maintaining the tradi-
tional Cold War mirror-imaging, the Soviets responded in kind. The Communist 
Party’s Secretary General, Yuri Andropov, charged the U. S. with following in 
Nazi-Germany’s “Blitzkrieg” footsteps and cited Hiroshima as an instance of 
American unscrupulousness. In the words of a close Andropov advisor: “Here 
comes the recipe for total war against the Soviet Union and its allies.”35
Month after month, Pentagon officials disseminated bizarre ideas about sur-
viving Armageddon. Respective contingency plans were leaked to the press—not 
by whistleblowers, but by government insiders and their intellectual consultants. 
A variety of troubling documents saw the light of day: Jimmy Carter’s “Presi-
dential Directive 59,”36 two “National Security Decision Directives” by Ronald 
Reagan,37 the “Fiscal Year 1984–88 Defense Guidance,” and, to top it all, parts 
of the “Single Integrated Operation Plan No. 6” or “SIOP 6.”38 Different as they 
were in topic and range, all these memoranda had one crucial item in common: 
they envisioned protracted atomic wars and fine-tuned nuclear exchanges. The 
authors of the “Fiscal Year 1984–88 Defense Guidance,” for instance, postulated 
“plans to prevail against the Soviet Union on all levels of conflict, be it insurgen-
32 “If we make just the maintenance of peace alone […] the raison d’etre on the core of our 
policy deliberations, I’m afraid we’re going to bring about […] the destruction of the very 
objective we’ve established for ourselves: peace. There are things that we Americans must be 
willing to fight for. I know this republic was spawned by armed conflict […]. It was Patrick 
Henry who stated ‘give me liberty or give me death’. […] Clearly, in the nuclear age the 
responsibilities in this area become all the more awesome. But the point I wanted to make is, 
there are things worth fighting for. We must understand that. We must structure our policy 
under that credible and justified premise.” Alexander Haig, Statement before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on his nomination as Secretary of State, Washington, D. C., 
January 9, 1981, in: The New York Times, Major Points From Appearance by Haig Before 
Senate Committee, January 10, 1981, Section 1, p. 9.
33 Ronald Reagan, Address to the National Association of Evangelicals, Orlando / Florida, 
March 3, 1983, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 28/10 (1983), pp. 994–1001, 
here pp. 1000 f.
34 United States Information Service, Wireless Bulletin, June 18, 1981.
35 Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 27/11 (1982), p. 1137; see also Dima Adamsky, 
The 1983 Nuclear Crisis—Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice, in: Journal of 
Strategic Studies 36/1 (2013), pp. 18, 22.
36 For Presidential Directive (PD) 59 “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy” from July 25, 
1980 see https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd59.pdf. 
37 For an overview of Reagan’s National Security Decision Directives see https://fas.org/irp/
offdocs/nsdd/index.html.
38 William M. Arkin, Why SIOP-6?, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 39/4 (1983), p. 9.
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cies or nuclear war.”39 And, in this same vein in the summer of 1980, the editors of 
the mainstream magazine Foreign Policy published an article headlined “Victory 
is Possible,” and with it the scenario of a nuclear war waged to deny the Soviet 
Union an extended sphere of influence.40
However preposterous all this may sound, it also points to a political-military 
twilight zone at the core of the “Second Cold War.” Beyond belligerent verbal 
skirmishes played out in the open, the superpowers engaged in a military war 
of nerves. For the Soviet Union, the main places to contain Western power and 
influence were Afghanistan and Poland. For the United States, “psychological 
operations” or so-called “psyops” were the means of choice. Time and again, 
American intelligence and military operations were staged with an ulterior 
motive in mind: to make a convincing case that the Soviet Union could not 
adequately defend its airspace and coastline, that its early warning systems were 
outdated and that, in case of war, American forces would get a head start. U. S. 
bomber wings repeatedly flew mock-attacks against the Soviet homeland veering 
away only within seconds from its borders; in September 1981, American war-
ships sneaked into the Barents Sea near Murmansk unnoticed by Soviet radar; 
navy fighters deployed for naval exercise “Fleetex 83” in the vicinity of the Kurile 
islands repeatedly entered Soviet airspace.41
Keep it in mind that the United States did not intend to provoke, much less to 
unleash, a nuclear war. The plan was that the Soviet leadership should henceforth 
live in fear—fear of both the capacity and the disposition of the United States 
to carry out devastating “decapitation strikes” against centers of political and 
military command, control and communication. The Soviets should be kept in 
doubt over when and why the United States might push the button, and should 
stay tenuous in its judgement of what Washington’s decision-making body was 
thinking. Showering all kinds of troubling and dubious information on Moscow 
was at the core of this psychological warfare strategy. The more you intimidate an 
adversary, the more you extend your own scope of action: this mantra-like slogan 
was maintained for years.42
Inadvertent risks accompanying this show of force were all too obvious. In 
the summer of 1983, Soviet border forces had become increasingly edgy because 
of intensified U. S. missions probing Moscow’s air defense facilities—on average, 
70 close approaches per month. When, in the early hours of September 1, a U. S. 
reconnaissance plane again drew near to the Soviet defense zone over Sachalin 
and crossed the flight path of a civilian Korean carrier, military air-controllers 
made a fateful identification error and ordered missile-fire on KAL 007, killing 
39 Fiscal Year 1984–88 Defense Guidance, in: The New York Times, May 30, 1982, and Blätter 
für deutsche und international Politik 27/10 (1982), pp. 1011–1016.
40 Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, Victory is Possible, in: Foreign Policy 39/10 (1980), pp. 14–27.
41 Seymour M. Hersh, The Target is Destroyed: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What 
America Knew About It, New York 1986.
42 Adamsky, 1983 Nuclear Crisis, pp. 11, 23, 24.
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269 people. This was not the only misjudgement made during this time, but it was 
the first with tragic ramifications. U. S. officials, including the President, kept on 
charging the Soviets with wanton murder and terror, even after being supplied 
by their own intelligence network with evidence to the contrary.43 Even superb 
intelligence did not count; instead, deeply entrenched anti-Soviet emotions, 
prejudices, and mindsets carried the day, only increased by the prospect of win-
ning an easy propaganda victory over Moscow. Perpetuating traditional patterns 
on their side, the Soviets responded in kind: to retaliate for Washington’s show 
of force, they announced an increase in the number of Soviet submarine-based 
missiles targeted at the United States. Within days, U. S.–Soviet relations had 
sunk to their lowest point since the Cuba Missile Crisis.
KAL 007 was still in international headlines, when, unnoticed by the public, 
potentially disastrous incidents happened elsewhere. On September 26, shortly 
after midnight, a red alert was set off in a military reconnaissance installa-
tion south of Moscow. A space-based satellite system called “Oko” signaled 
the approach of five American intercontinental ballistic missiles against the 
Soviet homeland. 17 minutes passed before ground radar operators verified a 
malfunction in the system. In all probability, air controllers had been led astray 
by a combination of trivial circumstances—computer sensors had presumably 
confused cloud-reflected sunrays in the sky above an American airbase with the 
red tail of an airborne missile.44 
In early November 1983, there was again ample reason for bewilderment, 
misinterpretation, and distrust on account of dubious signals sent off by NATO’s 
command post exercise “Able Archer.” In a way that differed from similar 
exercises in the past, all levels of escalation from conventional to nuclear war 
were rehearsed; and, departing from previous understandings, the orders for 
launching nuclear weapons were camouflaged in codes indecipherable by Soviet 
services.45 It is true that “Able Archer” was nothing but an exercise; but against 
the backdrop of long-standing saber-rattling, it could also have been interpreted 
as a smokescreen for an imminent attack. Whatever it was meant to signal, there 
can be no dispute that it occasioned a runway alert for a number of Soviet nuclear 
fighter jets deployed in East Germany, a combat alert for some Soviet ground units 
in Eastern Europe and an enhanced readiness alert for a variety of Soviet ICBMs. 
Some historians claim that Moscow’s war scare put world peace on a razor’s edge; 
others interpret these Soviet countermeasures as yet another example of the Cold 
War’s routine mirror-imaging: nuclear impression-management on one side 
43 Hersh, The Target is Destroyed.
44 Interview with Stanislav Petrov, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 19, 2013, p. 7.
45 Benjamin B. Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare, Washington, D. C. 
1997, pp. 6–10; Len Scott, Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited, 
in: Intelligence and National Security 22/6 (2011), p. 767; Klaas Voß, Die Enden der Parabel. 
Die Nuklearwaffenübung Able Archer im Krisenjahr 1983, in: Mittelweg 36 23/1 (2015), 
pp. 73–92.
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provoking responses in kind from the other.46 Be that as it may, “Able Archer” 
testifies to deep-rooted distrust and to a political fabric that encouraged crisis 
escalation, inadvertent decision-making, and potentially even war.
5. The Demise of “Old Thinking”
To dub 1983 “the most dangerous year of the Cold War” is certainly way off the 
mark,47 but the early 1980s certainly qualify as yet another twilight zone of 
nuclear bravado and deep-seated mistrust. The atmosphere in the ranks of the 
Moscow Politburo and Soviet military and intelligence services deepened into a 
brooding anticipation of war. Whether Andropov actually believed in his slogan 
of an impending “nuclear Barbarossa” or not, nobody can tell for sure. But in terms 
of military hardware, it looked as if the U. S. was about to build up an uncatch-
able advantage, To some observers, its combination of sophisticated computer 
technology with new MX intercontinental and Pershing II intermediate-range 
missiles amounted to a veritable first-strike capability; and the endless blustering 
about “limited nuclear wars” and “decapitating strikes” aroused suspicion that 
an overly power-confident United States might be tempted to overbid its stakes 
in future crises and to engage in escalating modes of confrontation. This is why 
Andropov, along with the military Chief of Staff Nikolai Ogarkov, and Secretary 
of State Andrei Gromyko, time and again referred back to the summer of 1941. 
For all its propagandistic maneuvering, the “Barbarossa” generation of Moscow’s 
nomenklatura was genuinely concerned. According to the first-hand evidence of 
observers, the officials had not been so edgy at any time since the Cuba Missile 
Crisis in late 1962.48
With this as the background, it comes as little surprise that the Kremlin 
intensified its emergency preparations. It did so most notably in an endeavor 
dating back to 1981 which had the codename “RYAN” (shorthand for Raketno-
Yadernoe Napadenie, or “Nuclear Missile Attack”). This involved a sweeping 
attempt by Soviet and Eastern European intelligence services to collect data that 
46 Mark Kramer, Die Nicht-Krise um ‘Able Archer 1983’: Fürchtete die sowjetische Führung 
tatsächlich einen atomaren Großangriff im Herbst 1983?, in: Oliver Bange and Bernd Lemke 
(eds.), Wege zur Wiedervereinigung. Die beiden deutschen Staaten in ihren Bündnissen 1970 
bis 1990, Munich 2013, pp. 129–150; Vojtech Mastny, ‘Able Archer’: An der Schwelle zum 
Atomkrieg?, in: Greiner, Müller, and Walter (eds.), Krisen im Kalten Krieg, pp. 505–523.
47 Georg Schild, 1983. Das gefährlichste Jahr des Kalten Krieges, Paderborn 2013; Berliner 
Colloquien zur Zeitgeschichte, #15, “1983: The Most Dangerous Year of the Cold War?”, 
https://www.berlinercolloquien.de/colloquien/1983-the-most-dangerous-year-of-the-cold-
war/index.html.
48 Nate Jones (ed.), The 1983 War Scare, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing 
Book 426, Interview with Lieutenant General Gelii V.  Batenin, Document 23, p. 10; see 
also Document 24, pp. 106f and Beatrice Heuser, The Soviet Response to the Euromissile 
Crisis, 1982–83, in: Leopoldo Nuti (ed.), The Crisis of Détente in Europe. From Helsinki to 
Gorbachev 1975–1985, London 2008, pp. 137–149.
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might possibly indicate the coming of a Western nuclear attack: information on 
troop movements, radio traffic, police activities, daily schedules of high-ranking 
politicians and military leaders, emergency scenarios for hospitals, call-ups for 
blood donations, long working hours in ministries of defense, even the activi-
ties of military chaplains. Though many aspects of operation “RYAN” are still 
unknown, the operation testifies to the rampant distrust of the time.
Again, the metaphor of nuclear weapons as the Cold War’s game-changer 
seems appropriate. Even though political leaders understood the difference 
between threat and action, they time and again underrated the political and 
psychological price of nuclear brinkmanship, especially the potential for mis-
calculation and inadvertent escalation. Nuclear weapons did not, as such, create 
post-1945 tensions, but they certainly made conflicts ever more contentious by 
feeding fear, suspicion and mistrust, if not outright paranoia. It is hard to imagine 
any other force-multiplier of political controversies so powerful and persistent. 
Despite the effectiveness of nuclear weapons in deterring outright war, they 
stimulated international crises; and even though they set limits to the Cold War 
itself, they kept the confrontation alive.49
Against the backdrop of these cycles, which at the time seemed carved in stone, 
the abolition of an entire generation of nuclear weapons, agreed upon in the 
INF Treaty of 1987 is one of the most remarkable achievements in all Cold War 
History. It should encourage historians to readjust their analytical focus—away 
from the well-documented history of distrust to the delicate and little understood 
dynamics of positive trust-building.
49 Suri, Logiken der atomaren Abschreckung, p. 46; Holloway, Nuclear Weapons, pp. 380, 396.
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Back to the Future? The New Missile Crisis
1. Introduction
The 1987 INF Treaty1 between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles—more commonly referred to as the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty2—can easily be considered a landmark arms 
control and disarmament treaty.3 It was the first bilateral agreement between 
the Soviet Union and the United States to effectively eliminate a whole class of 
missiles and missile launchers. It lifted the most imminent nuclear threat to 
Western Europe, served as a significant turning point in U. S.–Soviet relations, 
and introduced the most intrusive verification measures up to that point. Its 
background history was the first period of détente, NATO’s Dual-Track Decision 
to counter the Soviet SS-20 threat, and a negotiation record which finally achieved 
what almost no one would have expected when negotiators first sat down in 
Geneva.
31 years after the INF Treaty entered into force (in 1988), the Administration 
of U. S. President Donald Trump decided to quit the agreement in the summer of 
2019. Since 2014 the United States had been publicly accusing Moscow of violating 
the Treaty by flight-testing a ground-launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) in the 
ranges banned by the INF Treaty (500–5,500 km).4 Subsequently, U. S. officials 
expressed concerns that Russia might have started to produce more missiles 
1 Parts of this article are taken from an earlier article on the INF crisis. See Ulrich Kühn and 
Anna Péczeli, Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty, in: Strategic Studies Quarterly 11/1 (2017), 
pp. 66–99.
2 Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics 
On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), 
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm.
3 Cf. Avis Bohlen, William Burns, Steven Pifer, and John Woodworth (eds.), The Treaty on 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: History and Lessons Learned, in: The Brookings Institu-
tion (December 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/12/
arms-control-inf-treaty-pifer/30-arms-control-pifer-paper.pdf; Amy F. Woolf, Russian Com-
pliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues 
for Congress, Congressional Research Service (April 25, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/
R43832.pdf.
4 U. S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, 
and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Report, (April, 2017), https://www.state.
gov/2017-report-on-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-
disarmament-agreements-and-commitments/ (accessed March 30, 2020).
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than needed to sustain a flight-test program.5 Russia rejected the accusations 
and tabled a number of counter-allegations against the United States.6 The 
diplomatic back-and-forth finally culminated in the U. S. decision to withdraw 
from the Treaty—a decision with potentially wide-ranging repercussions for the 
security of Europe and East Asia.
The end of the INF Treaty comes at a critical time. Ever since the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Moscow’s relations with the West have 
plummeted to an all-time post-Cold War low. Against a background of mutual 
accusations of violating the norms and principles of the European security order, 
covert Russian involvement in the war in Eastern Ukraine, Moscow’s alleged 
meddling in the 2016 U. S. Presidential elections, the unresolved case of the 
poisoning of former operative Sergei Skripal, the continued rhetorical Russian 
nuclear saber-rattling and intimidation of European NATO allies, the European 
Union’s economic sanctions against Russia, and the Russian military intervention 
in Syria, the West and Russia find themselves trapped in a dangerous downward 
spiral, which some have already labeled a “New Cold War.”7
The renewed confrontation has also left its mark on the instruments of arms 
control. Through its actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Russia violated 
the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 in which it, along with the United States 
and Britain, had agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial 
integrity of Ukraine (a key element in securing Kiev’s agreement to transfer all 
Soviet-era nuclear warheads to Russia for elimination).8 In so doing, Moscow 
further damaged the integrity of so-called negative security guarantees in gen-
eral. In March 2015, Russia completed its “suspension” of the most important 
conventional arms control treaty—the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe—and walked out of that treaty’s decision-making body.9 On nuclear 
safety and security, Russia ended almost all cooperation with the United States 
on bilateral efforts to secure nuclear materials and facilities under the auspices 
of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and cancelled the US–Russian 
Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.
5 Michael R. Gordon, Russia Is Moving Ahead with Missile Program That Violates Treaty, U. S. 
Officials Say, in: The New York Times, October 19, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/
world/europe/russia-missiles-inf-treaty.html?_r=0.
6 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Comments on the report of the 
U. S. Department of State on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonprolifera-
tion, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, (August 1, 2014) http://www.mid.ru/
brp_4.nsf/0/D2D396AE143B098144257D2A0054C7FD.
7 Robert Legvold, Managing the New Cold War, in: Foreign Affairs, 93/4 (2014), pp. 74–84.
8 For the Budapest Memorandum between Russia, the USA, the UK and Ukraine from Decem-
ber 5, 1994 see https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atfcf/%7BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s19941399_.pdf (last accessed March 30, 2020). 
9 Kingston Reif, Russia Completes CFE Treaty Suspension, in: Arms Control Today, April 
2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2015-04/news-briefs/russia-completes-cfe-treaty-
suspension (last accessed March 30, 2020). 
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Taken together, these developments have led some to caution that the world 
is experiencing “the end of the history of nuclear arms control.”10 Others have 
argued that Russia has effectively broken with the rules and constraints of the 
European and global security order and that the West (that is, NATO) is, there-
fore, no longer bound by agreements like the INF Treaty.11 After the end of the 
INF Treaty, the United States and its Allies in Europe and East Asia face a choice 
of what to do to enhance security: give arms control another chance or provide 
the ground for another missile buildup.
This essay recounts the history of the INF Treaty from the latter days of détente 
to the current developments after the end of INF. It explains why the current 
post-INF environment is highly problematic for European security, and what the 
way forward—reviving arms control or re-entering an arms race—might look 
like. Even though the new missile crisis might create additional negative ripple 
effects for East Asia, the essay focuses primarily on Europe.
2. The Cold War Missile Crisis
It is crucial to note that, from the very beginning, the history of the INF Treaty 
was mainly a history of European security concerns. The precarious military 
balance in conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact came under 
increasing pressure when the Soviet Union decided to replace its aging SS-4 and 
SS-5 ballistic missiles (all single-warhead missiles) with the three-warhead SS-20 
ballistic missile. Deployed deep inside Soviet territory and having a maximum 
range of 5,000 kilometers, the SS-20 was potentially able to strike any target in 
Western Europe as well as targets in Southeast Asia and Alaska.
The European NATO allies, first and foremost West German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt, identified those weapons as destabilizing the security system, 
creating a gap in NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture. They had no similar capa-
bilities to match the threat. When, in 1979, the NATO Allies decided effectively to 
mount a response to the growing SS-20 threat, they opted for a dyadic concept.12 
The Dual-Track Decision had two components. On the deployment track, NATO 
10 Alexei Arbatov, An Unnoticed Crisis: The End of History for Nuclear Arms Control?, in: 
Carnegie Endowment, June 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Arbatov2015_n_
web_Eng.pdf (last accessed March 30, 2020).
11 Matthew Kroenig, Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War, in: Survival 
57/1 (2015), pp. 49–70.
12 The Harmel Doctrine of 1967, named after Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, outlined 
a two-pronged strategy based on deterrence and engagement for NATO. The doctrine’s 
core concern was the maintenance of an adequate defense of all Allies. That concern was 
coupled with a political agenda of engagement with the Soviet Union aimed at stopping the 
nuclear arms race and reducing the dangerous tensions between the two blocs. See NATO, 
The Future Tasks of the Alliance, Report of the Council Ministerial Communiqué, Brussels, 
December 1967, pp.13 f., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67927.htm.
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threatened to introduce 108 newly built Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 
GLCMs into Europe. On the arms control track, NATO reached out to the Soviets 
and offered negotiations aimed at achieving limits that could affect the scale of 
the deployment it proposed. 
The first round of negotiations (1981–1983) was completely fruitless, due to 
both sides sticking to their maximum positions. Washington wanted to include 
all INF-systems—those in the 1,000 to 5,500  km range—wherever they were 
deployed and proposed the so-called “double zero” option (put forward by 
President Ronald Reagan), by which all SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles should 
be dismantled and the Pershing II and GLCM not be deployed. Meanwhile, the 
Soviets insisted on including British and French systems, limiting the geographi-
cal scope to cover only the European part of the Soviet Union (thus allowing for 
Soviet INF-range deployments in the Asian part of the USSR), and including all 
American nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft in Europe. In November 1983, 
as a result of this diplomatic deadlock, the first weapons were deployed in West 
Germany. As a direct reaction, the Soviet delegation to the INF talks in Geneva 
walked out.13
3. An Arms Control Solution
When Mikhail Gorbachev took office as General Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, a resumption 
of the INF talks had already been agreed upon (two months earlier). However, it 
was only in 1986 that the Soviet position changed markedly, and in a surprising 
way. By the time of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik in October 1986, 
the Soviets had already come close to the original U. S. double zero proposal, even 
though Gorbachev wanted to retain a small number of INF missiles in Asia. To 
the surprise of Western analysts, Moscow subsequently went even further than 
the original U. S. proposal had, by suggesting the inclusion of missiles of shorter 
ranges (between 500 and 1,000 km)—which meant including the West German 
Pershing IA and the Soviet SS-23 and SS-12.14 On 8 December 1987, Reagan and 
Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in the East Room of the White House.
Being of unlimited duration, the Treaty eliminated all Soviet SS-20, SS-4, 
SS-5, SS-12, and SS-23 ballistic missiles as well as SSC-X-4 Cruise Missiles and 
launchers on the one side; on the other, all U. S. Pershing II and Pershing IB 
ballistic missiles; and the relevant U. S. ground-launched Cruise Missiles and 
launchers. In fact, the Treaty banned all U. S. and Soviet ground-launched nuclear 
and conventional missiles and launchers with a range between 500 and 5,500 km 
worldwide. By June 1, 1991, a total of 2,692 intermediate-range missiles had been 
13 U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Understanding the INF Treaty, Washington, 
D. C., 1989, p. 9.
14 Bohlen et al. (eds.), The Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, p. 6.
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entirely eliminated. In addition, the Treaty prohibited producing or flight-testing 
any new INF systems or separate stages of INF missiles or launchers. It did not, 
however, ban sea-launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) or air-launched Cruise Mis-
siles (ALCMs). A further novelty was the asymmetric character of the reductions. 
While the Soviet Union destroyed 1,846 missiles, the United States destroyed 846 
missiles. To address possible compliance concerns and to oversee implementa-
tion, the Treaty established the Special Verification Commission (SVC).15
For Europe, INF meant the beginning of a process which resulted in a densely 
institutionalized network of various multilateral arms control and confidence- 
and security-building measures, including, among others, the Treaty on Con-
ventional Armed Forces in Europe, the various formal stipulations on military 
transparency and predictability of the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (the later OSCE), as well as the bilateral Strategic Arms Reductions 
treaties (START I and II) and the U.S–Soviet Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, 
reducing the number of tactical nuclear weapons with shorter ranges.
4. Growing Russian Discomfort and the U. S. Allegations
The subsequent years saw little reason to worry about the bargain. On-site 
inspections continued until mid-2001 when, according to the Treaty’s provisions, 
the extensive inspection regime was finally terminated and replaced by national 
technical means of verification—ten years after the last INF systems had been 
destroyed. However, below the level of public attention, Russian dissatisfac-
tion with the Treaty did surface now and then. Russian officials and President 
Vladimir Putin himself questioned the continued viability of the INF Treaty. 
Several times, they went so far as formulating arguments in favor of abandoning 
the agreement.16
In 2007, the then Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov publicly questioned 
the Treaty: “The gravest mistake was the decision to scrap a whole class of missile 
weapons—medium-range ballistic missiles. Only Russia and the United States do 
not have the right to have such weapons, although they would be quite useful for 
us.”17 What Ivanov hinted at was concern amongst the Russian military over 
China’s intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, a capability Russia could not 
match with land-based systems.18
15 See Article XIII of the INF Treaty, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm 
(accessed March 30, 2020).
16 Evgeny Buzhinsky, Does the INF Treaty Have a Future?, in: Security Index: A Russian 
Journal on International Security, 20/2 (2014), pp. 89–93; Bohlen et al. (eds.), The Treaty on 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, p. 22.
17 RIA Novosti, Scrapping Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles a Mistake—Ivanov, in: Sputnik, 
February 7, 2007, http://sputniknews.com/russia/20070207/60350944.html.
18 Victor Yesin, Nuclear Disarmament: Problems and Prospects, in: Russia in Global Affairs, 
March 2, 2008, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_10357.
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Then, in 2010, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeated its earlier 
claim that the continued U. S. use of “a whole family of target missiles” for its 
missile defense programs represented “direct violations” of the Treaty.19 As 
we know today, the U. S. government at that time already suspected that Russia 
was developing a new GLCM of intermediate-range. Finally, in 2014, the INF 
crisis reached the level of full public attention, when the U. S. State Department 
declared “the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF 
Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a GLCM with a range capability of 
500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.”20
Moscow’s reaction came immediately. In an official statement, Russia rejected 
the U. S. allegations and presented its own list of counter-accusations, most 
prominently U. S. missile defense installations in Romania and Poland, allegedly 
in violation of the INF Treaty.21 According to the Russian accusations, those 
missile defense installations could easily be converted—just by changing the 
necessary software—into launching sea-launched Tomahawk Cruise Missiles 
as ground-launched ones. In the words of Russian President Vladimir Putin, if 
America were to withdraw from the treaty, “our response would be immediate 
[…] and reciprocal.”22 What followed was a fruitless diplomatic back-and-forth 
which reached a first peak in November 2016 with the U. S. request to re-convene 
the SVC in Geneva (the commission which had been dormant for over 13 years) 
after information had surfaced that Russia was allegedly producing more mis-
siles than needed for a flight-test program.23 Neither the U. S. nor the Russian 
concerns could be resolved at that meeting.
5. INF and the Trump Administration
With Donald Trump’s unexpected ascent to the White House, U. S.–Russian 
relations took center stage due to U. S. accusations that Russia had influenced 
the outcome of the U. S. Presidential elections and had actively aided the Trump 
campaign. Questions were also raised about the new President’s business ties 
to Moscow, his somewhat ambiguous stance towards U. S. security guarantees 
for European NATO Allies, and his embrace of Russia’s authoritarian model. 
Against this background of largely poisoned relations, all decisions with regard 
19 Quoted from Kühn, Péczeli, Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty, p. 9.
20 U. S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonprolifera-
tion, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, Report.
21 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Director of the Foreign Ministry 
Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov’s interview with the 
Interfax news agency, December 19, 2017, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/ 
asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2998923.
22 Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, October 19, 2017, http://en.kremlin.ru/
events/president/news/55882.
23 Gordon, Russia Is Moving, in: The New York Times, October 19, 2016.
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to Russia became a bone of contention in domestic U. S. politics, sometimes 
with far-reaching repercussions for European security. The INF Treaty was just 
one policy topic amongst many where U. S. policy-makers were raising their 
anti-Russian profile.
What has spurred the end of INF is also the fact that U. S. policy towards 
Russia under Donald Trump is not coherent or homogenous but breaks down into 
varying lines taken by different, sometimes competing, groups of actors. There 
are some in the U. S. government who favor a tough stance towards Russia, and 
in particular want to contain and push back against Russian influence in Eastern 
Europe. Perhaps the most prominent voice for this course was that of John 
Bolton, Trump’s National Security Advisor from April 2018 to September 2019. 
During his time in office, Bolton emerged as the main critic of the INF Treaty. 
Bolton had a proven track record of deep-seated skepticism towards treaties 
constraining U. S. power, particularly arms control agreements.24 In 2014, he 
publicly lobbied for the United States to end the INF Treaty, arguing that “with 
Russia’s violations of the Treaty, America remains the only country bound by and 
honoring a prohibition on deploying intermediate-range forces.”25 He inferred 
that “maintaining international security requires that the U. S. have access to the 
full spectrum of conventional and nuclear options.”26 In addition, Bolton saw 
the United States as ill-prepared in the looming power struggle with China, which 
was never a party to the INF Treaty.27
This group got significant support from defense hawks in the U. S. Congress. 
In a hearing before Congress in early 2017, U. S. General Paul Selva, Vice Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that Russia had already deployed a 
significant number of prohibited missiles in the ranges banned by the Treaty.28 
In late 2017, in order to increase pressure on Russia to return to compliance, the 
U. S. Congress mandated the Secretary of Defense to develop a conventional 
ground-launched cruise missile within INF ranges.29 The original bill by the 
Senate went even further, authorizing research and development for a nuclear-
24 Joseph Cirincione, John Bolton is a serial arms control killer, in: The Washington Post, Febru-
ary 1, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2019/02/01/inf/.
25 John R. Bolton and John Yoo, An obsolete nuclear treaty even before Russia cheated, in: The 
Wall Street Journal, September 9, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/john-bolton-and-john-
yoo-an-obsolete-nuclear-treaty-even-before-russia-cheated-1410304847.
26 Ibid.
27 Franz-Stefan Gady, INF Withdrawal: Bolton’s Tool to Shatter China-Russia Military Ties?, in: 
The Diplomat, October 24, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/inf-withdrawal-boltons-
tool-to-shatter-china-russia-military-ties/.
28 General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Transcript of Hearing on Mili-
tary Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements, March 8, 2017, https://dod.defense.
gov/Portals/1/features/2017/0917_nuclear-deterrence/docs/Transcript-HASC-Hearing-on-
Nuclear-Deterrence-8-March-2017.pdf.
29 115th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Report 115–404, https://www.
congress.gov/congressional-report/115th-congress/house-report/404/1.
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capable version—an endeavor ultimately blocked by the White House.30 In the 
words of an anonymous U. S. official, the idea behind this proposal was “to send 
a message to the Russians that they will pay a military price” for violating INF 
by “posturing ourselves to live in a post-INF world […] if that is the world the 
Russians want.”31
Last but not least, the U. S. Department of Defense, in consultation with 
the White House and the Department of Energy, developed its own approach 
towards the INF crisis. This approach can be subsumed under the headline of 
“staying within the regime while being tough on Russia.” In essence, that meant 
formulating INF Treaty-compliant military responses, including responses in 
the nuclear realm. In early 2018, the Pentagon released an updated version of 
the U. S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),32 a document outlining U. S. policy 
on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation for the years to come. 
The NPR suggested the United States should “modify a small number of existing 
sea-launched ballistic missile warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in 
the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile 
(SLCM).”33 The new SLCM, the NPR argued, would “provide an arms control 
compliant response to Russia’s non-compliance with the Intermediate-range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty.” Further on, it said: “If Russia returns to compliance 
with its arms control obligations, reduces its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, and 
corrects its other destabilizing behaviors, the United States may reconsider the 
pursuit of a SLCM.” Finally, on October 20, 2018, Donald Trump announced the 
United States’ intention to withdraw from the Treaty.34 
6. Europe and the New Missile Crisis
For Europe, the end of INF has the potential to plunge the continent deeper into 
a security dilemma with the Russian Federation. Back in July 2018, NATO heads 
of state and governments had reaffirmed their intention to “remain fully com-
mitted to the preservation of this landmark arms control treaty.”35 So Trump’s 




32 Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/ 
02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
33 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, p. 54.
34 Julian Borger, “Trump says US will withdraw from nuclear arms treaty with Russia,” in: The 
Guardian, October 21, 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-
arms-treaty-russia.
35 NATO Brussels Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government partici-
pating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, July 11–12, 2018, www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.
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withdrawal announcement came somewhat as a surprise to most U. S. Allies. In 
the weeks following Trump’s announcement, U. S. officials began to provide more 
details about the Russian violation. According to these public statements, Russia 
had tested a GLCM, the Novator 9M729 (NATO designation SSC-8, “Screwdriver”) 
from both fixed and mobile launchers, far surpassing a range beyond the INF 
compliance threshold.36 Even the German government, which had previously 
been hesitant to call out Russia publicly, shifted course. On November 20, 2018, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that “we know” that Russia has not 
been complying with INF “for some time.”37 In December 2018, the NATO Allies 
announced that they “strongly support the finding of the United States that 
Russia is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty.”38 A last-ditch 
effort to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, suggested by Chancellor Merkel, 
would only delay U. S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty. On February 1, 2019, 
Donald Trump declared that the United States would exit the INF Treaty six 
months later. On August 2, 2019, INF became history.
The implications are clear. Europeans could be the first to see the negative 
effects of the end of INF. Because of the extremely short flight times they take 
(around five minutes only), intermediate-range weapons, if directed at Europe, 
would give the targeted states almost no warning time. In the words of Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the 1980s’ threat of INF weapons “was like holding a gun to our 
head.”39 This effect would immediately come back, and it would pertain to 
almost all of Europe, should Russia deploy the alleged new systems in its western 
military district (perhaps including deployment in its westernmost exclave of 
Kaliningrad).
Such deployments, if they were to occur in the years ahead, would also lend 
additional arguments to those warning of Russia’s assumed nuclear doctrine of 
“escalate to de-escalate.” According to the drafters of the new American NPR, 
Moscow “mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first 
use of nuclear weapons would serve to ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on terms favorable 
to Russia.”40 What they refer to is the fear of extended deterrence failure in 
36 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats 
on Russia’s INF Treaty Violation, November 30, 2018, www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/
speeches-interviews/item/1923-director-of-national-intelligence-daniel-coats-on-russia-s-
inf-treaty-violation.
37 “Pressestatements von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem dänischen Ministerpräsiden-
ten Rasmussen,“ November 20, 2018, www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/presse 
statements-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-und-dem-daenischen-ministerpraesidenten-
rasmussen-1552136.
38 Statement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Issued by the NATO 
Foreign Ministers, Brussels, December 4, 2018, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_161122.htm.
39 Quoted from Q&A: 25 Years On, Gorbachev Recalls Nuclear Milestone, in: The Moscow 
Times, December 6, 2012, https://themoscowtimes.com/news/qa-25-years-on-gorbachev-
recalls-nuclear-milestone-19978.
40 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, p. 8.
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the context of Russia attacking one of NATO’s militarily weak member states in 
Eastern Europe, perhaps in the Baltic area. In that scenario—so the argument 
by Western analysts goes41—Russia could resort to the early and limited use 
of non-strategic nuclear weapons to coerce NATO into accepting a military 
fait accompli. Without the capabilities for an immediate, measured nuclear 
response, NATO would then have little choice but to accept defeat.42 Seen from 
this angle, additional Russian intermediate-weapons would give the Russian 
military additional assets to hold at risk NATO targets deep in Western Europe 
and critical for reinforcement in the event of a military crisis, say (again) in the 
Baltic region. Against a pre-existent background of NATO grappling with the 
worst-case scenario of not being able to defend the Baltic States in a conflict with 
Russia, intermediate-range missiles would further tip the already precarious 
regional military balance in favor of Russia, most notably by threatening to 
disrupt NATO’s supply and reinforcement chains.
Even though most of such military considerations currently take place in 
expert circles behind closed doors and stay largely unnoticed by the wider public, 
the coming years might well see a renaissance of intermediate-range missiles in 
Europe, together with a political debate akin to that of the late 1970s and early 
1980s.
7. Back to the Future: Arms Racing or Arms Control?
With the end of the INF Treaty, Europe’s security is once more very much up in 
the air. Two scenarios are possible in the years ahead. Both of them would, to 
different degrees, mirror past developments surrounding the emergence of the 
INF Treaty in the 1980s.
The first scenario—arms racing—sees Russia and the United States developing 
and deploying more and more intermediate-range missiles. This course would 
be in line with other developments on the strategic nuclear level. In his State of 
the Union speech in March 2018,43 Vladimir Putin revealed a number of new 
or planned strategic nuclear systems aimed at offsetting America’s advantage in 
41 Matthew Kroenig, Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War, in: Survival 57 
(2015), pp. 49–70. 
42 Proponents of that logic refer to the readiness levels of NATO’s dual-capable aircraft in 
Europe which are currently measured in weeks and the assumption that the Allies’ aircraft 
might not be able to penetrate Russian airspace. According to NATO, its dual-capable aircraft 
“are available for nuclear roles at various levels of readiness”—the highest level of readiness 
is measured in weeks. NATO, NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Forces, December 3, 
2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm#. See also Alexander Lanoszka 
and Michael A. Hunzeker, Confronting the Anti-Access / Area Denial and Precision Strike 
Challenge in the Baltic Region, in: RUSI Journal 161/5 (2016), pp. 12–18.
43 Russia’s Putin unveils ‘invincible’ nuclear weapons, March 1, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-43239331.
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strategic missile defense installations, and made it abundantly clear that Moscow 
views its missile inventory as the ultimate security and great power guarantee. 
While a stance like this does not rule out the possibility of U. S.–Russian nuclear 
arms reductions in the future, it makes it less likely against the background of 
the current political tensions.
Even though the Trump Administration says otherwise, a reintroduction of 
U. S. ground-launched intermediate-range missiles becomes quite likely now that 
the INF Treaty is ended. The Pentagon has been researching a new conventional 
GLCM and a modern medium-range ballistic missile since 2018, and the first 
tests of these weapons systems were made in 2019.44 The latest reports from 
Washington indicate that the GLCM could be ready for deployment in early 
2021.45 Defense hawks in Washington would probably welcome a decision to 
fund these systems to the full in the years ahead, even more so since leaving the 
INF Treaty has finally untied America’s hands in East Asia, where China can field 
as many missiles in INF-ranges as it wants while the U. S. military has up to now 
been barred from reciprocating.46
In this scenario, America’s European Allies would face the daunting challenge 
of consulting with Washington over what to do with the new missiles—where to 
deploy them. Complicating all this, NATO’s European members share no com-
mon position on how to respond to Russia’s new missile challenge. While French 
President Emmanuel Macron is pushing ever harder for European “strategic 
autonomy” in the realm of defense and perhaps even in nuclear matters,47 some 
members of the German Social Democrats have been discussing requesting the 
removal of some twenty U. S. nuclear gravity bombs from German soil, which 
would result in Berlin opting out of NATO’s operational nuclear sharing arrange-
ment.48 Fueled by the growing transatlantic rift, strong public opposition to a 
new arms race on the continent could easily resurface in a number of countries, 
and not just in Germany.
At the same time, some European allies, such as Poland, would be extremely 
eager to host new U. S. intermediate-range missiles, for the simple reason that 
44 Paul McLeary, U. S. Busts INF Wall With Ballistic Missile, Puts Putin & Xi On Notice, 
Breaking Defense, December 12, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/12/pentagon-
busts-though-the-inf-wall-puts-putin-and-xi-on-notice/.
45 Shervin Taheran, U. S. to Test INF Treaty-Range Missiles, in: Arms Control Today, April 2019, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-04/news/us-test-inf-treaty-range-missiles.
46 Evan Braden Montgomery, Managing China’s Missile Threat: Future Options to Preserve 
Forward Defense, in: China’s Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States, 
April 1, 2015, pp. 6–7, http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/04/managing-chinas-missile-
threat-future-options-to-preserve-forward-defense/.
47 William Drozdiak, France is prepared to extend its nuclear deterrent to Germany, The Wash-
ington Post, February 28, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/02/28/
france-is-prepared-extend-its-nuclear-deterrent-germany/?utm_term=.8813e0a9ae06.
48 Bojan Pancevski, In Germany, a Cold War Deal to Host U. S. Nuclear Weapons Is Now in 
Question, Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-germany-
anger-at-trump-throws-cold-war-nuclear-pact-into-question-11549976449. 
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those missiles would mean a permanent presence of U. S. forces on the ground. 
Poland’s offer of May 2018 to pay $2 billion for the permanent stationing of a 
U. S. Army tank division on Polish soil underscores that point. In the end, under 
a possible second Trump term, the U. S. Administration might simply sideline 
hesitant Allies like Germany and decide on bilateral basing agreements with more 
supportive member states, Poland amongst them. The political damage to the 
NATO Alliance would be massive. Crafting a common political approach vis-à-
vis Moscow would be almost impossible, and the Russians would in all certainty 
respond by producing and deploying even more missiles.49 
Perhaps the biggest difference between the current situation and the original 
missile crisis of the Cold War is that in today’s crisis, U. S. Allies in Europe 
play almost no visible role. Back in the 1970s, Helmut Schmidt was adamant in 
ensuring that Western Europe’s security concerns were properly addressed—first 
by publicly raising awareness of the Soviet missile buildup and then by making 
sure that burden-sharing and diplomatic outreach to the Soviets would inform 
NATO’s Dual-Track Decision. Today, Germany, still a key European NATO Ally, 
has taken a “wait and see” approach, with Chancellor Angela Merkel keeping the 
issue below the level of public attention. The result is that the new missile crisis 
largely plays out as a bilateral game between Moscow and Washington, with the 
latter moving incrementally forward in formulating its own policy responses. 
Thereby the United States is defining European leaders’ room for maneuver. This 
self-imposed restraint on the part of the Europeans may, one day, come to haunt 
Europe’s leaders—if a new missiles arms race should kick in on the continent.
The good news is that there are other military means to respond to Russia than 
simply producing and fielding new intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Some 
U. S. military officials see no specific military need for new ground-launched 
systems.50 Instead, the limited rotational forward deployment of conventional 
cruise missiles on U. S. bombers and ships in Western Europe, supported by the 
deployment of Cruise Missile defenses at NATO’s vital logistics and transporta-
tion nodes, could well thwart the military advantage Moscow might hope to gain 
from allegedly violating the INF Treaty.51
These military options might open up room for maneuver for a second sce-
nario, which would be an arms control solution to the current crisis. In concrete 
terms, the military countermeasures already announced by the United States in 
49 In 2015, Colonel General Victor Zavarzin, a member of the Russian federal assembly’s 
Defense Committee, warned “if the Americans indeed deploy their ground-based nuclear 
missiles in Europe, in this case we will face the necessity of retaliating.” Quoted from 
Lawmaker, Moscow can answer possible deployment of U. S. nuclear missiles in Europe, in: 
Tass, June 5, 2015, http://tass.com/russia/799098.
50 Cf. Maggie Tennis, Republicans Aim to Produce Banned Missile, in: Arms Control Today 
(2017), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-09/news/republicans-aim-produce-banned-
missile.
51 Ulrich Kühn, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Europe in a Post-INF World, in: The 
Nonproliferation Review 26 (2019), pp. 155–166.
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the new NPR and legislated by Congress might well lead the Kremlin to take a 
more transparent stance. And transparency, on a reciprocal basis, would be most 
urgently needed. For that to happen, Russia and the United States would have to 
be willing to “trade transparency for transparency.” On the one hand, Russia’s 
concerns about a potential dual-use applicability of U. S. missile defense systems 
in Romania and Poland could be addressed by offering on-site demonstrations of 
the system to Russian inspectors. As one Russian arms control expert suggested, 
“Washington should agree to modify the tubes of the interceptor launchers in 
Romania and Poland so that canisters containing Tomahawks or other offensive 
missiles cannot be installed there.”52 Such a solution would go beyond just 
mere fixes to the software, currently one of the distinguishing features between 
offensive and defensive capabilities. In turn, U. S. concerns could be clarified by 
showing U. S. inspectors the fuel tank capacity of the Russian missile that caused 
the end of INF.
A second option would be for NATO to make a no-first-deployment pledge 
in exchange for Russian geographical restraint. In essence, NATO would pledge 
not to deploy new land-based intermediate-range missiles in Europe first. Russia 
would reciprocate by relocating its SSC-8 missiles east of the Ural Mountains. The 
verification of Russian withdrawal could be achieved using national technical 
means, which have already been sufficient to detect the Russian violation in the 
first place.
Another, more complex option, would be the separation of nuclear warheads 
and launch vehicles on both sides. That would mean storing nuclear warheads 
verifiably several hours away from the respective launch systems. That way, 
both sides would increase crisis stability by reducing the potential for misunder-
standings triggering an overreaction. Such an approach could apply to mobile 
land-based launchers and ballistic missiles as well as to NATO’s forward-deployed 
fighter jets. A technical study by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research recently came to the conclusion that verifying the absence of nuclear 
warheads from their non-strategic delivery vehicles could be possible.53
Another reason to engage in compliance, and perhaps arms control talks, 
lies in the risk of losing the New START agreement over the INF crisis. The New 
Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) limits the strategic systems of the 
United States and Russia with ranges beyond 5,500  kilometers. New START, 
signed in 2010, entered into force in 2011 and expires in February 2021. On a 
one-time basis, the Treaty can be extended by another five years. In the United 
States it would only need an executive agreement by the U. S. President and no 
52 Sergey Rogov, How to Prevent a Dangerous Escalation, in: Foreign Affairs, May 22, 2018, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2018-05-22/can-us-and-russia-
find-path-forward-arms-control.
53 Pavel Podvig, Ryan Snyder and Wilfred Wan, Evidence of Absence: Verifying the Removal 
of Nuclear Weapons, UNIDIR, 2018, https://www.unidir.org/publication/evidence-absence-
verifying-removal-nuclear-weapons.
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advice and consent by the Senate to do so. Unfortunately, the Trump Admin-
istration has, so far, not taken up the Russian initiative to extend the treaty for 
another five years.54 Without INF, and, perhaps, also New START in place, the 
U. S.–Russian security relationship would be thrown back into a state of almost 
complete non-transparency and unpredictability—a highly dangerous state, last 
experienced in the 1960s.
8. Conclusion
Today, thirty years after stipulations under the INF Treaty entered into force, 
a tragic security dilemma is once more unfolding. Again, Russia seems to find 
value in fielding a new generation of intermediate-range missiles. Again, the 
United States is contemplating the option of engaging in a missile tit-for-tat, 
answering Russia’s actions. Again, the bilateral relationship is at a significant 
low. And again, the ramifications for Europe are anything but positive. More 
worrisome these days, the renewed missile crisis has not gained center stage in 
public discussions yet. Even though the voices warning of a New Cold War are 
growing, no commonly shared sense of risk seems to be present, and the urgency 
of formulating a multilateral diplomatic response to the crisis is not pressed. In 
the vacuum of political leadership addressing the question and its absence from 
public debate amongst Europeans, the crisis will further fester in the years ahead, 
if no unexpected diplomatic breakthrough is made.
In the end, that could well mean that Europe will experience another sudden, 
vehement debate over hosting new U. S. intermediate-range missiles on the 
continent. As a result of the end of INF, the New START agreement could expire 
without being replaced. The negative ripple effects of this dual misfortune—INF 
and New START withering away—would be felt in Europe and beyond. As this 
essay demonstrates, there are a number of possible arms control steps that both 
sides could take in order to prevent a new arms race from unfolding. Unfortu-
nately, it is not good advice or new ideas the U. S.–Russian relationship lacks; 
fundamentally, it is trust that is missing. And just as much as it was during the 
Cold War, trust is a necessary ingredient for entering into a cooperative security 
dialogue.
54 Kingston Reif and Shannon Bugos, Putin Invites U. S. to Extend New START, in: Arms 
Control Today, January / February 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-01/news/
putin-invites-us-extend-new-start.
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